

**PROBLEMS OF THE
MIDDLE EAST**

PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

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TO
MY WIFE

CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	xi
THE STORY OF THE YOUNG TURKS PARTY:	
I. ITS AIMS AND ACHIEVEMENT	i
II. THE POSITION OF THE SULTAN	34
THE STORY OF PERSIA AND THE POWERS	62
GREAT BRITAIN, GERMANY AND THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY	156
THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION	
I. THE QUESTION OF PERSIA	187
II. THE POSITION OF AFGHANISTAN	203
III. IN RESPECT OF TIBET	215
GREAT BRITAIN AND AFGHANISTAN:	
I. THE REIGN OF ABDUR RAHMAN	229
II. THE RULE OF HABIB ULLAH	247
THE STORY OF THE HEDJAZ RAILWAY	273
THE PASSING OF KOREA	293

MAPS

PERSIA	F
THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY	<i>facin</i>
THE HEDJAZ RAILWAY	”

APPENDICES

	PAGE
I. THE TURKISH CONSTITUTION OF 1876	367
II THE PERSIAN CONSTITUTION :	
I. THE ELECTORAL LAW OF SEPTEMBER 1906	393
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF DECEMBER 1906	403
III. THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF OCTOBER 1907	418
III. THE PERSIAN ARTICLES OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CON- VENTION, 1907	
	435
IV. THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY CONVENTION	452

INTRODUCTION

THE problems which go to the make-up of this book have been selected as representative of the issues of the political conditions in the Middle East. The reader will observe that a study of the Young Turks Party, together with a comprehensive survey of the relations of Korea with certain Powers, has been included, and by just so much the questions presented in this volume exceed the accepted political limitations of the Middle East. It is at best very difficult, if not impossible, to confine the political interests of the Middle East within their geographical boundaries. The ties between Great Britain and Japan, which at one time might have brought an Asiatic Power to the active support of Great Britain in defence of Anglo-Indian interests, reveal in one direction the elastic character of the politics of the region. In another the Baghdad Railway, which links Near and Middle Eastern interests by indissoluble bonds, imparts a special significance to the recent changes in the Ottoman Empire. The indulgence of the reader and of the reviewers therefore is asked, since no study of Middle Eastern politics can avoid encroaching a little upon those of the Near East and of the Far East.

It will be seen that the references to the commercial activity of Germany in Western Persia, which appear in the account of the Baghdad Railway, are repeated in those paragraphs of the chapter on the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907, which deal with the prospective policy of Germany in the Persian Gulf. This repetition is intentional. It concerns two pages, and is made in order to preserve the completeness of the narratives of the railway and of the treaty.

In tracing the history of the problems selected, the author has endeavoured to present each in such a way that the development of the respective interests of the Powers in the various questions is readily seen. The "man in the street" is apt to be indifferent to the details of questions which none the less concern his country very closely, just as the man of affairs is too busy to study them for lack of a convenient *précis*. To meet the attitude of the one, "a plain tale is told plainly"; while to supply deficiencies to the other, references are supplemented by dates and the text of important treaties is given wherever possible. Care has been exercised in writing, references are accurate and have been verified. Protracted bouts of ill-health have delayed the completion of this volume, but it is to be hoped that it will be found to be quite up-to-date. In this direction, if the closing pages of many of the problems foreshadow the passing of the political supremacy of Great Britain in the areas in question, a loss of British prestige or a decline in British interests, the author would beg the reader not to attribute so gloomy a conclusion to the writer's pessimism.

Reviewers will not require to be reminded of the unfortunate tide that is setting in throughout the Middle East in matters concerning the British Empire. The Young Turks *régime* has effected some improvement in the position of Great Britain at Constantinople over former conditions; but the Ottoman Dominions are almost beyond those of the Middle East, while the change is certainly not reflected in Mesopotamia nor across the waters of the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, the Imperial Government regards the Persian Gulf as a British lake, and the time is approaching when the Baghdad Railway will arrive at the water's edge. Yet, when opportunity offered for the safeguarding of the *status quo* as a prospective precaution, Western Persia, the seat of British trade with Persia, was expressly excluded from the scope of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Again, as a general policy in Persia, the Imperial Government is opposing the Shah in his resistance to the Nationalist movement,

which means in great measure that British policy in Persia is impairing Anglo-Persian relations. The solution of the Persian Question will not be found on such lines.

Persia in the main requires administrative and financial reorganization, and the Powers can secure the one by guaranteeing the other. Bankrupt, but possessed of extensive resources, all progress is checked because the administration is corrupt and the State confronted by an external debt amounting to five millions sterling, four millions of which are due to Russia. As a preliminary measure, then, it is necessary to fund the Persian indebtedness, and arrange for the liquidation of the Russian debt by a loan of ten millions sterling guaranteed by the Powers and secured on all the vested interests of the Crown and Government. Follow this with a scheme of reforms which promises peace, prosperity and justice. To win success, however, it is as essential to modify the autocratic character of the Shah's rule as to refrain from pressing for the introduction of Constitutional Government, for which the times in Persia are not yet ripe. The change should not be difficult to achieve, although it may not be to the liking of the Shah, nor to the taste of those who have been encouraged to find in the establishment of Constitutional Government the panacea of Persia's misfortunes. But it is, at least, the middle course, and a precedent for its employment exists in the wonderful rejuvenation which has been wrought in the condition of Egypt by the introduction of the judicious supervision of the West.

The Persian Debt could reproduce the form and system of the Ottoman and Egyptian Debt Services, a controlling authority being invested in the Imperial Government, as holder, with the Government of India, of the largest stake in Persia, and exercised through the medium of a Persian Customs Service. While the disordered finances of Persia were being reduced to a scientific basis, the requisite proportions of the surplus remaining to the Debt Commissioners could be devoted to the improvement of the

economic conditions of the country, and the reorganization of the administration. For the latter purpose the several departments of the Government would have to be provided with a staff of foreign advisers. If Persia must be placed in leading strings, there is no reason for the friends of Persia to despair. Its plight to-day is identical with the conditions which prevailed in Siam when Chulalongkorn gave himself up to a round of Court festivities in the midst of events which had brought French gunboats, cleared for action, up to Bangkok. The Siamese sovereign was himself responsible for the troubles with which his indifference to State affairs had visited the country; yet he changed suddenly and completely, and to-day Siam, prosperous, peaceful and far removed from its earlier state, testifies to the advantages to be derived from a little friendly supervision. Mahomed Ali in some degree has reaped a whirlwind sown by his predecessors. What was possible for Siam, however, is possible for Persia, but it is desirable that a beginning at once should be made.

The suggestion for which consideration is invited here is put forward by the author because an intimate knowledge of the conditions prevailing in the Middle East leads him to think that it is not to the advantage of British interests to follow at the present juncture a policy of non-intervention in Persia. The Imperial Government could probably secure the immediate cessation of Persian disorders by the benevolent exercise of its influence over the leaders of the Nationalist cause. It is a pity that the attempt is not made. Sooner or later action will have to be taken to restore peace, for the area of disturbance is a wide one. Trade is almost at a standstill, although for the moment the Russian sphere is most affected. With the best intentions of preserving the spirit of its arrangement with the British Government it may become impossible under such conditions for the Russian Government to refrain from reprisals or at least to prevent the dispatch of a small force to Tehran, either in response to the Shah or to safeguard

the lives of the Europeans in the capital. With such beginnings it would be impossible to foretell the end, and the effect on the *locus standi* of Great Britain at Teheran in the event of Russia's military occupation of the Persian capital might become speedily disastrous. At all events the establishment of constitutional government would be indefinitely deferred, although such an eventuality might be the most satisfactory solution of the Shah's troubles.

In considering the problems of the Middle East the author has put forward suggestions in respect of the Baghdad Railway, the Hedjaz Railway, and the British sphere in Persia which he would ask his readers to support. British interests in the Middle East would better withstand competition if they could rely upon an active and unfailing official support. Unfortunately it is very seldom that assistance is given, and trade suffers accordingly. An immense impetus would be imparted to the material and moral qualities in the Imperial position of the Empire if, in conjunction with the Government of India, the views here put forward were adopted by the Foreign Office. If participation in the construction of the Baghdad Railway should prove impossible, the development of the British sphere in Persia along the line that has been indicated should certainly become a first charge upon the Imperial energies; while to assist the building of the Hedjaz Railway would be a delicate attention that assuredly would reap its own reward.

This volume is the result of journeys which the author made to the Far East for the *Pall Mall Gazette*, to the Middle East for the *Pall Mall Gazette* and the *Times of India*, to the Near East for Reuter's Telegram Company; and the author's acknowledgments are tendered to Sir Douglas Straight for many years of kindly help and encouragement, to Mr. L. G. Fraser and Baron H. De Reuter. Acknowledgments are also due to Mr. W. L. Courtney and Colonel Pollock for permission to use in another way material which has appeared in the *Fortnightly Review* and the *United Service Magazine*. To Professor

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Edward Browne of Pembroke College, Cambridge, the author is specially indebted for permission to reproduce in the appendix of this book his translation of three of the "Four Pillars of the Persian Constitution." The description of the Hedjaz Railway is abridged from the Proceedings of the German Geographical Society and the text of the published notes on the Hedjaz System of Auler Pasha. Acknowledgments are also due to Mr. Lewis Appleton, the author of *The Foreign Policy of Europe*, while among other works to which occasional reference has been made are : *England and Russia in the East*, by Sir H. Rawlinson ; *The East End of Europe*, by Mr. Allen Upward ; *The Marches of Hindustan*, by Mr. David Fraser ; *Persia : The Awakening East*, by W. P. Cresson ; *To-morrow in the East*, by Douglas Story ; *The Unveiled East*, by F. A. McKenzie ; *The Middle Eastern Question*, by Valentine Chirol ; in addition to the columns of the *Times*, *Standard*, *Morning Post*, *Pioneer* and *Times of India*.

PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

THE STORY OF THE YOUNG TURKS PARTY

I. ITS AIMS AND ACHIEVEMENT

FROM its earliest phase opposition to the reform movement in Turkey has arisen with the governing classes, who were apprehensive of their privileges, rather than with the Sultans, who realized that if the oppression of the Christian races within the Empire continued it would provide European Powers with a pretext for intervention in the affairs of the Ottoman Dominions that was calculated to promote the dismemberment of the State. By the terms of the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, and confirmed by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi of 1832, the Christian population of Turkey-in-Europe was placed under the protection of Russia, who made it a practice to grant Russian nationality to any Turkish Christians who cared to pay a brief visit to Russian territory. In order to check so far as possible the power of interference in the local affairs of the Porte, which the claims of these irregularly protected subjects gave to Russia,

2. PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Abdul Mejdjid attempted the amelioration of the conditions of his Christian subjects by the *Hatt-i-Sherif* of Gülhane, a Charter of Reforms, which appeared in 1839.

By this instrument the farming of taxes was abolished, a Council of State created, and a Penal Code drawn up. A State Bank was also organized, while the peoples of the Ottoman Empire were informed that the institutions which the *Hatt* had established secured the life, honour and property of all the Sultan's subjects, without distinction of religion. An odd light, however, is thrown upon the vagaries of Ottoman rule by the fact that the principal opposition to this measure came from the Christian money-changers of Constantinople, who stood to lose by the proposed changes. Under these conditions perhaps it was to have been expected that the new era would have endured no longer than two years.

If the reform movement in Turkey in the past has not possessed sufficient inherent strength to defeat the opposition that arose from the character of the vested interests that were at stake, there have been, just the same, Turkish statesmen skilful enough to read correctly the signs and portents of their times, and rulers patriotic enough to accept the inevitable sacrifice of Moslem privilege which their concessions to their Christian subjects entailed. Although the effect of the *Hatt-i-Sherif* of Gülhane was short-lived,

Abdul Medjid has the credit of renewing his attempt to improve the conditions of his Christian subjects in 1855 for the second time, as also in 1856.

In 1855 the Allied Powers, anxious to preserve the form of Turkish administration now that Turkey was to be admitted to the European hegemony and to save the Porte from dismemberment, secured the introduction of a law which admitted Christian races to service in the Ottoman army. Here again, however, the difficulties which are so peculiar to Ottoman rule were encountered; for, although the law was admirable in spirit, it aroused the objections of the Christian population, who declined to fight under the Crescent against the Cross, as well as those of the Mahomedans, who feared for their lives if the Christians were armed.

In a dispatch from the Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, our ambassador at Constantinople, the British Government, on February 28, 1856, defined its attitude as follows—

With reference to the question of religious persecutions in Turkey I have to state to your Excellency that her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it might be strongly represented to the Porte that as the Turkish Empire is by treaty stipulations to be declared part and parcel of the European system, it is quite impossible for the Powers of Europe to acquiesce in the continuance in Turkey of laws and practices which are a standing insult to every other nation in Europe.

4 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Stimulated by the terms of the communication which the British Ambassador in Constantinople made to Abdul Medjid, that Sultan issued immediately the *Hatt-i-Humayun*, which reaffirmed in more pronounced fashion the provisions of the deed of 1839.

The new decree again abolished tax-farming and bribery; once more reasserted the equality of all races within the Ottoman dominions, and proclaimed a number of reforms in administrative, financial, ecclesiastical and judicial matters. For all practical purposes the Ottoman peoples on this occasion received their first Constitution. Proclaimed on February 18, 1856, it was at once communicated to the Power at whose instance it had been called forth. Later, when before the signatories to the Treaty of Paris, it was approved by the Powers and referred to in the text of that instrument which at the same time removed the protection of the Christian subjects of the Porte from the hands of Russia to those of United Europe.

For the nonce it was assumed that an era of reform had dawned in Christian Turkey. But, although the spirit of progress was in the air and the wish to secure a better order of affairs uppermost in the mind of the Caliph, the provisions of the *Hatt-i-Humayun* proved in practice a dead letter, even if on paper and in the words of the Treaty of Paris "they were of high value," for there was no one to ex-

cute them. Indeed, seven months after the Imperial rescript had been published the Earl of Clarendon, in a dispatch to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe on September, 23, 1856, in summing up the situation, declared—

There can be no doubt that throughout the dominions of the Sultan a feeling of uneasiness prevails among his Christian subjects, and a belief that their position and prospects are now worse than before the Allies of the Sultan had made such generous and costly sacrifices for his cause, and that up to this moment no *bona fide* effort has been made by the Porte to secure the faithful execution of the late *Hatt-i-Sherif*.

The view which the British Government took was forced upon it by circumstances which proved that the movement for the regeneration of Turkey was in advance of its times. Strangled in the very hour of their birth, the reforms countenanced by the *Hatt-i-Humayun* of 1856, as those of the *Hatt-i-Sherif*, died unsung, even undesired by public opinion if the attitude of the upper classes and the indifference of the lower orders can be regarded as indicating the passive resistance of the Ottoman peoples to the Occidental tendencies of their Sovereign. Although the Powers had hoped to guarantee the lives and properties of the Christian subjects of the Porte by the conversion of the exclusive protection of the Turkish Christians, which Russia had enjoyed, into an engagement common to the Great Powers, and no

6. PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

less respectful to the Sultan, the course of years proved that, in spite of the remonstrances made by the British Government, as well as by other Governments, the evils, against which complaint had been so constantly lodged, by no means were abated.

Rumours of the rapacity, injustice and brutality of the Turkish officials in Boshia and Herzegovina were a fruitful source of apprehension to the interested Powers. Austria, no less than Great Britain, was concerned in the growing discontent; but, while the Austrian Government contented itself with vague expressions of sympathy for the oppressed people, the prevailing condition of affairs was compelling the Allies to consider the advisability of reviewing their relations with the Ottoman Government. So serious had the situation become by 1860 that, in a dispatch from Lord John Russell to Sir Henry Bulwer on August 25 of that year, his Lordship wrote in the course of a review of the situation as follows—

You must not be surprised that such feelings should be excited, and such reflections made; nor would it be of any use to conceal from the Porte that either the whole system of Ottoman Government must be replaced by one founded on integrity and justice, or the Sultan must prepare himself for the abandonment of his cause by his best and most persevering Allies.

While the Powers continued to debate the

question of Turkey, and the Sultan was proving himself unable to guarantee the execution of reforms in the Provinces, since his officials neglected with impunity what they only accepted with reluctance, Abdul Medjid died, and, with the accession of Abdul Aziz in 1861, the reform movement no longer continued to be an object of solicitude with the Porte. If the character of the new ruler contrasted unfavourably with that of his predecessor, and the fifteen years of his reign in the main reduced the Ottoman dominions to penury, the seeds of enlightenment sown by the late Sovereign were to spring up with remarkable effect in the near future. Although the record of this reign describes a chapter of anarchy that convinced the Allies of the hopelessness of supporting the Turkish cause, the period produced towards its close a minister, in the person of Midhat Pasha, Grand Vizier, who was destined to exercise a widely reaching influence.

Arising from the insurrection which broke out first in Herzegovina in 1874, and in Bosnia in the following year, incipient rebellion stirred the Ottoman Christians, while the repressive measures adopted by Turkey in 1875 aroused the indignation of Europe, and provoked a declaration of war from Servia and Montenegro in the same year. Although Servia and Montenegro were defeated, the intervention of Europe followed, just as a domestic crisis occurred in Constantinople, where Midhat Pasha,

8 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

pledged to the introduction of a Constitution, was the leader of a palace revolution which, in a final bid for reform, brought about the deposition—and subsequent assassination—of Abdul Aziz in 1876. The deposed ruler was succeeded on May 30, 1876 by his son Murad V, by which time the knell of the Ottoman Empire seemed to have sounded. Some three months later Murad himself was deposed in favour of Abdul Hamid II, on the ground of insanity, by Midhat Pasha when the potential leader of the Young Turks failed to extract from his puppet the Constitution which he had promised.

Intent upon reform, and recognizing that the condition of the several provinces of Turkey-in-Europe called for drastic measures, England had called a conference of the Powers at Constantinople, as the result of an armistice which General Ignatieff, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, had demanded from the Porte in the hour of Turkey's victory over Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria. Confronted with such a situation Abdul Hamid at once acceded to the demand of Midhat Pasha for a Constitution, and thus it came about that the greatest political reactionary of all the Sultans began his reign with a proclamation which "described the aspirations of France and the practice of England."

The first sitting of the Conference, indeed, had

just begun on November 23, 1876 when salvoes of artillery were heard, and Safvet Pasha, the president of the Conference, explained that the State was celebrating the promulgation of a Constitution. Called into existence amid such conditions, the Turkish parliament met in March 1877 and passed away in February 1878, in virtue of Article XLIV of the Constitution, which reserved to the Throne the right of closing both Houses at its pleasure. Although Midhat Pasha was the author of the Constitution of 1876, which was as liberal in spirit as anything that had been granted to Western peoples, he was destined to fail because, his methods becoming more powerful than his principles, he could not win the confidence of the Caliph. In the circumstances of his accession Abdul Hamid may be forgiven if he regarded Midhat Pasha himself as a direct menace to his own powers, just as, influenced by such a view, it was inevitable that he should support the reactionaries against his Minister.

If the times were scarcely ripe for the reforms which the Grand Vizier would have effected, it is significant that to-day the Young Turks Party is united over what in 1876-8 precipitated disaster. Although the Softas helped Midhat Pasha at the outset of his task, in August of 1876 they petitioned against the clauses of the Constitution which, as in the earlier measures, sought the emancipation of Turkey's Christian subjects. The Greek and Armenian

19 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

patriarchs, objecting to the military obligations involved in the proposals, were also roused against the contemplated changes, which were due solely to Midhat Pasha, who believed that within the Sultan's realms the equality of all races and creeds before the law was fundamental to the success of any constitutional movement. When the Grand Vizier fled, carrying his ideas with him into exile, the taste for reform died, while that for absolutism revived, embittered against the section of the Sultan's subjects whose grievances had created such deep concern among the Powers.

If the fortunes of the reform movement languished after the downfall of Midhat Pasha, its prospects may be said to have revived during the nineties, when a number of Turkish residents in Paris, who had fled thither to escape the vengeance of Yildiz, and there drunk of the fountain of liberty and progress, formed themselves into a patriotic committee for the purpose of forwarding the cause of liberalism within the Ottoman dominions. For a time Paris and Geneva were the European centres of this organization, which became known as the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress. In due course the *Mechveret—Consultation*—appeared at Paris, and the *Halal—Crescent*—at Geneva in support of the interests of the new Society, making direct appeals to European opinion by the moderate character of their statements of the aims

and purposes of the Party, of which Murad Bey was appointed leader. Unfortunately Murad Bey was not proof against Abdul Hamid's blandishments, and betrayed the cause. Others were more stout-hearted, and the place of the renegade was filled by Ahmed Riza Bey, who ever since has been identified with the fortunes of the Young Turks Party outside the confines of the Turkish Empire, and is now president of the Turkish Chamber of Deputies.

Meanwhile the movement spread, and in 1895, at the time of the Armenian massacres, and again in 1897, on the eve of the Turco-Greek war, plans were in readiness for a rising against the Sultan's régime. No doubt, too, this would have occurred if the knowledge of the internal organization of the Paris fraternity, which the Sultan obtained by the desertion to Stamboul of Murad Bey, had not made it difficult for the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress to make its existence felt within Turkey itself. By degrees converts were gained in the outlying dominions: in Eastern Europe, in Asia Minor and in Egypt. Under the expanding interests of the Young Turks Party it was impossible to avoid importing into the propaganda of the Party a more militant note than was favoured by the executive committees in Paris and Geneva. Early in 1902, therefore, the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress called a meeting at Paris at which forty-

12 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

seven representative delegates, including Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Jews, Albanians, Armenians, Tcherkesses, attended to establish a line of common policy.

At a prefatory sitting Ahmed Riza Bey proposed at first to submit to the Congress the following—

1. A declaration of loyalty towards the ruling dynasty within the limits of the law.

2. Promotion of modern progressive civilization among the adherents of the Mahommedan creed; and protection of other religions on the same footing, of equality.

3. Establishment of harmonious political co-operation among all Ottomans, Mussulman or non-Mussulman.

4. Adoption of the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1876, as the basis of government.

At a second meeting, under the presidency of Halil Ganem, editor of *The Crescent*, and founder of *La Jeune Turquie*, a further paragraph was added to this programme, seeking

in combination with a return to the Constitution of 1876, the maintenance of the integrity and indissolubility of the Ottoman Empire, as the surest and most precious guarantee of general reform . . .

many delegates warmly approving.

When the Congress assembled, however, a rider to the principles of Ahmed Riza and Halil Ganem was put forward by a number of delegates who, in their mistrust of the Sultan, proposed to call upon

the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, to exercise their kindly offices in winning recognition of these elementary principles of good government, and in securing Turkey's observance of her international obligations. Ahmed Riza, Halil Ganem and others assailed the suggestion as calculated to promote the dismemberment of Turkey. Supported by the Armenians, who cared nothing for Ottoman interests, the motion was carried by a majority in which Turks did not appear, precipitating a split in the councils of the party. At the last meeting of the Congress, however, the minority, comprising exclusively the Turkish delegates, put on record its rejection of any action which would encroach upon the independence of the Ottoman Empire, and announced the starting of an organ *Chourai Ummett—National Grand Council*—which would be devoted solely to their views. At the same time the majority proceeded to the creation of a new society under the presidency of Prince Sabah-ed-Din, already the head of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, to be styled the Ottoman League of Private Initiative of Decentralization and Constitution.

Meanwhile the Armenians drew up a programme of their own and called into existence the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. Since 1897 racial interests in Macedonia had been represented by the Bulgarian Internal Organization, which, purporting to be a

14 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Union of all racial elements in Macedonia irrespective of creed, was avowedly a design for the supplanting of Turkish rule by that of Bulgaria in this Turkish province. Insomuch that the *Comitadjis* of the Bulgarian Internal Organization aimed at relieving Macedonia from the Porte's oppression, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation preferred to identify itself with their policy rather than support anything that would tend to prevent the break-up of Turkey. The difficulties in which the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress was placed by the schism between the views of the moderate element of the Young Turks Party and those of the partisans of outrage, increased through the amazing variety of racial interests that now clamoured for amelioration. While the Bulgarian Internal Organization and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation were anxious to work with the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress in so far as each was willing to put an end to the Hamidian régime, there were the aspirations of the Albanian, Syrian, Servian, Greek and other elements, opposed to fettered action no less than to each other, to be considered. Stimulated by the furious hatred of these competing Christian nationalities, outrages now became a chronic feature of Macedonia to the end that in the process of time, and in satisfaction of the growing impatience of Great Britain, France and Italy with the operations of the bands, a corps of international *gendarmérie* was drafted into the

province as the first measure in a scheme of reform put forward by the Powers, and in the teeth of the Porte's opposition.

Throughout the areas affected by the advent of the *gendarmerie* their presence was hailed as a sign that the attitude of the Yildiz Party would end inevitably in the abscission of Macedonia from the Ottoman Empire, even if the Turk were not banished, bag and baggage, from Europe. If Macedonia, then, were not to go the way of Bulgaria, Eastern Roumelia, Herzegovina and Bosnia, it was essential for the Young Turks Party to arrive at a position from which it could compel the Sultan to accede to the introduction of a scheme of moderate reform, and thus lessen the risk of foreign intervention in suppressing the disorder of the Macedonian vilayets. At first, in order to direct public opinion against the abuses of Hamidian government, agents of the Young Turks Party were employed in placarding with Nationalist manifestoes the walls of mosques and other public buildings. In the main these proclamations were directed against some specific cause of complaint, as witness the manifesto here given. Posted in Constantinople, it referred to the Sultan's concessions to foreign capitalists, and is as follows—

In spite of assurances from the Palace of Yildiz, Abdul Hamid is suffering from a mortal disease, from which there is no escape.

Ecclesiastical and civil law alike define a mortal

16 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

disease as one that continues without a break and is destined to kill the patient within a year. . .

A patient in that condition is forbidden by ecclesiastical and civil law to dispose of more than a third of his property and goods, movable or immovable. No other bequest or will is valid. . .

Applying this provision to Abdul Hamid, we see that the same law which applies to the case of one or two heirs or a couple of houses or shops applies equally to the millions of his subjects and the whole of a vast empire.

Now Abdul Hamid, whatever his motives may have been, has succeeded in identifying himself with the whole of the State.

If a sick man has no legal right to dispose of more than a third of his goods to an individual, then how can Abdul Hamid arrogate to himself the privilege, under the name of concessions, of allocating to, it matters not whom, the vital resources of the Empire and future well-being of the country—that future which is the sole hope of the nation?

This must not be! Mahommedan and civil law are against it. So destructive a privilege, a right so shameful, does not belong to any dying person, be he the most powerful potentate in the universe!

It is therefore certain that in the near future, when the moment of our deliverance has come, we shall stand upon a firm and legal footing in refusing to recognize the concessions granted in the course of the last few months. The Ottoman people will then know how to defend the rights which are their own by the terms of the religious and legal code.

Now, therefore, as there is danger in further

delay, we declare that from this day henceforth the Ottoman people will regard as null and void any concession, privilege, or other private benefit that Abdul Hamid may have granted during his illness.

Unfortunately in spite of these efforts the cause possessed little prospect of success so long as the mutual antipathies of the various peoples were preserved and the army remained loyal to the Sultan. Race hatred so dominates the conditions of the Nearer East that it has become a factor of great importance in the administration of the country, and one, too, which the Sultan has invariably turned to his advantage. Hitherto no attempt had been made to meet racial prejudices on the common ground of some mutual understanding. It was because racial unity was unknown that the problem of Macedonia remained unsolved; while, perhaps, the most remarkable of the changes which have taken place in the dominions of the Sultan since the summer of 1908 are those which, accompanying the Turkish rendering of the cry "One Flag One People," disclose a racial solidarity which, of itself, went some way towards securing the defeat of the Sultan.

It is impossible to state at what point in their plans the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress was assured of the co-operation of the various races, but born of Turkish misrule in Macedonia another nationalist society came into existence early in 1905, with head-quarters at Salonika and the fighting

8 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

of Macedonian wrongs as its immediate objective. Becoming known as the Committee of Liberty the new fraternity was an immediate success, and as its aims were identical with those of the Paris body, although its methods were more distinctive, its fusion with the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress took place in the spring of 1906, when Salonika became the head-quarters of the Central Committee, or active section of the Young Turks Party. Beginning with the spring of 1905 a committee was formed in every village in Macedonia for the purpose of putting forward the aims of the Young Turks Party, and was empowered to act upon its own initiative in the adjustment of grievances. It is in part to the divided control which this arrangement created, that the prolongation of the Macedonian disorders can be attributed; for, unmindful of the intricacies of the international situation, the villagers were not always able to appreciate the fact that the principle of the movement was aggressive, while its purposes were pacific. Apart from this defect the plans of the Central Committee worked smoothly.

In some respects the Bulgarian Internal Organization served as a model for the machinery of the Young Turks Party, although its movements have been enveloped by impenetrable mystery. Secrecy was, however, essential to the success and existence of the Society, for the Young Turks Party was already regarded with suspicion by the palace spies.

THE YOUNG TURKS PARTY

19

Elaborate plans were drawn up for regulating the procedure of members of a brotherhood, the aim of which was to preserve individual anonymity. For this reason there was no definite organization, no regular staff, nor any special rendezvous until the Sultan, compelled to accept the *fait accompli* of July 24, 1908 presented the White Tower Garden at Salonika to the Central Committee. A Council of Three sat in Paris, and a Council of Ten presided at Salonika, but the members of these two bodies were elected by secret ballot and were changed frequently, the only other permanent feature of the internal working arrangements of the movement being a Committee of Six, acting as a secret advisory committee to the operations of the Party and appointed by rotation. Adherents, who in Macedonia alone number 15,000 and throughout Turkey 80,000, were formed into companies of 150 men. The operations of the companies were directed by two agents, one of whom was in touch with the Council of Ten in Salonika and occupied for the time being a position of great responsibility. The second agent was appointed as a check upon the loyalty of the first and had the right to report but not to give instructions. The companies were divided into groups of five, no member knowing more than his four confederates.

Meetings were summoned by word of mouth and with the assistance of women, who also played

C-3609

an important part in transmitting messages, or in distributing revolutionary intelligence. Meetings invariably took place amid the greatest possible seclusion and were held by preference in the forests, those attending wearing masks, and only the directors speaking. When the occasion arose for the introduction of a new member an elaborate procedure was followed. When the candidate had expressed his willingness to join the Society, and taken an oath of solemn character to betray nothing in the event of his wishing to change his mind, he was taken to a rendezvous by men unknown to him and there blindfolded, when he was addressed upon the objects of the organization, and its plans for the liberation of Turkey. He was then sworn to secrecy and fidelity on the Koran and announced as a member of the Society on probation. A period now passed in which the new recruit was tested in various ways by instructions which reached him mysteriously and without his coming in contact with any other follower of the party. If the tests were satisfactory he would be again conducted to some secret trysting-place, where his sponsor would meet him and by whom he would now be formally introduced into the group of the company with which he would be affiliated. At the same time the identities of the four men composing the group were not disclosed.

The oaths taken by the members possessed a terrible solemnity. A revolver and sword were placed

upon the Koran and the member warned that he surrendered body and soul to the Society and would have to execute his own brother if the Society so bade him. After this caution he repeated the following oath—

swear in the name of God and Mahommed that I will fight for nationality, freedom and truth while a drop of blood remains in my body.

With this oath taken the member then paid his tax, which amounted to two per cent. of his income, undertook to provide himself with a rifle and to be prepared to abandon family, work and friends at any moment that he was called upon to fight for the cause. Monies derived from the taxation to which members were subjected, accruing from donations or obtained in the course of operations, were devoted primarily to the purchase of arms, ammunition and stores; secondly, to the support of the families of those members who might be killed during the course of the revolution.

In a movement in which the taking of life was regarded as of little consequence, it is almost surprising to find that elaborate measures were drawn up to regulate the passing of death sentences upon enemies of the cause. Enemies were held to be all who adopted any repressive measures against the Party—whether action was directed against individuals or the organization as a whole—while traitors were those

22 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

who revealed information about the Party to the authorities, who hindered the plans of the movement, who declined to carry arms or refused donations. Cases were dealt with summarily, and mercy was not a distinguishing quality in the verdict of the tribunals by whom sentences were passed. Yet the infliction of the death sentence was no part of a haphazard arrangement, but was relegated to a special corps of assassins whose remuneration depended largely upon the status of the person to be killed. It was governed also by the means which were employed to accomplish the task, and the financial position of the group at the time.

Christians were not at first allowed to participate in the movement. At a later date they were admitted, when they were conceded the right to carry arms and to contribute to the funds, but were compelled to subscribe a different oath. To Mussulmans and Christians alike the committees recommended—

- (1) Armed resistance to acts of the authorities.
- (2) Non-armed resistance by means of political and economic strikes, strikes of officials, police, etc.
- (3) Refusal to pay taxes.
- (4) Propaganda in the army; soldiers to be asked not to march against the people or the revolutionaries.
- (5) General insurrection.

In regard to the task of seducing the army from its allegiance to the Sultan, this work became the mission of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress so soon as the Paris and Salonika organizations had amalgamated. In an incredibly short space of time the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress established branches in a variety of directions, which in turn formed working committees in every centre of importance in Turkey-in-Europe, as in Turkey-in-Asia. Attention was paid first to the Third Army Corps which, from the fact that it constituted the Macedonian garrison and was constantly engaged in guerilla operations against the bands, was the most hardened force in the Empire. At the same time conditions of service in Macedonia have tended during the last few years to the subversion of all discipline, and perhaps in this direction lies the explanation of the alacrity with which the troops of the Third Army Corps responded to the proposals of the Young Turks. On this point an interesting testimony is to be found in the Macedonian Blue-book of 1908. Writing to the late Sir Nicholas O'Connor in January 1908 our Consul at Salonika says—

. The military authorities have for a long time past been quite sensible to the fact that the discipline and military efficiency of the Third Army Corps have been most injuriously affected by the system under which for the past five years the troops com-

PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

posing it have been scattered over the country in small detachments of from ten to twenty men, engaged in guarding roads, railways, vilayets, and even outlying farms, all sense of cohesion not only in battalions but even in individual companies being thereby lost.

Soldiers in this condition, oppressed further by grievances in regard to arrears of pay, excessively prolonged service, and the jobbery which attended promotion, of necessity would be ready for any mischief.

Care was taken to spread the propaganda widely among the men of the Adrianople establishment—the Second Army Corps—in Syria and Anatolia; although, lest the obstinacy of Yıldız should force the Young Turks Party into active revolt against the ruling dynasty, it was to win over to the cause the details of the Sixth Army Corps, Turkey's *corps d'élite*, strongest and most telling, that the agents of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress most seriously set themselves. Instead of meeting with difficulties, however, it was found that the doctrines of the Young Turks Party appealed to all shades of national opinion, and were assimilated by the troops with an eagerness only equalled by that of a prairie fire for the dry grasses of the plain. By December of 1907 practically the whole of the Third Army Corps had taken the oath of fidelity to the Constitution, the Second and Fourth Army Corps had given

manifestations of sympathy with the work of the agitators, while the work round Smyrna, of Dr. Nazim Bey of Salonika had so prepared the Anatolian reserves that they were no less ready to fall into line with the new movement.

In view of these encouraging conditions a second Congress of the Young Turks Party was called at the close of 1907 by the Paris branch of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress. Among the groups who dispatched delegates were the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress in Salonika, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the Ottoman League of Private Initiative of Decentralization and Constitution, from Constantinople, the Israelite Committee of Egypt, and the Bulgarian Internal Organization. After exhaustive discussion, in which the principle of moderation was admitted to be more in accordance with the immediate interests of the fraternity than a recourse to methods of violence, a working agreement was made between the moderate element and the various Armenian, Jewish and Macedonian revolutionary committees. For the future, too, the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress became potential head of the Young Turks Party. For a time at all events the situation was saved in the interests of the moderate elements; but the following principles were agreed upon as worthy of general acceptance by the several groups, as the result of the Conference—

26 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

- (1) The abdication of the Sultan Abdul Hamid.
- (2) Radical change of the present régime.
- (3) Establishment of the Constitution of 1876.

Such a programme obviously pointed to revolution at some future date; and, although counsels of moderation still proceeded from the Paris and Geneva branches of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, elaborate preparations for such an eventuality were made in Turkey itself. While the leaders of the movement continued to reside abroad, actively engaged in working for the affirmation of the Midhatian principle of racial and religious equality in Turkey, the Salonika body set to work to wring a Constitution from the Sultan by threats of violence, behind which were plans for a general mutiny of the troops.

It was not the settled intention of the Committee to make any immediate stroke, but rather to take advantage of any crisis which might occur. In default of a more favourable opportunity alternative plans were revolved for a general rising on August 31, the anniversary of the Sultan's accession, or in the spring of 1909. Two political reasons have been assigned for the change of plans. One of these was the visit of Munir Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador at Paris and the Sultan's favourite *intrigant*, to Athens and Belgrade, where the rumour ran that both in 1907 and in 1908 he had been engaged in making humiliating agreements, which would involve the

cession of portions of Macedonia in return for an anti-Bulgarian combination. The other reason given was the desire of the Young Turks to forestall the application of the reform scheme, which was expected to result from the Reval meeting. The actual precipitation of events was, however, due purely to local happenings.

At the break-up of the second Paris Congress the Paris and Geneva organs of the Young Turks Party openly referred to the success of the agitation that had been conducted among the troops, with the consequence that the activities of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress in Salonika aroused the Sultan, whose principal spy in that city happened to be the *commandant de place*, Nazim Bey—several Nazim Beys occur in the history of the Young Turks Party—a trusted *aide-de-camp* of the Sultan. Accordingly, in March 1908, the secret police organized a number of raids among the officers of the Macedonian and Adrianople garrisons, while a special tribunal, sent from Constantinople, sat at Salonika on a commission of inquiry into the machinations of the Young Turks movement there. Alarmed at the tenor of the report which the Sultan's emissaries returned to Yildiz, a second commission followed hot upon the heels of the first, precipitating the crisis.

Fired with resentment at the proscription of a number of his fellow-officers and inspired by the highest aspirations for the future of his country, Niazi

Bey, on July 5, 1908, accompanied by two hundred men, raised at Resna the standard of revolt against Hamidian despotism, while on the following day manifestoes proclaiming the Constitution of 1876 were posted in all public places at Monastir. Events now began to move with bewildering rapidity only to disclose that the plans of the Young Turks Party had been laid with the greatest care. In obedience to imperative orders from Yildiz to crush the activities of the force in the Resna Hills, Shemshi Pasha, commanding in the region of Monastir, was preparing on July 7 to move against the rebels when he was shot dead in his carriage by an officer of the Third Army Corps. Meanwhile, Nazim Bey was concentrating his attention on the movements of the disaffected officers in Salonika and on July 8 arrested forty-eight who were known to be adherents of the cause. By way of reply two days later an agent of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress shot Hakki Bey, Nazim Bey's right-hand man, while on July 11 Nazim Bey himself was wounded by a would-be assassin.

Determined to suppress the mutiny, the Sultan now appointed a third Commission that repaired immediately to Salonika. One of the first officers to be denounced before the new tribunal was Major Enver Bey, Nazim Bey's own brother-in-law, and an officer on the staff of the Inspector-General of the Macedonian vilayets. Enver Bey was an active

member of the Salonika branch of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress. As such he received through the president of the tribunal a flattering invitation from Abdul Hamid to proceed immediately to Constantinople, where important preferment was awaiting him. Understanding the motives which inspired an invitation which on innumerable occasions had led to the bottom of the Bosphorus, Enver Bey fled on July 13 to Resna where he joined fortunes with Niazi Bey.

On the same day that these events took place the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress at Salonika assumed responsibility for the rising at Monastir, and publicly associated itself with it. From that moment the mask was thrown off completely by adherents to the cause of the Young Turks, who had now with them the great bulk of the troops in the Adrianople and Macedonian commands. Nevertheless Abdul Hamid was still unconvinced that the movement had any permanent foundations, and dispatched in hot haste Marshal Osman Feizi Pasha, in succession to the late Shemshi Pasha, with instructions that rewards, in the shape of promotion, decorations and increased pay, would be given to those who remained loyal, while instant death awaited all who sided with the revolutionaries. Osman Pasha read the orders of the Padishah to the troops at Monastir at a parade of the garrison on July 15, reporting to Yildiz that the Imperial

message had merely resulted in an attempt on his own life. Simultaneously with this news came the tidings that Salonika was in the hands of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, who had informed the foreign consular body in Macedonia that the Constitution had been established throughout the three vilayets.

With this proof of the gravity of the situation Abdul Hamid prepared to meet the action of the insurgents with concessions. On July 21, it was learnt in Salonika that the forty-eight officers who had been arrested on July 8 had been released from prison. On July 22, by way of stimulating the energies of the Sultan, Niazi Bey at the head of one thousand men occupied Monastir and carried off Marshal Osman Feizi Pasha to Ochrida, where he was kept under the surveillance of the Resna leader. The following telegram to the Sultan was then dispatched in the name of Osman Paşa by the executive of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress—

I am in the hands of the troops, who have sworn that unless the Constitution is immediately granted they will march in force on Constantinople; and I may respectfully add that I intend to place myself at their head.

Early on the same day—July 22—as the result of a mass meeting at Ferizovich, where one hundred thousand Albanians had solemnly declared their

adherence to the Young Turks movement, a message was transmitted from Uskub direct to the Sultan, informing Abdul Hamid that the Albanians had unanimously taken the oath in favour of the re-establishment of the Constitution.

At Yildiz the tidings contained in the successive messages engendered at first commotion and consternation, and, at the last, dire confusion and stupefaction. Grand Vizier Ferid, an Albanian, who had only just received the Order of the Black Eagle, the highest German decoration, fell on the morning of July 22, and was replaced in the afternoon by Kutchuk Said Pasha, Grand Vizier for the seventh time. To the new Vizier Abdul Hamid gave urgent orders for the dispatch of the Anatolian battalions to Salonika. Said Pasha reminded the Sultan that it was not possible to employ Moslems against Moslems without a *fetva*, whereupon a palace secretary was sent for the *Fetva Amini* who, when he heard what the Sultan wished him to do, refused to prepare the documents, declaring that such a *fetva* was impossible as the action of the Macedonian army was not contrary to the precepts of the Koran.

At night the Council of Ministers assembled to deal with the situation. Although discussion waxed warm and was protracted, fear restrained the Ministers until the Sultan's aged astrologer, the Arab Sheikh Abu-l-huda, who was carried to the meeting on his bed, dangerously ill, dared to declare that the

restoration of the Constitution alone could save the Throne. Said Pasha, Kiamil Pasha, and others agreed with Abu-l-huda, on hearing which Abdul Hamid fainted. No decision, however, was reached that night and the meeting closed in the small hours of the morning of July 23.

Independently of Yildiz, but under the coercion of the Young Turks Party, on July 23 the Vali of Monastir, who afterwards resigned, proclaimed the Constitution of 1876 officially at Monastir amid the profound enthusiasm of vast crowds. Later in the same day, too, it was announced that the Anatolian battalions had thrown in their lot with the Macedonian regiments. Meanwhile, at Salonika, events had reached breaking point. On July 23, the Executive of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress delivered to Hilmi Pasha an ultimatum providing for the declaration of the Constitution within twenty-four hours. The action of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress placed the Inspector-General of the Macedonian Vilayets in a quandary. Feeling the most genuine sympathy with the Young Turks Party, Hilmi Pasha nonetheless was unable to allow his sentiments to influence his immutable loyalty to the Sultan, and for many hours it seemed that he was doomed to die.

Harried by the developments of the situation and a prey to vacillation, Abdul Hamid continued to give no sign, to the last unwilling to exchange the

sweets of autocracy for the plainer fare of Constitutionalism. But the receipt of the reports from Monastir, and Salonika during July 23 turned the scales. The question was no longer one of repression or conciliation, but one between civil war, involving the overthrow of Abdül Hamid's régime, and submission to the army backed by the best elements in the Empire. The die cast, Hamidian absolutism was doomed. When the Council of Ministers re-assembled at night the Grand Vizier requested his colleagues to give a *mazbata* recommending the re-establishment of the Constitution. All eyes were at once averted, all lips sealed; but, here and there, as Said Pasha spoke, the silence of death was broken by the sound of weeping. Said Pasha then repeated in an inquiring voice the Turkish equivalent of the proverb "Silence gives consent," whereupon the Ministers bowed their heads in acquiescence. In five minutes the *mazbata* was made out and handed round, each Minister affixing his signature and seal. Within a few more minutes Said Pasha, trembling and apprehensive of his fate, was in the presence of his Sovereign presenting the *mazbata*, across which, without noticing the Grand Vizier, Abdul Hamid at once wrote *Olsun*—So let it be.

As dawn, suffused the heavens with its rose-gold hues on July 24, Hilmi Pasha knew that he would live.

II. THE POSITION OF THE SULTAN

Aside from these political aspects of the situation in Turkey, conditions of life within the Ottoman dominions long since had approached the sum total of misery that the human machine could endure. Tyranny of every form flourished, poverty was universal and each grade of society was the victim of the one above it. For years the burden of an intolerant autocracy, in which freedom of speech was denied, liberty of movement was impossible, and human life was never safe, was borne without complaint.

In a measure these things sprang from the Sultan in whom suspicion was innate and whose spies were everywhere. In the public office, in the harem, in the street, in the dining-room, in the baths, wherever one went, whatever one did, the secret emissaries of the Sultan were there to report. To espionage Abdul Hamid had given his choicest thoughts and the system of surveillance, which he organized by the power of his private purse, was a wonderful, yet terrible, piece of machinery. Through it no father could trust his sons nor a master his servants, for Abdul Hamid proved that no one was beyond suspicion nor above temptation. As a consequence the lives of the highest and of the lowest of his subjects were affected in a most remarkable manner. A feeling of constraint permeated everywhere, influenc-

ing the simplest actions, and the most trifling remarks until life became, from the capital itself to the most distant confines of the Empire, a constant horror, unenjoyable even by the spies themselves, as the Sultan was too astute to place any credence in the evidence of the spy that himself had not been spied upon. •

To a system of delation that was marvellous in the perfection to which it attained, the Sultan added a policy that was based upon corruption and regulated by favouritism. The worst methods of Eastern despotism have prevailed for years past at Yildiz where, for many reasons, it would have been better to have regarded the court as Asiatic rather than European. From his earliest years Abdul Hamid has always gone in fear of assassination; and partly on this ground he has chosen to administer the government of his Empire single-handed. If the pressure which such a system of centralization naturally produced proclaims the Sultan of Turkey to have been among the hardest worked of contemporary sovereigns, it also prepared the way for systematic abuses which arose from the impossibility of the task that he had set himself. •

Among the first to feel the effects of the Sultan's system of government were the public services, for the interests of which a sufficiency of funds was not forthcoming. Dissatisfaction with the Government on account of arrears of pay was universal, and class preyed upon class. While, in the higher circles of

36 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

the Government, offices were bought and sold and promotion was only possible at a price, the lower grades resorted to illegal taxation and were no less corrupt. It was so, too, with the army; and, since such an order of life had continued year after year, it will be readily conceded that the moment was ripe for the Young Turks to press the acceptance of their propaganda upon the troops. The conspicuous success which rewarded their efforts must be taken as revealing the nation's weariness with the conditions that existed.

If hitherto Abdul Hamid had been able to rely upon his soldiers it is nevertheless clear that they were the determining factor of the Revolution of 1908. In this connection, it may be observed, popular movements are never satisfactorily championed by military *pronunciamientos*. In such cases they are usually subservient to some influence, professional or personal. With his pet troops on strike and the remainder making common cause with the insurgents, the Sultan of Turkey was driven into a corner. With no means of crushing the movement, the alternative to an immediate revival of the Constitution of 1876 no doubt was death. Under such circumstances, as the element of national solidarity in the forces against the Sultan was greater than the amount of support to be extracted from the army, Abdul Hamid upheld the Constitution; and it appears now that he must continue as he has begun.

The Sultan, however, is a past master of the art of graceful surrender. Yet even then there must have been an element of unreality in the strange scene which occurred on July 26, when he received at a window of his palace, for the first time in a reign of thirty-two years, an address from his subjects—

“Our desire is,” the speaker said, “only for your good health. Some perfidious ones have prevented us from seeing your face. For thirty-two years we wanted to see you. Thank God, our wish is now gratified. Long live our Padishah.”

The Sultan in reply said—

“Inasmuch as since my accession I have laboured for the salvation and the prosperity of the fatherland, God is now witness that my greatest object is the prosperity and salvation of my subjects, who are no other than my own children.”

Two days later, on July 28, Abdul Hamid took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and, with his hand on the Koran, made the following declaration to the Sheikh-ul-Islam—

“I have been made very happy by the thanks of my people. I swear, and abjure you to declare in my name, that I will execute to the letter the Constitution which I have granted to my faithful people. Nobody can stop me. The whole nation is now part of the Committee of Union and Progress, and I am its president.”

38 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

On the same day the Sheikh-ul-Islam summoned the leaders of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress and informed them of the Sultan's words. Turning to the officers who attended, the Sheikh-ul-Islam with his hand on the Koran said—

"I inform you that this declaration has been made with the Sultan's hand on the Koran, and that his Majesty declared that all useful reforms will be made when required. I swear by the holy book I hold that this is the Sultan's assurance."

If the protestations of the Sultan of Turkey at such a crisis were suspected, it was because he had been the strangest figure in the drama so recently performed. For thirty-two years he has ruled alone; for thirty-two years he has believed in no one but himself; he has made no confidences, sought no friendships, save those which the exigencies of his Empire imperatively demanded. His position has been unique among Western potentates and perhaps the most unenviable, for he is an Eastern monarch who, in his close proximity to Europe, has found only ruin and despoliation. However infamous his acts may seem to the Occident, it is by the standards of the Orient only that they should be judged. By terrorism the Sultans of Turkey have maintained themselves in their supremacy, and it was because the present Finest Pearl of the Age and the Esteemed Centre of the Universe could no longer inspire this

feeling that the Constitution of 1876 was revived in 1908.

In spite of the defects of his rule, Abdul Hamid has prolonged the existence of Turkey for more than a generation. He has combated war, insurrection, treason, assassination, bankruptcy. When, on August 31, 1876, he grasped the helm of State—a raw man untutored in the mysteries of statecraft, with no knowledge of the submerged rocks and shifting sands—there was little hope that Turkey would plough through the slough of despond which beset her. And yet under the control of this man, whom all Europe upon occasion has execrated, Turkey has succeeded in evading the constant menace of annihilation. Not for one single moment has the career of Abdul Hamid, as the Ruler of Turkey, been without the gravest danger to his own safety, bitter experience having proved the value of his coat of mail.

Surrounded as he was by the very men who had destroyed his father and deposed his brother; living in an atmosphere malarious with corruption and saturated with intrigue, it is in no way remarkable that he concentrated his aim upon an end which was to establish his power as absolute and his merest whim as law. Yet the Sultan of Turkey is not altogether a capricious despot; and the courage and grim resolution with which he faced catastrophes that might have been fatal to the integrity of his Empire indicate that beneath the surface of his motives there

is a genuine desire to benefit his country. Whatever else he may have been, according to his own lights he has been a very zealous patriot.

In his daily work Abdul Hamid is the slave of his people—a mere machine! He takes but few hours of sleep, sometimes passing the entire night engaged upon business of the most minor importance. Like most Orientals the Sultan is an early riser; and, after the prayers and ablutions enjoined by his religion, works steadily until sunset, when he dines, having accomplished—save for a break of two hours in the middle of the day when he lunches and takes the air—another of those protracted labours which have completely shattered his health.

Prematurely aged, the Caliph looks ten years older than he is. His figure is bowed, his frame shrunken. His iron-grey beard, his wrinkled skin, sallow and unhealthy in appearance, his gloomy black eyes—ever restless—have no trace of the refined and handsome countenance, eminently Asiatic in type yet most fascinating in expression, which distinguished him when he ascended the throne. He still retains the most winning manners, with the courtly graciousness of his lineage and that power of ingratiating himself when he wishes to be impressive which is characteristic of the *charmeur*.

He is modest in the requirements of his harem. Inclined to be artistic, he has not only a passion for music but has founded a school of art. A “true

believer," he drinks water and partakes of a diet almost wholly vegetarian. The silver dishes are sent to the table sealed and his drinking water is conveyed in special casks under rigorous precautions. In speech he is a purist, speaking well in a monotonous voice though he is capable of being roused to finished eloquence. He is shrewd and intelligent; when he wishes he can exhibit an elasticity of mind which has assimilated a very wide range of subjects. Yet in dealing with Abdul Hamid one feels one is dealing with a man who neither says nor looks what he thinks. He is mentally examining the strength of character of the persons before him, conning over to what end he may put the baseness his scrutiny has discovered. Where his estimate is wrong, he is surprised rather than resentful, for to suspicion of goodness is added mistrust of probity.

If the Sultan of Turkey had surrendered to the demands of the Young Turks Party, the leaders of the movement lost no time in requesting substantial guarantees from the Porte for the application of the constitutional *régime*. Three days after the events of July 24 the Executive Committee of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation in Constantinople informed Abdul Hamid that the decisions of the Paris Congress of 1907, which approved the abdication of the Sultan, radical improvements in administration and the establishment of the Constitution of 1876, would be supported at all costs by

the militant parties of the movement if the Ottoman Government attempted to prevaricate. Suspecting the intentions of the ruler, the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress combined with the military leaders in preparations against any counter revolution. These precautions so impressed the Sultan of Turkey that on July 30, when receiving the congratulations of the foreign representatives on the restoration of the Constitution of 1876, Abdul Hamid promised that henceforth there would be no interference with the working of the Constitution, the re-establishment of which he proclaimed, on August 1, in a *Hatt-i-Humayun*.

After referring to the Constitutions granted by Abdul Medjid in 1839, in 1855 and 1856, and by himself in 1876, this instrument declared that all subjects should enjoy, on a footing of perfect equality, the full protection of the law in conformity with natural rights and the provisions of the laws in force, and ordained that—

1. All Ottoman subjects, without distinction of race or origin, shall enjoy personal liberty and be equal as regards rights and responsibilities.
2. Nobody shall be questioned, arrested, imprisoned or punished in any manner without legal grounds.
3. Extraordinary Courts shall be prohibited and it shall be forbidden to summon any person outside the Department of the competent tribunal.

4. The domicile of all persons is inviolable and it shall not be permissible to enter a house or to keep any place of abode under observation, otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of the law.

5. Officials, noble or otherwise, shall not prosecute any person otherwise than as specified by law.

6. All subjects of the Sultan shall have the right to reside where they wish and to associate with whom they please.

7. The censorship of the press shall be abolished; letters and newspapers shall not be intercepted in course of post and offences of the press shall be investigated by ordinary courts.

8. Education shall be free.

9. Officials shall be responsible to the laws and they shall not be obliged to obey orders contrary to law. No one shall be appointed to a post against his will.

10. The Grand Vizier shall choose the Ministers and submit them to the Sultan for his sanction, with the exception of the Sheikh-ul-Islam and the Ministers of War and Marine. He shall also choose the diplomatic agents, the valis and the members of the Council of State with the assent of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of the Interior and of the President of the Council of State respectively, as far as it concerns them.

Articles 11 and 12 determine the conditions regulating the duties of provincial officials; while Article 13 provides that the budget of ordinary and extraordinary receipts and payments, as well as the budget of each department and vilayet, shall be published at the beginning of each official year.

14. After the revision of the existing laws and regulations relative to the organization and duties of the ministries and vilayets, bills for the alteration of said laws and regulations, according to the present requirements, shall be drafted with a view to their being submitted to the Chamber of Deputies, which is to meet shortly. . .

15. As the greatest power of the Empire rests in our army we formally express our wish for its advancement and for the improvement of weapons and equipment. We have, in this connection, given special orders to the Minister for War.

In conclusion, the Sultan commanded the Grand Vizier to submit to his sanction the formation of the new Cabinet, and urged, finally, that the efforts of the Grand Vizier, as also those of his colleagues, should be directed to the immediate execution of the Imperial wishes.

Considering that the right to appoint the Ministers of War and Marine, which by virtue of Clause 10 of the *Hatt-i-Humayun* the Sultan had retained, was an attempt to modify the constitutional privileges of the nation, since by Article XXVII of the Constitution of 1876 the appointment of these ministers was one of the prerogatives of the Grand Vizier, Jemaledin Effendi, the Sheikh-ul-Islam, resigned on the night of August 2 at a meeting of the Council of Ministers. The resignation was not accepted at the moment and a Cabinet crisis at once resulted. In other quarters, however, the *Hatt-i-Humayun* was greeted with satisfaction; and,

while the people acclaimed the Constitution, the military and official elements in the population voiced their recognition of the change in the following oath—

"We swear on our honour that we will scrupulously defend the Constitution and faithfully serve the Sultan, and should an attempt be made to modify the Constitution (which God forbid) that we shall be ready to sacrifice ourselves for its maintenance.

On August 3 the Sheikh-ul-Islam renewed his resignation, the threat of, which had already affected the position of the Cabinet, since Said Pasha was held responsible by the Young Turks Party for yielding the two Departments of State in which corruption was most rampant to the control of the Palace. To emphasize the views of the Party, a delegation of officers from the Salonika branch of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress attended Said Pasha and pointed out the necessity that existed for importing new blood into the affairs of the Government. After a conference which continued for four hours modifications in the terms of Clause 10 of the Imperial *Hatt*, bringing the instrument into conformity with the Constitution, were promised and arrangements made for the reinstatement of the Sheikh-ul-Islam.

Standing between two schools and too long identified with the traditions of the old to realize the aspirations of the new, the Grand Vizier together

with his ministers tendered, on August 5, the resignation of the first Cabinet appointed under the new Constitution. With the retirement of Said Pasha the task of forming a new ministry was entrusted to Kiamil Pasha on August 6 by an Imperial *Hatt*, which recognized also the right of the Grand Vizier to make ministerial appointments. After consultations between Abdul Hamid, the leaders of the Young Turks Party and the Grand Vizier, a Cabinet was established with a constitutional basis.

A fortnight later Kiamil Pasha drew up and published the following manifesto—

The ministry, sincerely appreciating the high value of the Imperial solicitude for the restoration of the constitutional law, is resolved to govern in conformity with the text of that constitutional law—which is in conformity with the divine and the natural law—by completely safeguarding the rights of the Sovereign, the Council of Ministers and Parliament, and the Political and General rights of the people.

It is absolutely impossible to postpone acting on this resolve till after the modification—by the deputies of the people—of the administrative system and of certain laws of the old *régime*.

As regards the several laws and regulations firmly established by the old *régime* which are not applicable to present circumstances, it is obviously necessary to bring them into accordance with the text and the spirit of the Constitution. All existing ordinances,

proclamations and notices whatsoever which have not assumed the form of law and are not in accordance with the text and the spirit of the constitutional law, must be considered null and void.

And pending the reforms which shall be submitted to the approval of the Chamber of Deputies, the Cabinet will exercise control over governmental affairs, ridding them of the ideas of the old *régime*. In the improvement and reformation of existing laws, and the elaboration of many laws and regulations the necessity of which is making itself felt but of which the preparation requires time, some questions on account of their urgency must naturally at the present time attract attention.

Of first consideration is the financial question, which for some time has assumed a serious character and cannot even under present circumstances be maintained in its present form.

On the one hand, then, attention will be directed to the preparation of next year's budget and the study of the necessary reforms in the administration of the taxes and imposts; on the other hand it has been judged necessary to pay attention, without loss of time, to the necessity of reducing the numbers of those who are employed in the various departments of State and are now so numerous as to be a hindrance to efficient work. With this end in view it is proposed to diminish offices to which no duties are attached and to provide with posts only such proportion of the unemployed employees or officials that is in ratio with the number of vacancies. At the same time temporary pensions will be allotted to all whose services are discarded, so as not to leave them

48 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

without resources and thereby reduce thousands of families to déstitution.

Small loans will be raised in order to cope with the needs of the treasury ; the greatest possible economy, compatible with the proposals above mentioned, will be exercised, and the provisional measures, under deliberation, as well as fundamental questions, will be submitted to the approval of the Chamber of Deputies.

It is needless to say that in the general reduction of expenditure the same attention will be paid to the military department as to the civil departments. But the Ottoman Empire being a great power, it will not be forgotten that, in order to maintain and augment its dominant position and its prestige, it cannot dispense with a well-organized army and navy. It is undeniable, that it will be possible by means of economy to lighten to a certain extent the expenses of the treasury. But at first, for the satisfactory progress of governmental business and the promotion of the prosperity of departments hitherto neglected by the Government, additional expenditure will be necessary, and if the extent of the Ottoman territory and the number of its population are taken into consideration, and these elements are compared with those of the other civilized powers, the insufficiency of its present revenue will become very evident. Consequently, on the one hand, without having recourse to fresh taxes it has been found necessary to reorganize the assessment of taxes and their collection ; and, by renewing commercial treaties and working with a view to the prosperity of the country, to let the treasury profit by the progressive increase of the revenues.

Hitherto want of method in the management of public works, as well as the existence of certain essential and subsidiary causes hindering the progress of commerce and industry, has formed a barrier to progress. Thanks be to God, the spirit of progress has penetrated to the Ottoman territory ; and so that the benefits of union may be advantageous to the Government and to the nation various projects, equal before the law and of equal obligation upon all classes of the population, will be elaborated with a view to presentation to the Chamber of Deputies. These projects concern commerce by land and sea, industry, public works, and agriculture in all its branches.

One of the elements constituting the wealth of the country is the right of property. This right is at present treated on various contradictory systems : credit on immovable property is almost non-existent, which is very pernicious ; the necessary reforms will be evolved and what is needful shall be done to give proprietors legal possession of their immovable goods, granting to the latter their legal value.

Wealth and knowledge have need of one another. It is unnecessary to insist on the fact that in order to render the country happy and prosperous the progress of knowledge must be promoted. The questions of instruction and education, which have not hitherto been dealt with in a manner befitting the dignity and reputation of the Ottoman people, will be reformed by the new Cabinet on the bases laid down by the Constitution.

The constitutional law, granting the equality before the law of all Ottoman people, applies equally

to all, and to all descriptions of employment. Similarly it extends military service to all classes of the population ; and, since the admission of non-Mussulmans to the military schools at present is forbidden, the requisite laws and regulations to effect the change are in preparation.

The department of the administration of justice requiring reorganization, like all other departments, various reforms in the existing laws are in course of preparation for submission to the approbation of the Chamber of Deputies ; while, without interfering with the fundamental principle of the independence of the law courts, changes in the character of these courts are being considered which will secure the equitable administration of justice in such a way as to give general satisfaction.

The restoration of constitutional law to the country and the nation, by concession of H.I.M. the Sultan, is an event, which reflects honour on the Imperial Government and has gained the approval of the friends of that Government and of foreigners. And the Government will be able to keep this honour by consolidating order and tranquillity in the interior, promoting the happiness of both natives and foreigners, and diffusing confidence in all directions. As the integrity of the law makes for the happiness of all, this quality of the greatest importance in the maintenance of order and tranquillity will never be lost sight of.

The Imperial Government stands in satisfactory relations with all countries. Its foreign policy having as its sole aim the maintenance of its sovereign rights and of the treaties, as likewise the

safeguarding of the nation's prestige, foreign relations will be based on these principles and the Government will keep up satisfactory relations with all foreign Governments.

Some subjects of foreign countries enjoy in Turkey, by virtue of old conventions and treaties, privileges and rights not comprised under general international law. (Capitulations.) The Government will work towards the suppression of these privileges, with the consent of the Powers concerned.

The Government will aim at making every branch of the administration inspire perfect confidence in all, and at making foreigners themselves admit the uselessness of their privileges. The Cabinet, which has assumed Government, imbued with these ideas has resolved to govern within the limits of constitutional law and to have the provinces governed in conformity with these same ideas. And, the policy of H.I.M. the Sultan tending entirely in this direction, the Government, though fully conscious of the difficulty of the task it has to perform, both in the present and in the future, sets to work with prayer for divine aid.

With the change of ministry and the advent to office of a strongly progressive Cabinet the Young Turks began to devote their energies to the task of securing unity of action and cohesion in their own ranks. Many divers associations existed beneath the ægis of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress and it was only a common detestation of Yildiz oppression which preserved, in the action of

the affiliated societies, the semblance of a single policy. To understand the situation it must be remembered that the Ottoman Empire embraces a variety of nations, each with its own culture and traditions. In Macedonia alone Turks, Greeks and Bulgars jostle one another to the utter confusion of racial unity and the lasting disadvantage of the Bulgar, who is in numerical preponderance. With the success of the Young Turks it was natural that inquiry should be made of their Executive Committee on behalf of Bulgarian and Greek interests in the Province. Both the Bulgarian Internal Organization and the Ottoman League of Private Initiative of Decentralization and Constitution, who had thrown its mantle over Greek interests, favoured at first the establishment of local autonomy in Macedonia. In addition Bulgarian interests required scholastic independence.

The views of the Bulgarian Internal Organization, as set forth in a letter addressed to the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, embraced eight points. They were as follows—

- (1) A radical revision of the Constitution of 1876 in accordance with modern democratic ideals.
- (2) New administrative divisions should be delimited in accordance with ethnographic frontiers.
- (3) Complete equality of all races and religions. Admission of Christians to all employments including military service. No official religion.

(4) Reorganization of the army in conformity with the economic situation of the people and the international position of the Empire. Reduction of the period of military service.

(5) Achievement of economic reforms by reduction of expenditure on official and military administration.

(6) Introduction of ethical measures of advancement for the people and the institution of national schools in which the language of instruction shall be that of the district, elementary instruction in Turkish being obligatory.

(7) A general amnesty.

(8) Deposition of the Sultan.

Although there was much in the platform of the Bulgarian Internal Organization which the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress could not accept, a strong desire existed to meet the wishes of so important a branch of the reform movement. Until the Turkish Parliament had assembled no definite decision could be given, although the importance of the questions at issue was quite well known. Moreover, the Bulgarian statement was a declaration of principles rather than a definition of requirements. In this direction an important modification was speedily forthcoming, and concerned the withdrawal of the proposal for the dethronement of the Sultan in deference to the religious sentiment of the Mahomedan world.

While the Bulgarian Internal Organization was

engaged in setting up claims to absolute independence, the Committee of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation intimated to the Central Committee that they would welcome the fusion of their society with the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress. With a similar purpose in view negotiations with Prince Sabah-ed-Din—who advocated decentralization, and as the head of the Ottoman League of Private Initiative of Decentralization and Constitution was regarded by the Greeks as their special champion—were concluded by the Salonika Committee on September 9. However the president of the Young Turks Party was compelled to modify the particular line of policy with which he had been identified since the foundation of his society.

By the settlement of these details the Young Turks Party now presented a united front on the question of their general policy. Whereas their task hitherto had been to incite the population against the State, they were now ranged on the side of law and order. So far as possible complete liberty was to be extended to the various races within the Ottoman Dominions; and, while rights were restored to the individual and its liberties to the press, freedom of political thought and action was encouraged. A striking development of this tolerance was the establishment of political clubs devoted to the Constitutional aims and requirements of the individual races within the Empire, the initiative being taken

by the Bulgarians, who were followed by the Albanians and by the Greeks.

A last work awaited the Young Turks Party. It was concerned with the preparation of the political programme which would be advocated by the nominees and supporters of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress in the new Chamber. Early in September a Congress of the various committees of the Party assembled at Constantinople and, after mature deliberation, published on September 23 the following manifesto.

After stating that the Articles of the Constitution of 1876 and such of the rights granted by the *Hatt-i-Humayun* of August 1, 1908, as are in accordance with the Constitution, will be maintained unless modified or abolished by the Chamber of Deputies, these Articles appear—

(1) The Cabinet is to be responsible to the Chamber and if Ministers fail to obtain majorities in the House they will be bound to resign their portfolios.

(2) The number of Senators shall not exceed one-third of the total number of Deputies. Article LXII of the Constitution, whereby all Senators are to be nominated by the Sultan, will be modified and one-third of the Senators will be nominated by the Sultan and two-thirds chosen by popular election.

(3) Every Ottoman citizen over twenty years of age shall have a right to a vote irrespective of any property qualification.

(4) An article will be added to the Constitution recognizing the right to form political clubs provided that their objects are of a constitutional nature.

(5) The necessary laws and decrees will be passed to facilitate the application of the system of decentralization as set forth in Article CVIII of the Constitution.

(6) The boundaries and administrative divisions of the provinces will be maintained unless the Chamber decides otherwise.

(7) Turkish will be the official language of the Empire and the medium of all official discussion and correspondence.

(8) The Chamber will be asked to vote an additional article of the Constitution sanctioning the proposal of private Bills on the part of not fewer than ten Deputies.

(9) All Ottoman subjects possess the same rights and duties without distinction of race or religion. Military service is incumbent on non-Moslems as well as on Moslems.

(10) Religious freedom is recognized, and the religious privileges granted to the various vilayets and communities will be maintained intact.

(11) The military and naval forces of the Empire will be disposed in accordance with its political and geographical position. A shorter term of military service will be introduced.

(12) Article CXIII of the Constitution will be modified with the object of obtaining greater security for individual liberty.

(13) The relations of employers and workmen will be the subject of new legislation with a view to obviating strikes and labour disputes.

(14) The landless peasantry will be assisted to become proprietors—not, however, at the expense of the present landowners.

(15) Improvements will be adopted in the system of the collection of the revenue.

• (16) Education will be free.

(17) All schools will be subject to inspection by the Ministry of Education. Government schools will be established which shall be open to all without distinction of religion or race. Turkish will be a compulsory subject in all primary schools.

• (18–19) These deal with measures which are to be proposed for the encouragement of agriculture and commerce.

(20) Ottoman subjects possessing the necessary qualifications may be elected Deputies for any division of the Empire instead of being only eligible as representatives of the districts in which they reside.

The Articles of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, to which reference is made in the above programme, are as follows—

Article LXII. The senators are appointed for life. The dignity of senator may be enjoyed by persons not otherwise engaged, having exercised the functions of minister, governor-general (vali), commander of a regiment, cazasker (grand judge), ambassador, or plenipotentiary, patriarch, knakhambachi (grand rabbi), by generals of divisions of naval or military forces, and also by individuals combining the desired qualifications. Members of the senate, called by their own desire to other offices, lose their title of senator.

Article CVIII. The administration of the provinces will be based on the principle of decentralization. The details of this organization will be fixed by law.

Article CXIII. Should there be at any time manifestations of serious disturbances in any part of the Empire, the Imperial Government has the right of there proclaiming a state of siege. The effects of a state of siege consist in the temporary suspension of the civil laws. The method of administration of the localities submitted to a state of siege will be regulated by a special law. To H.I.M. the Sultan belongs the exclusive power of expelling from the territory of the Empire all those who, from reliable information received by the Administration of Police, are recognized as being dangerous to the peace of the State.

With the publication of their programme the immediate objective of the Young Turks Party had been secured, and it is necessary to pass now from consideration of the part which they have played to a brief examination of the changes to which a revival of the Ottoman Empire may give rise. As to what the future will disclose it is impossible to resist the conclusion that, if constitutional government in a form suited to the capacities of the people can be maintained, the position of Turkey among the Powers, and international relations with the Porte, will be entirely transformed. Necessarily substantial modifications will have to be introduced into the Near Eastern policy of the various chancelleries. For the better part of a century Europe has been

contemplating the ultimate extinction of the Turk in Europe. Neither in Vienna nor St. Petersburg, assuredly not in Berlin, nor in any of the minor capitals has there been any doubt of the Empire's inevitable dissolution. Yet, when the idea of supporting the Turkish Empire by external pressure for the benefit of the various races inhabiting the Ottoman dominions has dropped from its foremost place in the programme of the European Concert, a new era dawns, instinctive with vitality and of a vigour sufficient to banish the old signs of decay.

Though the change were to the advantage of Turkey it has been heralded nonetheless with undisguised impatience by those who had already staked off their respective areas for occupation. Fortunately Great Britain has never been included among the expectant heirs who ravened at the bedside of a now convalescent Power; and if, at one time, Mid-Victorian statesmen reaped the enmity of the Sultan we would now appear to enjoy the confidence of the new school of Turkish statesmen. The change is welcome—how welcome only those can appreciate who have been in a position to realize for themselves the decline that has taken place in British prestige in Turkey in the last generation. Happily there is no middle course to be pursued. The British Government should support the Turkish Constitution, and in doing so achieve the solution of the Eastern question. Sir Edward Grey has been confronted

with what must prove the opportunity of his life. If he permits it to pass in allowing the new Parliament to waste its energies in a struggle for bare existence with the Sultan and his reactionary supporters, it were better that we took no further part in the affairs of the Near East:

While there can be no stability without a benevolent guarantee the provision of opportunity for the Young Turks to put their house thoroughly in order should be a matter of international obligation. In the interval the European Powers might do worse than reflect upon the proposals which Midhat put forward in 1876 and Lord Derby, to his lasting discredit, declined. At the same time the downfall of despotism in Turkey is one thing and the installation of an inexperienced parliament, founded upon irresponsible public opinion, another, as the situation in Teheran has disclosed. The mistakes which the Majlis made hardly will be repeated in Constantinople if the behaviour of the First Turkish Parliament affords any index to the proceedings of this one. The situation rests with the Moslem element; and if the present racial amity continues we may congratulate ourselves that a return to constitutionalism in Turkey has put an end to the viciousness which so long has described the Porte. In this Germany will suffer more than any other Power, for the reformers have swept away the satellites which worked her will. Nonetheless the good offices of the Deutsche Bank have been placed at

the disposal of the Young Turks Party. In a measure, the Nationalist leaders are looking to Great Britain for counsel and support. Happily the British Government has not committed its former error and withheld assistance. The services of Mr. R. F. Crawford, Commissioner of H.M. Customs have been lent to the Turkish Government and he will act as adviser in connection with the projected reorganization of the Ottoman Customs. Rear-Admiral E. H. Gamble will perform similar duty with the Ottoman Navy. Private interests have been no less active in coming forward. Sir Ernest Cassel of financial fame is associated with a proposal to found an Ottoman National Bank. These preliminary indications of returning confidence in Turkey will bridge many of the difficulties against which Great Britain has vainly contended in the past. Official and unofficial interests, however, must continue to follow a progressive policy towards the Porte if Great Britain is to reap any profit from the golden opportunity with which she is now presented. For a space perhaps the position of affairs will be impressed with political rather than commercial significance. The appeal to British sympathies on either issue is equally emphatic, and intelligently exploited should establish British prestige in Turkey, if not throughout the Levant, on a firmer basis than has ever previously been known.

NOTE.—The text of the Articles of the Constitution of 1876 will be found in the Appendix.

THE STORY OF PERSIA AND THE POWERS

THE position which Russia now fills on the Russo-Persian frontier may be ascribed to the logical development of a policy which had its inception in the following clause from the will of Peter the Great—

Bear in mind that the commerce of India is the commerce of the world, and that he who can exclusively control it is the dictator of Europe ; no occasion should therefore be lost to provoke war with Persia, to hasten its decay, to advance to the Persian Gulf, and then to endeavour to re-establish the ancient trade of the Levant through Syria.

The successive stages of the Russian advance which began with the dispatch of Colonel Walinsky in 1715 to the Persian Court and concluded for the time being with the provisions of the Treaty of Turkman Chai on February 21, 1828, have inspired Persia throughout their course with mingled feelings of bitterness and dread. Of a surety, Russia has given Persia every cause for alarm since those early

years of the eighteenth century, for Russian friendship has been purchasable only at the price of Persian provinces, or the acceptance of Russian loans. While the territories ceded to Peter by Tahmasp II in 1722 and embracing the whole of the Persian littoral on the Caspian in part were restored to Nadir by the Treaty of Resht in 1732, and in part by the Treaty of Gandja in 1735, but fifty-two years were to pass before, on January 25, 1784, Catharine II was to extend Russian protection to the Georgian Christians. Although this action provoked the Persian ruler, Aga Mohammed Khan, to take devastating reprisals against the Georgians it also laid a train which was to lead speedily to the reinstallation of Russian authority in the Caucasus. In 1796 an avenging Russian host threatened Azerbaijan, and was only prevented from investing the Persian capital—already removed to Teheran from Ispahan—by Catharine's death. With the accession of Paul I, a wider significance was imparted to the aggrandisement through which new areas were being added to the Czar's dominions, by the joint plan of Paul and Napoleon in 1800 for the invasion of Hindustan.

Daring as was the scheme of Napoleon, the victories of Nadir Shah over the Afghans in 1730 by which the Indian passes were seized, and against the Moguls in 1739 by which the boundaries of Persia were carried to the banks of the Indus, the forays

from Kandahar of Ahmed Shah Abdali who with the murder of Nadir Shah on June 20, 1747 proclaimed his independence of Persia, and the operations of Zeman Shah, the grandson of Ahmed Shah Abdali, in 1746 about Lahore, had established the defencelessness of Northern India. Apprehensive of the safety of the British position there, while the banks of the Volga became a scene of bustling preparation and an envoy from Napoleon visited the Persian Court, to arrange for the passage of a French army across Persian territory to a rendezvous in the plains of India with the Russian forces, the Government of India, in January 1801, contracted through the agency of Captain John Malcolm an offensive-defensive alliance with Futti Ali Shah. By this treaty Persia, in return for certain assistance, agreed to move against Zeman Shah if that ruler threatened India; and further bound himself that

. . . should an army of the French actuated by design and deceit, attempt to settle with a view of establishing themselves on any of the islands or shores of Persia, a conjoint force shall be appointed by the two High Contracting Parties to act in co-operation for their expulsion and extirpation, and to destroy and put an end to the foundation of their treason; and if any of the great men of the French nation express a wish or desire to obtain a place of residence, or dwelling, in any of the islands or shores of the kingdom of Persia, that they may raise the

standard of abode, or 'settlement, leave for their residing in such a place shall not be granted. . . .

Captain Malcolm further persuaded the Shah to issue a *firman* to the provincial Governors, which directed that

you shall expel and extirpate the French, and never allow them to obtain a footing in any place . . . you are at full liberty to disgrace and slay the intruders.

Almost before the ink had dried on the signatures to the Malcolm Treaty the Czar of Russia was assassinated in March 1801, his successor Alexander I at once resuming the pleasant pastime, abandoned by his predecessor, of absorbing Persia's Caucasian provinces. Mingrelia, Gandja, Shirwan, Karabagh, Talish, Georgia, Daghestan and others rapidly passed into Russian possession, to remain there in spite of the war which Futti Ali Shah waged in 1804 against Alexander at the inspiration of the French Government. Already in 1802 overtures to Persia had been made by France, but when they were repeated in the autumn of 1804 they coincided with a request for armed intervention in Georgia which Mirza Nebi Khan, an envoy from the Shah, had placed before the Governor-General of India. In view of the existence of the Malcolm Treaty, the ruler of Persia was placed in a position of no small embarrassment by Napoleon's proposals and, pending the

66 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

arrival of news from his envoy in India, Futti Ali Shah neither accepted nor rejected them. In the following year, war in the meantime having broken out between France and Russia, Colonel Romieu appeared in person at Teheran, accredited under the hand of the great war lord, to propose that Persia should repudiate the terms of the Malcolm Treaty in favour of an alliance with France, when the Emperor of the French would maintain a Resident Minister at Teheran, grant to the Persian ruler a subsidy for his troops and dispatch an army of intervention to Georgia.

While the Shah awaited the result of the British Government's deliberations Colonel Romieu died, and in the spring of 1806 intelligence of the failure of the Shah's mission to secure British intervention in the Caucasus reached Teheran. In spite of the Shah's disappointment there existed no alternative to the rejection of his request. The Malcolm Treaty had been directed against France in the interests of Persia no less than in those of India. Great Britain was already in alliance with Russia against Napoleon and could not enter upon an engagement with Persia against an ally, more especially as the treaty of 1801 was intended to refer solely to France. Futti Ali Shah now did everything in his power to hasten the conclusion of an alliance with the French. Since the project was very opportune, a preliminary treaty was at once drawn up by Napoleon, who sent M. Jaubert

post-haste to Teheran to convey its terms to the Persian monarch, and to hold his Majesty to them.

While the Shah was anticipating that by means of the French alliance he would recover Persia's Caucasian provinces, the political situation in Europe was altered by the provisions of the Treaty of Tilsit, July 9, 1807, to which Napoleon and Alexander had agreed. In view of this treaty, the armed intervention of the French Emperor in the Caucasus on behalf of Persia was now impossible. Moreover, when General Gardanne arrived at Teheran in the capacity of the Political and Military Plenipotentiary Extraordinary of Napoleon, bringing with him a large staff of military officers who were to establish the Persian army on European lines, substantial modifications had to be made in the terms of the treaty which M. Jaubert had previously agreed with Futti Ali. Of the original text only that portion was retained which held England and the English to be the common enemy of France and Persia. The change, however, was not to the liking of the Shah any more than the establishment of a French Mission in Teheran was approved by the Imperial Government or by the Government of India. Considering that the machinations of the Russo-French coalition had brought Persia within its purview, the Imperial Government in October 1807 sent Sir Harford Jones to Teheran as Envoy Extra-

ordinary to the Shah of Persia from the King of England, subordinated only to the Governor-General of India, and with powers to conclude a direct treaty between England and Persia. At the same time the Government of India, apprehensive of the results of Napoleon's coquetting with Futti Ali Shah and anxious to continue its policy of consolidating its relations with the states beyond the frontier, against one of which there was reputed to be a Franco-Persian confederacy, dispatched Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm to Teheran.

Arriving in the Persian Gulf in May 1808 the envoy from India found that his overtures were entirely disregarded. Owing to the refusal of the Governor-General of India in 1806 to support Persia against Russian aggression in the Caucasus, French influence now prevailed at Teheran, where General Gardanne had easily persuaded the Shah that Napoleon's mediation with Alexander offered the surest safeguard to Persia against absorption by Russia. Promise and performance, too, had gone hand in hand. The Emperor's pledges to the Shah had been followed by their due observance. General Gardanne was exerting himself on behalf of Persian interests in Georgia; French drill instructors were training the Persian troops and French engineers were constructing the fortifications of the capital.

Completely discomfited, and with nothing to record save an expenditure of twenty lakhs of rupees

(£133,320), General Malcolm retired in high dudgeon from Persia, leaving the honours of the field to be gathered by Sir Harford Jones. Disembarking at Bushire in October 1808 and arriving in February 1809 at Teheran, the King's Envoy found that Futti Ali's faith in the French had been shaken by the fact that the good offices of Napoleon had failed to arrest the Russian advance in the Caucasus. Proposing England as the Power which should protect Persia against the Northern Colossus in substitution for France, Sir Harford Jones signed a Preliminary Treaty with the Shah on March 12, 1809, by which it was expressly provided that

. . . from the date of the preliminary Articles (March 12, 1809) every treaty or agreement which the King of Persia might have made with any one of the Powers of Europe became null and void, and that he could not permit any European force whatever to pass through Persia either towards India or towards the ports of that country. . . .

In return we promised to support the Persian ruler with troops and subsidies, and to abstain from intervention, except as mediators, in any war between Persia and Afghanistan. Endorsed by the Government of India, Sir Harford Jones's treaty was never ratified, although on the conclusion of his mission, Sir Harford Jones was made Minister Resident at Teheran. Such a proceeding on the part of the Crown was regarded by the Governor-

General of India as "a soicism in the system of diplomatic delegation" and caused the re-appearance of General Malcolm at the Persian capital in 1810. This mission, the second from the Government of India, was accompanied by a number of military officers whose services were to be lent to the Shah, in an attempt "to restore and secure the injured credit and insulted dignity of the Indian Government!" Happily the situation created by such an unedifying example of departmental jealousy was not prolonged for, in the summer of 1811, Sir Gore Ouseley arrived in Teheran as Ambassador Extraordinary from the King of England with authority to supersede the rival plenipotentiaries.

In July 1812 a reconciliation was effected between England and Russia which, following on Napoleon's rupture with Alexander, caused the good offices of England, in such a contingency promised to Persia by the terms of Sir Harford Jones's Preliminary Treaty, to be exercised in making peace between the Shah and the Czar. Simultaneously Sir Gore Ouseley concluded with Persia, on the basis of the treaty of March 12, 1809, the Definitive Treaty of 1812. While the earlier efforts of the British Envoy to arrange peace between Russia and Persia proved abortive a second intervention was successful and a treaty of peace between Russia and Persia was signed at Gulistan on October 13, 1813, that confirmed Russia in possession of whatever Persian

territory she had already acquired in the Caucasus. Meanwhile the signing of the agreement between England and Persia was deferred. Although Sir Gore Ouseley specially returned to England for the purpose of laying the Treaty of Teheran before the Government, its Articles were not finally signed, sealed, and delivered until November 25, 1814, when the preamble declared that

these happy leaves are a nosegay plucked from the thornless garden of Concord and tied by the hand of the plenipotentiaries of the two great States.

In spite of its pleasant bouquet, the later growth of Sir Gore Ouseley's treaty was never so agreeable to the Persian ruler as the fragrance of its first appearance, for the perfume of friendship, exhaled by the plant of 1812, was never so noticeable in the species of 1814. Although the elemental principles of Sir Harford Jones's arrangement were preserved the clauses, by which England undertook to assist Persia in creating a naval establishment on the Caspian and in reorganizing the Persian army, were withdrawn. In lieu of military assistance against attack by another Power, too, the subsidy contemplated in the treaty of 1812 was increased from twelve lakhs to fifteen lakhs of rupees in the version of 1814.

Although Persia and Russia were now at peace, the Northern Power was concerned more with the

geographical limitations of her position in the Caucasus than with her treaty engagements towards Persia and looked forward to the eventual acquisition of all territory, albeit Persian territory, that lay to the north of the Araxes. Under these circumstances the Treaty of Gulistan served solely as an armistice to an inevitable resumption of hostilities. A want of precision in the demarcation of the Russo-Persian frontier under the stipulations of the treaty of 1813 provided the opportunity whenever it suited Russia to seize it. The retention of Talish, and the violent seizure of Gotcha were but links in the chain of that perpetual movement which was never really stayed until the results of the Russo-Persian War, 1826-1828, gave Russia the rights of a conqueror over the Caucasus. By the terms of the Treaty of Turkman Chai, February 21, 1828, Erivan and Nakshivan with the remaining portions of the Caucasus passed into Russian possession, while the Persian frontier was defined by the south bank of the Araxes in the areas of the Caucasus, and by Astara in the region of the Caspian. Thus, from the date of Catherine's action in 1784 to the Russo-Persian treaty of peace in 1828, it will be seen that much more territory passed into the keeping of Russia than had been restored to Persia by the treaties of Resht and Gandja. Once again, within a few decades, a vast heritage of rich provinces had changed hands. Lost and won back between 1722 and 1783; it was lost

again between 1783 and 1828, to remain a pendant of the Russian Crown.

The results of the campaign with Russia left Persia smarting under its loss of prestige, broken up into a number of petty principalities and ready to attempt armed incursions across the frontier by way of restoring its good name. Khiva and then Herat in turn were considered, selection finally falling upon Herat as the object of attack. The expedition set out in the autumn of 1833. Owing to the death of Abbas Mirza, the father of the Prince Royal, Mahomed Mirza Shah, who conducted it, the siege was raised and for the time being further action was deferred. In the meantime, affairs in Persia had attracted the attention of India; while, as the weakness of the Persian state increased, Russian diplomacy became more active.

Satisfied for the nonce by the position which she had secured for herself in the Caucasus, Russia began to pursue an unobtrusive, but none the less undeviating, course of interference with the internal affairs of Persia. Holding the Prime Minister in leading-strings, she recommended candidates for office, granted protection to all applicants and screened offenders. Azerbaijan, wherein the Government was solely dependent on Russian protection, and Khorasan were the Russian objectives, while the ultimate aim of her policy was centred in the region to the east of the Caspian. Moving slowly, and

uncertain of the outcome of her policy in Persia, for active operations beyond the Araxes were hindered by the necessity of keeping a close watch on the tribes of the Caucasus much as were her designs on Trans-Caspia by the suspicions and restlessness of the tribes on the Caspian, she obtained the right to establish a consulate at Resht, and commercial agencies at a number of other places. At the same time, distinguished by marked hostility to the influence of England in Central Asia, she embarked upon a policy which aimed at stirring up the tribes of Afghanistan.

With this end in view Russian advice counselled Mahomed Mirza Shah to resume the operations against Herat at the same time that a Russian Mission was dispatched to Kabul. Following the advice of the Russian Minister, the young sovereign set out in the summer of 1837, and on November 23 began the siege of Herat. No sooner was the Persian expedition of 1837-1838 launched against Herat than the Government of India awoke to the urgency of the situation. But it was not until the island of Kharak in the Persian Gulf was occupied by an Anglo-Indian expedition, early in 1838, that the Persian ruler withdrew, on September 9, from before the walls of the beleaguered city. Persian designs in respect of Herat were by no means crushed by the results of this campaign, while the defeat of Persian arms through the intervention of Great Britain sensibly increased the influence of Russia

over the Shah. With the close of the war in 1838, the Russian Minister in Teheran experienced no difficulty in obtaining permission for his Government to found a naval station on the Island of Ashurada off Astrabad, to which town a consul was duly appointed in the following year. Similarly, in order . . . to strengthen in that part of Asia the lawful influence to which Russia has a right . . .

in the winter of 1839 Perovski was dispatched on a disastrous expedition against the Khan of Khiva as a counterblast to the continued occupation by Great Britain of the Island of Kharak. Terms of peace were arranged by Khiva with the Russian Government in 1840, and Kharak was evacuated by the Indian Government in 1842. In making the retention of the island of Kharak a pretext for aggrandisement in Central Asia, the Russian Government was pleased to ignore the special circumstances which appertained to the position of Great Britain in Southern Persia.

Long before the mission of Captain Malcolm in 1801 a fairly flourishing trade had been conducted from Russian territory between England and Persia through the efforts of the British Moscovy Company. While Portuguese galleons sailed the Persian Gulf, British ships, until the Caspian was shut to foreign shipping in 1746, ploughed the Volga and the Caspian towards special entrepôts in Northern

76 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Persia. Rebuffed, but not discouraged, by Catherine's order, the activities of the British traders were at once transferred to the Persian Gulf, where the middle of the eighteenth century saw British commercial ascendancy established over the region. Factories were set up at Bushire, Jask, and Bunder Abbas; and an agency opened at Ispahan. In 1763 Shah Kerim Khan granted special rights and privileges throughout his kingdom to British trade. A generation later, in 1798, the English Government entered upon its first treaty with the Sultan of Muscat, which provided for the total exclusion of French and Dutch trade from the territory.

Although the rivalries of the Powers embittered their attitude towards each other in the Persian capital, the English Government was well disposed to Persia and encouraged the extension of Persian authority over the southern littoral of the Persian Gulf wherever it was possible. In nothing is this more patent than in the benevolent jurisdiction which the British Government itself exercised at this date in the Persian Gulf, and ever since has continued. From the Shat-el-Arab to the delta of the Indus the energies of the British navy were unflagging, without in the least begrudging the sacrifice of life and the expenditure of treasure which the self-imposed duties entailed. Although at first the predatory dhows of the semi-independent, wholly lawless and usually piratical sheikhs, who had settled

on the Persian, Turkish and Arabian shores, stubbornly resisted our attempts to suppress them, the reign of terror ultimately gave way to the *pax Britannica*, on land as on sea. Between 1810 and 1821 three expeditions were launched against the Jowasmi corsairs, as formidable to mariners as were their Barbary predecessors. In 1820 a treaty was made with the Trucial Chiefs of the Pirate Coast which bound them to desist from piracy. Thereafter foreign shipping relied on the protection of the patrolling British Squadrons which, unaided and without compensation, policed these waters in the interests of the world's commerce.

By the irony of fortune, and before Russia had obtained any marked success in Central Asia, the position held by England in the Persian Gulf was again to be thrust upon her notice. As a set-off to a Russian demand for the punishment of the Governor of Mazanderan for alleged complicity in a Turcoman attack on Ashurada, an Anglo-Persian Convention was arranged in 1851 by which, for the first time, British cruisers acquired the right of stopping and searching in Persian waters all native craft that were suspected of being engaged in the African slave trade. Two years later the policies of Russia and England were again contrasted. While Russia was contesting the mastery of the Syr Daria with the Khan of Khokand, Persian waters were rendered safer by virtue of an agreement with the Trucial Chiefs, by

78 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

which the tribes of the Pirate Coast promised to keep peace at sea.

While these events were occurring on the northern and southern borders of Persia, troubles had broken out in the east where, at Herat, disturbances arising out of the death of the Khan in 1851 had caused Said Mahomed, the new ruler, to throw himself upon the support of Persia. This situation gave rise to the Anglo-Persian Convention, January 25, 1853, by which the independence of Herat and its continuation in Afghan hands was assured in the following terms—

The Persian Government engages not to send troops on any account to the territory of Herat, excepting when troops from without attack that place, that is to say, troops from the direction of Kabul or from Kandahar, or from other foreign territory; and in case of troops being dispatched under such circumstances, the Persian Government binds itself that they shall not enter the city of Herat, and that immediately on the retreat of the foreign troops to their own country, the Persian force shall forthwith return to the Persian soil without delay.

The Persian Government also engages to abstain from all interference whatsoever in the internal affairs of Herat, likewise in (regard to) occupation or taking possession, or assuming the sovereignty or government, except that the same amount of interference which took place between the two in the time of the late Zuheer-ood-Dowlah, Yar Mahomed

Chan, is to exist as formerly. The Persian Government therefore engages to address a letter to Syed Mahomed Khan, acquainting him with these conditions, and to forward it to him (by a person) accompanied by some one belonging to the English Mission who may be in Meshed.

The Persian Government also engages to relinquish all claim or pretension to the coinage of money and to the "Khoòtbeh," or to any other mark whatever of subjection or of allegiance on the part of the people of Herat to Persia. But if, as in the time of the late Kamran and in that of the late Yar Mahomed Khan, they should, of their own accord, send an offering in money and strike it in the Shah's name Persia will receive it without making any objection. This condition will also be immediately communicated to Syed Mahomed Khan. They also engage to recall Abbas Koolee Khan, Peesecan, after four months from the date of his arrival, so that he may not reside there permanently; and hereafter no permanent agent will be placed in Herat, but intercourse will be maintained as in the time of Yar Mahomed Khan. Neither will they maintain a permanent agent on the part of Herat in Teheran. There will be the same relations and privileges which existed in Kamran's time, and in that of the late Yar Mahomed Khan. For instance, if at any time it should be necessary for the punishment of the Foorkomans, or in case of disturbance or rebellion in the Shah's dominions, that the Persian Government should receive assistance from the Heratees, similar to that afforded by the late Yar Mahomed Khan, they may, as formerly, render assistance of their

own accord and free will, but not of a permanent nature.

The Persian Government further engages, unconditionally and without exception, to release and set free all the chiefs of Herat, who are in Meshed or in Teheran or in any other part of Persia, and not to receive any offenders, prisoners, or suspected persons whatsoever from Syed Mahomed Khan, with the exception of such persons as having been banished by Syed Mahomed Khan from Herat, may come here and themselves desire to remain, or to enter the service. These will be treated with kindness and favour, as formerly. District orders will be issued immediately to the Prince Governor of Khorassan to carry out these engagements.

The above engagements on the part of the Persian Government are to be observed and to have effect; and the Persian Ministers, notwithstanding the rights which they possess in Herat, solely out of friendship and to satisfy the English Government, have entered into these engagements with the English Government, so long as there is no interference whatsoever on its part in the internal affairs of Herat and its dependencies; otherwise these engagements will be null and void, and as if they never had existed or been written. And if any foreign (State), either Afghan or other, should desire to interfere with or encroach upon the territory of Herat, or its dependencies, and the Persian Ministers should make the request, the British Government are not to be remiss in restraining them and in giving their friendly advice, so that Herat may remain in its own state of independence.

No less significant of the positions held by the rival Powers in Persia at this date, however, were the proposals emanating from Russia for Persia's participation in the Czar's approaching war with the Sultan of Turkey. Although refused in the end, the suggestion at first was very welcome to the Shah who, in 1853, entertained frontier grievances against Turkey in the west, and against England, in respect of Herat, in the east, besides nursing a sense of perpetual injury against the Government of India for its refusal to co-operate with the Persians in the Caucasus. The existence of the Crimean War provided the Persian ruler with an opportunity for returning to the question of Afghanistan. Persian action led to a rupture of Anglo-Persian relations on December 6, 1855 that was followed by the dispatch in March 1856 of a Persian force to Herat. The occupation of the city which followed was short-lived, an *émeute* occurring in which the Persian flag was replaced by that of the British. Within a few months the espousers of the English cause, receiving no encouragement from the Imperial Government, had hauled down their flag and Herat passed once more into Persian hands. Surrendered to Persia on October 25, 1856, it was evacuated finally on July 27, 1857, under pressure of the expeditionary columns which disembarked at Karachi in the Persian Gulf on December 4, 1856, and a little later at Bushire and Mohamera.

Within a few weeks the war was concluded by a treaty of peace signed at Paris on March 4, 1857.

In spite of the Treaty of Paris, Anglo-Persian relations continued to preserve an acrimonious note resulting from the attitude adopted by the English Cabinet towards the Shah's proposals in respect of Russia in the north, Turkey in the west, and the Afghan States in the east. In 1859 the custody of Anglo-Persian affairs passed from the Foreign Office to the Indian Office on the transfer of the Government of India from the East India Company to the Crown, but no change was made in Persian policy. In 1860 the departmental control of relations with Persia reverted to the Foreign Office, who permitted the Sultan of Muscat in 1862 to conclude a treaty with France, according to that Power equality of treatment with Great Britain. In 1863 after repeated attempts by the Shah, in virtue of Article VI of the Treaty of Paris, to secure the mediation of the British Government in checking Afghan aggressions in Seistan, over which Persia claimed to exercise rights which had never been recognized by the British Government, Nazir-ed-Din was referred to the arbitrament of the sword, an alternative measure which Persia was not in a position to adopt. Thus, while English interests in Persia suffered through the inability of Downing Street to preserve the spirit rather than the letter of the engagements of the British Government towards the Shah, Persia,

standing between two Powers, was hurt by the nonchalance of the one and intimidated by the action of the other.

In the meantime, since the submission of Shamil and his braves, on August 25, 1859, Russia, after fifteen years of intermittent struggling, had come to the end of her tribulations in the Caucasus. At liberty at last, she began to pursue in the territories to the east of the Caspian that vision of empire which beckoned Peter the Great when, in 1703, he sought alliance with the Khan of Khiva. Pushing forward along the line of the Syr Daria, a variety of minor victories was achieved by 1863. Of necessity the underlying menace in these operations was not lost upon the Shah, although in Europe they were thought to be inseparable from the strategic requirements of Russia's southern frontier. As the area of territory involved in Russia's little war continued to grow, concern over the character of the enterprise began to be manifested in Europe; whereupon, in response to inquiries, Prince Gortchakoff on November 21, 1864, issued to Russian Representatives abroad the celebrated circular which offered to the Great Powers an explanation of the policy which the Russian Government was pursuing in the regions beyond the Persian frontier.

Although the Russian Government cherished no design of conquest, and nothing was to be gained by "insisting on the palpable interest of Russia in

restricting the growth of her territory in Central Asia, the tide of war continued to absorb the several petty principalities which existed on the outskirts of Asiatic Russia. The submission of the Khanate of Bokhara was completed by 1868. In the following year a military station was founded at Krasnovodsk, on the eastern shore of the Caspian, as a *point d'appui* for operations against Khiva in one direction and the Turcomans in another. As Persia claimed jurisdiction over this part of the Caspian littoral, a *modus vivendi* was arranged by which a temporary frontier was found for Persian territory in the course of the Atrek River.

When the area of Russia's operations began to involve tribes over whom Persia hitherto had exercised jurisdiction, the Shah was beset by feelings of suspicion and insecurity. Accordingly, while friendly relations were maintained with Russia, every effort was made to reclaim the good offices of England. Many incidents testifying to this occurred between 1865-1872. In the former year the creation of a Persian navy, under English officers, with a view to establishing the Shah's authority over the tribes on the Persian littoral of the Gulf, was mooted—and suppressed, as it was considered to mask designs on the pearl fisheries of the Island of Bahrein, to whose Sheikh the Indian Government was bound by treaty. Again, in 1868, the Telegraph Convention, by which right of way across Persian territory

was given to the Indo-European telegraph lines, was settled. In 1870 the dispute with Afghanistan over Seistan, as well as border difficulties with Turkey, Baluchistan and tribes on the Persian Gulf, was submitted to the adjudication of British Commissioners. In 1872 a further Telegraph Convention—to remain in force until 1895—was concluded; but the most remarkable event of this year was the Reuter Concession.

Awarded on July 25, 1872, to Baron Julius de Reuter, a naturalized British subject, the complete and exclusive control of the whole industrial resources of Persia was surrendered for a period of seventy years. The unexpected creation of such a gigantic monopoly aroused the fury of Europe. It comprised the following items: the construction of a railway from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf, with a number of subsidiary branches; the laying down of tramways throughout the kingdom; the exclusive working of all the Persian mines, excepting those of gold and silver; the introduction of works of irrigation on whatever scale was deemed expedient; the establishment of a national bank; the issue of a loan of six millions sterling, with a Persian guarantee of 5 per cent. interest, and 2 per cent. sinking fund, together with a right to initiate all remunerative public works, such as lighting with gas, paving, and embellishing the capital; making roads, bridges, and embankments; postal and telegraphic extensions;

86 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

mills, factories, and workshops, etc., while, finally, the entire Customs of the empire were to be farmed for a period of twenty-five years. In return for this amazing delegation of Imperial powers to private interests the Crown was to receive 20 per cent. of the net profits of the railway, and 15 per cent. of all other net profits that accrued to the Government; while in respect to the Customs, the Persian Government had stipulated that the aggregate proceeds should be augmented for five years by an annual fixed sum of £20,000, and during the remainder of the term by the transfer to the Shah of 60 per cent. A sum of £40,000 caution money had to be deposited in the Bank of England in the name of the Persian Government, and was liable to forfeiture if work upon the various features of the concession had not been begun within fifteen months from the date of signing the contract.

To the chagrin of the Shah the storm which the terms of the Reuter concession had raised in the capitals of Europe found no corresponding state of feeling in England, where it received, indeed, neither official support nor popular recognition. Although designed by the Persian ruler to cement relations with England, to which purpose belonged, too, the visit that his Majesty paid to London in the course of a tour of Europe in 1873 while the concession was still the theme of universal speculation, the whole contract was annulled officially a few

days after his return to Teheran—but out of respect for his own safety at the hands of an outraged people, as much as in deference to the clamour of Europe.

Mindful of our obligations in the Persian Gulf towards the world's trade, if quite indifferent to a commercial monopoly over Persia, the treaty of 1873 was now arranged with the Trucial Chiefs of the Pirate Coast, by which they agreed to put down all traffic in slaves. Meanwhile, inspired by the suggestive possibilities of the Reuter concession, Prince Bismarck took advantage of the travels of the Shah to conclude, on June 6, 1873, a Treaty of Commerce between Persia and Germany, which is still in existence. Under the terms of Article XIX it is expressly stipulated that

in the event of Persia being involved in differences with another Power, the German Imperial Government declares itself ready to employ its good offices, at the invitation of the Shah's Government, with a view to promoting a settlement of such differences.

From this date the military activities of Russia in the region about the Persian border showed no abatement. The Khanate of Khiva fell in 1873; that of Khokand in 1875, while by 1876 direct approach had been gained to the borders of Afghanistan. Five years later, in spite of a visit to the Russian Court which the Shah paid as one of the features of

88 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

his second European tour in 1878-1879, the boundary between Persia and Russia east of the Caspian, the Akhal-Khorasan line, was defined by the terms of the Convention of December 21, 1881. Russia was now enabled to complete her conquests; and, while the annexation of Merv in 1884 proclaimed the defeat of the Turcomans, the construction of the Central Asian Railway heralded the dawn of peace which, though interrupted by the incident at Pendjeh on March 30, 1885, seemed to settle generally upon the Persian border.

Although the situation created at Teheran by the troubles on the Afghan frontier in 1885 was most unfortunate, the damaging effects attaching to it were soon eliminated by the personal influence of Sir Ronald Thomson, England's progressive and very enlightened minister in the Persian capital. Not only had Sir Ronald Thomson won the entire confidence of the Shah, but he pushed British interests to a foremost place by advocating most strongly the opening of the Karun River and the construction of a road between Teheran and Ahvaz, as well as the provision of a service of steamers on the Karun. Sir Ronald Thomson left Persia in 1886, and was succeeded in 1887 by Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, who carried the efforts of his predecessor several stages further—to the end that on October 30, 1888, the Karun River was declared to be open to international navigation as far as Ahvaz.

The year 1888 became a landmark in the economic evolution of Persia. Not only was a part of the Karūn River freed to commerce, but, on June 25, the first railway was opened under the auspices of a Belgian Company. This little line, with a length of five and a half miles, the first and last of its kind in Persia, ran from the capital to the mosque Shah Abdul-Azim. Since 1893 two branches, two and a half miles in length, to some neighbouring quarries have been added, but the lines, together with the Teheran tramway, built in 1889, ultimately passed into the hands of a Russian company.

While failure was not contemplated by the pioneers in the Persian field of concessions, the Imperial Bank of Persia yet represents almost the sole instance of success. Issued on January 30, 1889, to Baron Julius de Reuter, in exchange for the concession granted in 1872, the charter for the formation of a Persian State Bank carried with it the exclusive right of issuing bank-notes as well as control of a variety of mines and mineral deposits. Although the concession of 1872 had not materialized and Baron de Reuter lost the £40,000 which he had deposited with the Bank of England, Russia was known to be much annoyed at the character of Baron de Reuter's latest coup. As a reply thereto Prince Dolgorouki, the Russian Minister in Teheran, obtained in the following February a pre-emption over all railway concessions in Persia for the next

90 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

five years, as well as the right to establish a Russian Consul-General at Meshed through whom Russia at once began the steady subjection of Khorāsan to Russian influence. Seven months later, on September 2, the Persian State Bank was established by British royal charter, and on October 23, opened its doors at Teherān as the Imperial Bank of Persia, having bought out for £20,000 the New Oriental Banking Corporation that had recently started. In March 1890 British financial interests were granted a tobacco monopoly, while in November of the same year the Russian Government caused the terms of its Railway Agreement with Persia to be extended until 1900.

Secure in its possession of the rights over the mineral wealth of Persia, the Imperial Bank of Persia ceded in 1890 all powers in respect of mineral deposits to the Persian Bank Mining Rights Corporation, which went into liquidation in 1894. In 1891 the Imperial Tobacco Corporation developed from the concession of the tobacco monopoly. Unhappily the fate of this company was disastrous; for, while the Shah was engaged in exploiting the commercial development of the country in a way that was destined to bring into the private coffers of the Crown vast sums of money, popular feeling was being roused against the further malversation of Persian resources. In 1873 the pressure of national opinion brought about the recession of the Reuter

monopoly. In 1885 Prince Malkom Khan, Persian Minister in London, had written in favour of a Constitution, while since 1886 Jamal-ed-Din, first of the Young Persians and imbued with a passionate regard for the welfare of his country, had planted the seeds of constitutionalism in the breast of the nation by the propagation of doctrines from which an understanding of the injustice of their monarch's proceedings had grown up. When, in 1890, a monopoly of so intimate a feature of the life of the nation as the cultivation of tobacco was assigned to foreign interests, all shades of opinion were at once united. Led by the Mullahs, whose agitation was skilfully fanned by the intrigues of Russian agents, as the development of alien interests in Persia was opposed to the ultimate domination at which Russia aimed, the Corporation encountered the fiercest opposition. The climax was reached on January 4, 1892, when, after a serious riot at Teheran, a *firman* was issued by Nazir-ed-Din withdrawing the Concession. Three months later the Persian Government agreed, on April 5, to pay an indemnity of £500,000 that was to be met by a loan of £500,000 at 6 per cent. from the Imperial Bank of Persia on the security of the customs of the Persian Gulf. Somewhat similar misfortune attended a concession for the monopoly of lotteries which was granted to a Persian subject in the autumn of 1890. Ceded to a British syndicate for £40,000 it was withdrawn, inflict-

ing a direct loss of the purchase money upon the promoters.

With the retirement of Sir Henry Drummond Wolff for reasons of health in 1890 and the arrival of his successor, Sir Frank Lascelles, in the autumn of 1891, a new era in our relations with Persia may be said to have commenced. In spite of the enterprise of the Imperial Bank of Persia in developing a concession for a carriage road between Teheran and Ahvaz, British interests in Northern Persia were threatened with eclipse through the increasing importance that attached to Russia's commercial relations with the same region, supported as they were by the diplomatic activities of the Russian Minister in Teheran, and the efforts of the Russian Consul-General at Meshed. While these events were taking place in Northern Persia there were indications along the southern littoral of the kingdom that international influences were gravitating towards the Persian Gulf. In 1892 a treaty was concluded with the Sultan of Muscat by which that ruler bound himself not to cede any territory without consent from the British Government. Two years later, significant of the stress underlying the political coquetries of France with Russia, a French Consul was established at Muscat. Through the existence of the treaty which France had concluded with the Sultan of Muscat a generation before the British Government was no more able to oppose

In appointment, solely intended to contest the position of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, than it could prevent the further pinprick to which, in 1895, the Russian Government resorted.

With the intention of stopping the Indo-Trans-Caspian trade, which made Meshed its area of distribution, the Russian Government in 1895 announced a new tariff. Based upon a system of rigorous protection, it prohibited the importation into Turkestan of all British and Indian goods save those which Russia herself could not produce. At the same time it offered to Russian manufacturers railway rebates, equal to the taxes levied by Persia at the Perso-Russian frontier, on all goods of Russian manufacture that were destined for Persian markets. To Persian importers of Russian goods the Imperial Russian Treasury similarly paid a specific bounty, sufficient to cover both the cost of transport and the customs charges. In view of the assistance rendered to Russo-Persian trade by the Russian State, the practical extinction of Indian trade with north-eastern Persia would have been accomplished, if the Indian Government had not decided in 1896 to open out a trade route between Quetta and Seistan. As a matter of fact, the action of Russia in north-east Persia had aroused the attention of the Government of India as early as 1890; but a counter-move was impossible, since the Amir of Afghanistan occupied a portion of the region.

through which the suggested route would pass. By the terms of the Durand Agreement of 1893 this obstacle was removed. Between 1894 and 1896 boundary commissions delimited the Afghan-Baluch borders, upon completion of which work the new route was opened. In support of the action of Russia in Northern Persia France continued to press Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. While hostile tariffs in respect of Perso-Indian trade issued from St. Petersburg in 1896, with a view to facilitating the descent of Russia to the warm waters of the "British Lake" France endeavoured to coerce the Sultan of Muscat into granting her the lease of a coaling station on the Muscat coast. After a *pourparler* which was at once divulged to the British Resident, Downing Street communicated to the Quai d'Orsay the terms of the treaty of 1892, when the matter was arranged by Great Britain giving authority to the Sultan to lease a plot sufficient for the erection of a coal-shed inside the Bay.

At this stage in the titanic struggle between Great Britain and Russia for the trade of Persia a signal misfortune befell British interests through the assassination, on May 1, 1896, of Nazir-ed-Din at the hands of Hirza Reza, a Kerman shopkeeper and disciple of Sayyid Jamalu-ed-Din. The late Shāh appreciated the value of an understanding with Great Britain and in spite of the political advantages which described the Russian position, Russia had obtained

under his rule no very conspicuous success at our expense. With his successor, Muzaffar-ed-Din, who had been compelled to seek the financial assistance of the Imperial Bank of Persia, in order to travel from Tabriz, where he was crowned, and where, as Vali-Ahd he had resided as Governor-General of Azerbaijan, matters were different, since for many years he had been subject to Russian control. Among the difficulties confronting the new Shah at his accession was an entire absence of money. A loan was sought in the early months of 1898, when, although the sum wanted was only a million sterling, the Imperial Government did not follow the advice of Sir Mortimer Durand, then British Minister at Teheran, and guarantee the amount. British capitalists in negotiating demanded, therefore the right of placing their own agents in charge of those custom houses whose receipts were offered as security. Although in regard to a sum of £50,000 this point was conceded to the Imperial Bank of Persia, in respect of Bushire and Kermanshah, it was declined where it had reference to the larger sum. As a consequence the proposals fell through to the bitter disappointment of the Shah who, abandoning a contemplated visit to Europe, formed a most unfortunate impression of the British Government.

Compelled by stress of financial difficulties to find methods for improving the revenue, the reform of the customs department was now decided upon. The

services of a number of custom-house officials from Belgium were obtained, and a complete reorganisation of Persian methods begun. Under the supervision of M. Naus, lately Director-General of Persian Customs, the new system was instituted first at Tabriz and Kermanshah in March 1899, and twelve months later throughout the whole of Persia. Although the total Persian revenue at once appreciated the Shah himself was still pressed for funds, and in the summer of 1899 negotiations for a loan were opened again with London. Rendered impatient by delays, the Shah issued a *firman* in September which authorized the Russian Banque des Prêts, now called the Banque d'Escompte de Perse, to float a loan, when it became known that British capitalists were willing to advance £1,250,000 at 5 per cent. and issued at 82. This offer came too late for acceptance and, on January 30, 1900, the Russian Government officially announced the issue of a loan for £2,400,000. Secured upon the customs receipts of the whole of Persia, with the exception of those for the Persian Gulf, it was guaranteed, bore interest at 5 per cent. and was issued at 85.

Although Russia waived the right of control over the Persian customs, upon which British capitalists had insisted, she made it a condition that the balance of the British loan of 1892 should be paid off, and the indebtedness of the Persian Treasury to the Imperial Bank of Persia and the International Bank

of Commerce of Moscow liquidated. It was stipulated, too, that Persia should contract no other loan with a foreign Government for ten years. When the many obligations of the Persian Government had been satisfied but little more than a million sterling remained, and of this sum a large part was required for the expenses of a European tour on which the Shah embarked on April 12, 1900. Within a few months it was necessary for the Persian Government to appeal a second time to the indulgence of its northern neighbour. The advance of a million and a half sterling, which the Russian Government now made was conditional on the extension to 1912 of the period in which Persia was to refrain from borrowing from Powers other than Russia, and to 1902 of the terms of the Railway Agreement. The loans inflicted a severe blow on British commercial interests in Persia, cheerfully submitted for sacrifice by the Shah at the behest of the Imperial Russian Treasury. In the summer of 1902 the Shah made a second tour of Europe, visiting London in August. In return the Downe Mission repaired to Teheran to invest the Shah with the Order of the Garter and was so engaged on February 3, 1903, when it was proclaimed officially from St. Petersburg that a Russo-Persian Convention, revising the tariff of the Persian Customs in favour of Russia, had been signed on October 27, 1901—ten months before the Shah accepted the hospitality of the British Government.

ratified on December 13, 1902, and would be enforced from February 14, 1903. Roused by such unwelcome news, of which no inkling had reached the British Legation, Sir Arthur Hardinge within six days concluded the Anglo-Persian Convention of February 9, 1903, which, although entirely failing to repair the damage to British trade wrought by the sixteen-months-old Russian Convention, at least offers its own remarkable tribute to the capacity of British diplomacy in Persia at this period.

From this date it was not only in connection with the northern areas of the State that questions arose with Russia over the respective interests of the two countries in Persia. After experiencing the advantages to be gained by encroachment upon Khorasan it was hardly to be expected that the prospect of political difficulties with India would check the development of Russian policy in Eastern Persia. Accordingly, when Russia found that the facilities offered by the Nushki-Nasratabad route offset in great measure the penalties imposed upon Anglo-Indian trade by the Frontier Regulations of 1895 and the Russo-Persian Convention of 1901, she contrived in 1902, with the aid of enterprising M. Naus, to throw additional obstacles in the way of caravans from India. Besides a Customs Bureau under two Belgian officials which was established in Seistan, a Russian Consul was detailed to Nasratabad, their mutual efforts being supported

by a quarantine cordon, improperly brought into existence to check the spread of Indian plague as well as of Indian trade. Under the stress of these devices Indo-Persian trade was thrown into dire confusion, which was not materially reduced, by the announcement that the Government of India proposed to extend to Nushki the railway then terminating at Quetta.

Remonstrances addressed to Teheran seemed hardly to reach Seistan. For the moment the special measures, designed by Russia for the discomfiture of Anglo-Indian interests in a region offering equal convenience to Russia or India—according to the forward or defensive movements with which it might be concerned—were largely successful. Moreover, affairs in Seistan were already rather unsettled since the question of the waters of the Helmund River had arisen again between the Afghans and the Persians. By the early autumn of 1902 the controversy had begun to assume alarming dimensions, when by virtue of Article VI of the Treaty of Paris it was submitted to the arbitration of Great Britain. By virtue of this, early in January of 1903 an imposing Indian mission, under the leadership of Colonel Sir Henry MacMahon, arrived on the scene. Although experiencing the hostility of the Persians and arousing the indignation of the Russians, it remained in Seistan for three years, intent upon the demarcation of the Perso-Afghan boundary, and the

appropriation of the Helmund waters between the respective peoples of the border region. .

While the Government of India unravelled the riverine intricacies of the eastern border, the intrigues of the Powers in the Persian Gulf began to become a source of embarrassment to the position of Great Britain. Russia, with designs on a coaling station in the open waters of the south, Germany in search of a terminus for the proposed Baghdad Railway, and France in support of Russia, acting respectively through Teheran and Constantinople, had caused both Persia and Turkey to awaken to an interest in their rights over the tribes and littoral of the Persian Gulf. In support of the influences that were now at work many strange craft began to appear in the waters of the *mare Britannicum*, or what would have been it, true to our traditional policy, we had not constituted ourselves the custodian of international interests, besides carefully conserving the rights of Turkey and Persia. A German cruiser appeared at Kowyet and Basra in 1899; a Russian "medical" mission visited Bushire and Bunder Abbas in 1900; a pioneer steamer of the Volunteer Fleet, a commercial-political line hailing from the Black Sea and heavily subsidized by the Russian Government, called at Bushire, Muscat, Bunder Abbas, and Lingah in 1901, while in 1902 a French squadron had demonstrated before Muscat. In a zone hitherto exclusively British, where Continental trade had not

penetrated very far, foreign consuls appeared, their periods of greatest activity corresponding with the developments of the war in South Africa. Although trade in some districts was attracted temporarily by the numerous devices adopted for the purpose no lasting progress was made. In spite of the subsidies and rebates offered by Russia and Germany, no interests in the Persian Gulf equal in importance to-day those presided over by the house of Lynch Bros., the indefatigable pioneers of Anglo-Indian commerce in south-western Persia. Nor can the services of any other shipping compare with those daily rendered to the interests of navigation in Persian waters by the British Navy, and the not less admirable Mercantile and Indian Marine.

British prestige necessarily recoiled beneath the flutter of strange flags and bustling politicals that had descended upon the coast, and the task of maintaining the balance between the assertiveness and acquisitiveness of the newcomers and our own dominion called for no small degree of skill on the part of the Government of India. Happily at this trying period the fortunes of India were presided over by Lord Curzon, whose familiarity with the subtleties of policy in the Middle East gave the Government of India a ready mastery of the situation, that represents not the least conspicuous service of the many performed in the interests of the British Empire by the late Viceroy of India. Corresponding with

the operations of the intriguers, who strove wholeheartedly to undermine the edifice erected so laboriously by the hands of bygone generations of British builders, the Government of India dispatched additional consuls and vice-consuls to the areas of the Persian Gulf. Military officers were attached to Meshed and Teheran; the postal and telegraph services between India and Persia were extended and improved, and the duties of plague inspection added to the work of the medical officers appointed to the ports of Southern Persia. Under the parade of interests to which the energy of the Government of India gave rise, the position of Great Britain improved. It was not until the Imperial Bank of Persia came to the assistance of the Shah in 1903 by lending to his Majesty a sum of three hundred thousand pounds, provided for the purpose by the Government of India, that Anglo-Persian relations regained something of their earlier cordiality. The last touch of renovation, most impressive as also the least colourless, was provided by the tour of the Persian Gulf which the Viceroy of India made in 1904. By this journey a personal stimulus was imparted to the relations of the Government of India with British interests on the littoral of the Persian Gulf that should have prepared the way for an immediate return to the vigorous maintenance of the *status quo*, by which our policy was distinguished in the eighties of the late century:

In spite of the care which the Government of India had devoted to the restoration of Anglo-Indian interests in the Southern areas of the Shah's kingdom, the course of events in Persia was to be crossed by the inexorable influences of the unforeseen—in this case a complete upheaval of the domestic government of the country. The popular clamour which in 1872-73 had defeated the Reuter Concession, and caused in 1892 the withdrawal of the tobacco monopoly, showed the limits within which national exasperation at the practices of the Court could not be contained. Again, the murder of Nazir-ed-Din in 1896 expressed in a more sullen note the same spirit of antagonism. Docile and long-suffering, the Persian nation was vociferous only in extremity, and had permitted without complaint many concessions that the Shah had made to the nation in previous years to be ignored by his officials. When the Czar granted a form of parliamentary liberty to the Russian nation, however, the burdens of extortion, oppression and famine, by which the Persian people were weighed down, caused a prayer for an equal blessing to go up to the Shah from the hearts of his subjects. Unanimity of appeal was secured when, by way of protest against the misrule of the Court Party—among which are the royal princes, members of the ruling dynasty, the ministers and all Court followers—the mullahs and merchants of Teheran left the capital in December

1905 and took refuge at Kum, from where a demand for reforms was made upon the Shah. Alarmed by the situation thus precipitated the Court Party temporized, but failed to do anything. In July of 1906 the religious lawgivers of Teheran took up the cause of the reformers by abandoning their duties and setting forth in a body on a march to Kerbela. At the same time, fearing the vengeance of the Government, no less than 14,000 Persians of all classes took refuge in the compound of the British Legation and were not induced to leave until, on August 5, 1906, a Majlis was convoked in the following terms—

The Shah, since his accession to the throne, has always had the intention to introduce real and efficient reforms in all the departments of the State, so as to further the well-being of his people. For this purpose his Majesty has now decided that a National Council shall be formed at Teheran, composed of representatives of the Kajar princes (the royal tribe), clergy, nobles, merchants, and tradesmen. These representatives will be elected by their peers. The National Council shall deliberate on all important affairs of State, and shall have the power and right to express its views with freedom and full confidence in regard to all reforms which may be necessary to the welfare of the country. The result of the deliberations of the Council shall be submitted through the intermediary of the First Minister of State to the Shah for his Majesty's signature and shall then be carried into effect. The rules of

procedure of the National Council shall be drawn up with the approval of the members and shall receive the Shah's signature. The Council, after determining its rules of procedure, shall then begin to give effect to the sacred laws of Islam and to introduce the necessary reforms.

Despite this Ordinance, and the promulgation, on September 9, of the Regulation for the Elections to the National Assembly, the Court Party refused to take part in the elections and protested to the Shah against the summoning of Parliament. After more than a month had passed in attempts to modify the opposition of the Court Party, Muzaffar-ed-Din, stricken with mortal sickness as he was, assembled the objectors in his presence, and on September 30, 1906, addressed them as follows—

We know very well that the reason of your non-interference in the affairs of the Assembly which we have promulgated in the interests of the nation is due to the doubts infused in your minds by persons who are unaware of our intentions, and that you have, through a mistaken sense of loyalty to the person of your king, accepted them without reserve, and kept aloof. It becomes therefore necessary that we should personally explain our views to you.

When we were the Crown Prince of this kingdom we observed with pain and concern the masses of the people trodden down by unscrupulous officials, and confusion reigned in the various internal and external departments of State and chaos was supreme. We were then anxious to devise means to mitigate

these evils ; as, however, we had at the time to keep entirely aloof from affairs of State, no remedy was at hand, till in the ordinary course of nature the direction of the affairs of the kingdom came into our hands.

Upon our arrival in Teheran we repeatedly propounded our views to the Amin-us-Sultan, who after accepting them placed before us various obstacles and excuses from which we gathered that he was secretly not in accord with them.

Knowing that the late Mirza Ali Khan Aminud-Doulah was heartily desirous of giving effect to our wishes we placed the Premiership in his hands and fully informed him of what we desired to be done. It is due to this minister that strength and a larger field was given to our aims. He then with characteristic energy undertook to carry out our wishes, but pointed to us some cogent difficulties that were in the way which we instructed him to remove. As at the time Providence was against us we once again appointed Amin-us-Sultan and went into Europe. In our travels we were constantly consulting with him about giving a start to our long-deferred desires, which he faithfully promised to do on our return to Persia. When we arrived in Teheran we reminded him of his promise, whereupon he enlarged the Council of State. We then realized that not a soul was at the time in accord with us and that in opposition to our exalted and beneficent desires impenetrable walls of steel had been raised. We had then realized that still the will of Providence was not in our favour.

In our second trip through Europe we found our

surroundings free from uncongenial and opposing spirits, and repeated our long-deferred wishes to the Amin-us-Sultan. He forthwith assured us in a most convincing manner that, on return to Persia, he would without delay take active steps towards the attainment of our objects. When, however, the time for the fulfilment of these promises came, he put forth the usual excuses and obstacles.

Growing weary of the non-fulfilment of our long-deferred hopes and sick at heart at these prevarications we wanted to take a personal initiative in the matter. For various reasons we did not consider this step advisable at the time, and pressed Amin-us-Sultan, with the usual result. Having after a time realized our persistence he agreed to create a Council of State similar to those in existence in other free countries. This, too, did not come into existence.

We at last appointed Ain-ud-Dowlah Premier, and apprized him of our intentions. After agreeing with our wishes he suggested that the best way of overcoming the obstacles that were in his mind would be to reform the financial arrangements of the country, and devoted all his time to this end. At the start he met with complications which were in themselves the result of his failing to carry out our instructions in their entirety.

We have now placed the affairs of this realm in the hands of a man who has been brought up under our eyes, Mirza Nazrulla Khan, Mashir-ud-Dowlah, and have demanded from him the speedy realization of our views. He has for the welfare of the nation with very great activity and whole-heartedness removed all difficulties and has set our mind at rest.

We are very much pleased with the Mashir-ud-Dowlah and the ecclesiastical leaders of Islam—especially so with Aga Mir Syed Mahomed, Mojt-dhed, inasmuch as they most thoroughly gave effect to our wishes and carried the whole nation with them in the attainment of our long-deferred hopes, at the cost of their personal ease and comfort, making the Persian representative assembly an accomplished fact.

Then know you all that it has been through our own wish and initiative that this gift of liberty has been granted to our loyal subjects. We have with pleasure accepted the leadership of this Assembly, which is of our own creation. He who goes against this Assembly goes against our person. If you wish us to be pleased with you, speedily elect your representatives so that by the grace of God the elections may be completed.

Obedient to the Shah's behests the Court Party changed their attitude and the elections to the Majlis proceeded. In order to facilitate the reform movement the Russian and British Governments, who were in negotiation for the adjustment of the differences between their countries in Persia as elsewhere, offered a joint loan of £400,000 to Persia to relieve the more pressing needs of the State. Discussion of this proposal and the preparation of the code of fundamental laws or constitution by which the powers of the Throne and of the State were defined, occupied the Assembly so soon as its sittings opened on October 7, 1906. Strenuous opposition was

offered to both of these measures : from the Court Party to the proposed regulations, from the reformers to the loan. At first the Government Party drafted a form which was submitted for sanction to the Majlis. Three times it was sent back for alterations and three times the Majlis considered it. Finally, the Shah desired Parliament itself to submit something to him, which it did on November 6. Owing to the monarch's illness and the intrigues of the royal princes acceptance of the Constitution was deferred and it was not ratified until December 30, 1906, almost the eve of Muzaffar-ed-Din's death. By its powers written checks were placed upon the royal prerogatives of the Shah for the first time in Persian history. For the future the Persian monarch was no longer an absolute ruler, nor was he any more master of the lives and owner of the goods of his subjects. In complimentary phraseology he will continue to be described as the King of Kings, the Shadow of God and the Centre of the Universe; but stripped of hyperbole he has become an annuitant of the State with the revenues of the country removed from his control.

The articles prevent the monarch from altering or overruling the primogenital laws of succession, while the rights of the Throne to the Crown jewels and state properties, save for a small portion set aside for its private purpose, pass to the nation. In every way the autocratic privileges of the Shah are

modified; and where, hitherto, the Persian ruler exercised full liberty of action, the supreme control of affairs now passed to Parliament. Freedom of speech, the right of criticizing government measures and the liberty of the Press were conceded unconditionally, while Ministers of State were responsible to Parliament for their offices. In addition to a Lower House there was to be a Majlis-e-Sanah or Senate of Peers. The Throne was to have the power of dissolving Parliament and of summoning a new House, as well as the right of veto. All acts and statutes were to receive the formal sanction of the Shah before becoming law. In the Ministerial Departments a number of changes were also introduced. Ministers were empowered to take initiative without referring to the Crown; and as a check on possible abuse the right to requisition from Ministers of State any information that was required was conceded to members. Special clauses regulated the succession to the Crown, and vested it in the lineal descendants of Muzaffar-ed-Din, while the provisions made for the support of the royal establishments recall our own Civil List. A fixed proportion from the revenues of the province of Azerbaijan was set aside for the Vali Ahd or Crown Prince.

While the game of battle-dore and shuttlecock with the Kanam Assassi proceeded, the Majlis negatived early in December the proposals in respect of the Anglo-Russian loan, although the Shah and his

responsible Ministers supported them, and the policy of the Government was endorsed by the Vali Ahd. The conditions of the loan were as follows—

1. That the Persian Government should communicate to England and Russia the specific heads of expenditure on which the loan was to be spent.

2. That no expenditure on any of the heads embraced by Clause I should be made without the sanction of England and Russia.

3. That Russia shall not be able to charge any portion of her share of the present proposed loan to the payment of the outstanding balances on the loan of 1900 and 1902.

4. That the conditions of the contract shall be the same as those in the loan covenants of 1900 and 1902.

5. That four krore tumans of the present twenty krore tuman loan should be paid to the Persian Government by England and Russia in equal instalments within the present year. This period will be extended to four months in case of failure.

6. For this four krore tumans the Persian Government will undertake to guarantee the customs receipts of the northern division of Persia to Russia, and the receipts of the Post and Telegraph Offices to England. If the income derived from the latter two departments prove insufficient to recoup England's share of the loan, the customs of the Persian Gulf would be further guaranteed to England.

7. That the remainder sixteen krore tumans of the present loan will be gradually paid to Persia on her demand on the conditions on which the four

crore tumans will be paid to her after the signing of the contract for the present loan.

8. The present loan will be issued at 7 per cent.

Although the terms were not onerous the Majlis in its wish to avoid a foreign loan had conceived the project of creating a National Bank of Persia. Capital was to be subscribed entirely by the Persian nation and to be devoted to the redemption of the financial liabilities of the Persian Government to Foreign Powers.

As these events were taking place in Teheran the Foreign Ministers were drawing lots among themselves for the privilege of supplying the ailing monarch with the requisite professional advice. The Shah's condition becoming graver, urgent messages for the Vali Ahd to proceed to the capital to take up a regency were dispatched to Tabriz. Accompanied by an *entourage* that included Mahomed Ali's Russian physician, a Russian interpreter and the Russian tutor that was attached to the person of the Vali Ahd's son, the future Shah started for the capital, where he arrived on December 15. Here, again, international rivalries were uppermost. In the interests of the general peace of Persia, it had been agreed among the Foreign Representatives in Teheran, that no one of them should attempt to influence the situation against a colleague until opportunity for the adjustment of affairs had been given to the Vali Ahd. While the Ministers were

taking care to observe this self-denying ordinance the Russian Government stole a march and caused a gift of five thousand pounds and a military escort to be sent to Kazvin to await the arrival of the illustrious traveller.

Early in the New Year, on January 4, 1907, with his face towards Mecca, the Shah died, attended to the last by Dr. Lindley who, friend and physician, had been his daily companion for six years. The end came peacefully, painlessly, while Muzaffar-ed-Din was unconscious and seated in a chair—for the action of the heart forbade a more recumbent position. Mahomed Ali Shah succeeded his father on January 8, 1907, and from the first day of his reign was involved in difficulties with the Majlis. Exasperated at the action of the Majlis in rejecting the Anglo-Russian loan, he excluded its members from the ceremonies of the coronation which took place on January 19, as from the general durbar which was held on January 20. The policy of the reformers at this stage was purely passive. Their first efforts were directed towards securing from the advisers of their ruler the assurance that the Majlis would be represented in the formation of the new cabinet. Popular demands sought a charter for the National Bank and clamoured for the dismissal of the two Belgian officials—M. Naus, the head of the Persian Customs, and M. Priem, the financial administrator. As monetary considerations

solely governed the situation the Shah assented to the dismissal of the Belgians on February 10. A little later in the month he granted a charter for the incorporation of the National Bank of Persia, with a capital of five millions sterling, on the condition that a sum of £600,000 was loaned to the Government: the half of it before March 21—the new year of the Persian calendar—and at the rate that the proposed Anglo-Russian loan would have carried. Intense enthusiasm prevailed for a space when the assent of the Shah to the creation of a National Bank was made known. One hundred persons pledged themselves to contribute one thousand pounds apiece with which to start the scheme. With such support sufficient funds were at once forthcoming to enable an advance of £200,000 to be made to the Persian Treasury, at a 7 per cent. rate of interest and secured upon the revenue of the Persian Posts and Telegraphs. With this payments were made towards the arrears of pay which were due to the troops, and other pressing expenses.

With this accomplished, a Committee of Inquiry into State Expenditure was appointed. The annual deficit was £570,000; and a Budget was drawn up which showed, on paper, economies to the extent of £800,000, derived in the main from the suppression of pensions and the revision of the methods of tax collecting. In connection with the Budget a number of provincial officials, whose malfeasance

had added to the indebtedness of the State, were recalled, and pledges for the suppression of corrupt practices in the administration of government sought from the Ministers. Accustomed to the ways of autocracy, the Shah at times was reluctant to conform with the demands of the Majlis, the tension between the people and their ruler increasing from the suspicion that he was intriguing with the reactionary elements in the Government against the Constitution-
 alists. As the solution of administrative difficulties did not advance Mahomed Ali, accepting a suggestion made by the Russian Minister, recalled from exile Mirza Ali Askar Khan, Amin-es-Sultan and Atabeg Azam, for years the right-hand man of Nazir-ed-Din Shah. The intervention of the Atabeg Azam only bridged the crisis between the Majlis and the Shah, who now became the centre of a number of intrigues, behind some of which could be seen the influence of Russia. Signs of unrest, in part out of sympathy with the cause of reform, in part because the authority of the central government was weakening in its hold, began to appear in many quarters of the provinces. In particular, a dangerous spirit of revolt showed itself among the semi-independent tribes on the Persian frontiers, where encroachments threatened to be attended by serious complications. By August the aspect of affairs was undoubtedly grave. The course of events did not improve with the murder of the Amin-es-Sultan on

August 31 by Abbas Aza, a Nationalist fanatic—no less an adherent of the reform movement than was the assassin of Nazir-ed-Din. Such a deed necessarily created in the mind of the Shah an animus against the cause of the reformers.

Coincident with the death of the Amin-es-Sultan an announcement was made of the details of a treaty that, since 1905, had been in negotiation between Great Britain and Russia. By its provisions British and Russian interests in Persia were divided by a line which, in the case of the British sphere, ran from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman and Bunder Abbas; and, in the case of the Russian sphere, passed from Kasr-i-Shirin through Ispahan, Yezd and Kakhk, to terminate at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers. In accordance with this arrangement the areas dividing the sections allotted to Great Britain and Russia became a neutral zone, open to the commercial activities of any Power and including, besides the entire littoral of the Persian Gulf, an important part of Western Persia. The Treaty gave to Russia valuable political and economic advantages, and increased the security of India by preserving the integrity of Seistan.

While the terms of the Treaty came as a painful surprise to all who had at heart the welfare of British interests in the Middle East, the Persian people may be excused if they drew from the articles in respect

of Persia the unpleasant impression that England had divided their country with Russia. To dispel this idea, Mr. Marling, the *chargé d'affaires* of the British Legation in Teheran, addressed, on September 5, 1907, the following letter to the Persian Foreign Office :—

Information has reached me that the report is rife in Persia that the result of the Agreement concluded between England and Russia will be the intervention of these two Powers in Persia, and the partition of Persia between them. Your Excellency is aware that the negotiations between England and Russia are of a wholly different character, since the Mushíru'l-Mulk recently visited both St. Petersburg and London, and discussed the matter with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of both Powers, who explicitly declared to him the objects aimed at by their respective Governments in Persia, which assurances he has no doubt duly reported.

Sir Edward Grey has informed me of the substance of his conversations with the Mushíru'l-Mulk, and also of the substance of M. Isvolsky's declarations, officially communicated to the British Government. Sir Edward Grey informs me that he has explained to the Mushíru'l-Mulk that he and M. Isvolsky are completely in accord on two fundamental points.

Firstly, neither of the two Powers will interfere in the affairs of Persia unless injury is inflicted on the persons or property of their subjects.

Secondly, negotiations arising out of the Anglo-Russia Agreement must not violate the integrity and independence of Persia.

Sir Edward Grey also observes that hitherto antagonism has existed between England and Russia, each of whom has endeavoured to prevent the continuance of the other in Persia, and had this antagonism been prolonged in the present uncertain state of Persia, one or both of these two Powers might have been tempted to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia, so as not to allow the other to profit by the existing state of affairs, or to profit by it to the detriment of others. The object of the present negotiations between England and Russia is, to prevent such difficulties from arising between them, and these negotiations are in truth in no wise directed against Persia, as M. Isvolsky has clearly explained to the Mushirul-Mulk, saying, "Neither of the two Powers seeks anything from Persia, so that Persia can concentrate all her energies on the settlement of her internal affairs." Both Ministers are entirely in accord as to the policy of non-intervention in Persia, and have left no possible ground for doubt in the matter. M. Isvolsky's words, which include the intentions of England, are as follows: "Russia's general principle will be to refrain from any kind of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries so long as nothing injurious to her interests is done; and it is quite impossible that she should deviate from this principle in this present case."

As to the reported partition of Persia between Russia and England, concerning which it is asserted that the two Powers above mentioned wish to define spheres of influence for themselves, Sir Edward Grey and M. Isvolsky have explicitly declared that these reports have no foundation. What the two Powers

desire is to come to an agreement which will prevent future difficulties and disputes from arising, by guaranteeing that neither Power will aim at acquiring influence in those parts of Persia which are adjacent to the frontier of the other. This Agreement is injurious neither to the interests of Persia nor to those of any other foreign nation, since it binds only England and Russia not to embark on any course of action in Persia calculated to injure the interests of the other, and so in the future to deliver Persia from those demands which in the past have proved so injurious to the progress of Persia's political aspirations. This is what M. Isvolsky says—

“This Agreement between the two European Powers which have the greatest interests in Persia, based as it is on a guarantee of the independence and integrity of Persia, can only serve to further and promote Persian interests, for henceforth Persia, aided and assisted by these two powerful neighbouring States, can employ all her powers in internal reforms.”

From the above statements you will see how baseless and unfounded are these rumours which have lately prevailed in Persia in respect of the political ambitions of England and Russia in this country. The object of the two Powers, who in no way intend to attack Persia's independence, in making this Agreement is to assure for ever the independence of Persia. Not only do they not wish to have at hand any excuse for intervention, but their object in these friendly negotiations was not to allow one another to intervene on the pretext of safeguarding their interests. The two Powers hope

that in the future Persia will be for ever delivered from the fear of foreign intervention, and will thus be perfectly free to manage her own affairs in her own way, whereby advantage will accrue both to herself and to the whole world.

In spite of the reassuring nature of such a communication, the existence of the treaty added to the mistrust in which the Persians already held their Sovereign, increasing their grievances against him. Although each side gave way in minor matters a burning question soon arose, concerned at first solely with the amount of the Civil List. The Majlis, in the reforms provided for by the Budget Proposals of 1907, had arranged that the Shah should confine his expenditure in all matters appertaining to the royal establishments within a sum of £100,000, which had been set aside for his use. Mahomed Ali at first was pleased to regard this sum as a sufficient contribution to his needs, until his Treasurer explained that the upkeep of the royal establishments—that is, the harem, palaces, parks, household and Court disbursements—would entail at least as much again. For a time the Shah endeavoured to come to terms with the Majlis but the royal overtures were rejected with contumacy. A popular crisis now set in which the Shah endeavoured to meet by ratifying on October 7 the Supplementary Laws of the constitution. As the situation did not abate, warmed by the rising anger of the populace,

his Majesty paid on October 13 a State visit to the Majlis for the purpose of taking the oath of fidelity to the Constitution. Nonetheless difficulties continued to beset the Throne, and Cabinets followed each other into retirement in quick succession. After an audience of his Ministers on November 26, at which each was summarily rebuked, the Shah ordered a deputation from the Majlis to attend him on the following day. At this meeting, after threatening to dissolve the Chamber, his Majesty demanded that the consideration of Parliament should be given within four days to the following points—

1. That the Majlis had usurped certain royal prerogatives enjoyed by all Constitutional Monarchs in appointing or dismissing Cabinets and in choosing servants of the Crown for various appointments.

2. That to arrest the further spread of disorders in the country it was positively necessary to make a sharp distinction between legislative and executive powers.

3. That the legislative power, in accordance with the Constitution granted by his father and himself, shall be vested in the Majlis.

4. That the executive power must rest with the Government, guided by the Sovereign, who had already taken oath of fidelity in the Assembly and whose sole aim was to pacify his country and make his subjects, whom he regarded as his children, happy and contented.

5. That the secret and open societies of Teheran, which had done a good deal of mischief in fomenting

disturbances in the country, although there were a few good and right-thinking exceptions among them, must be suppressed, and stringent laws enacted to that end. So long as those societies existed public order could not be restored.

After several days' discussion of the Shah's demands, the representatives of the anjumans forwarded to the Sovereign on December 13 a letter of protest against the charges levelled at them. In it they asked for the expulsion of Saad-ed-Dowleh and Amir Bahadur, the leaders in the intrigues against the existing Cabinet. At the same time they convened a public meeting for December 14 at which Mahomed Ali's reply should be announced. In sympathy with this action, the Ministry tendered their resignations which the Shah accepted with reluctance on December 14. The news was not made known until the following day, when, conscious that he was standing at the parting of the ways and attributing to constitutional government the troubles which beset his kingdom, the Shah had resolved to effect a *coup d'état*. Early on the morning of December 15 a number of paid ruffians attacked the Majlis and raised riots in the bazaars, when the losses to life and property were considerable. By noon the capital was in a state of siege, the Shah's plans being completed with the imprisonment of the leader of the Cabinet, Naşir-el-Mulk, and the arrest of a number of other Ministers. Nothing further was attempted.

Acting on the instructions of Mr. Marling, Mr. Churchill, the Oriental Secretary of the British Legation, immediately secured the release of Nasir-el-Mulk, who is held in high esteem by the European residents in the Persian capital and is a graduate of Oxford, and the other members of the Cabinet. For the next few days Tehéran was divided between two armed camps: the Reactionaries, in possession of the Top Maidan or Gun Square, supporting Mahomed Ali; and the Constitutionalists, pledged to the protection of parliamentary rights and the principles of democracy, flocking to the Sipah Salar mosque. Meanwhile the Foreign Ministers counselled moderation; and on December 17 the Majlis petitioned the Shah, while it also appealed in a circular for the moral support of the Legations. For the rest, Cabinet Ministers, deputations from the Majlis and the representatives of the Foreign Powers came and went about the Palace, fading as images in a glass darkly, until under the united representations of all classes in the capital the Shah withheld his hand.

To the petition of the Assembly the Shah sent on December 18 the following answer—

Nasir-el-Mulk has been granted leave in accordance with his own wishes. I will now telegraph that he is permitted to go wherever he wishes, and further that wherever he may be he is to be treated with consideration. I bind myself to put into exe-

ention the laws which have been made by the Parliament. Ala-ed-Dowleh and Moin-ed-Dowleh have been released at the request of Asaf-ed-Dowleh. With regard to the protection of Parliament, I will concert with the Minister for War. With regard to the expulsion of Saad-ed-Dowleh, the necessary measures will be taken in a few days. I must explain that certain contentious points which are apparent in the framework of the Constitution which has been granted (to you) should, when they occur, be treated from both points of view. Those which relate to Parliament can be decided by Parliament itself. Those which concern the anjumans, the newspapers, and the press must, without compromise, be dealt with by the Government in order to remove the difficulties. The people who have committed acts of violence before the gate of Parliament shall be punished and the degree of requisite punishment established.

Two days later, December 20, the Shah appointed a new Cabinet, with Nizam-es-Sultan at its head, to open negotiations with the Majlis and on December 22, his Majesty agreed to the following conditions—

1. That Saad-ed-Dowleh, the chief of the Palace clique, should be expelled from the country..
2. That Amir Bahadur Jang should be expelled from Government service, although he could remain in the personal entourage of the Shah.
3. That the Cossacks and other military forces of the country should be under the control of the

Minister for War who in turn should be responsible to the Majlis.

4. That the rioters in the recent disturbances should be punished.

5. That a National guard of 200 men should be enrolled for the protection of the Majlis.

After the royal acquiescence had been announced to the Majlis, the Nizam-es-Sultan read to the assembled members the following oath which Mahomed Ali had inscribed, signed and sealed on the first page of a Koran—

As suspicion has recently been aroused amongst my people as to my lack of fidelity to the Constitution, I now swear by the Owner of this Koran (God) that I will remain faithful to the principles of Constitutionalism and that I will take care to safeguard them.

With the reading of this oath peace was established between the Assembly and its ruler. For the moment each side was satisfied with the assurances it had received, although the Shah's sincerity had been discounted by the reinstatement of the reactionary Nizam-es-Sultan—recalled from Shiraz for the purpose—as Prime Minister, and the arrangement made between them as to an increase of £20,000 in the amount of the Civil List. When the capital had become calmer the Shah sent, on December 26, for the Russian and British representatives and once more declared his intention of

supporting the Constitution. This assurance was remitted to the National Assembly by its two recipients, on December 30, in the following joint note—

I have duly received the letter of the National Assembly, dated 11 Ziî-Kade (December 17), concerning the events of the past few days. I have noted with the keenest interest the good intentions of the National Assembly.

All those who entertain towards Persia sentiments of profound and sincere good-will, and in particular the English Legation (and the Russian) which cherishes for this country the best wishes for its welfare and happiness, were impatiently awaiting the end of the recent troubles, and in this same spirit of humanity they have endeavoured to pacify the regrettable state of affairs latterly prevailing. They also wished to represent to his Majesty all the evil consequences which the continuation of so embroiled a situation would entail.

Thus I had not failed to obtain by friendly means the assurance that his Majesty entertains towards the Parliament only those sentiments which entirely accord with the happiness we desire for the country. In terms which were addressed to me personally his Majesty deigned to inform me of his firm resolve to act in accordance with the principles of the Constitution and in concert with the National Assembly, always respecting the fundamental laws.

As for myself, I have acquired the absolute conviction that for the future also his Majesty will not permit any measures which might be in opposition

to the oath and promise given to the National Assembly. I beg to offer my heartiest congratulations to Parliament on the occasion of this agreement being concluded. .

In begging your Excellency to be so good as to communicate the foregoing to the Members of the Hon. National Assembly, I believe myself justified in expressing the conviction that they will have a new proof of the friendly sentiments and profound good-will which unite England (and Russia) to Persia.

If calm had been restored to the capital by the close of 1907, the provinces, fomented by the actions of ignorant agitators, at the dawn of 1908 were seething with rebellion ; and the frontiers were aflame. On the Perso-Afghan border the Turcomans were ravaging the Meshed region ; Persian brigands were pillaging in the Caucasus and a wave of Kurdish activity had broken over the west. Complications with Turkey in one direction and Russia in another naturally followed. Although the influence of the Anglo-Russian treaty served to restrain Russia from well-merited reprisals, the Turks crossed the Persian border and still continue to hold, in the region of Lake Urumiah, territory to which they have not the slightest title. As the year advanced the position of His Majesty grew steadily more embarrassed. Failing a Minister who was competent to steer a middle course between the autocratic methods of the past and the modifications which the situation was

showing to be desirable, his Majesty was compelled to rely upon his Russian advisers, whose predilections were opposed to popular suffrage. As a consequence, the Majlis suspected the sincerity of their Sovereign and a vast impetus was given to the Nationalist movement. Similarly a significant increase took place in the numbers of the political clubs, many of which openly conducted a campaign against the Throne.

Committed to a general policy of intimidation, the reformers were united against the Persian ruler by variations of a common hostility which, on February 28, engineered a dastardly attempt upon the life of the monarch. Fortunately the plot miscarried; but against a party whose doctrines are emphasized by bombs there is obviously no alternative to repressive action. None the less, menaced by every form of political difficulty and embarrassed by the support which the British Government gave to the Nationalist movement, quâ Constitutional, Mahomed Ali delayed to put into practice the policy which, at heart, he was anxious to follow. In March, the discovery, at the last moment, of a second plot against the Throne caused the Shah to realize that, so long as the secret societies dominated the Assembly, there was no prospect of peace. Meanwhile all classes were suffering and the weeks passed without bringing any appreciable change in the situation. The exchequer was empty for the people had not paid taxes where there was a possibility that,

if the monies were returned to the officials of the Majlis, they would have to be made over a second time to the Crown. Trade was stagnant, and the incapacity of the Majlis was shown in the licence which the political clubs enjoyed. At their instigation a cessation of work had become general throughout the country. When the Shah found that the bazaars at Teheran had been closed he issued a *firman* calling upon the shopkeepers to take down their shutters on pain of being mulcted in the contents of their shops. As the anjumans prevented any general respect being shown to this order, the Shah determined to suppress them.

In view of the fact that it was to the advantage of Russia to see order restored in a territory where the whole of her sphere of influence was affected equally by conditions of anarchy, the Shah turned to the Russian Government for assistance in freeing the State from its enemies. An appeal in such circumstances was no doubt irresistible. Although no official help was forthcoming, the kindly offices of various persons were exercised unofficially on many occasions which were singularly opportune for the interests of the Shah. Instances of this occurred at Teheran, Resht, Tabriz, Baku, Tiflis, and elsewhere; but they were of little importance and implied personal indiscretions rather than deliberate evasions of the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention. Oddly enough financial interests were not con-

cerned in these questions. Nevertheless it has been frequently suggested that, crippled for lack of means, the Shah obtained an advance from the Banque d'Escompte de Perse for purposes which were represented in a perfectly transparent character by the military camp that he had formed beyond the gates of the capital. There, on June 3, Mahomed Ali took up his quarters. Thither a deputation from the Majlis turned its steps on June 16, bearing a Memorial from the National Assembly which elicited nothing beyond a significant reminder that the Throne of Persia had been won by the sword, and would be kept, if necessary, with its help.

The Shah resolutely held to his intentions. He instructed his Ministers to inform the Majlis that the basis upon which normal relations could be restored must include the banishment of the National leaders, the closing of the anjumans, the censorship of the press, and the increase of the strength of the Palace guards to 10,000 men. By way of encouragement he began to hasten his preparations in the camp beyond Teheran. In spite of this, the anjumans continued an active propaganda against the Throne. When, on the night of June 18, the Ministers warned the Majlis of the gravity of the situation, advising them to be reconciled to the Throne, the President of Parliament requested the Ministers to demand a written answer to the recent memorial

within twenty-four hours. The members of the Majlis agreed at the same time to fight to a finish.

When these tidings reached the Shah the ominous preparations of the people could be ignored no longer. Proclaiming a state of siege on June 22, he appointed as Military Governor of Teheran the Russian officer, Colonel Liakhoff, who commanded the Persian "Cossack" brigade, upon whom the Shah relied for the safety of his palace. On the appearance of the proclamation relations between the Shah and the Majlis were broken off, and vast hordes of panic-stricken people fled for sanctuary to the Legations. An hour before dawn on June 23 the Shah's troops surrounded the Parliament Buildings and ordered the dispersal of the members, who at once opened fire from the roof of the Majlis and killed thirty-seven of the Palace Cossacks. Before eleven o'clock the bombardment of the Baharistan and the Sipar Salar mosque had begun, fighting and firing continuing throughout the day. By dusk, despite heavy losses in the Royalist ranks, success rested with the Shah, although responsibility for a recourse to arms lay with the members of the deposed Majlis. At nightfall of the same day the British and Russian representatives advised Mahomed Afî to take immediate steps for the restoration of order. In accord with this, the Shah addressed to the Provincial Governors of the State on June 24 the subjoined rescript:—

As all are aware, various anjumans which had neither rules nor constitution, have been created. These anjumans persisted in interfering with the affairs of government to such a degree that the thread of affairs went from the hands of the Government, the desire of these anjumans being to carry on the government of the country as they pleased. As the result, a state of great confusion, dangerous to the Government and to the State, was fast approaching.

Further, newspapers and orators, supported by the anjumans, aided further to disturb and to interfere with the affairs of the State. For the carrying out of Government there must be a proper executive, composed of a limited number of sagacious and able men. We endeavoured to impress this fact upon the anjumans, and to draw their attention to their functions, with a view to preventing their mischievous excesses.

Owing to their reliance on the Majlis our sincere aims did not bear fruit. Moreover, some mischief-makers and disturbers of order, who have ever been desirous of bringing about a state of confusion, prevented the affairs of the country from running in their proper channels. At length, aiming as we do at the preservation and the welfare of this Empire, with which the Most High God has entrusted us, and wishing the security and the contentment of all our subjects, whom we look upon as our children, we decided to apprehend the mischief-mongers and to put a stop to their improper and injurious deeds. No sooner was this attempted than the Majlis protected them, and a number of agitators and sedition-makers sought refuge in the

Majlis, erected barricades against the Government troops, and resorted to the use of bombs and explosives.

We have therefore been compelled to dissolve the Majlis for three months from this day. At the expiration of that period, upright, pious and patriotic deputies shall be elected, and the Majlis shall be opened, together with the Senate, as laid down by the Constitution.

As the refugees in the Legations continued to cling to the protection of the Foreign Ministers, the following statement was issued to the nation on June 25 :—.

Our object is to maintain the security of the country and to ensure the peace of our people. It was for their well-being that we took steps to apprehend mischief-makers and agitators.

In order that innocent persons and peace-seeking subjects may be freed from fear and anxiety, and may enjoy our Imperial favours, in virtue of this rescript, we grant general pardon to all suspects.

As regards those who have been apprehended, a Court, composed of just and impartial men, shall be formed, and it shall make careful and perfect inquiry. Those proved innocent shall be set at liberty, provided that the people do not act contrary to the law proclaimed by the military government, and do not implicate themselves in acts contrary to order.

In spite of the reassuring words from the Throne, confidence did not at once return to the capital of a

ruler whose promise of amnesty was challenged by the setting up of a court of summary jurisdiction under the presidency of the Military Governor. If but few people were dead, many were in flight from the city and all who remained behind were cowed by the overwhelming rigours of martial law. Drum-head executions and domiciliary visits were imported from Russia; but most suggestive of the Russian influence which was riding the stricken city was the proclamation which Colonel Liakhoff posted in all public places. Withdrawn at the instance of the British Legation, it ran as follows :—

Agreeably to the Command of His Royal and Imperial Majesty (may our lives be his sacrifice !), and for the assurance of public security and the due enforcement of the laws regulating the internal order of the city of Teheran, I announce for the information of the public the matters hereinafter mentioned, together with the necessary general regulations which have been enacted—

1. The regulation of all the affairs and dispositions of the Capital is entrusted to the Officers and Cossacks of His Imperial Majesty's Brigade, the Gendarmerie, the regiments of Khalakh and Zarand, and the Police of the Department of Public Security.

2. Any persons transgressing the commands of the Law herein set forth, or failing in obedience thereto, will be prosecuted and punished with the utmost rigour. Persons suffering from tyranny or oppression of any kind are hereby permitted and

empowered to submit their complaints and appeals to this Office, or to lay them before me personally.

3. Offenders proved guilty of acts of tyranny and oppression towards such complainants will be summarily punished, and the wrongs suffered by the latter will be righted, under the supervision of an officer nominated by the Government. In cases of theft, assault or contumacy the victims of such acts must, on their occurrence, notify the officer in command at the nearest guard-house.

4. The prices of bread and meat must remain at the present rate. Should the normal price be raised, those responsible for such rise will be fined a sum of money double the amount of the difference between the normal price and the raised price at which they have sold.

5. Assemblies in the streets or open spaces of the city exceeding five persons, whether assembled to watch street performances or to listen to speeches, will be dispersed by armed force.

6. Persons engaged in the sale of firearms or their appurtenances are hereby warned that from this date onwards they are rigorously prohibited from selling such to any one without my permission. Permission to sell arms to persons who are in need of them will be granted by me only.

7. Seeing that the discharge of firearms in the town may give rise to the idea of some disturbance (should such occur), a number of Cossacks will at once be dispatched to that place to put down the disturbance. If a gun be discharged by mistake, the offender will be imprisoned for a definite period. If a gun be fired at a thief by night, some of the

Cossacks who are guarding the city will be detailed to enter the house and make the necessary investigations. Persons deliberately and wilfully discharging firearms will, when captured, be punished with the utmost rigour.

8. Should a ~~gun~~ be discharged from any house in the streets or quarters of the city in the direction of any street or place patrolled by the soldiers, who will be constantly on the move, that house will be destroyed and reduced to ruins by artillery and musketry, should it be clearly and certainly proved that ulterior motives prompted such discharge. In such cases the house will be destroyed and reduced to ruins with guns and cannon.

9. Persons who have been in the habit of depositing in the streets and thoroughfares loads of straw, firewood, planks and the like, are strictly forbidden to commit such acts in future.

10. Carriages and droshkys must stand one behind the other on the right-hand side of the street. Should any dispute be witnessed between the drivers, they will be punished.

11. The duty of scavenging, watering, and keeping in order the streets and thoroughfares is incumbent on the owners or tenants of the adjacent houses.

12. I desire all the inhabitants of Teheran to assist me in supervising all matters connected with the maintenance of order in the city.

(Signed) POLKOVNIK (COLONEL) LIÁKHOFF,

Officer in Command of the Mounted Cossack Brigade of his Imperial Majesty (may our lives be his sacrifice!).

It is in this connection perhaps necessary to point out that the Shah had surrendered the work of restoring order in Teheran to the hands of Colonel Liakhoff. With Captain Ushakoff and three non-commissioned officers, he is seconded without pay from the Russian army for service with the Brigade of Persian Cossacks in continuation of an arrangement with the Persian Government which has been in existence since 1879. The Russian Government, therefore, is not in any way identified with the acts or movements of the officers of the Brigade of Persian Cossacks, not even indeed where, with singular irresponsibility, Colonel Liakhoff has made bombastic allusions to the might of Russia and the Czar's friendship with the Shah. Loyal to their salt, the officers of the Brigade have fought the quarrels of the Persian Government with a complete freedom from prejudice; brutal and businesslike, they carried their men with them in their endeavours to crush the Constitutionalists precisely as any other officers would have done had they, having accepted service under a foreign government, been suddenly confronted with rebellion against the head of the State.

One of the first acts which Colonel Liakhoff did as Military Governor of Teheran was to place Cossack pickets on the approaches to the Foreign Legations, with a view to restraining fugitive Nationalists from finding refuge therein. Such an action of course represented a serious affront to the

respective Governments which, in the case of Great Britain, produced a significant sequel before the order was withdrawn. The correspondence concerning the apology that the Persian Government made to the British Legation in this connection explains itself, save for the fact that his Majesty the King recognized the services rendered on this occasion by Mr. Marling with the award of a Companionship of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. Dated July 2, 1908, the following communication was addressed from the British Legation to Ala-es-Sultaneh, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, by Mr. C. M. Marling, the *chargé d'affaires* :—

“ Your Highness,—I did not fail to communicate to my Government the contents of the telegram under date of 29th ult., in which, by the commands of his Imperial Majesty the Shah, your Highness expressed regret for the affronts which, during several days, were placed on his Britannic Majesty's Legation.

“ The instructions which I have to-day received from his Majesty's Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs direct me to inform your Highness that, in view of the repeated insults to which his Majesty's Legation, in spite of my formal protests, was exposed at the hands of the police and the Cossack brigade, his Majesty's Government, having carefully considered the grave situation which has thus been created, have formulated the following demands—

1. That the Cossacks and police be withdrawn

from the approaches of the Legation, and that British subjects and servants be not molested by them.

2. That a formal and full apology be offered to myself at the British Legation by the Minister of the Court on behalf of his Majesty the Shah, and by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Persian Government, both these high officials being in full uniform and due and sufficient notification of the intended visit being given beforehand.

3. That all persons who have been recently arrested while going to or coming from the Legation on ordinary business shall be immediately released.

4. That a written guarantee signed by his Majesty the Shah shall be given to me for the lives, persons, and property of the refugees now in the Legation.

5. That if, among those refugees there are any persons charged with crimes as distinct from political offences for which they are now amnestied, a fair trial shall be given to them, at which a member of his Britannic Majesty's Legation shall be present.

In pressing these demands upon your Highness, I am instructed to state also that, in the event of their not being immediately accepted and scrupulously fulfilled, his Britannic Majesty's Government will be compelled to take such steps as they may consider fit to obtain the reparation which they consider due to them. In accordance with the instructions of my Government, I have laid the above terms before his Imperial Majesty the Shah.

A week later, the subjoined answer, dated Teheran, July 9, 1908, was forthcoming :—

Sir,—~~C~~ognizance has been taken of the contents of your Note of July 2, containing five conditions which you stated that you proposed to the Persian Government in accordance with the instructions of your Government. The matter has been submitted to his Imperial Majesty the Shah, and in view of his Majesty's sacred resolve to give particular care to the protection and maintenance of the foundations of the friendship and concord existing between the two Governments, and in order to prove these pure intentions, his Imperial Majesty has agreed to the demands, and has commanded me to inform you of the acceptance of the conditions contained in your Note. Regarding the third point, you will, of course, inform the Persian Government who the persons are whose release is required, in order that the necessary orders may be given. With regard to the fourth point, security for the lives, property, and persons of the refugees in the Legation will be given ; but, as I have asked verbally, and, as the British Government are aware, I remind you of the necessity that some of the refugees in the Legation should travel for a time, since their presence is the cause of mischief, and their departure will conduce to the tranquillity of which the country is in so much need.

The necessary orders have been given for the execution of the above-mentioned conditions, and it is evident that you will consider this incident as completely closed. It is hoped that, just as the

Persian Government always endeavour as far as possible to meet the representations of the British Government, the latter will appreciate the good-will shown by the Persian Government.

I avail, etc.,

ALA-ES-SULTANEH MUHAMMAD ALI.

In accordance with the stipulations of the British Note, as represented by Clause 2 and Clause 5, Sultan Ali Khan, the Minister of the Court, and Ala-es-Sultaneh, suitably accompanied, attended the British Legation on July 11 to offer a formal apology on behalf of the Persian Government to Mr. Marling, as well as to give the required undertaking in respect of the safety of the refugees. The apology was as follows:—

The Imperial Government of Persia have learned with great regret that in the execution of measures which were designed only to maintain order and to assure the security of the inhabitants of the capital, certain subordinate officials, in carrying out their duty, have committed certain acts of disrespect towards the respected Legation of his Britannic Majesty, which have been contrary to their instructions. His Imperial Majesty, therefore, has been greatly displeased at the conduct of his officials, and has charged me to convey to your Excellency his sincere regrets for these incidents, which were in no way in conformity with his sentiments of friendship towards England.

While the guarantee ran thus:—

The Minister for Foreign Affairs,—As some Persian subjects, being afraid because of their past behaviour, have taken refuge in the British Legation, we, out of respect for that Legation, have forgiven them their past offences, and herein declare that the persons mentioned in the list given by the British Legation should be secure in respect of their lives, property, and persons, and that they may consider themselves amnestied for their past offences. Some of them who are the cause of mischief, although their past offences have been forgiven, should necessarily leave the country for a time. You should submit to us the list in order that we may fix the period of their absence.

If the Shah were master in his capital—with the aid of Colonel Liakhoff and the Brigade of Persian Cossacks—the floodgates of rebellion had burst over the province of Azerbaijan. After sanguinary fighting between the Royalist and Nationalist forces in the streets of Tabriz a Nationalist tribunal was set up which demanded, on August 31, acceptance from the Shah within five days of the following points—

1. A Ministry to be formed of Nationalists.
2. All Reactionaries to be exiled from Teheran.
3. Accordance of a full amnesty.
4. Election of Governors on a plan to be proposed by the political clubs.
5. The immediate convocation of the National Assembly.

Before the Persian Government had decided on

its course of action, an identical British and Russian Note was presented on September 8 to the Shah. Drawing his Majesty's attention to the disturbances in Tabriz and elsewhere, it urgently recommended him, with a view to reassuring the nation, to summon the Majlis to meet in November. In replying on September 19 to these representations the Persian Government, although agreeing to convoke a new Assembly, demurred at doing so until order had been restored in the provinces. To this end steps were directed on September 23 by the Minister of War calling upon Tabriz to surrender, failing which punitive measures would be taken. Two days later, applying the *surviter in modo* to the *fortiter in re*, of the Minister of War, Mahomed Ali ordered the convocation of a new parliament by a rescript which was as follows—

Whereas after the dissolution of the Majlis (a step taken in order to preserve order and to do away with mischief-makers and societies that were a source of insecurity to the country) we made it known that after order had been restored, agitation and confusion in the country had come to an end, and peace and quietness had been established, we would give a Majlis suitable to the state of the country and conformable with the Shar' (Sacred Law).

Now that the time for the convocation of the said Majlis is approaching, we notify to all Our subjects that by virtue of this rescript we fix

Shavval 19 (November 14) as the day for the opening of the Majlis.

The assembly shall be composed of upright and pious men of the country in order that it may be a means of safeguarding the people under the security and blessing of the Sacred Laws. It shall once for all remove all vestige of disorder produced by the anjumans, it shall give effect to our sacred objects—viz. to keep all parts of our Empire in security and order, to render the people contented and happy, and to do what is needed for the administration and economic progress of the country.

We command that the rules for elections shall be ready not later than Shavval 1 (October 17), so that both Chambers may be convoked at the appointed time and everybody may know what to do.

Be it known, however, that whereas the insurgents of Tabriz have carried their misdeeds to the utmost limit, committing murders and agitating and upsetting the whole city, the Government cannot refrain from punishing the insurgents and the mischief-makers. Therefore, until order and security is restored in Tabriz and the unfortunate inhabitants of that city are at peace, Tabriz shall be excluded from the provisions of this rescript.

Rescript dated Shaban 28 (September 25).

Undeterred by the prospect of reprisals and contemptuous of the Imperial message, the rebels in Tabriz added unmitigated insult to spirited defiance by issuing on September 29, in justification of the Nationalist cause, the following

APPEAL BY THE PEOPLE OF AZERBAIJAN, PERSIA, TO
THE CIVILIZED WORLD.

To all the lovers of humanity. To all who seek justice in five continents. Though we Persians, in religion and nationality, differ from you, yet the manner of Government in every country works for the common good of its people. But in humanity and justice and the seeking of righteousness we are all alike. We are drinking of the same spring. If we open the heart of a Japanese, who has the love of humanity, it will not be like the heart of a Russian, though he appear to be of the same clay. Likewise if we open the heart of an Englishman, and of a German, and of a Chinese, and of a Persian, we will find that they are of identical clay and water. In this way the face and the word of we Azerbaijanis, who are the lovers of freedom and justice, are turned towards you who have the blessings of justice and humanity. We pray you to give us your consideration. We adjure you to give us a fair hearing. Forget for one moment the bigotry of creeds, the prejudices of nationality, and give us the justice of your unbiassed conscience. If we are right, oblige the Ministers of our Government, even if they will not lend us the hand of help, at least that they do not pull us down. Tell those who inform you of Persian affairs to instruct you truthfully, and not to belittle the capabilities of Persians. . .

All these troubles are due to the blandishments of a few sycophants who for their own ends advertise the Divine right of Kings, who claim that opposition to the will of the Shah is opposition to Islam, and

that obedience to his wishes is obedience to God and the Prophet. Their practice is defined in the titles they give to the Shah—"The Shade of God," "The Trinity with God and the Prophet." For what purpose do they thus flatter him?

Certainly the King of a country should be superior to his subjects. He must be the fount of justice. If, however, a King does not exercise the justice which God has placed in his hands, he falls from his high estate, and loses his title to be called "the Shadow of God." Certainly, if his acts are in direct defiance to the will of God, he at once sacrifices his high office. The Prophets are all spotless and holy. Therefore, he cannot hope to be mentioned in the same breath with them. Let us now examine the circumstances in which a King thus falls from his high estate, and as a criminal becomes at once equally amenable to the laws of his country with the simplest citizens. It is in these circumstances: When the honourable love and respect of his subjects have been lost; when he has prostituted the honour of the country; when he has taken the public money to squander it in gratification of his carnal and bestial lusts; when he takes the people's money to give pensions and salaries to renegades and sycophants to the exclusion of his faithful and good subjects; when he deliberately takes the enemies of the true religion (foreigners) into his confidence, and delivers the State and army into their hands; when he prefers the offices of the ignorant and corrupt clergy to those of the priesthood that are proved holy and righteous; when he does not even stay his hand from wrecking a holy

mosque with his mercenary cannon ; when he betrays the just men of his country into the hands of barbarous infidels (Liakhoff and his Cossacks) ; when he dispels his councillors with cannon-shot ; when he is an accomplice to the murder of his innocent subjects ; when he breaks the solemn oath he has sworn on the Koran ; when he prostitutes the national honour by having to ask pardon of England, for acts committed in his name, and with his knowledge, by infidel mercenaries.

In such circumstances as these where can we find the " Divine right " of our King ? Yet we do not fasten the main responsibility upon his breast. It is with the circle of sycophants, scoundrels, traitors, and renegades, by whom he is surrounded, to whose counsels he listens, that the real responsibility lies. We, therefore, the people of Azerbaijan, recognize no Divine right in our King, and we point out that the time has now arrived for the King to put away all these iniquities which encompass him, and to allow the Ministers, properly appointed by the people, to carry on the affairs of State.

Is it to be said that the people of Persia are not the just persons to demand of their King justice and equity ?

With chaos in the capital, revolution in Tabriz, and an empty Treasury, the prospects of a speedy restoration of peace were not heightened by the dispatch of a force against the rebel citadel. While the days passed in desultory operations, fitted more to the domain of *opéra bouffe* than the field of Mars since a Persian army is less adept at suppressing

anarchy than in creating it by pillage, the confusion of the proceedings was increased by the desertion of the bulk of the Royalist forces. Without troops and lacking supplies, the Royalist general appealed for the assistance of the Brigade of Persian Cossacks in quelling the stout spirit of the city. With a promptness which revealed the excellence of the organization prevailing in the corps, a force was prepared. Paraded on October 11 for review by its Commanding Officer, at the conclusion of the march past, Colonel Liakhoff dismissed the Brigade to its destination with a glowing address.

O valiant soldiers and Cossacks! (said Colonel Liakhoff) Since the enrolment of your brigade you have repeatedly shown your unparalleled heroism, your unflinching obedience, and your sincere loyalty to the Shah and to your officers. For this devotion to duty many of you have been honoured with decorations, gifts, and other rewards both from the Emperor of Russia and from the Shah. Your effective onslaught on the Revolutionaries of Teheran in the House of Assembly and in the Sipar Salar mosque has excited the admiration of the whole world. A small detachment of your men succeeded in annihilating a good half of the Revolutionaries. You razed to the ground the refuge of their wickedness (*i. e.*, the Majlis), and thus you completed your victory. In that engagement many of your comrades fell, but that only helped to spread abroad the sound of your triumph.

The Shah's throne is endangered, for the people

of Tabriz have gathered from all sides numbers of base villains, have captured the cannon of the Government, and have presumed to declare war upon the Shah himself. They refuse to acknowledge his Majesty's authority, and are endeavouring to compel him to recognize the Constitution. The Constitution will limit and decrease the rights and prerogatives of the Cossacks, and will subject your salaries to its control. The Constitution is your enemy ; one you must combat with the last drop of your blood.

When I realized the position of the Shah I offered him the services of the Cossacks, for I was confident that they would achieve victory and honour in this struggle. The presence of the Cossacks will fill the enemy with fear and despair. . . . Victory over these timid rebels will make your name and your honour eternal, and you will once again astonish the world.

To save you from unnecessary hardship, either in travel or on the field of battle, I have provided against all your necessities. Be sure that if you return victorious you will be laden with money and every kind of reward from the Emperor of Russia as well as from the Shah. The capture of Tabriz is of the most vital importance to you. Remember that in the event of your triumph the Constitution will perish. If, on the other hand, the Constitutionalists are victorious, then the Cossacks will be for ever disbanded, and you, your wives, and children will starve. This you must not forget. Fight like lions ! Yourselves or the Constitution !

How I wish that I might accompany you on

this campaign! The political situation, alas, prevents me from doing so, and another Russian officer, Captain Ushakoff, will lead you. To him you must give the same love and obedience as you have given in the past to myself.

It should be explained that owing to a strong protest upon the part of the British Legation in Teheran, Captain Ushakoff was not allowed to proceed to Tabriz, but was replaced by a Persian officer. The Brigade of Persian Cossacks in connection with which this incident arose is a small force, fifteen hundred men all told. It is divided into four regiments of cavalry and two battalions of field artillery, and is the one effective military organization in Persia. From its inception in 1879 it has been furnished with Russian instructors and armed with the Berdan rifle and Russian guns. Regularly paid, properly fed and well turned out, the safety of the Persian ruler during the past few months has depended solely on its efficiency and devotion. Mahomed Ali is not unmindful of the services that the force has rendered; and proposes, when order is restored to his kingdom, to increase the establishment. The number of Russian officers is to be raised to six, and that of Russian non-commissioned officers to twelve. In future the officer commanding the corps will be subject directly to the Shah and be permitted to exercise a recruiting jurisdiction over the Shahsevan, a nomad tribe frequenting the Caspian

littoral. The contracts of the Russian officers now serving with the Brigade are to be renewed for a further term of twelve years. Colonel Liakhoff has already put in three years, but Captain Ushakoff has completed a longer term.

Although not at first deliberately decreeing the suppression of the Constitution, the Shah clutched at anything which might justify an evasion of the promises he had made in the rescript of September 25, and was quick to find a sufficient pretext for his action in the movements of his troops. Early in November, however, better material was furnished to his Majesty. At a public Durbar, held on November 7 at the Bagh-i-Shah for the purpose of renewing the Constitution, a spontaneous demonstration against the Shah's intentions was given—after much careful rehearsal—by an infinitesimal proportion of his subjects. Mahomed Ali was so moved by the prayers of a faithful three hundred that he at once promised to promulgate a rescript abolishing the Constitution, a proceeding that called forth a combined protest on November 8 from the representatives of Great Britain and Russia. In despair at the broken promises which littered the Throne and the tumult that was fast spreading through the kingdom, forty leading notables of Teheran drew up on November 16 a petition to the Parliaments of Europe which, when presented to the Foreign Legations, was couched as follows:—

In consequence of the illegal dissolution of their Parliament, a proceeding which has caused actual civil war in Azerbaijan and insecurity throughout the country, the Persian people labour under the yoke of tyranny and despotism. Through the medium of the undersigned duly accredited persons they appeal to the generous sympathies of the Parliaments of the civilized world, always the protectors of the oppressed. They hope that their anxious appeal will be heard, and that the Parliaments which have grown out of the desires of the nations for Liberty, will help them to win back that Liberty which has been so treacherously taken from them. They record their vigorous protest against the childish demonstration against the Constitution which took place at the Court. It was organized by violence and inspired by interested courtiers.

They wish to draw your attention to the single important point that so long as the Persian Parliament is not re-established on the lines of the Constitution, signed both by the late monarch and by the present Shah, peace and security cannot be attained nor international economic interests be safeguarded.

Although official recognition could not be given by the Legations to the Memorialists, when news of their action reached the Shah it elicited an immediate response, if not quite of the requisite description. Recalling his words at the Durbar of November 7, Mahomed Ali denounced the Constitution on November 22 in a rescript, addressed

to the Mullahs, which was posted in all the mosques of the capital. The essential clause of this proclamation which, in spirit, if not in words, offers defiance to the remonstrances of the Powers, ran :—

Having promised to summon a Parliament on November 14, we were prepared to redeem our word, but, learning from the assembled representatives of our people that they did not want a Constitution, a fact which they stated in writing, and being supplicated by the whole people not to convoke a Parliament we have decided to defer to their wishes.

As you have recognized that the establishment of a Parliament would conflict with the laws of Islam and all the ecclesiastics have declared so telegraphically or in writing, we, therefore, desist from such a plan, and in future under no pretext shall such a Parliament be established. Nevertheless, in the interests of justice we have given necessary instructions for the maintenance of justice. We summon the ecclesiastical body to communicate to the whole people this our resolve to protect the rights of our subjects and to frustrate the wicked designs of evil-doers in accordance with the religious law.—MAHOMED ALI, Shah.

As the result of vigorous protests by the Foreign Legations the rescript was removed on the next day at nightfall, giving place to a plan for the creation of a Council of State of a non-elective character. Controlled by the veto of the Throne, such an administrative body obviously offered no substantial


substitute for the abolition of the Constitution ; and, although it was at once set to work by the Shah on a revision of the laws, it quite failed to remedy the situation.

With the recital of these events this study draws to a close, unhappily accompanied by no prospect of Persia's returning fortunes, since the incidents which have marked the closing of the second year of Mahomed Ali's reign have been all ill-omened. Crisis has succeeded crisis, each one bringing the spectacle of a Persian *débâcle* perceptibly nearer until at best the situation sets out a truce with Fate, with misfortune, that only can be converted into something more enduring by the firmness of Great Britain and Russia. Consideration of the successive phases of the situation makes manifest the fact that the present plight of Persia arises from the attempt to replace autocratic methods by Constitutional principles at a moment when there is no reserve of parliamentary ability in the country. Under the influence of the example offered by the rise of the Russian Duma, Persian reformers have put the roof to an edifice which lacked foundations and it is about the Throne that the beams, as a consequence, have fallen. Absence of regret at the disaster need not imply condonation of the follies of an autocrat, nor lack of sympathy with any movement that has for its aim the regeneration of Persia. It would have been wiser, of course, had

the Shah not ridden quite so roughly over certain of the aspirations of the Majlis, but in extenuation it may be mentioned that, while its members constantly vilified their sovereign from their seats in the House, not one of the many evils in the position of Persia has been removed by them. Plans have been discussed and reforms mooted, but all proposals came to nothing because of the inability of the members of the Majlis to confine the exuberance of their imaginations within the domain of practical possibilities. A squadron of Persian cruisers for the Persian Gulf, a Persian trunk railway from the Russo-Persian frontier to the Shat-El-Arab, each State owned and Persian built, showed the same contempt of perspective that distinguished the project for a National Bank of Persia, which collapsed through lack of funds and the impossibility of finding a capital of five millions sterling in a country of which the total revenue was but little more than one million, which through pressure of provincial disorders had dried up. With no money at the disposal of the Throne, the departments of Government confronted by exhausted coffers, and the half of the kingdom in a condition of anarchy, the circumstances of Mahomed Ali Shah at the beginning of the third year of his reign afford a tragic illustration of the faith that holds chaos under parliamentary guidance to be better than some pretence of order under mitigated despotism.

GREAT BRITAIN, GERMANY AND THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY

WITH the latest arrangement in respect of the Baghdad Railway it is to be hoped that British interest in this remarkable project will revive. Undoubtedly a railway of the importance of the Baghdad system merits more careful consideration in England than it has hitherto received. Since the British Government in April 1903 declined to participate in the proposals for the international construction of the line which were put forward by German interests, conditions in the Middle East have undergone considerable change, but in nothing so much as in the relative positions held by Germany in Turkey and by Great Britain in Persia. Further, in view of the terms of the latest Anglo-Russian Convention, it may be said that the division of Persia between Russia and Great Britain that the treaty establishes removes from the unfettered control of Great Britain the sphere which so long has belonged to her. By the clauses of the Anglo-Russian Convention it will be remembered that Western Persia, which in many ways is identical with the region of the Persian Gulf,



is expressly excluded from the areas of the British *enclave*. If not in spirit, in effect at least the region has been surrendered to the interests of any who wish to exploit it. Yet it is not the expansion of Russian trade which is to be anticipated in this abandoned belt nor the development of Anglo-Indian trade, but the appearance of Germany, whose presence in Persia has only just begun to make itself felt and will become far more potent should a German railway connect the Persian Gulf with the Bosphorus. As things now are in Persia, it is only a question of time before the dual division, which now exists between Russia and Great Britain, gives way to a tripartite arrangement by which the Power that controls the Persian Gulf terminus of the Baghdad Railway will become the controlling factor in Western Persia. Thus there can be little doubt that the question of the Baghdad Railway is of greater importance than the oft-discussed Trans-Afghan line; so much greater, indeed, that it may be said to be the outstanding problem in the politics of the Middle East.

Until lately Germany has not been in a position in Persia to thwart the influence exercised there by Russia and Great Britain. On the other hand, dating from the days of the Berlin Congress and under a variety of pretexts, she has contrived to concentrate close attention upon Turkey, with whom her earlier associations began as far back as 1839.

and whose affairs to-day she may be said to overshadow to the practical exclusion of other European interests. At the same time it is worthy of note that the earliest Convention between Germany and Persia was concluded in 1873, although it is only since the spring of 1906 that she has appeared in Persia. Since June of that year a regular monthly service of steamers belonging to the Hamburg-America line has been plying to Basra, while German agents have been indefatigable in their efforts to promote a German scheme for the irrigation of the Karun Valley. Similarly, where once German interests held the concession for a Baghdad-Teheran Road there is now talk of a Baghdad-Teheran Railway. Lately, too, the German Orient Bank has established itself at the Persian capital, committed to the policy of assisting the economic development of the country wherever possible, and presumably through the medium of the German College, which was opened in October 1907. An extension of the bank's powers has already been demanded, and in a little time branches will have been established throughout the kingdom, so that by the time the Baghdad Railway is completed German interests in Persia will rest upon sound financial and commercial foundations.

It must not be supposed that German enterprise in Asiatic Turkey has followed the haphazard system by which Anglo-Indian interests have been built up in the Middle East, and from the defects of which

they are now suffering. Careful preparation has been made by German merchants, and a close study of the region by commercial agents has secured for German interests the attention of a market that had been created at the expense of Anglo-Indian merchants. Similar care and precaution have distinguished the reconnaissance which has been carried out in Southern Persia, the legitimate object of which has been to prepare German trade against the time when the Baghdad Railway will be in readiness to convey German exports direct to the Persian dealer. Germany, of course, does not object to the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention, since much of the country with which that instrument is concerned falls within the Russian sphere. It will be through the Russian Government that German commercial agents and political representatives will work whenever there are indications of a conflict between Anglo-German interests, until Germany's right to a special position in the "no-man's-land" of the late treaty is recognized.

At the present moment a large German trade, under the guise of Russian produce, filters into Western Persia, where there is a fixed determination to lay out a field for German interests to which the Baghdad Railway will be the essential feeder. Most energetic efforts are being made on behalf of German trade to force the pace in Western Persia in order that the Baghdad-Teheran extension may be provided

with a legitimate excuse. Hitherto Germany has maintained a diplomatic representative at Teheran who also attends to consular affairs, and a consul at Bushire; but a campaign has now been started for additional consuls at Resht, Tabriz, Ispahan and Kermanshah.

If effect is given to these proposals Anglo-Indian interests will receive an unpleasant shock. Western Persia already absorbs a considerable percentage of German trade, which well may be expected to increase under additional official protection. Passed off as Russian produce in coming from the north, it appears undisguised at Hamadan, Sultanabad, Disful, Shuster, Ispahan, Kermanshah, and Shiraz when imported through the Persian Gulf, and its growth in the region that must be regarded as the terminal area of the Baghdad Railway has been extraordinarily rapid. In 1895 Germany possessed no trade whatever with Persian ports. There were no exports; there were no imports; but, on the other hand, the exports from the United Kingdom to Bushire amounted to the value of £679,723. Since then the Baghdad Railway descended to *terra firma* from the clouds of political discussion; and, ten years later, German trade at Bushire alone was returned at £40,141. In the same interval British exports dropped to £322,167. Germany thus has become an important commercial factor in the Middle East.

If we consider this aspect of the situation, in

connection with that which will exist in Baghdad Province when the Baghdad Railway traverses it, it is obvious that the commercial supremacy which so long has distinguished our position in these regions will be most seriously threatened. It is significant of what the future may disclose that German trade should have already become in Mesopotamia the one important competitor with Anglo-Indian trade. Further, German trade with Baghdad Province is increasing with the same degree of steadiness that has distinguished its progression in Western Persia, the increase being due to the activities of the Baghdad importing houses, and their agencies in the Jewish colonies which are everywhere to be found. French and Russian trade is insignificant. Since the conflict lies between the commercial interests of Germany and Great Britain, in view of the evident determination of the Sultan and the German Emperor that the line should be constructed it is surely desirable for the British Government to reconsider its refusal to participate in the scheme.

Some years have elapsed since the Anatolian Railway Company secured the concession for the prolongation of their existing system to Baghdad from Konia, the terminus of their line. The Irade, in point of fact, was issued on January 16, 1902, and the final form of the convention was signed on March 5, 1903, at Constantinople. The terms of the concession are exceedingly one-sided. They impose

upon Turkey the penalty of an unusually heavy kilometric guarantee aggregating when the contribution to the working expenses of the completed sections is combined with the payments on behalf of further construction, but little less than a million sterling a year, when due allowance is made for probable revenue. Under the first head the kilometric annuity is 4,500 francs per kilometre ; while under the second the payment is 11,000 francs per kilometre. The two payments are only a little in excess of the kilometric guarantees made to the Anatolian Railway for the construction of the lines to Angora and Konia. But, since they are regulated by the gross kilometric receipts and many sections will be totally barren of revenue for many years to come, while the lines to Konia and Angora have the advantage of tapping the most rapidly developing area of Asia Minor, thus decreasing the disbursements by the Ottoman treasury, it is to be feared that there is no immediate prospect of reducing the burden. Much help may be anticipated when the irrigation of the Konia Plain and the restoration of Mesopotamia is completed.

As at present surveyed, the future railway will pass alongside, or as near as possible to, the towns of Karaman, Eregli, Kardash-Beli, Adana, Hamidie, Osmanie, Bagtcheh, Kazanali, Killis, Tel-Habesh, Harran, Ras'el Ain, Helif, Nisibin, Avniat, Mardin, Mosul, Tekrit, Sadijeh, Baghdad, Kerbela, Nedjef,

Zubeir, and Basra. Branch lines will run from Tel-Habesh to Aleppo for the Hedjas line ; from Harran to Urfa ; from Sadijeh to Khanikin ; from Zubeir to Koweit. Although more than six years have elapsed since the concession was granted, owing to the difficulty of finding security for the guarantees of the Ottoman Government little work has been done. The head of construction to-day does not at present extend beyond Bulgurlu, between which place and Konia, a distance of one hundred kilometres, exists the only portion that has been completed. Beyond Bulgurlu begin the real difficulties of construction, and for the passage of the Taurus range nearly one hundred miles of tunnelling and blasting will have to be done. Owing to the expense involved in the sections from Bulgurlu to Adana, and from Adana to Tel-Habesh, it has been estimated that the outlay here will be between twenty and twenty-five thousand pounds a kilometre. Great expenditure will also have to be faced in the Mesopotamian sections owing to the swamps and marshes which cover so large a part of this historic district. Until 1908 when, by arrangements made in the spring of that year the financial difficulties were overcome, the cost of carrying the line through the Taurus had proved prohibitive to Ottoman finances.

For a long time past the advantage of pushing well beyond the barrier of the Taurus, when further construction was once begun, has been recognized in

principle and determined upon so soon as the source of the guarantees was established. The delay attending the conversion and unification of the Ottoman Debt did not facilitate the task of finding funds for the guarantees, and the first section of the road was built without the character of the guarantee having been specifically determined. Between 1903 and 1906 German diplomacy turned its attention to the surplus revenues of the Ottoman Debt and finally decided in the latter year to earmark these funds as the railway guarantees. For a brief space in the autumn of 1906 the developments which arose in the course of negotiations between Turkey and the Powers, in regard to the increase of the Turkish Customs duties by 3 per cent. in the interests of Macedonian expenditure, threatened the very security upon which German interests had fastened. Without any ulterior motive, Great Britain demanded that, in addition to the revenues resulting from the increased tariff being applied to the needs of Macedonia, a further sum of £T250,000 per annum should be devoted to the same purpose out of the Turkish Government's share in the surplus of the revenues administered by the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt. The Turkish Government thereupon proposed to the Debt Council that £T250,000 should be charged on the surplus of the revenues ceded to the bond-holders. The Debt Council had duly approved this proposal, when such determined

objections were raised by the German Ambassador that it was withdrawn. The Germans had foreseen that if the surplus of the ceded revenues was assigned to the Powers their plan for financing the unconstructed sections of the Baghdad Railway would be defeated. As an alternative it was proposed that the £T250,000 should be charged on the surplus of the tithes assigned to the payment of the railway guarantees. Sir Adam Block, the British delegate on the Debt Council, being of opinion that owing to existing liens on this latter surplus the margin was too small, asked that a supplementary guarantee of £T50,000 per annum should be given on the surplus of the ceded revenues. German diplomacy was also successful in negating this proposal, such perspicacity receiving its reward when this identical security was assigned, by the terms of the *Irade* of May 22, 1908; as the source of the guarantees for the construction of the projected sections of the Baghdad Railway.

The German success was greater as the surplus of the revenues administered by the Ottoman Public Debt practically constituted the only source of relief to the Ottoman Treasury that was available when that department was hard pressed. The Ottoman Government was very reluctant to abandon such a source of revenue and it required eighteen months' patient effort on the part of the German Ambassador before the Porte would give way. The surplus of

the revenues ceded to the service of the Ottoman Public Debt was not sufficient of itself to furnish the guarantee for the interest on the construction loan. The amount required for the purposes of the loan was 227 million francs or rather less than nine millions sterling, and the annuity required for the services of the loan was £T572,000; while it dated from 1913. As the surplus of the ceded revenues only returned £T410,000 a supplementary charge of £T200,000 was given on the sheep-tax of the Aleppo district. This arrangement, although satisfying the requirements of the Baghdad Railway, means in regard to the £T410,000 that the funds, which would have returned to the control of the Ottoman Government in 1913 and become available for the carrying out of very urgent reforms, have been pledged in the interests of less pressing matters.

It should be noted that, if these charges fail by some mishap to provide the requisite sums, the interests of the Baghdad Railway are still protected. By the insertion of a clause in the financial agreement the Porte has undertaken to make good from the general revenues of the State any deficit in the guarantees. In that case the already overburdened Treasury will have to support a further onerous charge. Seven years have been allowed for completing the various sections and the loan, beginning with 1909, will be issued as it may be required for purposes of construction. It will bear interest at 4

per cent. with 0·8 sinking fund. The most noteworthy feature of the arrangement is the fact that once again new sections of the railway will be built without British assistance, since French and German financial interests have undertaken to provide annually the twenty or thirty millions of francs that are necessary for the fulfilment of the conditions of the contract.

By the terms of the *Irade* of 1908 the construction of four more sections of the Baghdad Railway was sanctioned: from Bulgurlu, the present terminus, to Helif, the junction station for the town of Mardin. A short branch line from Tel-Habesh will connect the trunk line with Aleppo, thus ensuring through communication with the Hedjaz Railway, a link to which the Sultan of Turkey attaches the greatest importance since it will provide through communication between the Bosphorus and the Holy Cities of Arabia. A period of twelve months is allowed from the signature of the Convention for the preparation and presentation of the plans of the proposed sections, which renders it probable that work will begin in the spring of 1909, and provides opportunity for a final and complete survey of the passage across the Taurus. So far as it is at present arranged the line after leaving Bulgurlu will break through the Taurus Mountains by the valley of the Tschakyd Tschai instead of by the pass of the Cilician Gates, which for centuries has been the

chief military and commercial route. The work of construction in this section, together with the task of surmounting the ridge which slopes down to the plain of Adana, will present the greatest difficulties for the engineers. These, however, will be lessened by the utilization of the French railway from Mersina, on the Gulf of Alexandretta, to Adana for the transport of materials. From Adana the route will follow an easterly direction across the Euphrates and along the foot of the Anti-Taurus range to Helif, which lies a little to the south of Mardin, the four sections aggregating eight hundred and forty kilometres.

When completed these four sections will have broken the back of the whole undertaking, and will have had the effect of bringing Germany's Trans-Asia-Minor-Railway five hundred miles nearer to Baghdad. Although the new sections will be more important to Turkey from a political than from a commercial point of view, it will be seen that a means of rapid transit for troops and supplies will greatly strengthen her military hold on the eastern littoral of the Red Sea. At the same time it offers important strategical advantages in the event of operations against Persia or against the Russians in Trans-Caucasia. The real interest excited by the railway, however, is due to the fact that it is a German undertaking. As such it promises to make German influence predominant throughout the Near

East and Middle East. As the line advances so will German interests, commercial nominally, political in reality. Each step will bring into greater prominence the awkward situation that will be created for Anglo-Indian interests in Persia and in the Euphrates-Tigris region. Should Germany eventually attain the summit of her ambition and secure a port on the Persian Gulf as the terminus of the railway, the menace offered to our communications with India by the setting up of a second naval Power in the Persian Gulf will have to be considered. France, too, will be unpleasantly hampered in her privileged position in Syria for, when the Baghdad Railway gets through to Aleppo, German interests are sure to obtain control of the French line, Hamah-Damascus-Beyrout, and German influence will then become paramount in Syria. France thus may see her claim to the guardianship of the Christians in Palestine seriously challenged by the Kaiser who, since his visit to Jerusalem, has yearned to pose as the champion of Christendom in the Holy Land. Similarly in this connection it should be remembered that the present debt of Turkey, comprised under the Decrees of 1881 and 1903, will be paid off in about forty-five years. The ceded revenues would then revert to the Turkish Government, and the bond-holders and their delegates on the administration of the Ottoman Debt would disappear. The Baghdad Railway Concession covers

a period of ninety-nine years ; and, if the Ottoman Public Debt is extinguished about the middle of the present century, the German Government would no doubt arrange for the annuity of £T572,000 to be a first charge on the ceded revenues. By such a development the German delegate would remain in sole control and German influence in Turkey would hold a position precisely similar to that which British influence fills in Egypt.

Although the length of the Baghdad Railway does not appear in the terms of the Convention, it may be roughly estimated at 1,750 miles. The lines already under German control (the Smyrna-Kassaba and the Mersina-Adana Railways); as well as the existing Anatolian Railway, aggregate 1,025 miles, so that the general total of Germany's railway system in Asiatic Turkey, independent of any future extension in the direction of the Syrian and Arabian lines, will some day become 2,800 miles. For purposes of construction the Baghdad line is divided into sections of 200 kilometres, more or less. These sections comprise, starting from Konia, the following twelve links, with which are mentioned their suggested branch lines : Konia-Eregli, Eregli-Adana, Adana-Tell-Habesh—branch line to Aleppo and connection with the Hedjaz Railway, Tell-Habesh-Harran—branch line to Urfa, Harran-Helif, Helif-Mosul, Mosul-Tekrit, Tekrit-Baghdad—branch line from Sadijeh to Khanikin, Baghdad-Nedjef, Nedjef-

Zubeir and Basra ; Zubeir-Koweit. As has been stated the concession covers a period of ninety-nine years. But its life will be prolonged beyond this time, since the term exists separately for each section into which construction has been divided, actually dating from the time when the bonds in connection with the particular sections are issued. In the same way the life of the parent company, the Anatolian Railway Company, has been extended. By the Articles of Association work had to begin upon the first section within three months from the passing of the plans, and to be completed within two years. Eight years are allotted for the construction of the trunk route and the affiliated branches. This period is liable to expansion upon certain conditions, the existence of which will not be difficult to prove ; while, until the gross kilometric receipts have reached the sum of 30,000 francs per annum, the Baghdad Railway will be a single line. Although the Anatolian Railway Company is the parent company, the name of the railway from Konia to the Persian Gulf is the Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company, a change of name that does not disguise the controlling powers that German interests will exercise.

With regard to the construction of the line, the gauge is to be 1·435-1·455 metres inside the rails. In connection with the train service there will be a daily service of ordinary trains, a weekly express

between Haidar Pasha and Aleppo, and a fortnightly service to the Persian Gulf. For the first five years speed is to be restricted to forty-five kilometres per hour, which will make the journey between Constantinople and the Persian Gulf a matter of three days. Later it is proposed to accelerate the service and reduce the time to fifty-four hours. The initial capital was fixed at 15,000,000 *francs*, but considerably more than 15,000,000 *sterling* will not improbably be required before the venture is completed. Of the sum mentioned in the articles the parent company must subscribe 10 per cent, and the Ottoman Government is to contribute an equal sum. The affairs of the company are administered by a council of eleven members, three of whom are to be nominated by the Anatolian Company and three by the Turkish Government, leaving five seats for all other interests.

Many things have occurred to modify these conditions. Capital has been brought in and the several financial groups—Swiss, Austrian, French—have been given representation proportionate with the amount of the German interests on the directorate. The original capital was of course exhausted by the expenditure upon the first section, Konia-Eregli, and recourse was had to the Swiss, Austrian and French interests that are supporting German initiative in the undertaking. Although the traffic receipts on the initial section do not yet equal the

amount guaranteed by the Ottoman Government and are unlikely to do so until the line has been provided with a sea-to-sea connection, from the Sea of Marmora to the Gulf of Adalia, over the metals of the Mersina-Adana system the substantial guarantee paid by the Ottoman Treasury enables the contributing financial interests to ignore the inadequacy of the traffic returns. From time to time it has been frequently reported that British financial interests had decided at last to participate and would combine with French interests in building a short link from Eregli to Bulgurlu. The wish perhaps was father to the thought for until the British Government changes its attitude to the Baghdad Railway, which it is to be hoped will soon take place, British capital will not be seriously engaged. French capital, however, is neither so discriminating nor so punctilious.

Although the Baghdad Railway scheme is receiving no support from the French Government, which objecting to the ownership and control of the line being in the hands of a single Power has taken measures to prevent the issue on the French market of the shares of any company connected with the project, yet the railway has been accorded from the first powerful financial assistance in France. Indeed two years ago French capital was so heavily engaged that seven out of twenty-seven directors of the company were of French nationality. Amongst the twenty other directors, too, there were nine who

were not German and a few others who could be said to represent French interests,¹ so that very nearly half the board was French. The French directors, who were the nominees rather than the principals of the French syndicate and still represent French interests in the enterprise, are M. Deffes, director of the Franco-Ottoman Bank, Constantinople ; Comte G. d'Arnoux, director of the Public Ottoman Debt, Constantinople ; M. Gaston Auboyneau, member of the Board of Control of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, Paris ; M. Berger, French delegate on the Board of Administrators of the Ottoman Public Debt, Constantinople ; M. Pyrame-Navill, member of the Board of Control of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, Paris ; Baron de Neuflize, manager of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, Paris ; and M. Turrettini, director of La Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas, Paris.

The nine other directors, who were not German, and of whom some were associated with French interests, are M. Abegg-Arter, chairman of the Banque de Credit Suisse, Zurich ; M. Bedros Effendi Azarian, banker, Constantinople ; M. Euenidis, banker, Constantinople ; Handi Bey, Turkish delegate on the Board of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, Constantinople ; M. Carlo-Esterle, delegate of the Board of Directors of the Societe Generale Italienne d'Electricite Edison, Milan ; Høene Effendi, Under-Secretary of the Imperial Posts and Télégraphs, Constantinople ; M. Huguenin,

director of the Chemin de Fer d'Anatolie, Constantinople ; Pangiris Bey, director of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, Constantinople ; and M. Pissard, Constantinople. The German directors are Herr Arthur G. Winner, director of the Deutsche Bank, Berlin ; Herr C. Testa, German delegate on the Board of the Ottoman Public Debt, Constantinople ; Herr Otto Braunfels, Consul, Frankfurt-on-the-Main ; Herr A. von Kaulla, member of the Board of Control of the Bank of Würtemberg, Stuttgart ; Herr O. von Kuhlmann, member of the Board of Control of the Bank of Bavaria, Munich ; Herr K. Schrader, railway director, member of the Reichstag and member of the Board of Directors of the Deutsche Bank, Berlin ; Dr. P. Schwabach, consul, Berlin ; Herr M. Steinthal, director of the Deutsche Bank, Berlin ; Herr K. Sogermayer, director of the Bank Vereius, Vienna ; Herr C. Wese, Constantinople ; and D. K. Zander, director of the Anatolian Railways, Berlin.

From the cosmopolitan character of the board of directors and the capital interests concerned it will be seen that the Baghdad Railway enterprise is by no means at a standstill for want of funds. Quietly but steadily, and in the main owing to French assistance, the Germans have obtained all, or at least the bulk, of the financial support that they require. The present loan of nine millions sterling for the four sections that soon will be put in hand is so apportioned that it would be almost impossible to assign a share

of it to British interests, were application to be made. Unavoidably the answer would have to be that the request was made too late. Undoubtedly on the next occasion British co-operation would be accepted in the remaining sections. But as British interests await the decision of the British Government and the work progresses, the German position continues to grow stronger while the place in the enterprise that England can hope to obtain by peaceful means continues to diminish.

Important features of the concession are the minor rights which accompany it. Embracing mining, agricultural, quarrying and timber rights within a zone twenty kilometres wide on either side of the railway, they are capable of furnishing important supplementary revenues. Further, the company is exempt from taxation and all material and everything in connection with the construction is free from customs duty. Again, it has been granted the right to found ports on the Tigris at Baghdad, at Basra, and at the future terminus on the Persian Gulf, as well as unrestricted liberty of navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates, thus acquiring potential control over the inland waterways of Mesopotamia. In connection with these supplementary rights, notice must be taken of the powers of extension towards the railway systems of Syria and Northern Arabia which the trunk line possesses. There is little doubt that when a union has been effected with the Hamah-

Damascus-Beyrout Railway, it is intended to adopt the Sultan's suggestion and take over the management of the Hedjaz Railway. Similarly, in this direction, it is impossible to ignore the stipulation that no section of the Baghdad-Basra line may be built until the line from Konia to Baghdad has been completed. An unpleasantly restrictive prohibition, it is of course aimed at checking any advantage which might have accrued to Anglo-Indian commercial interests by the construction of a railway from the head of the Persian Gulf to Baghdad before the other sections of the line were completed.

Sufficient has now been written about the Baghdad Railway to disclose the character of the concession, the terms¹ of which merit careful consideration. Since the political aspect of affairs in the Near East is always unsettled and German supremacy in Turkey depends very largely upon the life of Abdul Hamid, it has been the aim of German policy to engineer an international combination which, while protecting her specific interests in the Baghdad Railway, would introduce the co-operation of Russia, France, Austria, and particularly Great Britain. Inspired by this view, almost before the terms were agreed upon in 1902, the interests of the Deutsche Bank were discreetly testing the feeling of financial circles in London and Paris as to the joint construction of the proposed line.

¹ The Baghdad Railway Convention will be found in the Appendix.

From these preliminary overtures matters passed in the spring of 1903 to the direct proposal that Great Britain and France should co-operate in the construction of the Baghdad Railway. Although promises of unofficial French support were at once forthcoming the proposals put forward in London were of an impossible character, and were finally declined.

It is unnecessary here to reopen the discussion of these terms. Nothing has occurred in the interval that has elapsed since 1903 to modify the special claim to financial and working control over the railway that German interests put forward. Whether Germany can do without our help or not is immaterial. While it is quite within her power to construct the railway, that fact does not make it more fitting for us to accept conditions which imposed upon British interests considerable inequality with the rights allocated to Germany. It is, therefore, useless to attempt to arrive at an understanding on the basis of the original terms, but there should be nothing at this moment to prevent a reconsideration of the whole question from an alternative point of view. Joint control is impossible, for German direction of British financial interests would lead to friction. Yet what is to prevent the separation of the various interests and the apportionment of particular spheres of activity and interest between German, French, and British capital? By this means the conflict now impending between the commercial

interests of Germany and Great Britain in the Near East and in the Middle East might be avoided. Germany has not yet won a position in the Middle East that can be said to correspond with the position which British trade holds in the Near East, so German interests could not very well object to a division that restricted their participation in the Baghdad Railway to the areas beyond Baghdad Province. By this means a very fair adjustment of the situation would be found. German interests could have West and Central Asia Minor for their area of development and exploitation. Baghdad Province, pre-eminently an Anglo-Indian field and necessarily including Mesopotamia, would become the British sphere; and France would be happily placed in Syria. The Imperial Government could then entertain no apprehension on the subject of a sinking fund for the construction of the railway or of guaranteeing the interest if it became a private undertaking. At the same time the entire project could be made part of a general reorganization of British Policy in Western Asia. Under the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention, so many opportunities for encroachment exist that the British Government should certainly lead the way in any work that is destined to provide for the perpetual paramountcy of Great Britain in this region.

In a measure the opportunity now presents itself and an important step towards the solution of the

problems of the Middle East would be taken if Germany would permit Great Britain to build the Baghdad Province section of the Baghdad Railway. If this were done, attention might be paid to the necessity that exists for a comparison system of commercial railways in Western Persia. The two systems, the Baghdad Province section and the Western Persian section, should properly belong to one service. They could be built from the same sinking fund, and the departure would indicate a welcome recognition of the importance of assisting British interests in the Middle East. As matters are, Great Britain can make no headway on the Turco-Persian border for the Baghdad Railway Concession includes the right to construct a branch line to Khanikin from Sadijeh, while Khanikin itself falls within the Russian sphere of influence. If the construction of the Baghdad Province section became a British interest, terms could be arranged with Russia by which the branch line could pass into our keeping. The plans then could be recast and from the projected terminus of the Baghdad Railway a Western Persian railway system could be built which would be linked with the Baghdad system *via* Khanikin.

In connection with such a scheme—and it must be regarded as the corollary of the Baghdad Railway—Mohamera is perhaps the best starting-point since from it a chain of communications could be laid which would link up most of the important

centres in Western Persia. With but little trouble the system could pass through the Karun Valley to Shuster and thence after arrangement with Russia communicate with Teheran *via* Burjird and Sultanaabad, projecting branches, as it passed, to Kermanshah and Hamadan in one direction, Ispahan and Shiraz in another. The cost of the two ventures need not exceed ten millions sterling. It might be provided by Government or if endorsed by a Government guarantee and provided with a sinking fund, the capital would be forthcoming from the public. A single line would suffice at least for the nonce. There is no need to look askance at this suggestion. It is eminently practicable, and it would have a most encouraging effect upon British trade in the interested spheres of Persia and Turkey. Moreover, there should be nothing to stop it for, now that Great Britain has come to an agreement with Russia in respect of Persia, there is little doubt that the Russo-Persian Railway Agreement could be circumvented. In its early days it was certainly an advantage to Russian policy. That was in 1890 and Great Britain can hardly be bound to-day by conditions, in respect of Persia, which have never been divulged to the world nor even communicated diplomatically to the interested Powers.

In consideration of these points it should not be forgotten that the Baghdad Railway possesses the right of approach to the Persian Gulf, as well as the

power to control the Baghdad-Teheran trade route through the suggested branch line to Khanikin. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the Anglo-Russian Convention places an unfortunate complexion upon the future of British trade in this same region. If these three things are considered together as they should be it will be seen that, through unforeseen circumstances, British interests in Western Persia are threatened with a competition before which they will be practically helpless. On these grounds, then, it is surely wiser that Germany, our principal competitor, should not secure any avoidable advantages. Further, it is no less inadvisable for Great Britain to permit any Power to possess such independent rights over the head-waters of the Persian Gulf as are bestowed by the terms of the Baghdad Railway Concession and the Anglo-Russian Convention. Under the circumstances a compromise is desirable, less out of hostility to Germany and Russia than because of the wisdom of avoiding possible causes of friction in the Middle East.

Of the various solutions, that which favours the division of the concession upon a basis which permits Great Britain to control the section of the line which traverses Baghdad Province is the best, if not the only one. Under its application Great Britain would be relieved of all possible anxieties arising out of the presence of Germany in the Persian Gulf, since all

rights in respect of that terminus, and the control of the inland waterways conferred by the Articles of the Agreement would revert to Great Britain. From that moment it might be justly claimed that a new field for our economic expansion had been found, for if we take over the construction of the Baghdad Province section of the railway we must identify ourselves no less with the task of restoring Mesopotamia. Such a work is within the bounds of possibility. The railway obviously will give a fillip to native activities in the Middle East that, under the inspiring guidance of Great Britain, could be directed into the most profitable channels. Great Britain's political and commercial relations with Baghdad Province and the regions of the Euphrates and the Tigris are important enough, but the future of these lands lies in the re-irrigation of their historical areas. Nothing better can be conceived than the utilization of the two rivers in the wonderful project that Sir William Willcocks has planned for the reconstruction of the Garden of Eden. In that direction India would find a valuable field for its surplus labour, and of a kind, too, that no European Power in the world could exploit with success.

Considering the overwhelming importance of British interests in the Persian Gulf, in Western Persia, and in Baghdad Province, responsibility for the rejuvenation of Mesopotamia must be a British interest.

In many ways it is a task that the Imperial Government cannot afford to see in other hands, and no effort should be left untried in order to secure such a basis to our co-operation with Germany in the building of the Baghdad Railway. Such co-operation is in the nature of insurance against business losses not otherwise to be avoided. If we fail to secure our position now we shall not remedy the situation when the loss comes when, by reason of past declaration of policy in respect of the Persian Gulf, we shall be confronted with a most humiliating position. The situation is eminently suited to a compromise, while the obstacles to a happy understanding are by no means insuperable. If German interests are anticipating the spectacular development of any special industrial feature appertaining to the region, priority of claim in commercial issues could be acknowledged so long as Great Britain had assured control of the section of the railway from where it will enter the northern confines of Baghdad Province to its arrival at the Persian Gulf. If essential the British section could be reduced to the link between Baghdad city and the Persian Gulf, but such a line should be the irreducible minimum. Even in that eventuality it could hardly be accounted as a satisfactory or sufficient share in so vast an undertaking.

Difficulties spring in the main from the fact that Germany has long looked forward to the

development of the lustrous and oil lands at Eregli, Kerkuk, about Babylon, and in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys. They are supposed to be able to furnish supplies many times more abundant than those which come from the Baku wells. The agricultural possibilities of the region have also attracted German attention. It is believed that the areas of Anatolia, Syria, and Mesopotamia can be made to yield a greater return of cereals than is recovered from the cornlands of Russia. Since the autumn of 1907 the Anatolian Railway has been engaged under contract in opening out for the Turkish Government 260,000 acres of the Konia plain to wheat culture by a system of draining and canalization. The undertaking is being carried out by the Frankfurt firm of Ph. Holzmann and Co., who were the contractors for the section of the Anatolian Railway from Eskisher to Konia, and also for the first portion of the Baghdad Railway. A special company has been formed by the railway company and the contractors, with the title of the Company for the Irrigation of the Plain of Konia. It will be under the management of Messrs. Huguenin and Helfferich, of the Anatolian Railway Company, and Mr. Riese, representing the firm of Ph. Holzmann and Co. The most difficult part of the work is the canal joining the Beisher and the Tchershembah, which will dry up Lake Karaoran. Thirty-one miles in length, it will be completed in 1910 at the outside,

186 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

but it will be 1912 before the entire scheme is executed.

Intense interest also fastens upon the vast possibilities of the cotton supply from Mesopotamia. It is believed to be capable of freeing Germany from the thralldom, in which the United States holds her to-day and in case of war would be so injurious. In addition there is the magnet contained in the developing of German trade with the 300,000,000 of British India. Other valuable advantages could be enumerated until it requires but slight imagination to realize the character of the situation which confronts Great Britain's diplomatists in this part of the Middle East. With such privileges and such immense possibilities vested in a powerful railway company at the back of which is the Deutsche Bank supported by an energetic Foreign Office, Germany may well congratulate herself and decline to depart from or to change her successful policy in Western Asia.

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION

I. THE QUESTION OF PERSIA

THE conclusion of an Agreement between Great Britain and Russia in 1907, in respect of the Middle East, put an end to negotiations the course of which had extended over two years. Although from time to time a variety of reports on the nature of the proposals under discussion had appeared nothing of material value was permitted to escape. It is, perhaps, a pity that the convenient method of testing political negotiations by the release of a *ballon d'essai* was ignored on this occasion, since the clauses of the instrument do not reveal grounds for any excess of confidence in their ultimate utility. Depending in an unusual degree on the mistaken view that Russian interests in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet are equal with our own, a hint dropped in time might have brought the necessary correction and so have saved the general sacrifice of our interests in the regions concerned that the Convention discloses.

The main value of the Anglo-Russian Convention lies for us in the testimony it offers to the good

feeling towards this country; that is now animating the Russian Government, a sentiment moreover that Russian action in Persia during the last few months has converted into a tangible asset. The interests of Great Britain and Russia in the Middle East, however, are not regulated by temperamental considerations. They are vested interests with their roots firmly embedded in the various political, commercial, and strategic matters appertaining to the area. Rising from permanent foundations and influenced by an association with the region that is neither wholly localized nor entirely Asiatic, the safe custody of such rights should not have been liable to inconsequent surrender. In many ways the mutual interests of the two races in the Middle East are an inherited possession, to which the respective Governments of Great Britain and Russia stand as sponsors for the benefit of posterity.

Although the character of British interests in the Middle East has undergone some alteration since the days when Lord Salisbury advocated the establishment of spheres of influence in Persia, nothing has occurred to alter the fundamental fact that, wherever the British sphere be, it must be accompanied by undivided control over the Persian Gulf. Upon no other condition is it possible for us to maintain unimpaired the structure of our commercial and political empire in the Middle East. Many generations of, mostly effort have given us a right to international acquies-

cence in our position in the Gulf, and it will not be forgotten how Lord Curzon himself viewed the possibility of bartering away British rights in Persian waters. Unhappily, while the predominating character of British interests in the Middle East has received unequivocal recognition in speech, the translation of words into deeds has not kept pace. In such circumstances it is not reassuring to find that the area allotted to Russia under the new Convention was greater than she had any right to expect while Great Britain was awarded but a corner of the zone to which, in justification of her policy, she could legitimately lay claim. In spite of much that can be said in favour of the principle of the treaty, therefore, it is to be feared that it will operate disastrously upon British interests in the Middle East.

Divided into three sections, and specifically excluding the Persian Gulf from its scope, the terms of the articles of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 that refer to Persia are as follows—

Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of, British subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transports, insurance, etc.—beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Ispahan,

Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the concessions referred to.

II

Russia on her part engages not to seek for herself and not to support in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the concessions referred to.

III

Russia on her part engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement

as regards the grant of concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia.

All concessions existing at present in the region indicated in Articles I and II are maintained.

IV

It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the exception of those of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortization and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse, up to the date of the signature of the present arrangement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea, and those of the posts and telegraphs shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present arrangement.

V

In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse, and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present arrangement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources

of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article II of the present arrangement, or for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article I of the present arrangement, the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present arrangement.

While the strategic importance of Seistan is established by the recognition of the areas within the limits of the Gazik-Kerman-Bunder Abbas line as a British sphere of influence, it should be borne in mind that hitherto this zone has been regarded by the Indian military authorities as valuable because it represented merely the irreducible minimum necessary to the defence of India. As a commercial field it possesses no material attraction, save by the position of Bunder Abbas at the base of the caravan routes to Seistan and Central and South-eastern Persia. Moreover, expert opinion was directed to this same zone at a time when Great Britain exercised a commercial monopoly over the Gulf as over Southern Persia, when our markets had not been circumscribed either by Russian or German intrigue, and there was no

necessity to look forward to a troubled future or to define seriously the limits of an extra-strategic zone in South-eastern Persia. These qualities, however, no longer distinguish our position in Persia. Our influence with the semi-independent tribes of Southern Persia has diminished with the increasing power of the Central Government, while our mercantile pre-eminence has been challenged by many Powers. Such changes in our position certainly made desirable the definition of our rights, but in a way that should have upheld incontestably the political and commercial supremacy of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf, no less than in Southern Persia.

The award of an unnecessarily generous zone to Russia and the restriction of our special interests to an area that is largely arid and commercially uninviting is not calculated to secure British prestige, either along the waters of the Gulf or in the southern hinterland. It is not even in keeping with the policy, urged by Lord Curzon and happily adopted by the Government of India, of winning back our influence by a more numerous distribution of political and commercial representatives in and about the Gulf. By these means, in the last six years the improvement in our political prestige has been as marked as the original decline was rapid. A policy in consonance with this new note should have been favoured, when our sphere of influence would have lain south of a line drawn from Seistan in the east to

the valley of the Karun River in the west, and passing to the north of Yezd and Ispahan.

If such a line clashes with that which now becomes the southern boundary of the Russian sphere, at least it would have covered the area in which British interests are most prominent. In spite of the fact that Ispahan and Yezd are included within her sphere, Russia has no commercial connection with Yezd whatever; at Ispahan her trade is so notably deficient that the place is the terminus of the Lynch Road belonging to British interests and supported by British capital. It is true that a year or two ago a Russian consul-general was established at Ahwaz on the Karun, and that a similar official has long been stationed at Ispahan; but these officers were brought forward in order to minimize the political prestige that attached to our own representatives. At Ispahan, Yezd, Ahwaz, Kermanshah, Basra and Mohamera, our trade is of such importance that fully-fledged consuls have long held the posts.

It is not only with Persian trade at the head of the Gulf that our commercial activities are concerned. British interests of an important character centre around the Karun River. At least two millions sterling of British capital have been invested in the products of this region alone. So integral a part of the British sphere has South-western Persia been considered that it is not long since the Lynch interests projected another road, the alignment of which now

appears to penetrate for some considerable distance into the territory that has passed so irrevocably to Russia.

Passing from the areas that have been abandoned, the no-man's-land of the future, to those with which the agreement is identified, one is constrained to regard with astonishment the relegation to Russia of so large a territory. Surely it cannot be imagined that Russian trade penetrates so far as the limits of the southern boundary would suggest? At the same time is it supposed that our commercial interests in Persia are confined within the line drawn from Bunder Abbas to Gazik? If either or both of these questions be answered in the affirmative, the information at the disposal of the Foreign Office is very defective, since British trade predominates in Ispahan and Yezd, of the Russian area, no less than at Birjand, Kerman, and Bunder Abbas, of the British sphere. Moreover, British trade relies on no financial bounty and enjoys little official assistance. On the other hand, Russian trade with Persia is not only bounty-fed but receives the official protection of the Belgian Customs, as well as being able to command the fullest attention from Russian official representatives. The extent and volume of Russian trade, therefore, is governed by unusually artificial conditions which, if withdrawn, would bring about its very speedy collapse.

Presumably it is contended, that as Russia has

made so much display of her position in Northern Persia, she should be confirmed in the enjoyment of its economic advantages, in spite of their artificial character and in defiance of the fact that such trade as exists has been gained at the expense of British merchants. Yet, comparison of the trade returns of the two countries with Persia shows the volume of British trade to be greater and less subject to fluctuation as a whole than the volume of Russian trade. Since the late war in Manchuria, and the economic havoc wrought among Russian interests in the Middle East by industrial disturbances in European Russia, there has been a revival of British enterprise in Persia. Although it may not yet have affected the immediate areas of Northern Persia, it has made its presence noticeable throughout the Seistan district, as well as at Birjand. Granted continuation of the conditions existing prior to the signing of the Convention and reasonable assistance from India, our interests would have regained a considerable part of their former importance.

To those who are acquainted both with the commercial and political aspects of Persia, the revelation of this new spirit has been the sole compensation which the retrospective study of British enterprise in the country produces. Emanating from Seistan, and largely depending upon the facilities offered by the Quetta-Nasratabad route, but deriving advantage from the disturbed condition of Russian Central

Asia, the revival was only in its earliest stage. It is deplorable that, just as the commercial forces of the empire were gathering for a new campaign in Northern Persia, that particular area should be withdrawn from the scope of the contemplated operations. Inquiry would naturally have elicited these details. If the veto has been put against our peaceful penetration of these markets, it is to be hoped that the crying necessities of the area officially allotted to us will be relieved. Although incapable of great development and presumably valuable to the Government of India on account of their desert character, the provinces of Kohistan and Kerman could be made in parts both productive and profitable. The construction of a system of permanent communications between Bunder Abbas and Kerman, which in due course might be extended to Birjand, is of the first importance. A good alignment for the first half of such a road already exists. It should pass Minab, Manujan, Regan, and Bam in proceeding to Kerman, thus meeting with no engineering difficulties, and turning the Jabel-Bariz Mountains. The value of trade between Bunder Abbas and Kerman in existing circumstances is some twenty lakhs, while caravans in transit occupy from twenty-five days to three months, a period which would be materially reduced if a proper cart-road were made. It is also advisable to consider the advantage of equipping this region with a light railway.

Although Bunder, Abbas has been chosen as the westerly limit of the strategic area, and the place is generally regarded as the key to the Gulf, it is strategically valueless unless the concession includes the islands of Kishm, Henjam, and Larak, which would not appear to be the case. Great Britain possesses a claim to territory at Basidu on Kishm Island—a relic of the days when Kishm Island served as a naval station for the Persian expedition—and at Henjam, where a British telegraph station has been established. The treaty does not convey any recognition of these important interests, the careful conservation of which is vital if we propose to make Bunder Abbas the pivot of our policy in Persian waters. Perhaps, too, it would have been better for our commercial, as well as our political, purposes if the limits of the zone had extended to Linga, a hundred miles to the south-west, when no questions would have arisen. As strategic principles underlie, if they do not solely control the treaty, no time should be lost in making clear the special nature of our claim to these commanding points. Without them assuredly we cannot protect our interests in Persian waters nor insure against the innumerable difficulties with Germany, which await us when the Baghdad Railway arrives at the head of the Persian Gulf.

The recognition of a Russian and British sphere of influence in Persia does not by any means dismiss the question of the Middle East, for now the part

which Germany will play in the immediate future has to be considered. During the last few years German influence has become firmly established in the Nearer East, but it is only since the spring of 1906 that she has manifested an interest in Persia. Since June of that year a regular monthly service of steamers belonging to the Hamburg-America Steamship Company has plied to all the ports of the Persian Gulf, while German agents have been indefatigable in their efforts to promote a German scheme for the irrigation of the Karun Valley. Similarly, there is talk of a Baghdad-Teheran Railway.

Lately the German Orient Bank has established itself at the Persian capital, committed to the policy of assisting the economic development of the country wherever possible. An extension of powers has already been demanded and in a little time branches will have been established throughout the kingdom, so that by the time the Baghdad Railway is completed German interests in Persia will rest upon sound financial and commercial foundations. Germany, of course, does not object to the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention, since much of the country with which German interests are identified falls within the Russian sphere and it is through the Russian Government that German commercial agents and political representatives will work. In point of fact the treaty does Germany a very good turn. In place of the dual arrangement

now existing we may look forward, by the time that the Baghdad Railway is completed, to some tripartite division under which Germany will secure the southwestern areas of Persia, now apparently excluded from the Agreement.

Although Lord Salisbury was the originator of the principle of reciprocal spheres of influence in regard to Persia, he never contemplated the sacrifice of potential British interests nor the surrender to Russia of so vast an area. It would have been more prudent for Sir Edward Grey, either to have improved upon or to have followed the lines which his predecessor had laid down, in preference to working upon a new model. As it happens, it is very improbable that any previous agreement of similar importance has so expressly ignored commercial, financial, and even political requirements. Not only is all reference to the Persian Gulf expressly banned by a personal declaration of Sir Edward Grey, but the zone allotted to Great Britain is hopelessly inadequate and based upon a division of interests and the maintenance of principles that no longer bear any relation to the existing situation.

Against the closing of Russia's Central Asian markets and those of Northern Persia by the imposition of a tariff framed on rigid protectionist principles, and supported by a system of rebates, we have been able to place an unchallenged commercial supremacy in Southern Persia. It has not been smooth sailing,

latterly at all events, since Germany certainly incited the Turkish officials to harass the Sheikh of Mohamera. Trade, however, prospered under the knowledge that it was being conducted in a region where, through political advantages, competition was not to be feared and a few years ago prospects were not overshadowed. Indeed, it was not until Lord Salisbury's Government proved incapable of formulating a definite policy in respect of the Baghdad Railway that Germany made her first efforts to tap the resources of the Gulf. In 1895 Germany possessed no trade whatever with Persian ports. There were no exports; there were no imports; but, on the other hand, the exports from the United Kingdom to Bushire amounted to the value of £679,723. Since then the Baghdad Railway has descended to *terra firma* from the clouds of political discussion. Although as a practical undertaking the Baghdad Railway is far from completed, the necessity for creating contingent interests in the Persian Gulf has stirred Germany to unwonted activity. Destitute of any commercial connection with the Gulf in 1895, by 1904 her trade at Bushire alone was returned at £40,141, while steady progress has been maintained in the five years that have passed.

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clever commercial agents already has been made, and the German merchant now enjoys the advantage of a highly technical familiarity with the requirements of the markets. This reconnaissance of Southern Persia was carried out before the advent of a subsidized line of German steamers to the ports of the Persian Gulf offered facilities to the manufacturers of France, Austria, and Belgium. Until then foreign trade had suffered from the drawbacks attendant on transshipment at Bombay and Karachi. These difficulties have now disappeared. Thus it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that so soon as the Baghdad Railway arrives at the Persian Gulf, unless measures are taken in the brief interval that still remains, our commercial supremacy in the Middle East will not be able to prevail against the flood of Continental articles that will be carried to Persia either by the steamers of the German Shipping Company or over the metals of the German Railway.

The question, therefore, may well be asked whether the Government has acted wisely in withdrawing the markets of South-western Persia from our preferential zone. If the safety of India needed the provision of a special strategic area, surely the menace of increasing competition made the adoption of somewhat similar precautions in the interests of Anglo-Indian trade with Persia no less desirable! British prestige in Persia, then, has been shaken to its foundations by the Persian sections of the Anglo-

Russian Convention. For several generations past we have proclaimed our policy towards the Persian Gulf, as throughout Southern Persia, to be identified with the principle of commercial as well as political paramountcy. Yet that axiom has now been surrendered amid conditions which must arouse anxiety for the future, since their existence necessarily precludes the restoration of our traditional prerogatives.

II. THE POSITION OF AFGHANISTAN

Before proceeding to the discussion of the clauses of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907 which deal with Afghanistan and Tibet respectively, it may be as well to indicate the foundations upon which our policy towards the Amir of Afghanistan hitherto has rested.

By the Agreement of 1880 Afghanistan had become a buffer zone between the dominions of Russia and Great Britain in Asia, from which Russian intervention was always to be excluded. In the twenty-nine years that have passed since that date there certainly have been moments when the ruler of Kabul has chafed under the conditions which governed him, but nothing has occurred to cause any modification of the basis of our compact or to admit others to a share in its privileges. Prompted in the main by military requirements, under successive British ministries the objections of the Indian military

authorities have been respected, until the perpetual isolation of Afghanistan has become a fixed idea in the consideration of measures for the defence of the north-west frontier. In all this time, too, it has been understood that no Power could be given right of intercourse with Afghanistan. Moreover, as circumstances have made it necessary, the Russian Government has been invited to recognize the right of Great Britain to an exclusive control over Afghan affairs. As a consequence there are in existence at this date numerous instruments in which Russia has put on record the declaration that Afghanistan lay entirely without the area of her jurisdiction in Mid-Asia. Unfortunately both the spirit and letter of these assurances have been broken by the Russian frontier officials, the constant violation of principles already conceded by the Russian Government imposing upon the British Government the necessity of administering sharp remonstrances to Kabul, as well as to St. Petersburg.

Even so recently as the spring of 1900 the dominions of the Amir became the cause of an exchange of diplomatic notes between Lord Salisbury and the late Count Mouravieff. In a communication dated February 6, 1900, M. de Staal informed the Foreign Office that the Russian Government were proposing that direct relations should be established between Russia and Afghanistan with regard to frontier matters; but that such relations should

have no political character, as the Russian Government intended to maintain their former engagements, and would continue to consider Afghanistan outside the sphere of Russian influence.

The attitude of Great Britain to this request was plainly indicated when Lord Salisbury replied that, having regard to the understanding by which Afghanistan is outside the sphere of Russian influence—

. . . It would be impossible for the British Government to take into consideration any change in existing arrangements, or to frame proposals to be brought before the Amir, without more precise explanation in regard to the method which the Russian Government would desire to see adopted for the exchange of such communications between the frontier officials, the limitations to be placed on them, and the means of ensuring that those limitations would be observed. . . .

Although no reply was returned at the moment a violent agitation was started in the Russian Press for liberty of direct communication with Afghanistan, and the right of diplomatic representation at Kabul. At the same time the Russian Government did not abandon its resolve. Considerable attention was thus aroused when the Amir of Afghanistan, on September 5, 1902, read in public Durbar a letter of extreme cordiality from the Russian Government. It was as follows—

. . . In the opinion of the Russian Government the time has now come for closer commercial relationship between Afghanistan and Russia. The Afghans have nothing to fear from Russian aggression, since the friendliness existing between England and Russia would be endangered if further annexations were made by the Government of the Czar in the direction of Badakshan and Wakhan. This fact in itself becomes a permanent guarantee of peace. In these circumstances it is an act of folly to continue the attitude of suspicion and concealed hostility that now exists between the Afghan and Russian commanders of frontier posts. The Russian Government, therefore, invites the Amir to throw open to Russian caravans the trade routes between Khushk and Herat, and Khushk and Kabul. The Russian Government in return will allow Afghan traders to enter freely, and traverse without restriction, Russian territory. The matter has already been laid before the British Government, but this letter is addressed personally to the Amir of Afghanistan, because a favourable answer from the Afghan Government would greatly strengthen the Russian case.

The Russian proceedings not unnaturally gave rise to questions in Parliament ; whereupon Lord George Hamilton, on October 21, 1902, announced for the first time the receipt of the Russian proposal, which had been transmitted by the Russian Embassy to the Foreign Office nearly three years before. A few weeks later, on January 14, 1903, Lord George

Hamilton's statement elicited the following *communiqué* from St. Petersburg—

As regards Russia's relations with Afghanistan, it is necessary to declare that Russia addressed no request of any sort to the British Cabinet, but simply notified it of her desire and purpose to enter into direct relations with Afghanistan in the future.

No further declarations were made of this subject.

It is perhaps difficult to understand the reasons which brought such an emphatic denial from the Russian Government. But the facts are of interest. They may be said to bear directly on the treaty, since that which was refused by a Conservative Cabinet in 1900 was conceded by a Liberal Government in 1907; with the addition that, while Russia in 1900 referred only to a right of communication in respect of frontier matters, she has now been granted, under certain circumstances, the privilege of actual representation at Kabul. Assuredly nothing existed in the outlook of foreign affairs to warrant such an amazing reversal of policy. Moreover, so far as Russia is concerned, the Articles establish no principle in respect of Afghanistan that has not appeared afresh in each successive renewal of the Declaration since Prince Gortchakoff in 1868-1869 first assured Lord Clarendon that the Russian Government regarded Afghanistan as beyond Russia's sphere of influence. Consideration of these details, then,

obviously gives rise to the suspicion, that upon the present occasion the Russian Government formulated proposals in respect of Afghanistan with its tongue in its cheek—and met with unexpected success.

It is certain, that the temporary collapse of Russia in the Far East does not permit liberties to be taken with our position in the Middle East, to which the upshot of the Russo-Japanese campaign brings at most a ten years' peace. Very possibly within this period we may have cause to regret the concession by which Russia has secured the right of maintaining commercial (*sic*) representatives within the Amir's dominions. The Russians are masters of intrigue. More than sufficient trouble already has been set afoot in these regions by their ever-present agents for us to have excellent reason for not establishing Russian influence in Kabul on our own responsibility. In this direction, too, there is as yet no need to forget that it was over the reception of the Stolietoff Mission by Shir Ali that Great Britain fought the second Afghan War.

While a detailed study of the relations at present existing between Great Britain and Afghanistan will be found in another section of this volume, an interesting sidelight is thrown upon the eagerness of the Russians to cultivate the Amir by the fact that the text of the treaty reached Kabul from the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, and not from Calcutta. The Articles are as follows:—

ARTICLE

His Britannic Majesty's Government declare that they have no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan.

His Britannic Majesty's Government further engage to exercise their influence in Afghanistan only in a pacific sense, and they will not themselves take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures threatening Russia.

The Russian Government, on their part, declare that they recognize Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty's Government; they further engage not to send any agents into Afghanistan.

ARTICLE II

The Government of His Britannic Majesty having declared in the Treaty signed at Kabul on March 21, 1905, that they recognize the Agreement and the engagements concluded with the late Amir Abdur Rahman, and that they have no intention of interfering in the internal government of Afghan territory, Great Britain engages neither to annex nor to occupy in contravention of that Treaty any portion of Afghanistan, nor to interfere in the internal administration of the country, provided that the Amir fulfils the engagements already contracted by him towards His Britannic Majesty's Government under the above-mentioned Treaty.

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ARTICLE III

The Russian and Afghan authorities, specially designated for the purpose on the frontier or in the frontier provinces, may establish direct relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of non-political character.

ARTICLE IV

His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Russian Government affirm their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan, and they agree that any facilities which may have been, or shall be hereafter obtained for British and British-Indian trade and traders, shall be equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders. Should the progress of trade establish the necessity for Commercial Agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures shall be taken, due regard of course being had to the Amir's sovereign rights.

ARTICLE V

The present arrangements will only come into force when His Britannic Majesty's Government shall have notified to the Russian Government the consent of the Amir to the terms stipulated above.

Examination of the treaty shows that Sir Edward Grey in effecting changes in the *status quo* of Afghanistan was influenced by commercial rather than political considerations. It had been evident ever

in 1900 that her future proposals for right of intercourse with Afghanistan would be based upon commercial rather than political grounds. It appears that she required merely to bide her time, and no better premise could be found in appealing to the kindly offices of a Government pledged to the sacrifice of British interests on the altar of Free Trade. It should not be forgotten that in the Far East Russian commercial enterprise became the lever for the establishment of the Czar's authority over Manchuria. In the same way politics and commerce are no less interwoven in the Middle East. In point of fact, it will be exceedingly difficult to draw the necessary distinction that Article III requires; and, when the pernicious possibilities of Article IV are appraised, it is impossible to doubt that the preservation of peace along the waters of the Oxus would have been better assured by the retention of the *status quo ante*.

No doubt great inconvenience attached to a system by which the adjustment of difficulties was referred backwards and forwards from the Oxus to Tashkent, from Tashkent to St. Petersburg, from St. Petersburg to London, from London to Calcutta, and from the Viceroy's Council to Kabul. Yet the trouble was not sufficient to justify the removal of a procedure that in every way was entirely suited to the peculiar conditions governing Anglo-Afghan

cation and the right of representation is fettering our position in Mid-Asia in a most unfortunate degree.

It is possible for those who have no knowledge of the conditions under which trade exists in Afghanistan to believe from the wording of Article IV that British trade enjoys considerable commercial advantages within the Amir's dominions. This is by no means the case; although it is true that, through constant representation by the Government of India, Hahib Ullah has been induced to remit a few duties, and to lower the transit charges on caravans that were passing through Afghanistan *en route* to the markets of Russian Turkestan. It had been hoped that other obstacles to freedom of commercial intercourse with India would have been removed for the small benefits already offered produced immediate response. Unfortunately for Indian commerce, in addition to the heavy charges levied by the Amir's officials, it has to compete with the bounties granted to Russian traders by the Russian Government. As a consequence, wherever Anglo-Indian goods meet in Afghanistan the products of the Russian market, the bounty-fed trade of Russia enjoys a conspicuous advantage.

The flow of Russian trade into Afghanistan from the Trans-Oxus region is by no means contemptible. For the future, under the advantages with which it is now to be endowed at the expense of unfortunate British and Indian merchants, it may be expected

to reveal a decided increase. Already articles of Russian manufacture are imported into Afghanistan from Moscow, Merv, Bokhara, and Samarkand, figuring in every bazaar in the Herat and Afghan Turkestan provinces. Russian trade passes through the customs stations of Kelif, Chushka Gusar, and Termes—the former of which is the principal seat of the Russian Customs on the Middle Oxus—and during recent years has steadily risen in volume.

In many ways it has been artificially stimulated since Afghan traders receive a rebate on goods purchased in Russian territory equal to the tax levied by the Amir's officials. Further, customs dues on goods exported from Afghanistan to Russian Turkestan have been reduced by 50 per cent. The value of the traffic which passed through the Russo-Afghan posts in 1902 was £450,000. To-day it probably exceeds half a million sterling, while the agents of Russian firms at Kelif and Chushka Gusar state that they can now compete successfully with British-Indian trade in Northern Afghanistan, since the Trans-Caspian and Orenburg-Tashkent lines of railway are carrying Russian merchandise at specially low rates. As matters stand, Russian silk, linen and cotton goods are the equal of those fabrics of Anglo-Indian manufacture which find their way into the country. Russian chintzes are more durable and of coarser texture than the Anglo-Indian article, although less elegant in appearance and depicted in colours that

are not quite so fast. At the same time they meet with a ready sale among the poorer classes. Russian paper is another commodity that is in great demand and has quite captured the Afghan market. Indian tea holds its own. Certain imports from Russia and India, of which leather is the most important example, are unable to compete with the local manufactures, the trade from Russian Turkestan in skins and hides having been killed by the Amir's customs charges. They have long been a thorn in the side of the Russians. But as Article IV proclaims the equality of commercial opportunity and endows Russian trade for the future with whatever advantages we may have secured in the past, for which generosity there exists neither pretext nor excuse, it is by no means too much to expect that these difficulties will disappear. Similarly, since there is no prospect of the Amir changing his fiscal policy in the same light-hearted way that his suzerain takes up with a new foreign policy, there is the probability that the Russian Government, now possessing liberty of direct intercourse and concerned in the development of Russian trade with Afghanistan under conditions which must operate disastrously against British-Indian trade, will forthwith ask 'Kabul to remove whatever grievances Russian traders may ventilate.

Although the treaty has been ratified between Great Britain and Russia, the new arrangements do

not come into force until they have received the sanction of the Amir, while the old treaties will not be disavowed until the new one comes in. As the Amir is still delaying his acceptance of the clauses of the Afghan section, there is time to direct public attention to the folly of relaxing our control over Afghanistan at a moment when, if the situation in Kabul is in need of anything, it is some little tightening of the reins. It is quite possible to foresee the nature of the difficulties that will arise if any departure is made from existing practice, particularly in a form that is both dangerous and provocative, and destined to recoil with considerable force upon those with whom originated the proposals.

III. IN RESPECT OF TIBET

If the utility of the Articles of the Anglo-Russian Convention with which Afghanistan is concerned is a little doubtful, it is impossible to understand the motive that brought Tibet into a field of discussion which more properly should have been limited to an exchange of views upon the conflict of Russian and British interests in Persia. For years past Russia has intrigued in Tibet, Russian treaties and assurances on this question being numerous, and of as little value as those on the question of Afghanistan. The most conspicuous treaty is also the most recent and its existence spurred the Tibetans to those acts

of aggression which brought about the dispatch of the Younghusband Expedition in 1904. This Russo-Tibetan Treaty was concluded in June, 1901, with the chief of the Tibetan Mission that was then visiting St. Petersburg, and was ratified by China on September 16, 1902, through the instrumentality of Yung Lu. The Articles are as follows :—

" ARTICLE I

As Tibet represents a territory lying between Central China and Western Siberia, so Russia and China are bound mutually to maintain peace in the country. In the case of disorders breaking out in Tibet, China, in order to secure that region, and Russia, in order to make its frontiers secure, will have to send troops thither after having given each other due notice.

ARTICLE II

In case it should be feared that a third power is trying, directly or indirectly, to stir up strife in Tibet, Russia and China bind themselves to take such common action as may seem to be necessary for suppressing such disorders.

ARTICLE III

Complete freedom of practising Russian orthodoxy or Lamaism is to be introduced into Tibet ; but all religious teachings of any other kind are to be forbidden unconditionally. To this end the chief of the Russian Orthodox Mission in Peking and the Dalai Lama are enjoined to work together in the

most friendly manner and by mutual agreement, so that both religious creeds may be spread and that all due measures may be taken to prevent religious disputes.

ARTICLE IV

Tibet is to become gradually a country with an independent Government, and to attain this end Russia and China will work together. Russia takes upon itself to train the fighting forces of Tibet on a European system, and pledges itself to carry out this work in a friendly spirit and without reproach. China, for its part, takes upon itself to develop the economic condition of Tibet and more especially its foreign trade.

It may be added, too, that the most recent assurances on this subject were conveyed on April 8, 1903, on behalf of Count Lamsdorff, by Count Benckendorff to Lord Lansdowne, when it was said that, even in the extreme contingency of the *status quo* in Tibet being seriously interrupted, Russian policy "ne viserait le Tibet en aucun cas" !

Diplomatic issues in Tibet were settled by the Younghusband Mission of 1904, but the Tibetan section of the Anglo-Russian Convention appears to defeat the objects at which that Mission aimed. Prefaced by the statement that the Governments of Great Britain and Russia recognize the suzerain rights of China in Tibet, and that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the *status quo* in the

external relations of Tibet, the Articles are as follows :

ARTICLE I

The two High Contracting Parties engage to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet, and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration.

ARTICLE II

In conformity with the admitted principle of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, Great Britain and Russia engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government. This engagement does not exclude the direct relations between British Commercial Agents and the Tibetan authorities provided in Article V of the Convention between Great Britain and Tibet of September 7, 1904, and confirmed by the Convention between Great Britain and China of April 27, 1906 ; nor does it modify the engagements entered into by Great Britain and China in Article I of the said Convention of 1906.

It is clearly understood that Buddhists, subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may enter into direct relations on strictly religious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other representatives of Buddhism in Tibet ; the Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, as far as they are concerned, not to allow those relations to infringe the stipulations of the present arrangements.

ARTICLE III

The British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send Representatives to Lhasa.

ARTICLE IV

The two High Contracting Parties engage neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or other rights in Tibet.

ARTICLE V

The two Governments agree that no part of the revenues of Tibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects.

In considering these clauses, it should be borne in mind that although Great Britain and Russia agreed to treat with Tibet through the Imperial Chinese Government, four years before Lord Lansdowne had telegraphed, on February 18, 1903, to Sir Charles Scott, our ambassador at St. Petersburg, that

. . . We had found that it was no use to deal with Tibet through China, owing to the dilatory methods of the Chinese Government, and the slenderness of their influence over Tibet. . . .

While Lord Lansdowne's dispatch establishes in principle the direct contradiction of the course now adopted by Sir Edward Grey, this *volte face* is not the most important feature of Article II. Interesting as of course it is, it is eclipsed by the liberty of movement, which is conceded by the last paragraph of Article II to the Buddhist subjects of Russia in

Tibet, always provided that their relations with the Dalai Lama are confined strictly to religious matters ! In point of fact, this clause requires to be considered in conjunction with Article III, in which Russia undertakes to send no representatives to Lhasa. Although within the last few years many agents of the Russian Government have passed between the Tibetan capital and St. Petersburg, these persons have never been officially accredited to the service of the Czar. Hence, when the activities of the Siberian Buriats Dorjieff, Zybikoff, and Norzunoff stirred the British Government to protest, our representations on each occasion were met by a disavowal of the official standing of the emissaries in question. Yet, not only has Dorjieff been a very active intermediary between the Russian Government and the Dalai Lama, but it may be remembered that, accredited with recommendations from the Bogdo of Urga to the spiritual head of Lhasa, he arranged for the dispatch to the Czar of a Tibetan Mission in October of 1900 and again in June of 1901. Thus, whether an individual be accredited or unaccredited, the value of the clause lies in the right of direct communication with Lhasa which it secures to Russia, always provided that the go-between is careful to exclude from pontifical audiences the discussion of temporal matters.

In view of the facilities for all sorts of intrigue, including the dissemination of anti-British doctrines,

which now come into existence, it is of interest to recall that one of the causes of the Younghusband Mission to Lhasa was to readjust the situation which had been created there by the pernicious activity of this same Dorjiew. In this direction, too, it is not unlikely that the precise interpretation to be placed upon these clauses will soon arise, since the ex-Dalai Lama is returning to Lhasa and has invited the Russian scholar, Cherbatskoi, to accompany him on his journey! Great Britain is directly concerned in this development, for in the Anglo-Chinese Convention of April, 1906, we reaffirmed our intention of retiring from the Chumbi Valley when the final instalment of the Tibetan indemnity had been paid. Tsarong Shap, the Tibetan envoy to India for the negotiations in connection with the Anglo-Tibetan Trade Treaty of April 20, 1908, paid the money on January 27, 1908, to the Government of India. A little later in this year the remaining details of the late expedition were withdrawn from Tibetan territory, when a return to the *status quo ante*, the period of the expedition was made, the paradox increasing when the ex-Dalai Lama arrives.

One of the articles of the Lhasa Treaty stipulated that an Indo-Tibetan Trade Convention should be subsequently drawn up, and since the Younghusband Mission returned from Tibet considerable development has taken place in Indo-Tibetan trade. The rise of a commercial intimacy between Tibet and

India is distasteful to Russia, whose interests, however, may acclaim a signal victory now that Great Britain has subscribed with extraordinary self-denial to the text of Article IV. It is indeed to be feared by the terms of this clause that Indian trade suffers a direct loss, in so much that the Tibetans have now awakened to an interest in, and acquired a zest for, Indian trade, which, particularly prominent along the Simla-Shipki caravan route as well as at Gartok the new western mart, will now be suppressed. Although Russia, who is without commercial ties with Tibet, imposes these arbitrary conditions on Indian trade which feeds a market not two hundred miles distant from the Indian frontiers, she is not herself observing the spirit of the Treaty with any exceptional pains. Within ten days of the announcement of the Anglo-Russian Convention, an important "scientific" mission under Lieut.-Colonel Kozloff left St. Petersburg for Central Asia, thus directly violating the stipulation that, for a period of three years from August 31, 1907, no scientific mission, either Russian or British, should proceed to the region.

There can be no question that the Government of India should be permitted to exercise unfettered control over an irresponsible state lying within the shadow of her own frontier. Russia has sought the principle of commercial equality in an area twelve hundred miles distant from her own

frontiers in order that Great Britain should be said to have recognized the intervening region as beneath Russian control. Lhasa is an important point from which to influence the peoples of Central Asia, and it is quite well known to the Government of India that Russia's real objective for some time to come is to secure uncontested domination over Chinese Turkestan. At present one of the three territories which lie beyond the eighteen provinces of the Celestial Empire proper, it certainly appears that, so far as Russian expansion is concerned, Chinese Turkestan is destined to fill the *rôle* so recently occupied by Manchuria. Proposals, by which Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan were to be ceded to Russia in exchange for the evacuation of Manchuria, were put forward just prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war. It will not be surprising, therefore, to learn that Russian officials now regard Chinese Turkestan as their exclusive sphere. Russian trade with Chinese Turkestan does not yet respond to the exertions of the Government to any appreciable extent. In many places the unsupported efforts of the Indian traders prevail, although Russian officials never lose an opportunity to create difficulties for Indian merchants with the provincial officials. It is however as impossible to deny as to disregard the prestige and activity of the Russian officials that have been drafted into Chinese Turkestan from the administrative bureaux at Tashkent.

At Kashgar there is a diplomatic agent supported by a customs staff, a consular secretary, an Intelligence Officer from the military head-quarters in Petersburg and a consulate guard of sixty mounted Cossacks. At Urumtchi, the capital of the province, there is a consul, assisted by a vice-consul and a consular secretary. These have a guard of one hundred mounted Cossacks. In Kulja and Torfan there are consulates, presided over by full-fledged consuls assisted by consular secretaries. The consulate escort in Kulja and Torfan amounts in each case to sixty mounted Cossacks. In addition to the consular establishments at Kulja, Torfan, Kashgar and Urumtchi, Russia maintains in Chinese Turkestan a number of *aksakals* or native consular agents, who have been credited to Khotan, Kargarik, Yangi-Hissar, Kashgar, Yarkand, Maralbashi, Aksu, Keriya. In each of the consular centres Russian churches have been erected. In Kashgar and Urumtchi only—the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war stopping the erection of bank-premises in Khotan—are there branches of the Russo-Chinese bank, that political and financial institution which supports throughout Asia the advance of Russia. In Chinese Turkestan it refuses the advantages of its protection, as well as the privileges of the clearing house, to any trader who deals in Indian or Chinese goods.

Attached to these several Russian consular estab-

lishments necessarily there are interested or small dependent communities of Russian or Russian native subjects. Around each of the eight native agents smaller gatherings of Russian native subjects have collected when the ease, with which the influence of Russia radiating continuously from several separate points spreads in the regions bordering Tibet, will be readily understood. In spite of this elaborate system, however, it may be doubted whether the population of these areas would exchange Chinese for Russian protection. Russia exercises administratively in Central Asia a purely destructive influence. If the maw of the Chinese official is no less capacious, Chinese rule itself is both benevolent and tolerant.

Against this flourish of Russian authority in Chinese Turkestan it is interesting to place the position occupied by British influence. Until quite lately Great Britain had no official representative in Chinese Turkestan, the sanction of the Imperial Chinese authorities in Peking to the elevation of Mr. George Macartney, C.I.E., from Special Assistant for Chinese Affairs to the Resident in Kashmir with a seat of office at Kashgar, to British Consul in Chinese Turkestan only having been received within the last few months. For twenty years, Mr. Macartney has officiated unaided in Kashgar, so of his value and suitability for the new post there can be no two opinions. In addition to Mr.

Macartney British interests are reported upon by six *aksakals*, placed respectively at Khotan, Yarkand, Kashgar, Yangi-Hissar, Kargarlik and Maralbashi. But neither Mr. Macartney nor any of the other officials are supplied with military escorts. Under these circumstances it is to be feared that the Articles in respect of Tibet have merely compromised our position in that state while confirming Russian supremacy in Chinese Turkestan.

By a strange irony the advantage of the situation rests with China, who has awakened to a sense of responsibility for Tibet which seems not unlikely to lead to the ultimate inclusion of the little State within the dominions of its super-lord. Russian action in Chinese Turkestan could alone prevent such a scheme, and in that contingency Anglo-Indian troops in spite of treaties would have to return to the Tibetan capital. Two recent decrees, speaking of Tibet as "the real frontier of China," explain that the appointment of Chao Erh-fung as Imperial Resident in Tibet, and of his brother, Chao Erh-hsun, as Viceroy of the adjoining province, Szechwan, was designed with the object of ensuring harmonious co-operation in developing military efficiency, encouraging education and agriculture, and generally improving the government of Tibet. The officials specially selected for service in Tibet are promised a long tenure of office. The necessary funds and officials will be provided from the rich

province of Sze-chwan, the Viceroy Chao Erh-hsun being the ablest financier and one of the most upright administrators in the Chinese Empire. It seems to be then but a question of years before Tibetan independence will have passed away, when, if China can resist the pressure of Russia in Chinese Turkestan, a remarkable situation will have arisen on the north-eastern frontier of India. Nepal and Bhutan are as much tributary to the Celestial Government as to the Indian Government, and the strengthening of Chinese influence in Mid-Asia would necessarily bring up the question of the relations of the Government of India with its two neighbours. It may seem to many a long way from the Younghusband Mission of 1904 to the delicate issues involved by some prospective consideration of the character of China's rights in Nepal and Bhutan. It is not such a very long way, however, and the problem would have been solved for all time if the British Government, as the Russian Government would have done, had only kept for itself the fruits of its own enterprise by maintaining its position in Tibet.

Novel as the situation may be, the attitude of the Chinese Government towards the Indo-Tibetan negotiations, from which resulted the Trade Convention of 1908, shows how seriously China intends for the future to pursue rights, long neglected but no more to be regarded as non-existent. Nineteen years have passed since, in 1890, Lord Lansdowne,

then Viceroy of India, and the Chinese Amban at Lhasa signed at Calcutta a Convention concerning Sikkim and Tibet, which among other things dealt with trans-frontier trade. Three years later, British and Chinese Commissioners met at Darjiling and drew up the trans-frontier Trade Regulations of 1892 by which an Indo-Tibetan trade mart was opened at Yatung, in the Chumbi Valley. The Tibetans resented the arrangements made on their behalf on that occasion and acted with such violence and defiance of the superior Power that the Younghusband Expedition took the field.

Events prior to 1904 disclosed then Tibet's complete disregard for the authority of China. The Younghusband Mission brought its own lesson both to suzerain and vassal, and the cleavage in Sino-Tibetan relations in 1904 had been welded by 1908 into an unassailable unity. In the Trade Regulation of 1908, there is constant mention of China's authority over Tibet, much as the negotiations showed Chang, the Chinese plenipotentiary to possess superior powers to those held by his Tibetan colleagues. In four years Tibet had been humbled and Chinese authority had emerged from a classic obscurity. For the rest the jealous conservatism of China precludes any great development of trade under the new conditions from taking place.

GREAT BRITAIN AND AFGHANISTAN

I. THE REIGN OF ABDUR RAHMAN

AMONG the many native states whose territories are protected by the British Government there is none of greater importance than Afghanistan, whose ruler, the Amir Habib Ullah Khan, so recently made a visit to India as the guest of the Viceroy. Many years have passed since the late Amir, Abdur Rahman Khan, paid his respects to Lord Dufferin as Viceroy of India at a special Durbar at Rawal Pindi in 1885. But until 1907, although the invitation has been renewed regularly and special missions have been sent by the Government of India to Kabul, for a variety of reasons—in which ill-feeling was generally the determining factor—that visit has never been repeated.

On account of its geographical situation, Afghanistan is of the highest value to the position of India. Lying between the possessions of Great Britain and Russia in mid-Asia—bounded on the north by the Oxus River and Russian Turkestan, on the south by India, on the west by Persia, and on the east by the region of the Pamirs—it fulfils the functions of a buffer

State, and mistakenly is so described, although the recognition of its independence," contained in the Dane Convention, removed any vestige of subordination that was remaining to its position. The capital is Kabul, and other cities of importance are Kandahar and Herat. Among the physical features are the celebrated mountain range, the Hindu Kush, which runs from east to west across the country; and the classic Oxus, one of the most historical streams in Asia. It is divided to-day into five major provinces—Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, Afghan Turkestan and Badakshan, and extends protection to the two territories of Kafiristan and Wakhan. Afghanistan occupies an area more than 300,000 square miles in extent, contains a population estimated at a little less than six millions and boasts an annual revenue varying between one and two millions sterling. It possesses an army of doubtful quality, but returned numerically at 150,000 on a peace footing. The eminent advantages attaching to its geographical location have made it always desirable that complete accordance should be maintained between its ruler and the Viceroy of India. For this purpose various treaties have been exchanged, and still, in fact, exist.

Relations with Afghanistan date back to 1809, when, agitated by the rumour that the Emperor Napoleon and the Tsar Alexander were proposing to invade India through Persia, Mr. Elphinstone was

sent as an ambassador to Kabul. The immediate outcome of this visit was the arrangement of a treaty with Shah Shujah, as the ruler of Kabul, an alliance ultimately interrupted by the anarchy with which the country was convulsed. The upshot of these proceedings brought Dost Mahommed to the throne in 1826, when the active support which Russia was lending to Persian schemes of aggression against Herat gave point to the necessity of establishing a permanent barrier along the north-west frontier. Treaties of alliance were renewed with Ranjit Singh and Shah Shujah; and a rupture of relations with Dost Mahommed on account of the presence of a Russian mission at Kabul followed. An expedition, ostensibly prepared for the relief of Herat but designed to check the growing influence of Russia in Afghanistan, crossed the Indus under the leadership of Lord Keane in November 1838. The first Afghan war—1838–1842—had now begun, and Kabul and Kandahar were captured. Our initial act after entering Kabul was to restore Shah Shujah to the throne. The murder of Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir William Macnaghten in 1841 brought about his displacement in favour of Dost Mahommed in whose interest, as the result of the national revolt and the disasters occurring to our arms in 1840–1842, we evacuated Afghanistan.

The fortunes of the next few years completely restored Dost Mahommed to our favour, so much so

that in 1854 Sir John Lawrence received Ghulam Hyder as a special envoy from the Amir, while in the next year the first treaty between Great Britain and Afghanistan was signed, sealed, and exchanged. Two years later a second treaty was arranged, when a subsidy of twelve lakhs was granted to Dost Mahommed and the appointment of a British Agent to Kabul provided for. In the following year, 1858, Shir Ali was nominated as the successor of Dost Mahommed. At the death of the aged Amir in 1863 Shir Ali's claim to the throne was disputed by his half-brother—the eldest son of Dost Mahommed—Mahommed Afzul Khan, the father of Abdur Rahman Khan. Between 1863–1868 there were long years of civil war, with Shir Ali on the one side, Mahommed Afzul Khan, his son Abdur Rahman, and Azim Khan, another son of Dost Mahommed, on the other side.

As the result of these troubles Shir Ali gained the ascendancy, Abdur Rahman Khan fled to Samarkand, in Russian territory, and Azim Khan died in flight to Teheran. So soon as the new Amir had settled himself upon the throne supplies of money and war materials were presented to him by the Government of India, by whom he was invited to a conference with Lord Mayo at Umballa. In return Shir Ali sought in 1869 recognition of his son, Abdullah Jan, as the heir apparent, a concession which was refused. Repulsed in one direction, Shir

Ali proclaimed on his own account in 1873 this same son; and imprisoned in the following year Yakub Khan, the heir-designate of the Government of India. Two years latter he extended a cool reception to the mission which Lord Lytton dispatched to Kabul; and, as a reply to our occupation of Quetta in 1876, opened negotiations with the Governor-General of Russian Turkestan, General von Kauffman. From now until the end of his reign, 1878; Shir Ali relied upon Russia and, confident of her support, welcomed a Russian Mission under Major-General Stolietoft to Kabul in 1878. As the result of the visit of the Russian Envoy an offensive and defensive alliance between Russia and Afghanistan was drawn up. Before it could be ratified the refusal of Shir Ali to receive a British Mission under Sir Neville Chamberlain had precipitated the second Afghan war, 1878-1879. Kandahar was occupied by General Sir Donald Stewart in January 1879; and the recalcitrant Amir, flying to Mazar-i-Sharif, died in the following month. Shortly after these events the war concluded, with the installation of Yakub Khan upon the throne and the dispatch of the Cavagnari Mission to Kabul to draw up the treaty of Gandamak.

Yakub Khan had reigned less than four months when Sir Louis Cavagnari and his staff were massacred in September. The third Afghan war now opened, 1879-1880, with the operations under General Sir

Frederick (now Field-Marshal Lord) Roberts. The Afghans were defeated at Charasía and Yakub Khan fled. But the ill-temper of the capital had spread to the surrounding tribes and, before the end of the year, a general rising had taken place. By December 1879, Kabul was cut off, and only immediate action on the part of Sir Donald Stewart, who came up with forces from Kandahar, saved the situation.

At this crisis in the affairs of Afghanistan Abdur Rahman, who had retired into Russian territory on his defeat by Shir Ali in the war of succession, 1863-1868, suddenly appeared from across the Oxus, supported by Russian arms and a small force. It was no part of the Russian scheme of the moment that Abdur Rahman should go to Kabul. General Kauffman, believing we were about to retire from Afghanistan, thought that Abdur Rahman might make a bid for Afghan Turkestan and, in establishing himself there, prepare the way for the Russian occupation of the province at some future date. Unlooked for by us as Abdur Rahman's appearance undoubtedly was, it was nevertheless welcome. He was invited to Kabul, where, in June, 1880, he was elected Amir by the assembled Sirdars.

In the following month, under instructions addressed to General Sir Donald Stewart by the Marquis of Ripon, as Viceroy of India, Sir Lepel Griffin communicated on July 20, 1880, the following promise in the course of a letter to Abdur

Rahman, in confirmation of his election to the throne—

. . . If any Power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary in repelling it, provided that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations. . . .

Unhappily this engagement concerned only the external relations of the country and took no notice of the task which immediately confronted the new ruler. In Afghanistan itself all was chaotic, the gravest confusion prevailing in every department of the political, civil and military administration. At the time, too, the tribal system was in full swing, and each tribe, together with its sub-divisions according to its numerical force and territorial dimensions, supported one or more of the reigning chiefs. The existence of these leaders may be compared with that enjoyed by the dukes and barons of the Middle Ages in France. They occupied so great a position in the State that the enlistment of their services upon behalf of the Throne was always sufficient to maintain the balance of the scales in favour of the ruler of Kabul. Nevertheless, in order to fortify his own position, Abdur Rahman decided to suppress

them. One by one they were brought under subjection, the gradual circumscription of their authority paving the way to the subsequent solidarity which distinguished his own position. This work occupied all his energies for the first three years of his reign; when, at its completion, he turned his attention to the army it was to find that his resources were already considerably straitened.

At this juncture, in order to mark the correctness of Abdur Rahman's conduct during the first years of his reign, Lord Ripon, on June 16, 1883, wrote in the course of a letter to the Amir—

. . . Impressed by these considerations, I have determined to offer to your Highness personally . . . a subsidy of ten lakhs of rupees a year, payable monthly, to be devoted to the payment of your troops and to the other measures required for the defence of your north-western frontier. . . .

With the assistance of the subsidy Abdur Rahman began to work upon the military system of the tribes, gradually shaping it to a model of his own. At an early stage in his task, at the Durbar with Lord Dufferin on April 5, 1885, he was assisted with a gift of ten lakhs of rupees, 20,000 breech-loading rifles, three batteries of artillery, and liberal supplies of ammunition. These presents, the guarantees of the good-will of the Government, prompted Abdur Rahman to pledge the Viceroy in these momentous words—

. . . In return for this kindness and favour, I am ready with my arms and people to render any services that may be required of me or of the Afghan nation. As the British Government has declared that it will assist me in repelling any foreign enemy, so it is right and proper that Afghanistan should unite in the firmest manner and stand side by side with the British Government. . . .

The interest and sympathy of the Government of India stirred the Amir to such efforts that, as the outcome of his initiative, he may be described as the actual founder of the army of Afghanistan. In place of the old feudal levies with their variable allegiance, he called into being a force paid, created and controlled entirely by himself. Under the terms of the Durand Convention, the Amir's subsidy was increased from twelve to eighteen lakhs and the right to import munitions of war was conceded to him. He now proceeded to erect in his capital model workshops and factories, and an arsenal with a weekly output of two guns, one hundred and seventy-five rifles, and a varying quantity of ammunition. With these he intended to equip a million men, and to build up a reserve of five hundred rounds for each field-piece and five thousand rounds for every rifle. Although the million men standard was not reached he did amass an immense stock of ordnance supplies in Kabul, and imparted to the position of Afghanistan, for the first time in its history, an element of profound security.

By means of his 'perfected army Abdur Rahman founded a military autocracy. At the same time he had the wit to see that the continuation of such a form of government would be rendered more difficult as soon as the energies of his people were profitably occupied. That change has now generally taken place. Although the Afghans retain at the present time their old characteristics—their love of their own country and their hatred of alien races—through many years of peace, and their intercourse, on the one hand, with the Russians and, in the other direction, with India they are liable to flock to the standard of the Amir less than they were. It must not be forgotten, moreover, that to-day Afghanistan reproduces the conditions of a settled country and possesses a population much more contented than that of a generation ago, the penetrating associations of prosperity having benumbed the warlike instincts of the bulk of the people. Side by side, therefore, with his reorganization of the army, Abdur Rahman reformed the laws, improved the conditions of trade and revenue, and reared from amid the remains of the tribal system a civil administration. The laws which the Amir designed, together with their various modifications and amendments, now fill a dozen volumes. At the time every official, great and small, possessed a manual signed and sealed by him ; but, although his intentions were excellent, judicial corruption made evasion of the penalties neither difficult nor infrequent.

The condition of the Criminal Code was left untouched and to-day there is no limit to its penalties. Torture is invariably applied; men are still blown from guns, while penalties of equal brutality are exacted for comparatively trivial offences. Occasionally, too, a spirit of sheer barbarism distinguishes the justice which is dispensed, and in the fates which befell a robber and an over-zealous student of political affairs this is very plainly indicated. The former was a renegade official whose exploits had won for a mountain pass near Kabul an unenviable notoriety. Captured at length by the police Abdur Rahman determined to make an example of him. Upon the summit of a pass, 8000 feet above sea level, the Amir erected a flagstaff; from this was suspended an iron cage, and in the cage Abdur Rahman placed his quondam official—where he left him.

The student had broken in upon a Durbar, which Abdur Rahman was holding, with the declaration that the Russians were advancing to invade Afghanistan.

“The Russians are coming!” said the Amir. “Then you shall be taken to the summit of yonder tower and shall have no food until you see them arriving.”

From the first the condition of the revenue and the question of the currency attracted his attention; but the Amir's attitude towards foreign trade was

irregular and despotic. In a sense he favoured protection, and, while he modified existing taxes and improved their methods of collection, he interdicted trade with India and Russia. At the same time he established a mint in Kabul and proceeded to replace by new tokens those hitherto in circulation. At a later date, when Abdur Rahman imported American minting machinery and the services of an official from Calcutta, the Kabul mint possessed a capacity of 100,000 silver and copper tokens a day.

These measures were the necessary and preliminary steps to any restoration of order in the State, and it was as well perhaps that the Amir began his task at the beginning. It was, however, upon the formation of a capable and permanent administration that he concentrated the greater part of his energies; and, in any consideration of his reign, it is the elaborate administrative machinery which he left behind that stands out most prominently. Unfortunately, in spite of high-sounding titles, the methods of the new system were regulated in many instances by the principles of the old. Yet, as contrived by him, the civil administration represent the outward form of civilized government. It is not to be supposed that he was able to maintain it free from abuse. Spoliation and embezzlement have existed so long in the Orient that recourse to them has become second nature to every functionary. In Afghanistan each official, whether he were the

product of the new order or a remnant of the old, was corrupt, and regarded abuse of office as the customary symbol of administrative power. The existence of such a state of affairs impaired the success of any attempt at reform for, although Abdur Rahman produced a fine array of departmental chiefs, peculation was rife and disorders really unabated. In Oriental government the supreme and one propelling motive of the official classes is the enhancement of their own interests. Although Abdur Rahman put a stop to the sale of public offices he could not control the disbursement and acceptance of bribes, by which the award of such offices could be influenced. In spite of inherent difficulties the Amir achieved substantial success, simplifying in the end the methods of government procedure and improving the general condition of the country. In order to win respect for his laws he permitted a firm of silk merchants from Bombay to summon the Bibi Halima, his wife; and he punished with amputation of the fingers any who defaced a Government ledger.

Always alive to his own interests, Abdur Rahman was well aware of the significance of the development which he was effecting in the position of Afghanistan; and, while the dignity of the State grew from year to year, the Amir equally realized that his own importance was appreciating. For the first ten years of his reign he was an absorbed, silent

worker, and his labours were characterized by foresight and self-reliance. All the measures—military, financial, and administrative—calculated to enhance his name and to improve his State were pushed to completion in this period. Once safely accomplished and a certain national dignity secured to his country, so little did he consider himself beholden to the Government of India, that, by way of replying to the stoppage of certain supplies of war material by the Viceroy, he repudiated his subsidy, dispatched regiments to the frontier as an impudent precaution, and wrote over the head of the Viceroy a letter of complaint to Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister of the day. This independence of action, of interest to the historian but troublesome to the Government to whose service the Amir was pledged, may be said to have described the second half of his reign, during which time his strenuous spirit no doubt lacked sufficient occupation to keep it from mischief. In any case, between 1890 and 1898, the Amir pushed relations between Kabul and Calcutta to the verge of rupture through his patronage of certain fanatical spirits of the border, his indulgence in spiritual activities of a disturbing character, and the ostentatious sounding of a note of truculent defiance at the time of the Tirah Campaign. In a letter addressed to the Viceroy of India, before the Durand Mission set out to its labours in the tribal zone, Abdur Rahman wrote,

the following prophecy of what would happen in the event of the Government of India interfering with the region in question—

As to these frontier tribes known by the name of Yaghistan, if they were included in my dominions I should be able to make them fight against any enemy of England and myself, by the name of a religious war, under the flag of their co-religious Muslin ruler (myself). And these people being brave warriors and staunch Mahommedans would make a very strong force to fight against any power which might invade India or Afghanistan. I will gradually make them peaceful subjects and good friends of Great Britain. But if you should cut them out of my dominions they will neither be of any use to you nor to me; you will always be engaged in fighting or other trouble with them, and they will always go on plundering. As long as your Government is strong and in peace, you will be able to keep them quiet by a strong hand, but if at any time a foreign enemy appear on the borders of India these frontier tribes will be your worst enemies. You must remember that they are like a weak enemy who can be held under the feet of a strong enemy, as long as he is strong; and the moment he ceases to be strong enough to hold him the weak one gets out of his hold and attacks him in return. In your cutting away from me these frontier tribes, who are people of my nationality and my religion, you will injure my prestige in the eyes of my subjects, and you will make me weak, and my weakness is injurious for your Government.

Troubles quickly followed the writing of these words. But it is doubtful whether they would have attained the dimensions which distinguished them if Abdur Rahman had not gone out of his way to exploit the marauding proclivities of the tribes. Afghan participation in the long series of minor wars which concluded with the Tirah was well known, and gave rise to a situation so little different to that recently existing on the Indian frontier that a reference to it here is of special interest. After patiently submitting for many months to the situation thus brought about, the Government of India addressed a protest to Kabul, which might indeed have been but recently penned. It was as follows—

. . . It is right that I should tell your Highness that the information which I have received indicates that tribesmen from your Highness's territories have joined the Mullah of Hadda, and have in other respects committed aggression against the British Government. Bodies of men from Jelalabad district crossed the Kabul River openly with flags flying and drums beating. After the fight at Shabkaddar they returned in the same manner, carrying their dead and helping their wounded. On the side of Khost numbers of camels, stolen from my troops in Dawar, have been taken across the border, and it is even reported that these camels have been ordered to be collected by Sirdar Sherindil Khan. Your Highness will no doubt recognize the propriety of directing the restoration of camels belonging to the Govern-

ment of India, which have been stolen and carried into Afghan territory.

Your Highness has said that "tribesmen can never join such a movement openly for fear of me. If any one has come he must have gone secretly." What I now ask your Highness, in accordance with those assurances of friendship which you have so readily made, is that you will publicly announce to the tribesmen, through your local officers, that if they cross the border and join in disturbances against the British Government, they will incur your displeasure. The belief is entertained by many misguided persons that they will not incur your Highness's displeasure by acting in a hostile manner against the British Government, and this belief can be dispelled if your Highness's local officers will keep watch along the Kabul River and at other places in order to prevent your Highness's subjects from crossing the frontier with hostile intentions, whether secretly or openly. I ask your Highness, therefore, to issue orders to this effect. . . .

When Abdur Rahman acknowledged the receipt of this letter the situation, of which the Viceroy had complained, had become considerably aggravated by the active assistance which the revolting tribesmen had received from the Amir's frontier officials. None the less the Amir denied responsibility while, at the same time, forwarding to Simla a reassuring statement of his intentions towards the tribes. In the course of this letter Abdur Rahman wrote as follows—

. . . I have ordered the local officers to keep watch on Afghan subjects to the best of their ability, and prevent them from joining Mullah Hadda. . . . No tribesmen from my territories can do such an act in an open manner. Some of them, however, have great faith in Mullah Hadda, and it is possible that they may have joined him during the night, travelling like thieves by unfrequented roads. How is it possible to keep watch on thieves during nights along such an extensive frontier? . . . My kind friend, such an arrangement could only be possible by posting about 10,000 soldiers on all the mountain tops and at all the fords in that district. Then they will be able to execute properly such an arrangement, otherwise how would it be possible to stop the people who are familiar with the country? If the well-known roads be guarded against them, they can, owing to their knowledge of the country, find paths over mountains and through desert tracts to cross the frontier. As far as possible, however, the local officials have been watching, and will watch, any open movements of the tribesmen. . . .

After the receipt of this communication from the Amir of Afghanistan the Government of India pushed forward preparations for the punishment of the tribes; and, accordingly, the Tirah Field Force came into existence. Concerned at the direction of events, and deriving an inspiration from the magnitude of the preparations which Sir William Lockhart was making, the Amir changed his tactics and reprimanded, where previously he had ignored,

the inaction of his officials. In consequence of this change of front on the part of the ruler of Kabul the tribes were unable to look with any certainty of help to the Amir's officials. At the same time there is no doubt that the tribes did receive material assistance of an unofficial character and continued to receive it until the conclusion of hostilities. The occasions for concern at Abdur Rahman's attitude were less as the aged Amir approached the close of his life; relations between Kabul and Calcutta being cemented by the warm regard which the Afghan ruler possessed for the Viceroy, Lord Curzon of Kedleston. Before this friendship had had time to influence the course of border politics Abdur Rahman died when a figure of commanding ability and of absorbing interest disappeared from the stage of Central Asian politics amid expressions of genuine regret.

II. THE RULE OF HABIB ULLAH

When Abdur Rahman Khan died on October 1, 1901, the personality of his successor and son, Habib Ullah Khan, was not altogether unknown to India. During the last years of his life Abdur Rahman had been compelled for reasons of health to transfer much of the administrative business of the state to the hands of Habib Ullah. The new Amir, therefore, possessed an intimate knowledge of the

internal affairs of the country; and, since he had replaced his father at the weekly *Durbar*, during the last five years of Abdur Rahman's reign, ample opportunities had existed for forming an estimate of his character. A despot by environment, if not by inclination, he filled his father's shoes with tolerance and patience. In some degree the promise of his early years has been realized in the developments which have described his domestic policy. So far as his relations with India are concerned Habib Ullah has not gone out of his way to meet the wishes of the Indian Government. Pride of place handed down by Abdur Rahman, has propelled the Amir to regard himself in a way which was destined to clash with the views of the Government of India. Abdur Rahman conceived an Afghanistan which would possess an untrammelled independence, a sea-coast line and the right to maintain representatives abroad. It was these same aims which Habib Ullah set before himself when he assumed responsibility for the affairs of his country. He has not hesitated to give expression to the more extravagant of Abdur Rahman's aspirations, he has no less maintained his father's view on the topics which have come up for discussion between the Government of India and himself, and were vexed questions in the days of the late ruler. Plain indications of the views which the Amir holds on the subject of railways and telegraphs, and the arms and subsidy questions, have been given

at frequent intervals since 1904, and his manner at these times has recalled the brusqueness by which, upon occasion, the old Amir was distinguished. In no way has Habib Ullah displayed his independence so much as in his treatment of the very delicate issues involved in the problem of the border zone and its lawless tribes. He has freely patronized certain wandering *fakirs*, whose activities are objectionable to the Government of India and regarded as a menace to the peace of the border. In this direction it can be said that the Amir is not quite the master of the situation that public opinion imagines. Indeed the ruling powers in Afghanistan are divided between three factions, each directly interested in the fortunes of the State. They are represented firstly by those who profess the cause of the Amir; secondly by the supporters of Sirdar Nazr Ullah Khan, brother of Habib Ullah; thirdly by the adherents of Bibi Halima, the Queen Dowager, wife of the late Amir Abdur Rahman and mother of Sirdar Mahommed Omar Jan Khan.

Nazr Ullah Khan is the offspring of a Wakhan concubine named Gulriz. His claim to the *gadiz* is in support of the theory that might is right. Since possession is nine points of the law, and Habib Ullah is in possession, it is obvious that he will have to make considerable effort. Bibi Halima aspires to the throne by reason of her direct descent from Amir Dost Mahommed Khan. She is of the blood royal

and in possession of ~~her~~ liberty, would compel Sirdar Mahommed Omar Jan Khan to take the field. His chances of success in any rebellion would not be as great as those enjoyed by his half-brother, Nazr Ullah Khan, who is full brother to Habib Ullah.

The disparity in the ages of these three sons of Abdur Rahman is a factor in the situation. Habib Ullah Khan, born 1872, and Nazr Ullah Khan, born 1874, are many years the senior of Sirdar Mahommed Omar Jan Khan, who was born in 1889. In this direction it is interesting to recall that the lawful heir to the throne, Sirdar Inayat Ullah Khan, the son of Habib Ullah, was born in 1888. He is actually six months older than his uncle, Sirdar Mahommed Omar Jan Khan. Habib Ullah watches over the interests of his heir very carefully, consolidating his position wherever he can do so. The Amir made this son Governor of Kabul during his own visit to India in 1907. It will be remembered that Habib Ullah sent Sirdar Inayat Ullah Khan to India to greet Lord Curzon.

Family dissension is not an unusual feature of the domestic environment of Oriental potentates, and that of the Amir is no exception. At the same time a wide circle of dependents battens upon his indulgence; but the most outrageous of many acts of imposition came from his sister, who had fled to India because her husband had incurred the displeasure of the Amir. Taking advantage of the

manifesto which the Amir issued at the time of his accession, this enterprising lady, by way of greeting, sent to Habib Ullah a verse from the Koran sealed with her cypher. The Amir replied with permission for his sister and her husband to return to Kabul, and he dispatched a gift of 30,000 rupees for the expenses of a journey,—which the lady had never proposed to take. It was with Sirdar Nazr Ullah Khan and Bibi Halima that opposition to Habib Ullah's accession emanated, and for months their intrigues occupied his attention. Ultimately, in order to safeguard his own interests, Habib Ullah was compelled to confine the widow of Abdur Rahman to one of the royal palaces, and to dismiss his brother on a tour of military inspection.

In the politics of Afghanistan Nazr Ullah Khan is the leader of the Afghan Party—that is, the party composed of the principal Mullahs and more conservative Afghans who are opposed to foreign influences and modern innovations. It was this faction that endeavoured to prevent the Amir's visit to India, and it was due to its machinations that Habib Ullah encountered so much hostility on his return to his capital. Expressing an active intolerance of anything tending to modify the rigorous isolation which Afghanistan has so long preserved, these conservative elements, with Nazr Ullah Khan at their head, were antagonistic to the Dane Mission, and in the end contrived to bring

about its complete discomfiture. The aim of the Mullahs is to win observance for the every letter of Moslem doctrine; and, since the priests are the real rulers of the country, Nazr Ullah Khan has had the wit to ally himself with them. Prior to the advent of the Dane Mission, Nazr Ullah Khan became a *Hafiz* or repeater of the Koran and frankly abandoned his use of European clothing when the Mullahs denounced the passion for ostentatious habiliments which distinguishes the Afghan. Embroidered shoes, bright handkerchiefs and gold lace were banned, since when Nazr Ullah Khan appears only in sacerdotal garb and officiates in the robes of a Mullah at every festival of importance that takes place.

Afghanistan is one of the most powerful Mahomedan states in the world and religion exercises a deciding voice in its affairs. The superstition which prevails so widely is the outcome of long existing bigotry. The great division of the State lies between two sects of Mahomedans, the Sunnis and the Shiah. All Afghans are Sunnis. The Sunnis of Kabul regard Nazr Ullah Khan as their leader by reason of the intimacy which exists between himself and the principal Sunnite Mullahs. Nazr Ullah, as witness his attitude towards "foreign fashion" clothing, misses no opportunity of emphasizing the sincerity of his religious convictions. To exploit them still further he is contemplating a pilgrimage

to Mecca. If the sincerity of Nazr Ullah Khan may be questioned—and in Kabul he is certainly credited with designs against the throne—his cleverness in throwing in his lot with the Mullahs and making a bold bid for the influence of what is the strongest party in the State, cannot be denied. Moreover, at heart the Afghan is a simple fanatic, opposed to foreign influences and more ready to acclaim the man who abandons Western fashions than him who openly prefers them. At the moment neither the plans nor the partizans of Nazr Ullah Khan are prepared, but if the reported rift between the brothers were to widen, events would move with incredible swiftness.

In a measure Habib Ullah understands the situation; and, while at the beginning of his reign Nazr Ullah Khan was the Commander-in-Chief and the Amir himself preferred to be regarded as the director of things spiritual, something approaching a complete reversion of the respective positions of the two brothers has now taken place. Sorely pressed at first by the fervour of the Kabul Mullahs, the Amir was too weak to head the current and too zealous a Mahommedan to question the teaching of the fanatics around him. Thus he drifted into a condition of complete subserviency to the Mullahs, with unfortunate results to his relations with the Government of India. In obedience to the behests of the priests, he divorced three of his seven wives on the ground

that the Mahommedan religion forbade a true believer to maintain more than four. Again, he became the Lamp of the Congregation and the Faith, the while he lost touch with the army and the military affairs of the kingdom.

It is difficult to appraise the exact causes which have been responsible for the change in the position of the Amir and his brother. When the recent visit to India was under consideration, it very frequently was said that the extreme antipathy of Nazr Ullah Khan to the project incensed the Amir against him, and gave rise in the mind of the Amir to a feeling that he would like to acquire closer acquaintance with the military conditions of his country.

From the moment when Habib Ullah himself made the tour of inspection that he had arranged for Nazr Ullah to carry out, a remarkable difference in the respective positions of the two men in the State may be noticed. At first there is little doubt that Sirdar Nazr Ullah Khan, as Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan Army, carried the bulk of the troops with him. The Kabul garrison, existing under the special protection of the Amir, could alone have been counted upon. The long absences of the Amir from Kabul and the active intrigues of Nazr Ullah Khan with the officers of this garrison, temporarily undermined the loyalty of this particular establishment. Meanwhile in the provinces Habib Ullah's position was improved and his following increased by his visits

to Kandahar, Herat and the posts in Afghan Turkistan. In Kabul, since his return he has contrived to keep a closer grip on the reins of government. With an eye to the advantages of rapid communication between the capital and the outlying parts of the State he has introduced telephone lines between Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sherif, while a wireless installation between Kabul and Calcutta is under consideration.

One of the alleged points of difference between Habib Ullah and his advisers was connected with the Amir's predilection for European dress. On State occasions the Amir is a resplendent figure. In his attire as Commander-in-Chief there was not much difference between the style affected by Nazr Ullah Khan and that adopted by the Amir. Habib Ullah prefers on all unofficial occasions to wear European clothes; Nazr Ullah has always shown a preference for Afghan dress. It is possible, therefore, that Nazr Ullah's change from Court dress to the robes of a Mullah will not make such a forcible appeal to the people as it might have done had he been as pronounced a patron of Western costume as his brother. Nazr Ullah Khan receives considerable sympathy and support by reason of his marked resemblance to the late Amir. For those whose secret prayer is Afghanistan for the Afghans, there is always this link between the present and the past as encouragement. In speech Nazr Ullah Khan certainly

recalls the mannerisms of his father. Of equal height with the late Amir, he is neither so bulky as his brother nor are his features quite so heavy. In complexion he is darker; while his temperament is morose and his manner reticent. The bluntness of Abdur Rahman is altogether wanting in his sons. Nazr Ullah Khan possesses a greater capacity for intrigue and a larger measure of self-assertion than his brother, Habib Ullah Khan. Moreover, his attitude towards current affairs in Afghanistan has never concealed his appreciation of the possibilities of his position and the need to proclaim himself boldly that some day may arise, if he wishes to realize the hopes of his supporters. It will be an interesting moment for us should any dynastic trouble break out in Kabul; but, while Habib Ullah would hardly risk a quarrel with Nazr Ullah Khan, the Sirdar well understands that were support forthcoming from the Government of India, it would be offered to Habib Ullah.

So much was written about Habib Ullah's appearance at the time of his visit to India in 1907 that there is little need to refer to it here. He is both smaller in stature and much sallower than his father; and, while inclined to stoutness, the heaviness of his features is concealed by a beard and moustache. In conversation his face lights up with an engaging smile and his manners are bland, but touched with condescension. Since the Dane Treaty conferred upon

him the title of Majesty, and the Government of India allowed him by some strange oversight ten more guns than would be conceded to the German Emperor were he to visit India, there has been a steady development in his estimate of his own importance and a corresponding increase in his vanity. Milder than his father, who was as quick to read character as he was to resent injury, the discernment, judgment and courage of the older man are wanting in the son. The two share in common a certain grimness of humour. An absence of political perspective perhaps is the cardinal demerit in the Amir. The embarrassments now existing between Kabul and Calcutta are the price of a mistaken generosity, and Habib Ullah draws his conclusions from the concessions we have granted to him. In the case of the Dane Treaty, we permitted the Amir to dictate his own terms. In the preliminary negotiations for the visit to India we ignored a proclamation, posted in Kabul on the eve of the visit, which announced the expiration of the Dane Treaty, an act which should have caused the withdrawal of the invitation.

There is no doubt that, since the death of the late Amir Abdur Rahman, our engagements with Afghanistan have stood in need of revision. It is intelligible that agreements which were concluded so far back as the Rawal Pindi Durbar of 1885 and the Durand Agreement of 1893 well might merit further consideration in the altered circum-

stances of 1905. Habib Ullah himself would have been probably the first to recognize the material change which the situation had undergone. In any case he fostered the course of events with a growing appreciation of his own interests and the importance of his State, and with a singular contempt of his relations with us. Unfortunately, the position was rendered the more difficult from the fact that the development of Afghanistan had brought about among the Afghans a very general feeling that the independence of their country should be recognized; and that its quasi-protected condition should be finally and formally removed.

In this direction it is possible to feel some little sympathy with the ambitions of Afghanistan. If it were not an essential part of our policy to maintain Afghanistan as a vassal State, subject to the requirements of India and of a possible expansion in Indian policy, there would have been room for the benevolent toleration of not unnatural aspirations. But under the circumstances of the time it became impossible to entertain the pretensions to independence which the successive rulers of Afghanistan have put forward through their unexpected interpretation of their treaties with us. In the main the questions, on which the views of the late Amir, as also those of the present Amir diverged from the Government's interpretation of Agreements with Afghanistan, were in connection with the subsidy and the right to

purchase and to import provisions of war through India. Through disagreements with the Government of India, and with the view of maintaining his claim to the independence of Afghanistan, the late Amir Rahman declined to draw the subsidy of eighteen lakhs of rupees. This attitude was continued by his son, Habib Ullah, from the time when he succeeded his father, although he did not fail to credit himself with the amounts of the monthly instalments. Again, while the late ruler of Afghanistan was permitted to disburse the subsidy in whatever manner he chose, it will be remembered that it was granted with a view to the pecuniary relief of the Amir's exchequer in the payment of the troops, and for other purposes requisite to the defence of the north-western frontier of the State. These two questions, with those raised by the wished-for reorganization of the Afghan army under British officers and the provision of more adequate means of communication between India and Afghanistan than the caravan routes afforded, were the more important problems of several which should have been solved by the Dane Mission.

Inveterate suspicion of foreign influence characterizes every aspect of Habib Ullah's external policy. So frequently during 1901-4 did these doubts of our good faith imperil Anglo-Afghan relations that, at the close of 1904, action of a convincing nature was held to be essential. Concerned at the rupture

which was threatening India and Afghanistan at a moment when Lord Curzon was absent from India, and unwilling to insist upon the Amir's acceptance of the Viceroy's invitation to a conference, the Imperial Government, as the only means of renewing the Agreements which remained to them, decided to dispatch a mission to Kabul. At the instance of the Secretary of State for India, Mr. St. John Brodrick, the acting Viceroy of India Lord Ampthill acquainted Habib Ullah with the wishes of his Majesty's Government. In reply his Highness, with the hope of improving his position when the time came for diplomatic discussion and as an act of conciliation towards the Viceroy, intimated his willingness to send his son, Inayat Ullah Khan, to meet Lord Curzon upon his return to India. As constituted, the mission comprised Mr., now Sir Louis, Dane, Foreign Secretary of State, Mr. H. R. Dobbs—who, together with Major Wanliss, had recently returned from replacing the boundary pillars on the Perso-Afghan border—Major W. Malleon, R.A., Captain Victor Brooke, 9th Lancers, and a British doctor. Leaving Peshawar on November 27, the mission reached Dakka on November 29, and was met at Lundi Khana by two hundred Afghan cavalry under the Sipah Sala Ghulam Hussein, the Sarhang of Dakka, and Mahommed Habin Khan. Major Roos-Keppel, political agent for the Khyber, accompanied the party for a few

miles beyond Lundī Khana to Torkhānā, where a guard of honour of the Khyber Rifles was drawn up, the mission ultimately arriving at Kabul on December 10. Elaborate gifts were conveyed by Sir Louis Dane for presentation to the Amir, among many others a £700 motor-car and several cases of sporting equipment. As a compliment to the ladies of the harem the Government of India thoughtfully included a cinematograph, providing at the same time the necessary operator. Among the presents to the mission from his Highness were a gold watch and a set of gold cuff-links which Habib Ullah had offered to Sir Louis Dane. The note struck by the negotiations was scarcely in the same pitch as the festivities by which the withdrawal of the mission was celebrated, when seven gramophones simultaneously discharged bursts of discordant revelry.

After the ceremonial Durbar with which the preliminaries opened the Amir invited Sir Louis Dane to a private meeting with his Council on the day following. To this Sir Louis Dane and the two civilian members of the Mission drove, dressed in frock-coats. Met by Shahgassi Abdul Kaddus and then by Nazr Ullah Khan they were ushered into the council chamber, where the Amir, dressed also in a black frock-coat, sat, at the head of an inlaid table, furnished with pens and paper. After the usual greetings the British delegates took their seats at the table on the Amir's right; on his left sat

Nazr Ullāh Khan, Shahgassi Aḥdul Kaddus, Sirdar Mohamed Asif Khan, Lionab Khushdil Khan and the Kotwal, Mohamed Hussein Khan. There were two interpreters, who stood on the Amir's right, Khan Bahadur¹ Maula Bakhsh, on our behalf, and Sirdar Azimullah Khan on behalf of the Amir. Owing to the necessity of avoiding all misunderstanding on the important matters under discussion it was agreed that it would be more satisfactory to work through two interpreters, who could check each other, although Sir Louis Dane himself was perfectly at home in Persian, the Court language of Kabul. After a little polite conversation, and some general talk about the Russo-Japanese war in which the Amir was extremely interested, the subject of a new treaty was broached. "

"What was good enough for my father," in effect said Habib Ullah Khan in reply, "is good enough for me," adding that he wished for no treaty, the agreement with Abdur Rahman amply satisfying his views. By way of explanation it was pointed out to the Amir that the treaties which had been arranged with Abdur Rahman constituted a private *modus vivendi*, and that the Government of India was prepared with a new treaty to be regarded as made between itself and the Amir of Afghanistan. Sir Louis Dane then proceeded to read over to the Amir a copy of the suggested treaty, when the Amir interrupted with the remark, anent the restrictions

against the importation of arms, that Great Britain professed friendship, and yet refused to supply the just wants of Afghanistan. At this clause, together with that concerning the extension of the railway to Dakka, the Amir appeared concerned. From this point, negotiations in connection with the British proposals practically broke down, Sir Louis Dane failing to elicit from the Amir or from his advisers anything more than the assurance that the ruler of Afghanistan did not wish for a special treaty, and that what was wanted he could prepare for himself. At a later date the Mission was supplied with a copy of the agreement which the Amir was anxious to see ratified. But from the moment when he raised his objections to the opening clauses of the treaty until Sir Louis Dane was in a position to give the assurance that the Imperial Government had acceded to his wishes, a period of six weeks, the Amir was confined to his bed with gout, and members of the Mission were not admitted to audience. Throughout this period it may be presumed that the Amir kept in touch with the progress of the discussion. Although his principal advisers, with whom it had become increasingly difficult to negotiate, recognized the isolated position in which Afghanistan was placed and refused to entertain the suggestion of the introduction of the telegraph to Kabul, the extension of the railway to Dakka or the reorganization of the military resources, it is doubtful whether

they would have rejected such proposals upon their own responsibility.

In regard to the negotiations a full note was kept by both parties of all that was said. Important points which required further consideration were held over for answer by written memoranda. In this way a great deal of ground was covered during the interviews, which lasted about three hours. Within the next day or two a written memorandum dealing with the unsettled points would be exchanged, each in turn necessitating further replies and other interviews. In this way the negotiations dragged on during the stay at Kabul. There were, of course, long periods of inactivity and delay owing to the necessity of references to the Government of India, and thence sometimes to the home Government. It took about five days—and in the coldest season more—to send a telegram by runner down to Landi-Kotal whence it was dispatched to Calcutta, and the same time to get an answer. Allowing a minimum of a week for the Government of India and the Secretary of State to consider the points at issue, an answer would seldom arrive in less than seventeen to twenty days.

From the moment that the copy of the treaty which had been drawn up by the advisers of the Amir had been handed to the head of the British Mission, the treatment accorded to its members changed. While the treaty was in process of being

transmitted to India and forwarded from India to London the interval at Kabul was occupied with the exchange of an elaborate correspondence between the principal advisers of the Amir's Government and Sir Louis Dane, the marked rudeness of which, upon the part of the Afghans, would have been sufficient justification for the summary breaking off of negotiations. Unfortunately, through the absence of adequate powers, the Mission had to await the decision of the Imperial Government upon the Amir's treaty. But when in place of the order for the immediate withdrawal of the Mission Mr. Brodrick sent instructions that the treaty, as arranged by the Amir should be signed, the Mission was informed that the Amir had changed his mind; and that the version of the treaty to which the Imperial Government had agreed was to be replaced by another.

When this second agreement was produced the difference between the new treaty and the old was of such a character that Sir Louis Dane declined to sign, a proceeding which was very proper and earned the support of his immediate following. Instead of maintaining his position and withdrawing from a situation covering all concerned in it with humiliation he oscillated between the attraction of bringing home a treaty however ineffectual, and the complete rupture of relations with Afghanistan. Finally he decided to attach his signature to the

document as a precautionary measure and conditional upon its ultimate acceptance by the Imperial Government.

In connection with the signing of the treaty, Mr. A. H. Grant, an officer of the Mission, relates an interesting incident which occurred as the Amir was attaching his signature to it. By sad mishap one of the Amir's secretaries upset some ink over one of the parchments. Endeavours were at once made with chalk, blotting-paper and penknives to remove the stain, but it remained.

"After all," said the Amir, with a smile, "it's the contents of the treaty which we care about, and not its looks." This is only a mole on its face."

Whereupon Sir Louis Dane, with great felicity, quoted the words of Hafiz: "I would give all Samarkand and Bokhara for the Indian dark mole on the face of my lady-love."

Abdul Kaddus, who at once elaborated the jest, said, "Well, now that you have got your lady-love's mole, what about Samarkand and Bokhara for Afghanistan?"

"Unfortunately for you," Sir Louis Dane replied, "the Amir has kept the mole copy himself."

"At any rate," returned Abdul Kaddus Khan, "this treaty will always be remembered by its mole," regarding which Mr. Dane has quoted so aptly."

The Dane Treaty, when signed, was as follows—

He is God. Extolled be His perfection.

His Majesty Siraj-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, Amir Habib Ullah Khan, Independent King of the State of Afghanistan and its Dependencies, on the one part, and the Honourable Mr. Louis William Dane, C.S.I., Foreign Secretary of the Mighty Government of India and the Representative of the Exalted British Government, on the other part.

His said Majesty doth hereby agree to this, that in the principles and in the matters of subsidiary importance of the Treaty regarding internal and external affairs, and of the engagements which His Highness, my late father, that is, Zia-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, who has found mercy, may God enlighten his tomb ! concluded and acted upon with the Exalted British Government, I also have acted, am acting, and will act upon the same agreement and compact, and I will not contravene them in any dealings or in any promise.

The said Honourable Mr. Louis William Dane does hereby agree to this, that as to the very agreement and engagement which the Exalted British Government concluded and acted upon with the noble father of His Majesty Siraj-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, that is, His Highness Zia-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, who has found mercy, regarding internal and external affairs of principle or subsidiary importance, I confirm them and write that they (the British Government) will not act contrary to those agreements and engagements in any way or at any time.

Made on Tuesday, the fourteenth day of Mu-

harram-ul-haram of the year 1323 Hijri, corresponding to the twenty-first day of March of the year 1905 A.D.

(Persian Seal of Amir Habib Ullah Khan.)

This is correct. I have sealed and signed.

AMIR HABIB ULLAH,

LOUIS W. DANE,

Foreign Secretary, Representing the Government of India.

It will be seen that the Dane Agreement establishes no more than a simple renewal of engagements which had their origin in the pledges given by Lord Ripon as Viceroy of India to the Amir Abdur Rahman on his recognition by the Afghan Sirdars at Kabul in 1880. As a matter of fact, this renewal on both sides of the engagements entered into between the Amir Abdur Rahman and the Indian Government represented the limit to which the Amir Habib Ullah would permit himself to go. Under the powers of this convention the Amir thus obtained, firstly, the release of the arrears of subsidy, in all some £400,000; secondly, the continuation of the annual subsidy of eighteen lakhs of rupees; thirdly, the right to an unrestricted importation of arms; and, lastly, recognition of himself as independent King of Afghanistan and its dependencies. It is not to be supposed that these substantial concessions were intended to be awarded without adequate return. But the Amir conceded nothing; and the position of affairs as between Kabul and Calcutta stands to-day almost where it was left by the death

of Abdur Rahman. No political engagements resulted from Habib Ullah's visit to India as the discussion of Anglo-Afghan relations was expressly ruled out, and the Afghan Articles of the Anglo-Russian Treaty are still the subject of correspondence between the Amir and His Majesty's Governments.

To-day there are so many points to be considered in our relations with Afghanistan that it is perhaps of interest to recall those that are of chief importance. Broadly speaking, our wants may be said to fall under two heads—

1. Those that are the concomitant of our responsibilities in respect of the territorial integrity of Afghanistan.

2. Those that have arisen locally through political misunderstanding.

In connection with the first it must be understood that our requirements at the present time are only the logical complement of that protection by which we shield Afghanistan from foreign aggression. If, in the future, we are to continue to give practical effect to the letter, as well as to the spirit of our engagements with the Amir, the facilities to enable us to do so should be provided. So long as we are denied the possession of any points of vantage in Afghanistan itself nothing but misfortune can be expected to accrue from an arrangement which expects us to safeguard the northern frontier of Afghanistan from points 500 miles distant, with-


out the means for rapid communication and in the absence of an efficient Afghan army. To avoid disaster it is desirable that the system of strategic railways now existing on the Indian frontier should be prolonged to Kābul and Kandahār; a telegraph service established between Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sherif and India; the reorganization of the Afghan army under officers of the Indian army permitted and arrangements sanctioned for the training with the Anglo-Indian establishment of representative groups from the Afghan army. Of course none of these important developments can be carried out without the assent of the Amir, and it is hardly necessary to point out that the Imperial Government, desirous of securing his benevolent co-operation in the realization of measures designed solely for the benefit of Afghanistan, approaches the question in an indulgent and amicable spirit. In this direction it is of use to say that the opposition to Indian assistance is confined almost entirely to the Court Party in Kabul, whose anti-foreign prejudices are imbibed from the teachings of the Mullahs, at once a curse and a power in the land and the most enduring menace to our influence which Afghanistan contains. Although obdurate to all suggestion, Haib Ullah has none the less made known his intention of falling back upon the support of the Government of India in the event of necessity. Such a contingency is likely to happen at the outset of a

war between Great Britain and any foreign power and the folly of his intolerance of foreign supervision is manifest. The *matériel* of the Afghan army is excellent. Its good qualities could be enhanced easily and quickly by judicious training under British officers.

The features of the second category are upon a different plane to those of the first. They are concerned in the main with the Amir's interference with overland and interprovincial trading caravans from India; with his control of the Mohmand border tribes and his perpetuation of Abdur Rahman's regulations against the use of the railhead at New Chaman. No one of these questions is beyond adjustment; but reflection on the condition of affairs now prevailing on the Indo-Afghan border should show at once the similarity existing between the situation of 1897-1898 and that of 1908-1909. Unfortunately the most persistent, as it has been the most prominent, annoyance to the Government of India, in connection with Indo-Afghan relations during Habib Ullah's reign, has proceeded from the Amir's dalliance with the independent tribes of the border zone. In marked contrast to the policy that his father usually followed, Habib Ullah has offered constant encouragement to the border tribes to regard Kabul as their protecting centre. Numerous deputations from the Afridi zone, including one or two from the Zakka Khels, our recent enemies have attended Kabul. On an earlier occasion an Afridi

bodyguard was raised from sections of the tribes which had been at war with us. Indiscretion in the conduct of border affairs may be said to have marked Habib Ullah's policy from the time of his accession. In spite of remonstrance, he has continued his patronage of the more disorderly border elements. If the tribes at last have got a little out of hand, it is to be feared that responsibility rests with him.

The late Amir was accustomed to use the frontier firebrands, the Mullah Said Akbar, the Sufi Mullah and the Hadda Mullah, to consolidate his own authority and to interpose a fretful hedge of fanaticism between his kingdom and the outside world. At the same time he was able to curb their insolence and to check their excesses when he wished. Habib Ullah has not that power and would appear to display a curious predilection for the society of men in whom the impulse of mischief is stronger than the dictates of common-sense. This is the most disquieting feature in the future of Anglo-Afghan relations. It will continue to remain so unless the Government of India uses the first available opportunity to read the tribes a lesson. There is no question of war with Afghanistan. There is a risk of a border conflagration and that possibility should be regarded as the consequence of following an indefinite policy in our relations with the Amir.



THE STORY OF THE HEDJAZ RAILWAY

It is a peculiar coincidence, Auler Pasha remarks in the admirable brochure on the Hedjaz Railway that he has recently drawn up, that it should be reserved for Sultan Abdul Hamid II to revive the activity of two of the most famous trade routes in the history of the world. These are the coastal Red Sea route from Cane Emporium to Damascus, and the Persian Gulf route through Mesopotamia to Palmyra ; the former, that of the Sabaeans or Himyarites and Nabataeans, by means of the Hedjaz Railway, and the latter, that of Palmyra, by means of the Baghdad Railway. Unfortunately the construction of the Baghdad Railway has been interrupted by the character of the technical difficulties to be met with in the passage of the Taurus and the expense to be incurred when attempted. The advantage of continuing the railway over the Taurus at least up to Aleppo, already in railway communication with Damascus by the French line, lies in the fact that it would add to the prosperity and development of the region. When the three hundred and sixteen

miles are laid between railhead on the Baghdad Railway at Bulgurlu and Aleppo, uninterrupted communication by rail between Mecca and Constantinople would be secured. It is to be feared until this link has been provided that the full significance of the Hedjaz Railway to the Osman Empire will not be understood.

The Sultan necessarily had a dual objective in ordaining the construction of the Hedjaz Railway. Although he would esteem at a high value, and rightly so, the advantages accruing to the Caliphate from a railway which united Constantinople with the sacred cities of Damascus, Medina and Mecca—respectively the burial place of Fatima, Mahommed's famous daughter; the burial place of the Prophet himself, and the Prophet's birth place—it is impossible to think that he failed to find in the railway the solution of those strategical problems to which the position of Turkey has given rise. Certainly this aspect of the question of the Near East has been recognized by the expert advisers of the Sultan. No less an authority than General von der Goltz, the reorganizer of the Turkish Army, prefaces Auler Pasha's work with the following observation—

The great distance dividing the southern province from the rest of the Empire was not the only difficulty of holding them in control, but it made Turkey unable to concentrate her strength in case of great danger in the north. It must not be

forgotteñ that the Osmanie Empire in all former wars on the Danube and Balkans has only been able to utilize half her forces. Not only did the far-off Asiatic provinces not contribute men, but they, on the contrary, necessitated strong reinforcements to prevent the danger of their being tempted into rebellion. This will be quite changed when the railroads to the Persian Gulf and the centre portions of the Red Sea are made. The Empire will then be in a way rejuvenated and have renewed strength.

The formal inception of the Hedjaz Railway dates from 1900. In April of that year the Sultan proclaimed to the Faithful his intention of building a railway to connect Damascus with the two cities held in universal veneration by the Mahommedan world. An immediate appeal was issued to Mussulmans of whatever country for funds to carry out the work. The Sultan himself headed the list of subscriptions with a donation of £T50,000. The only compulsory element in these subscriptions was the 10 per cent., or one month's salary, levied on every official in the Turkish service, civil and military, at home and abroad, including even the privates in the ill-paid army. Many of these officials were not of the Moslem faith; some were Christians. But in this case the small minority were included and had to pay the proportion fixed by the Railway Commission. Newspapers, printed in a multitude of tongues and circulating in Europe, Africa, India,

America and Australia, appealed to all—black, brown or white—followers of the Prophet for money. Seldom has religious zeal responded more generously. Committees were formed everywhere and offerings came to them in the form of money, jewels, ivory, silks, cloths and even slaves. The Faithful gave of their substance direct and £3,000,000 were raised. It is roughly estimated that the levy of officials realized nearly £250,000 and the purely voluntary subscriptions yielded not less than a million. Work was begun on August 31, 1900, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Sultan's accession to the Throne. It has been continued according to a definitely fixed programme, each section being completed on the prearranged day—August 31.

On September 1, 1901, the Mezariib-Dera'a section was opened and on September 1, 1902, that between Dera'a and Serka. During 1903 the progress of the work was delayed owing to non-delivery of material. None the less on September 1 the Serka-Katrane portion was finished. By May 1904 preliminary work on the track had advanced three hundred and eleven miles: twenty-five miles south of Ma'an, the metals being laid two hundred and twenty-seven miles from Damascus. On September 1, 1904, the piece between El Katrane-Ma'an was completed, when an Imperial Commission attended the opening ceremony, which was an occasion of general rejoicing throughout the Mahommedan world. The next

two sections, Ma'an to Medawara and Medawara to Dhat el Haj, were opened by September 1, 1906. By the end of the year rails were laid four hundred and fifty-two miles—from Damascus to a point nineteen miles beyond Tebuk. On September 1, 1907, the Medain-Saleh section, ending at El Ula station six hundred and fourteen miles from Damascus, was specially inaugurated. By the end of this year trains could go as far as Bar-Jehid, six hundred and sixty-nine miles from Damascus. The distance completed during 1907 was two hundred and seventeen miles, while preliminary work had been thrown up along a great portion of the remaining one hundred and fifty-six miles to Medina, which city was reached on September 1, 1908. At the end of 1907 the total expenditure amounted to £2,750,000 leaving about £250,000 in hand. The distance constructed for that sum, including the one hundred miles of the Dera'a-Haifa branch, is seven hundred and sixty-nine miles, each mile having cost on an average rather over £3,000.

Service with the railway on account of its religious aspect has been a point of honour with the Turks. Civil engineers, in the main graduates of the Constantinople engineering college, have joined the railway with a fair theoretical equipment, though their practical knowledge has left something to be desired. The Ottoman army has also supplied many useful officers, some of whom have been selected on

account of, their technical qualifications, others have given proofs of their energy and patriotism by volunteering for service with the railway battalions. The rank and file are composed of three battalions of Nizam and two battalions of railway pioneers. They have been raised by conscription mainly from Syrian vilayets. Each unit contains a sprinkling of Turks, for the average Turkish officer or official in Syria, whatever his knowledge of the language of the Koran, has little colloquial Arabic at his command. They were paid formerly at the rate of one Turkish piastre a day from the railway fund, in addition to their very inadequate military pay. A new system was recently introduced. Each soldier now is paid a piastre for every cubic metre of earth excavated or laid on the track, and two piastres for every cubic metre of rock or stones. Under these conditions embankment work has made extremely rapid progress.

In all nearly seven thousand people have been employed along the line, engaged in earth-works, cuttings, levelling, laying down rails, transport, etc. The technical work has been done by contractors: natives and foreigners, but mostly Italian. Non-Moslem workmen included hundreds of Italians and Montenegrins and four hundred Greeks and Syrians.

The work of the soldiers has been beyond all criticism and indeed merits the highest praise. Their participation in the construction of the railway was due to the conduct of the foreign contractors.

As the line penetrated further and further into the desert their demands grew more and more extortionate, ultimately compelling the Commissioners to summon the military to their aid in building the stations and bridges. For this purpose a number of the men of the 4th Company of No. 1 Railway Battalion were especially trained in carpentry and masonry by master workmen and attained such proficiency that they were soon able to work without supervision. In view of the custom, which excludes non-Moslems from the Hedjaz proper, it is possible that the whole of the work in the Medina-Mecca section will be done by the men of the railway battalions.

The country traversed by the Hedjaz Railway lies at a considerable distance east of the coast of the Red Sea. The chief characteristics of the district are the volcanic ranges whose highest elevations attain 10,000 feet. On the west these mountains fall away to the Red Sea in abrupt declivities; on the east the descent to the Arabian plateau is by a succession of terraces. The railway follows generally the eastern extremities of these terraces, which are crossed by numerous wadis. From Batu el Ghoul the track is closely contained by column-shaped rocks, but it soon emerges on to the broad valleys. There is an extraordinary difference in the relative heights of the spurs on each side of the railway. To the north between Ma'an and El Muteli they are not generally more than 300 feet. To the south of

El Muteli, especially in the narrow wadi of El Ula they rise to over 600 feet. The average height of the line varies between 2,100 feet and 3,450 feet.

From Damascus, past Dera'a, Ma'an and Medina to Mecca, the railway covers 1,116 miles. It follows where possible the new pilgrim road and starts from Kadem station which bears, by the way, the same name as a suburb to the south of Damascus. Between Damascus and El Ula it follows the ancient caravan road, only leaving it to avoid impassable difficulties. Between Ma'an and Batu el Ghoul, it traverses a stony desert that extends to the north of Ma'an. At Ghadir el Haj station, and continuing past Bir el Schedije station to the 300 mile, it descends a long decline, but rises two thousand feet to the Akabat el Hejazieh. Here the railway makes a detour to the east to avoid a high ridge, running in a direct line from Ma'an to Akabat el Hejazieh.

From Akabat el Hejazieh, where the country becomes hilly, the railway ascends 3,500 feet, reaching an altitude which it attains only at one other point, on the watershed of El Muteli 3,462 feet. From the summit of the plateau the land slopes, at first gradually, to the station at Batu el Ghoul and then falls sharply away into the basin of that name. The descent of 740 feet into the Batu el Ghoul is accomplished in loops of a minimum radius of 375 feet. From Batu el Ghoul it follows the Wadi Rutm, which widens out in a southerly direction and

enters a plain about six miles west of the railway. As the hills to the east recede, the plain broadens; but, on the west, the hills follow the course of the wadi for a short distance. At Kala'at el Medawara they form a mass of rugged rock.

The railway, after proceeding for a little distance, runs about two miles east of Kala'at el Medawara and follows the plain of the Wadi Rutm to about six miles south of Medawara, where the ascents to Halat el Amar and Dhat el Haj begin. At this stage the scene is desolate in the extreme, while the oasis of Dhat el Haj, with its beautiful palms, stands out in striking contrast to the drabness of the general environment of the line. Between Ma'an and Dhat el Haj the ground is very well adapted for railway construction. The only obstacle is a salt basin to the south of Medawara: it is one thousand yards broad and becomes filled with water in the rainy season. Fortunately rain seldom falls in the Hedjaz, besides which deep trenches have been dug at the side of the permanent way, thus leaving the embankments high and dry. A few miles south of this basin a patch of shifting sand was encountered, and the line taken to the east.

The maintenance of the permanent way between the different stations, a distance varying between twelve and eighteen miles, is intrusted to the railway battalions. Two men are detailed to each point and share the station dwellings with the depot officials.

The buildings have four rooms apiece and are protected from attack by high walls. On the southern part of the line the protecting walls have been loop-holed as a precaution against parties of predatory Bedouins. The construction of the station premises follows a common plan but some are larger than others. The stations south of El Mu'assan have been provided with six-room houses and a corresponding increase in the resident staff.

The station buildings are built in the form of squares. The smaller ones cover 36 ft. \times 36 ft. the larger ones 45 ft. \times 45 ft.; along one wall a shelter from the sun has been provided for travellers. The buildings are of one storey, very massive and built of sandstone with flat cement roofs. The stations between Damascus and Ma'an are furnished with brick roofs and in their interior arrangements are simple yet serviceable. As the difficulty of obtaining fuel and water is the bane of the railway elaborate measures, against the misuse of the one and for the storage of the other, have to be employed. Stations, like Dhat el Haj, that possess an abundant supply of spring or cistern water are equipped with windmills and steam apparatus for feeding water to the locomotives. The coal for the use of the steam pumps has to be brought long distances and its use is almost prohibitive. Since there is always plenty of wind in the Hedjaz windmills are more commonly employed to raise water.

At Dhat el Haj a distinct change is noticeable in the aspect of the country and six miles to the south the train enters an open plain called "El Ka'" by the Bedouins. The surface of the plain is level, firm as a floor and most suitable for motor traffic. When the work of construction had reached this point Meissner Pasha proposed that a motor transport service should be organized for the conveyance of building materials and provisions to the troops. The proposal was regarded favourably by the general commission at Constantinople and tenders for the supply of the necessary motors were obtained. The plan fell through, on the score of expense, in spite of the obvious adaptability of this part of the Hedjaz, as also of the wadis of the south, to such means of transport.

Ten miles to the east of the railway at Dhat el Haj a low range of hills may be seen and the volcanic mountains bordering the Red Sea are visible in the distance on the west, the line of telegraph poles, and the bleached bones of camels that have dropped in their tracks, constituting the only break in the monotony of the landscape. The plain, however, is not entirely devoid of vegetation for patches of desert grass and small bushes appear here and there. As Tebuk approaches, twelve miles to the east a curious-looking hill rises 2,000 feet above the plain in the form of a great pulpit, with terraced sides and called by the Bedouins, Jebel Sherora. Tradition

says that Mahomet preached from the table-like summit of the mountain to the Arab tribes.

From the well-watered Dhat el Haj oasis the railway climbs to the stations of Bir Hermas, where a well gives one hundred tons of water daily, and El Hazma, from which it once more descends to El Makhtah, a siding with a well of brackish water. From this point the Tebuk oasis is visible and the line ascends gradually to Tebuk station, which lies in a shadeless wilderness, a few yards from the wells. Tebuk is provided with all the accessories of a first-class station; a mile of sidings, water towers, engine sheds and turn-table. There is a massive one-storey hospital with sixty beds and a mosque, built by the chief of the Construction Department of the railway on a spot where Mahomet once knelt in prayer.

The village of Tebuk, which lies amidst date palms and is graced by a few hundred acres of cultivation, prior to building of the line was the only permanent settlement in the three hundred miles or so intervening between Ma'an and El Ula. Nowadays, as the Hedjaz correspondent of the *Times* once pointed out, the palm groves, garden, and cornfields are cultivated by the Beni Hamdan, a little community of some three hundred souls, obviously of servile origin, negroes and Abyssinians, crossed with Arab blood. Three new wells, all of which yield an abundant supply of drinking water at a depth of about twelve feet, have been sunk near the station by

the Turks and now that the Beni Hamdan are guaranteed against Bedouin attack, the area of cultivation will probably be extended.

The houses of Tebuk for the most part are mean, ill-built, mud-hovels. When the construction parties first reached the place only seven or eight houses were inhabited out of a total of sixty. The rest had been abandoned by the cultivators in consequence of raids by the Beni Atiyya, who killed several people and plundered the rest, compelling most of the survivors to take refuge at Ma'an or Teima. Under existing conditions the refugees have returned. Sheik Harb himself, the chief of the Beni Atiyya, has demanded and received permission to build a house near the village, thus giving a guarantee of future good conduct which the Turks are delighted to have obtained.

The level character of the country round Tebuk ends abruptly at Wadi Atil some sixteen miles south of the oasis, to which point the railway runs almost in a straight line. Where the plain ceases the wadi is crossed by a massive stone bridge 429 feet long with twenty 18-foot arches. This bridge is longer than any other bridge on this section of the line.

Beyond Wadi Atil are the ranges known as Harrat el Aweyrid and Harrat el Khaterra and their influence is perceptible in the broken aspect of the region. As the line continues, this feature of its setting becomes emphasized and the country assumes

a mountainous character. Just beyond Mustabka it enters a narrow winding gorge which terminates in a tunnel 540 feet long. The railway emerges from the tunnel upon another cutting, equally steep and narrow and three quarters of a mile in length, which delayed the working parties for six months. After the series of curves have passed, in which the Wadi Akhdar is negotiated, Akhdar station is found perched high among rocks.

From Akhdar, which lies in a fairly fertile and well-watered region, the train ascends a scarcely perceptible gradient through the rock-bound Wadi Akhdar and the Wadi Hamis until it reaches Hamis station. Here the line enters the Wadi el Sani and the train runs through it until it reaches El Kadi. It then passes the station of Dis'ad and arrives at last at the comparatively open station of El Muadhdham, a few hundred yards from Kalaat Muadhdham. At Kalaat Muadhdham there is a stone reservoir with a capacity of 11,000 tons, which the Bedouins say holds when completely full sufficient water for seven years. It dates back to the earliest times.

After Muadhdham the railway continues to follow the wadi, but the red sandstone hills are soon left behind, while the deposits of lava disappear altogether. Slowly ascending, the line reaches Khishm Sanaa where there is witnessed the sight, which becomes familiar at certain places along these wadis if a

rarity elsewhere, of a flourishing vegetation in a waterless region. This fact certainly suggests that the chain of wadis between Akhdar and Dar el Hamra are capable of cultivation if proper irrigation could be established, either through boring wells or by collecting the rainfall. At Dar el Hamra, by the way, there is a reservoir similar to that which may be found at Kalaat Muadhdham, but it is nearly always dry.

From Dar el Hamra the line climbs to the watershed and proceeds to the station of El Muteli, from whence it winds through the singular formations in red sandstone which give effect to the name of the region. To the right and left rise solitary masses of red sandstone worn into grotesque shapes through the combined influences of time and weather. At one point there is what appears to be a row of graceful minarets; at another a number of massive blocks have the appearance of ruined mosques. Here there looms a gigantic sphinx; there the suggestion of a terrifying face, elsewhere the head of an animal.

Beyond El Muteli the train passes the station of Abu Taka and then continues along the wadi of the same name to El Mushim. From El Mushim the pilgrim road runs via the Mabarakat el Naka Pass and through it to Medain Saleh. Unfortunately the railway was prevented by a belt of shifting sands from following the same route as the pilgrims; for that reason it bends at El Mushim sharply to

the west and then to the south. In a measure the engineers responsible for selecting the route were confronted with Hobson's choice. If the direction selected did not offer quite so many obstacles as a line through the Mabarakat el Naka Pass might have done it presented, none the less, more technical difficulties than any other section of the track and of a nature for which the extreme picturesqueness of the landscape, and the wondrous rock formation of the Mushim district, was not sufficient compensation.

Medain Saleh, where numerous Nabataean and Semitic traces have been found, stands above the level of the wadis and was not at first intended to become so important as it now is. The unhealthiness of ancient El Ula, a permanent settlement fourteen miles to the south and the most northerly grain depôt of the Queen of Shebah, determined the choice of the railway commission in its favour. In every way the site is desirable. It is readily defended, well supplied with water and rests upon a sandstone foundation. By virtue of its position it has now become a military and railway encampment, the last large depôt on the line before Medina is reached. From the heights of Medain Saleh the line descends to El Ula. The wadi here is verdant with vegetation and the station lies at the southern extremity of a palm grove. Towering walls of red sandstone, 900 feet in height, close in upon the line.

where it first thrusts itself upon the seclusion of the village, to widen out as the line proceeds.

El Ula, screened by groves of date palms and lemon trees and invisible from the line, lies behind walls which, although nine feet high, are slight and easily surmounted. Typical of its class as a trading mart the little place offers many indications of its superiority over other centres on the line. The solid, sandstone houses compare favourably with the indifferent hovels which are seen at Tebuk and other Arab villages. They are mostly two storeys with flat roofs. As each roof is connected with its neighbour a walk along the house-tops after sunset becomes a favourite pastime with the villagers. If the houses are imposing the streets are insignificant. They are narrow, barely six feet broad and protected from the sun by branches of trees and palm leaves laid across from house to house.

The oasis of El Ula is very productive. It is watered by several springs and pools, which, in the main, are utilized for purposes of irrigation. The supply of dates is very plentiful and more than suffices for local requirements. Hitherto the surplus has been sold to the Bedouins or given in exchange for the rice which caravans occasionally bring from El Wedj. Rice is an article of luxury in the Hedjaz owing to the high charges for camel transport and the reign of terror over the oasis, which the Bedouins hitherto have maintained. It is believed

now that the railway will not only ameliorate conditions of existence at El Ula by reducing the cost of living, but give to the inhabitants of the oasis a chance of selling the produce of their groves to advantage. With the advent of the railway it is assumed that the rule of the sons of the desert has come to an end.

The section of the line beyond El Ula is that most recently opened. From El Ula the railway rises and falls over easy gradients to Kalaat Izumrud where it traverses a defile and reaches its highest point south of the oasis, at 2,700 feet above sea level, after an abrupt rise of 350 feet in seven miles. From here it descends to Bir el Jedid between which place and Hedieh it reaches its lowest point, 1,150 feet above sea level. From Hedieh, Medina is 115 miles distant and the road rises only 1,100 feet in this distance. While railhead has arrived at the Holy City the political advantages of reaching Medina without delay caused the work to be hurried more than was desirable for efficiency. Happily the two hundred miles presented no difficulties, and as neither tunnels nor bridges of importance were required, remarkable dispatch was possible. Work proceeded from either end of the section; but, although the foundations of the permanent way were laid as carefully as in the earlier portions of the work, the top ballasting has been scamped, rails have been laid carelessly and embankments have taken the places

of bridges over the various wadis. From motives of economy wooden sleepers again have made their appearance. Similarly the station buildings with the exception of Medina, to the construction of which a benevolent Moslem subscribed a million francs, await completion in some places, construction in others, the working parties, the troops and the railway officials meanwhile living under canvas. Although the speed with which work on the stage to Medina was pushed on resulted in trying conditions, the workmen had everything that they wanted in the way of good water, shady encampments and fresh vegetables. Moreover there were no delays as the full capacity of the transport was given up to the carriage of material. It is expected that the facilities enjoyed on the El Ula-Medina section will be found equally on the Medina-Mecca stage. The sister city is to be no less equipped, the two depôts when ready being as well provided as any centre south of Damascus.

Beyond Medina two roads run to Mecca. A road to the east passes through a volcanic area and is less suited to the rapid construction of the railway than the western route. This follows the coast line and has been selected as the route of the last section of the railway. Preliminary construction has already started at three points; at Medina itself, at Mecca and at the Red Sea port of Rabigh. It is possible, too, that the construction of the line between

Jiddah and Mecca may proceed simultaneously with the forging of the more important link. At any rate, it will be seen that the greatest possible expedition is being observed. Happily for the success of all concerned the western route presents no special difficulties. The course of the wadis can be followed and no tunnels will have to be made. In this respect the line between Medina and Mecca resembles that between El Ula and Medina, with the exception that there is a small belt of drifting sand in the vicinity of Mecca. The distance between the two cities, a matter of 280 miles, is the principal obstacle to the completion of the work by August 31, 1909. Yet, if the unparalleled energy of the construction parties has already shown to advantage in the earlier sections of the railway, the world may rest assured that it will be a matter of principle with every one associated with the work to put forth at the eleventh hour an even more heroic effort.

In this direction the Indian Government might render an immense service to its Moslem subjects, and at the same time pay a graceful compliment to the Caliph, by building the stage between Jiddah and Mecca by which all Indian pilgrims will have to travel. Such an act would be a master-stroke and would exercise an undying influence throughout the Mahommedan world.

THE PASSING OF KOREA

THE position of Korea in regard to Japan is, of course, unfortunate, both geographically and politically. Lying between the territories of China on the one hand, and those of the Island Empire on the other, the Hermit Kingdom has never been quite free from that intimidating influence by which a paramount Power so frequently manifests its authority. Long years ago, in spite of treaties—possibly in defiance of them—Japan conceived a line of action in Korea, and has fashioned it to suit her needs. Korea thus bears many evidences of the war-like activities and commercial enterprise of past generations of Japanese, who, abandoning their own island home, sought domicile upon the shores of the neighbouring peninsula. The precarious existence of these waifs and strays from an alien State, in the midst of a people whose whole attitude was anti-foreign, did not deter others from coming to her ports. This gradual migration from Japan to the Hermit Kingdom continued during many centuries, promoting an intercourse between two races which the Japanese Government was powerless to frustrate.

Japanese historians argue from this early association with Cho-sun that Korea was a vassal of Japan from the second century by right of conquest and appropriation. At any rate, from the beginning of the Christian era until the fifteenth century, the relations between Japan and Korea were very close.

At the two points in her empire adjacent to the dominions of China and Japan, war and peace alternately prevailed. If, upon occasion, the Koreans went out unsupported to fight their invaders, their leaders more usually united with one of the two rivals against the other. Thus, there was always turmoil throughout the kingdom. In the south, as in the north, the tide of war rolled backwards and forwards, with varying success. From the west, the armies of China appeared and vanished, skirting the Liao-tung Gulf, to plunder and devastate the peninsula. Fleets from Shan-tung, crossing the Yellow Sea, dropped their anchors in the rivers of the land. The west was threatened by the hordes of China, and the south was harried by ships and men from the east, who pounced upon Fusan and seized the cities of the south. The aggressions of the Japanese extinguished any hope the Koreans might still have cherished of preserving the southern frontier of their kingdom intact. Although a cordon of armed sentinels and palisades, barriers of mountains, and miles of ruined and deserted wastes protected the northern borders against the incursions of the

Chinese soldiers to some extent, the south was vulnerable.

Fusan was the floodgate through which poured the hostile masses of Japan, an unbroken stream of men, to deluge the land. They invaded Korea as enemies, levying tribute; they came as allies against China; they appeared as the embassies of a friendly State, and returned enriched to the Court of their sovereign. Actuated by feelings of mercy, they sent grain-ships to Fusan when famine overtook their neighbours. Between Japan and Fusan there was the continuous passing of ships. Around this outlet, the one gate to the southern half of the kingdom, the spasmodic beginnings of the present important commerce between the two countries grew out of a fretful exchange of commodities.

In the years that followed the earlier visitations, Japan became so embarrassed by her own internal troubles that the Kingdom of Korea was left in that peace and seclusion which, always preferring, it had found so much difficulty in securing. This happy state of things prevailed for two centuries. At the end of this interval the annual embassy to Japan from the Court of Korea had ceased. The kingdom in general, lulled by visions of perpetual peace, no longer maintained defences. Military preparations were neglected; the army was disorganized; the old fighting spirit of the people died down, and martial exercises disappeared from the training of the militia.

Dissipation and profligacy were rife. In the meantime, order having been restored in Japan, the thoughts of her soldiers again turned towards fields of conquest and deeds of daring. The vassalship of Korea was recalled, and the King was summoned to renew his allegiance. The answer proving unsatisfactory, preparations for an invasion were at once begun. The fleet assembled and the ships set sail. The mobility which was to distinguish the Japanese in after years characterized their movements in this campaign. Within eighteen days after their landing at Fusan, the capture of the capital was accomplished, and a blow was struck which enabled the Koreans at last to understand the gravity of their plight.

The part which Fusan played in this war materially assisted the invading hosts of Japan. Seized by the colonists themselves so soon as the Japanese squadrons were descried off the harbour on the morning of May 25, 1592, by virtue of its position the port speedily became a base of supplies to the army of operation. Similarly it stood as a repairing yard for the Japanese fleet after its disastrous attempt to co-operate with the victorious forces which Konishi and Kuroda had assembled before Pyöng-yäng. After the conclusion of the first invasion and the Japanese retreat from the north, before the combined strength of the Chinese and Koreans on May 22, 1593, Fusan became one of the

fortified camps upon the coast, where the Japanese armies passed the winter in sight of the shores of their own land. Japan, anxious to establish her power in Korea, was in no hurry to withdraw the forces. Foiled in one attempt, she renewed her attack, and Fusan again became the seat of the councils of war, and the base for a second invasion. The operations began with the siege of the Castle of Nan-on, in Chyol-la Province, upon the morning of September 21, 1597. Twelve months later, the Japanese were withdrawn from Korea, and the war came to its close. Two hundred years passed before Korea recovered from the desolation of this conflict, which was one in which the loss of three hundred thousand men was recorded. Moreover, the Japanese retained Fusan.

The modern period in the history of Korea coincides in some degree with the advent of Christianity to the kingdom. According to native records this took place in 1686. Between this date and 1792, when the Pope formally recognized the Church of Korea, the faith spread slowly. By 1730, in the reign of King In-jong, the two provinces of Whang-hai and Kang-won were familiar with the doctrines of Roman Catholicism, the town of Yang-geun being regarded as the actual birthplace of the movement. Fifty years later, in 1780, Kwun Chul-sin, possessed of a single copy of the Scriptures, established a society for the study of Christianity; and in the same year

Alexandre de Govea, the Franciscan, baptized at Peking the first of Korean colporteurs. Five years later the number of its supporters had increased so much that the Faith aroused opposition and the Throne was memorialized, active persecution beginning in 1791, with the execution of six important converts. In 1792 the Church of Korea was intrusted to the Bishop of Peking, who dispatched, as the first ordained priest, to the new field, Père Tsiou, a Chinese, who, together with thirty converts, gave up his life in 1801.

A generation later, Korea was detached from the diocese of North China. The first incumbent, M. Bruigière, created Bishop of Korea by Pope Gregory XVI, was detained on the northern border of the kingdom through the intrigues of Père Yu, a Chinese priest already in residence in Seoul, and died before entering his See. In 1835 Père Maubant, of the Société des Missions Etrangères, was appointed to the bishopric. In 1837 he was given two assistants, one of whom was Bishop Imbert; but the priests, together with one hundred and thirty of their followers, were soon to be put to death!

Undeterred by the fate of their predecessors, other priests arrived in 1844. In 1846 the French Government complained of the murder of its three subjects, and dispatched, in 1847, the French frigate *La Gloire* and the corvette *La Victorieuse* in support of its letter. But these vessels were wrecked off the

coast, and the outbreak of the Revolution of 1848 prevented any repetition of the experiment. Meanwhile the King died and was succeeded in 1849 by Chul Thong. During the fourteen years that this monarch reigned, religious persecution ceased and the strength of Korean Catholicism steadily increased. In 1857 there were 16,500 converts; in 1863 adherents numbered nearly 20,000, many of whom were massacred in 1866 by the Tai Won Kun.

With the death of Chul Thong, Queen Chol, the leading wife of the late monarch, seized the government and nominated to the succession a lad of twelve years of age, Hwei Yi, who ruled until his deposition in 1907, which he survives. The government, at first, was conducted by the father of this youthful sovereign, Prince Heung-sung, commonly styled the Tai Won Kun, ruling as Regent. At first the new reign was untroubled; but prior to the change of rulers the boundaries of Russia and Korea had become co-terminous through the cession of the Ussuri Province to Russia by China. Widespread apprehensions of the advent of Russia on the boundaries of the kingdom were felt in Korea, and they increased when, in January, 1866, a Russian warship, dropping anchor in Won-san harbour, demanded liberty of trade. Incensed at these proceedings, the Tai Won Kun celebrated the rejection of the proposals by the murder of a number of French priests, while in June, three months later,

the crew of the American schooner *General Sherman* was butchered, while landing, near Pyöng-yäng on the Ta-dong river.

These occurrences provoked the Cabinets interested in the outrages to demand satisfaction from the Chinese Government for the acts of her vassal. With China's repudiation of responsibility, a French squadron under Admiral Rose, on October 11, 1866, blockaded the Han river and attacked Kangwha; while in May 1871 an American flotilla under Admiral Rogers, comprising the *Colorado*, *Alaska*, *Bernicia*, *Monocacy* and *Palos*, repeated the operation. Neither fleet was very successful, and knowledge of their discomfiture spurred the Tai Won Kun to fresh excesses, which continued until 1873, when disaffection against his policy compelled the Regent to surrender the reins of authority to their rightful holder.

Unfortunate "incidents," however, were still to occur, and in September 1875 a Japanese warship, engaged in survey work off the coast of Korea, was fired upon in mistake by the Chémulpo fort. By way of reprisal, the Japanese attacked and took possession of the fort, whereupon Korea, with the assent of China, agreed to the terms of the Japanese-Korean Treaty of 1876. From this date successive waves of Japanese colonization have lapped the eastern, western and southern shores of the Hermit Kingdom. Wherever the receding movement left a

throng of Japanese, the newcomers found indications of previous settlement in the affinity existing between their own language, manners and customs and those of the indigenous race. Unable to obtain any special secession of territory communities of Japanese had planted themselves everywhere, everywhere developing some little industry to their own advantage. In the wake of these early colonists, tapping the resources of the land in all directions, came the merchants, through whose persistent pressure the remaining obstacles were broken down. Thus Korea, even at this early date, was of value to the Island Empire.

Since 1866 the young King had been married to a niece of the deposed Regent, a member of the powerful Min family, and entirely opposed to the policy of seclusion favoured by the Tai Won Kun. When the Queen's faction prevailed in 1873, and the downfall of the Regent was brought about, the Min influence became sponsor for the opening of the kingdom. At the same time they proposed to move slowly, and were opposed by the Conservatives, who would not move at all, and the Extremists, who, having imbibed in Japan an enthusiasm for reform, moved without reflection, failing to realize that the sweeping changes already effected in the one country were unsuited to the other.

While the Japanese supported the Extremists, the Min element fell back upon the counsels of

China, who no longer wished to play an indecisive rôle in Korea. Thus grouped, on either side of Korea, were the future antagonists, when in July 1882 matters were complicated by a military rising on behalf of the Tai Won Kun. After murdering many of the Min family and driving the Queen from the capital, the riotous soldiery, with remarkable impartiality, destroyed the Japanese Legation, killed many Japanese and attacked the Extremists, thus visiting each faction in turn with their unwelcome attentions before they recalled the Tai Won Kun. As soon as news of the revolution reached the Chinese Government, Li Hung-Chang dispatched to the capital some 3,000 troops, by the aid of whom Queen Min was restored, and the Tai Won Kun deported to Tientsin, while Japan received ample compensation. Although the revolt was suppressed, the Chinese troops remained close at hand; and in October an officer of the force, Yuan-shi-kai, afterwards to become Viceroy of Pechili, was appointed Chinese Resident at the Korean Court.

Treaties were concluded with America in 1882, with Great Britain and Germany in 1883, with Italy and Russia in 1884, in which year a collision between the Min faction and the Extremists, abetted by the Japanese, resulted in the defeat of the Japanese, the destruction of the Japanese Legation and their expulsion from Seoul. The question of compensa-

tion led up to the discussion of the Chino-Japanese Convention of 1885, ultimately signed in April, at Tientsin, between the late Li Hung Chang and Count, now Prince, Ito, which was as follows:—

It is hereby agreed that China shall withdraw her troops now stationed in Korea, and that Japan shall withdraw hers stationed therein for the protection of her Legation. The specific term for effecting the same shall be four months commencing from the date of the signing and sealing of this Convention, within which term they shall respectively accomplish the withdrawal of the whole number of each of their troops in order to avoid effectively any complications between the respective countries: the Chinese troops shall embark from Masampo and the Japanese from the port of Ninsen.

The said respective Powers mutually agree to invite the King of Korea to instruct and drill a sufficient armed force, that she may herself assure her public security, and to invite him to engage into his service an officer or officers from amongst those of a third Power, who shall be intrusted with the instruction of the said force. The respective Powers also bind themselves, each to the other, henceforth not to send any of their own officers to Korea for the purpose of giving said instruction.

In case of any disturbance of a grave nature occurring in Korea which necessitates the respective countries or either of them to send troops to Korea, it is hereby understood that they shall give, each to the other, previous notice in writing of their intention

so to do, and that after the matter is settled, they shall withdraw their troops and not further station them there.

Under the terms of this Agreement comparative tranquillity was secured to Korea for nine years, during which time treaties were enacted with France in 1886, and Austria in 1892, while the ports of Won-san and Chemulpo were opened to foreign trade. None the less Japan had not relinquished all claim to Korea. With the return of the Tai Won Kun from exile the Japanese secretly pressed forward the cause of the King's father, and strove to detach Korea from her allegiance to China. Continuous bitterness therefore existed between the Queen's faction and that of the Tai Won Kun, the crisis arriving when the King of Korea appealed to China in May 1894, to assist in the suppression of a rebellion. In accordance with her engagement with Japan the Chinese Government notified the Japanese Cabinet of her acquiescence in the King's request. Dispatching 2,000 men to the scene of trouble, the Chinese Government found that the Japanese had taken identical steps, save that they had landed a far greater force, estimated in all at 10,000 men.

In the interesting diplomatic correspondence that followed, the Japanese Government endeavoured to justify its action, but negotiations only led to a deadlock, and on July 20 the Japanese Minister in Seoul

threatened the Korean Government with decisive measures unless the Chinese troops were ordered out of the country. At the request of the King of Korea, the Powers now intervened, and China had agreed to the simultaneous withdrawal of the Japanese and Chinese forces, when, on July 23, Japanese forcibly occupied the Royal Palace, and dispossessed the pro-Chinese party. After preliminary hostilities, in which the Chinese were defeated on land and sea, war was declared on August 1, 1894, and concluded by the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, when China acknowledged the independence of Korea, and withdrew from the country. Two months later, under pressure from France, Germany and Russia, Japan assented to forego the rights of conquest, and withdrew from Manchuria, in accordance with the Mikado's Rescript.

Undismayed by the fact that they had been deprived of the fruits of victory in Manchuria, the Japanese began to assert their influence in Korea. Japanese advisers were allotted to various departments of State, abuses were checked and reforms devised. Unfortunately the spirit was too impetuous, and progress was blocked by the objections of the Royal Family, as well as by those of the Extremists, to many of the proposed changes. Opposition, however, merely aroused the irritation of the Japanese, who, disinclined to brook delay, had begun to realize that one or other of the rival domestic factions would have

to be deposed. Thus, although Independence Day was celebrated on June 6 by the King and the whole nation, by the end of July an *impasse* had arisen, during which the Japanese Minister, Count Inouyé, who was the friend of the Royal Family, retired.

Early in August another Minister arrived, in the person of Viscount Miura, who considered that the adjustment of difficulties in Korea needed only vigorous action. In this view he was supported by the Tai Won Kun, who, shortly after Viscount Miura's arrival in Seoul, appealed to the Japanese Minister for assistance in effecting a radical change. With the connivance of the Tai Won Kun and the sanction of the Japanese Minister, a plan was formed to seize the Palace, to murder the Queen, to depose the King, and to establish once again the rule of the ex-Regent. About three o'clock on the morning of October 8, 1895, a mob of Japanese, with a number of Koreans, under the direction of the Tai Won Kun, gave effect to the plot. Three days later, while the monarch was a close prisoner, the Tai Won Kun issued an Edict which His Majesty had refused to sign, preferring rather, he said, that his hands should be cut off. None the less the spurious decree appeared, and bore the signatures of a number of high officials. It was as follows:—

It is now thirty-two years since We ascended the

throne, but Our ruling influence has not extended wide. The Queen Min introduced her relatives to the Court and placed them about Our person, whereby she made dull Our senses, exposed the people to extortion, put Our Government in disorder, selling offices and titles. Hence tyranny prevailed all over the country and robbers arose in all quarters. Under these circumstances the foundation of Our dynasty was in imminent peril. We knew the extreme of her wickedness, but could not dismiss and punish her because of helplessness and fear of her party.

We desire to stop and suppress her influence. In the twelfth moon of last year we took an oath at Our Ancestral Shrine that the Queen and her relatives and Ours should never again be allowed to interfere in State affairs. We hoped this would lead the Min faction to mend their ways. But the Queen did not give up her wickedness, but with her party aided a crowd of low fellows to rise up about Us and so managed to prevent the Ministers of State from consulting Us. Moreover, they have forged Our signature to a decree to disband Our loyal soldiers, thereby instigating and raising a disturbance, and when it occurred she escaped as in the Im O year. We have endeavoured to discover her whereabouts, but as she does not come forth and appear We are convinced that she is not only unfitted and unworthy of the Queen's rank, but also that her guilt is excessive and brimful. Therefore with her We may not succeed to the glory of the Royal Ancestry. So We hereby depose her from the rank of Queen and reduce her to the level of the lowest class.

The next day a second Edict raised the posthumous status of the late Queen to the rank of a concubine of the first class. A third Edict stated on October 15 that preparations for the selection of a new Royal bride were to be made, the Tai Won Kun continuing to offer insults of this description to the late Queen's memory, and to subject His Majesty to a humiliating confinement. At this stage the Japanese Government, awaking to the urgency of the situation, recalled Viscount Miura. Japanese influence, however, was betrayed by two Edicts designed to bring Korean national customs more into accord with Western ways. Aimed at the suppression of the Top Knot, an emblem of manhood and social dignity greatly venerated in Korea, they were as follows :—

I

11th Moon, 15th Day,
504th Year of the Dynasty.

The present cropping of the hair being a measure both advantageous to the preservation of health and convenient for the transaction of business, our sacred Lord the King, having in view both administrative reform and national aggrandizement, has, by taking the lead in his own person, set us an example. All the subjects of Great Korea should respectfully conform to His Majesty's purpose, and the fashion of their clothing should be as set forth below :—

1. During national mourning the hat and clothing

should, until the expiration of the term of mourning, be white in colour as before.

2. The fillet (*mang-kun*) should be abandoned.

3. There is no objection to the adoption of foreign clothing.

II

11th Moon, 15th Day,
504th Year of the Dynasty.

In the Proclamation which His Majesty graciously issued to-day (11th moon, 15th day) are words, "We, in cutting Our hair, are setting an example to Our subjects. Do you, the multitude, identify yourselves with Our design, and cause to be accomplished the great work of establishing equality with the nations of the earth."

At a time of reform such as this, when we humbly peruse so spirited a Proclamation, among all of us, subjects of Great Korea, who does not weep for gratitude, and strive his utmost? Earnestly united in heart and soul, we earnestly expect a humble conformity with His Majesty's purposes of reformation.

With the King in confinement and Queen Min dead, the authority of the Min faction dissolved in air before the repressive government of the Tai Won Kun. For the nonce, Japanese influence prevailed in the Palace as in the Council Chamber of the Cabinet, and the prospect was gloomy in the extreme when the King contrived to turn the tables upon his oppressors by escaping on February 11, 1896, to the Russian Legation. From such a haven he

proceeded to proclaim at once the return of the old order, and the immediate cancellation of the decrees of the Tai Won Kun, in the following proclamations :—

11th Day, 2nd Moon,
1st Year of Kun-yang.

By order of His Majesty.

Alas ! alas ! on account of Our unworthiness and mal-administration the wicked advanced and the wise retired. Of the last ten years, none has passed without troubles. Some were brought on by those We had trusted as the members of the body, while others, by those of Our own bone and flesh. Our dynasty of five centuries has thereby been often endangered, and millions of Our subjects have thereby been gradually impoverished. These facts make Us blush and sweat for shame. But these troubles have been brought about through Our partiality and self-will, giving rise to rascality and blunders leading to calamities. All have been Our own fault from the first to the last.

Fortunately, through loyal and faithful subjects rising up in righteous efforts to remove the wicked, there is a hope that the tribulations experienced may invigorate the State, and that calm may return after the storm. This accords with the principle that human nature will have freedom after a long pressure, and that the ways of Heaven bring success after reverses. We shall endeavour to be merciful. No pardon, however, shall be extended to the principal traitors concerned in the affairs of July 1894 and of

October 1895! Capital punishment should be their due, thus venting the indignation of men and gods alike. But to all the rest, officials or soldiers, citizens or coolies, a general amnesty, free and full, is granted, irrespective of the degree of their offences. Reform your hearts; ease your minds; go about your business, public or private, as in times past.

As to the cutting of the Top-Knots—what can we say? Is it such an urgent matter? The traitors, by using force and coercion, brought about the affair. That this measure was taken against Our will is, no doubt, well known to all. Nor is it Our wish that the conservative subjects throughout the country, moved to righteous indignation, should rise up, as they have, circulating false rumours, causing death and injury to one another, until the regular troops had to be sent to suppress the disturbances by force. The traitors indulged their poisonous nature in everything. Fingers and hairs would fail to count their crimes. The soldiers are Our children. So are the insurgents. Cut any of the ten fingers, and one would cause as much pain as another. Fighting long continued would pour out blood and heap up corpses, hindering communications and traffic. Alas! if this continues the people will all die. The mere contemplation of such consequences provokes Our tears and chills Our heart. We desire that as soon as orders arrive the soldiers should return to Seoul and the insurgents to their respective places and occupations.

As to the cutting of Top-Knots, no one shall be forced as to dress and hats. Do as you please. The evils now afflicting the people shall be duly attended

to by the Government. This is Our own word of honour. Let us understand.

11th Day, 2nd Moon,
1st Year of Kun-yang.

Proclamation to the Soldiers.

On account of the unhappy fate of Our country, traitors have made trouble every year. Now We have a document informing us of another conspiracy. We have therefore come to the Russian Legation. The Representatives of different countries have all assembled.

--vv-- Soldiers! come and protect us. You are Our children. The troubles of the past were due to the crimes of chief traitors. You are all pardoned, and shall not be held answerable. Do your duty and be at ease. When you meet the chief traitors, viz. Chohui Yen, Wu-pom Sun, Yi-tu Hwong, Yi-pom Nai, Yi-chin Ho, and Kon-yong-Chin, cut off their heads at once, and bring them.

You (soldiers) attend us at the Russian Legation.

With the return of the King the wane of Japanese influence set in, and in order to meet the situation the following Russo-Japanese Memorandum was concluded on May 14, 1896, between Baron Komura, the new Japanese Minister at Seoul, and M. Waeber, the Russian Minister :—

I

While leaving the matter of His Majesty's, the King of Korea, return to the Palace entirely to his

own discretion and judgment, the Representatives of Russia and Japan will friendly advise His Majesty to return to that place, when no doubts could be entertained concerning his safety.

The Japanese Representative, on his part, gives the assurance, that the most complete and effective measures will be taken for the control of Japanese *soshi*.

II

The present Cabinet Ministers have been appointed by His Majesty by his own free will, and most of them have held ministerial or other high offices during the last two years and are known to be liberal and moderate men.

The two Representatives will always aim at recommending His Majesty to appoint liberal and moderate men as Ministers, and to show clemency to his subjects.

III

The Representative of Russia quite agrees with the Representative of Japan that at the present state of affairs in Korea it may be necessary to have Japanese guards stationed at some places for the protection of the Japanese telegraph line between Fusan and Seoul, and that these guards, now consisting of three companies of soldiers, should be withdrawn as soon as possible and replaced by gendarmes, who will be distributed as follows: fifty men at Fusan, fifty men at Ka-heung, and ten men each at ten intermediate posts between Fusan and Seoul.

This distribution may be liable to some changes, but the total number of the gendarme force shall never exceed two hundred men, who will afterwards gradually be withdrawn from such places, where peace and order have been restored by the Korean Government.

IV

For the protection of the Japanese settlement at Seoul and the open ports against possible attacks by the Korean populace, two companies of Japanese troops may be stationed at Seoul, one company at Fusan and one at Won-san, each company not to exceed two hundred men. These troops will be quartered near the settlements, and shall be withdrawn as soon as no apprehension of such attacks could be entertained.

For the protection of the Russian Legation and Consulates the Russian Government may also keep guards not exceeding the number of Japanese troops at those places, which will be withdrawn as soon as tranquillity in the interior is completely restored.

On the 9th of the following month the principle of the above Agreement was confirmed, at Moscow, between Prince Lebanoff and the Marquis Yamagata, when it was agreed that—

I

For the remedy of the financial difficulties of Korea, the Governments of Russia and Japan will advise the Korean Government to retrench all superfluous expenditure, and to establish a balance between

expenses and revenues. If, in consequence of reforms deemed indispensable, it may be necessary to have recourse to foreign loans, both Governments shall by mutual consent give their support to Korea.

II

The Governments of Russia and Japan shall endeavour to leave to Korea, as far as the financial and economical situation of that country will permit, the formation and maintenance of a national armed force and police of such proportions as will be sufficient for the preservation of the internal peace, without foreign support.

III

With a view to facilitate communications with Korea, the Japanese Government may continue (*continuera*) to administer the telegraph lines which are at present in its hands.

It is reserved to Russia (the rights) of building a telegraph line between Seoul and her frontiers.

These different lines can be repurchased by the Korean Government, so soon as it has the means to do so.

IV

In case the above matters should require a more exact or detailed explanation, or if subsequently some other points should present themselves upon which it may be necessary to confer, the Representatives of both Governments shall be authorized to negotiate in a spirit of friendship.

The attitude of the Korean Government in connection with these arrangements was not shown until the following year, when, on March 9, 1897, the Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed the following observations to the Japanese Minister:—

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mar. 9th, 2nd year of Kun-yang (1897).

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 2nd instant, informing me that on the 14th day of May last, a Memorandum was signed at Seoul by H. E. Mr. Komura, the former Japanese Minister Resident, and the Russian Minister and that, on the 4th of June of the same year, an Agreement was signed at Moscow, by H. E. Marshal Yamagata, the Japanese Ambassador, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Russia; and that these two documents have been laid publicly before the Imperial Diet. You further inform me that on the 26th ultimo you received a telegram from your Government pointing out that the above-mentioned Agreement and Memorandum in no way reflect upon, but, on the contrary, are meant to strengthen, the independence of Korea,—this being the object which the Governments of Japan and Russia had in view,—and you cherish the confident hope that my Government will not fail to appreciate this intention. In accordance with telegraphic instructions received from the Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs you enclose copies of the Agreements referred to.

I beg to express my sincere thanks for your dispatch and the information it conveys. I would

observe, however, that as my Government has not joined in concluding these two Agreements, its freedom of action as an independent Power cannot be restricted by their provisions. I have, etc.

(Signed) YE. WANYONG,

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

H. E. Mr. Kato,

Minister of Japan, etc.

Taking advantage of His Majesty's presence in their Legation, many Russians of high rank visited the King, a curious light being thrown upon the Russian view of the Waeber-Komura-Lebanoff-Yamagata Convention by the report that M. Waeber was negotiating for the lease of the spacious harbour of Ma-san-po. At the same time the right to construct a railway between Seoul and Wiju was granted on July 4, 1896, to French interests, believed to mask a Russian claim; while in the autumn of 1896 M. Brunner, for a preliminary payment of two hundred thousand dollars and an annual subsidy of twenty thousand dollars, obtained lumber rights for twenty years over the banks of the Yalu and Tumen rivers, as well as on the island of We Yang. The concession was to be forfeited unless work was begun in five years. Other concessions were also awarded, including one to an American, acting for Japanese interests, for the construction of the Seoul-Chemulpo railway.

Early in 1897 the King decided to leave the Russian Legation, and in February His Majesty took

up his residence in the Myung-yi Palace, which had been recently erected. The change of abode had taken place when, in the summer of 1897, Russia manifested a vigorous interest in Korea under circumstances which were dictated by the requirements of the Russian position in Manchuria. Since the eclipse of Japanese influence in 1895 the training of the Korean Army had reverted to Russian instructors. Beginning with this quarter, a more decided note now appeared in the Russian policy. In August Colonel Potiata, three officers and ten non-commissioned officers of the Russian Army came to Seoul as additional military instructors to the Korean troops, their arrival coinciding with that of M. de Speyer in place of M. Waeber. Appearing on September 7 this resourceful diplomatist at once demanded the cession of a coaling station on Deer Island, near Fusan, with the intention of checking the growth of Japanese prestige at that port. Rebuffed in this direction but encouraged by a certain group of Korean officials, M. de Speyer brought about the displacement of Mr., now Sir John, McLeavy Brown from his dual position as Financial Adviser to the Korean Government and Chief Commissioner of Korean Customs, and caused M. Kir Alexieff, an official of the St. Petersburg Bureau of Finance, to be appointed to the executive control of the Korean Finance Department. In accord with this policy, and to give colour to the magnitude of Russia's financial interests

in Korea, the Russo-Chinese Bank opened at Seoul a branch of that institution under the style of the Russo-Korean Bank.

With the dawn of 1898 the aspect of Russo-Korean intrigues against Mr. McLeavy Brown precipitated a British naval demonstration in Chemulpo harbour, whereupon, as the moment had not arrived when the position in Korea could be forced with impunity by Russia, M. Alexieff retired in March, while M. de Speyer was relieved by M. Matunine in April. A little later the Russo-Korean Bank closed its doors and the Russian military mission withdrew. Russian policy in Korea had become as unpopular with Great Britain as Japanese policy was with Korea, and, accordingly, since each had suffered some little set-back, the two Powers resolved upon an understanding in respect of future action in the Hermit Kingdom. Signed on April 25, 1898, the clauses of the Nishi-Rosen Convention are as follows :—

Article I.—The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia definitely recognize the sovereignty and entire independence of Korea, and mutually engage to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of this country.

Article II.—Wishing to avoid all possible cause of this in future, the Imperial Government of Japan and Russia engage mutually, in case Korea shall have recourse to the advice and assistance of Japan or Russia,

not to take any measure relating to the nomination of military instructors or financial advisers without having previously arrived at a mutual understanding on this subject.

Article III.—In view of the great development the commercial and industrial enterprises of Japan have undergone in Korea, and of the large number of Japanese subjects resident in the country, the Imperial Government of Russia will not hinder the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea.

As if mindful of what had followed the Waeber-Komura-Lebanoff-Yamagata Convention, and in order to check Russian designs against Ma-san-po, Japanese diplomacy contrived to make the position of the harbour quite clear by causing the Korean Government, in June 1898, to throw open the port to the trade of the world.

While the political clouds hung over Korea in 1897, the King was filled with anxiety about the independence of his kingdom, and, as first Russia and then Japan intrigued for supremacy at his capital, he planned a change in the dignity of his State so that it should be for the future on a footing of equality with China and Japan. After careful consideration, therefore, Korea, on October 12, 1897, was officially designated as Dai Han or Great Han, and its ruler, henceforth described as an Emperor, believed himself to have raised his country above the risks of annexation and the menace of foreign suzerainty. As these

changes took place the course of events in Seoul was characterized by singular inconsistency. Although an Imperial Edict forbade, early in 1898, the granting of further concessions, the Seoul Electric Light and Tramway Company, and the Korean Waterworks Limited, none the less obtained their charters. In September, again, Japanese interests secured permission to build the Seoul-Fusan railway. In January 1899 the struggle between Russia and Japan advanced a stage further when, with a view to the construction of the line by Japanese, the Mikado's Minister forced the question of the surrender of the Seoul-Wiju railway concession upon the consideration of the Imperial Cabinet. In spite of the existence of a time limit, within which the project had to be started, the French had made no effort to begin, and the advantage of position, accordingly, lay with the Japanese when M. Matunine, the Russian Minister, supported M. Colin de Plancy, the French Minister, in a request that the concession should not be revoked. Later in the year, as the Russian colony in Seoul was celebrating the founding there of a mission of the Greek Church, the Japanese administered an unwelcome reminder of the futility of Russian designs against Ma-san-ŏ by requesting publication of the regulations controlling its foreign quarter.

With the new year, 1900, M. Pavlov, the Russian Acting Minister in Peking, arrived in Seoul, fresh from his diplomatic defeat of Sir Claude

Maedonald, when the Seoul-Wiju railway and the question of Ma-san-po immediately claimed his attention. Assisted by M. Colin de Plancy, and Yi Yong Ik, a Korean official afterwards Minister of Finance, M. Pavlov succeeded in persuading the Korean Government to take over the construction of the Seouli-Wiju line, and to create for the purpose a North-Western Railway Bureau, of which Yi Yong Ik, who undertook that only French engineers and French materials should be employed, should be president. In regard to Ma-san-po, M. Pavlov effected, in April 1900, the Russo-Korean Convention, a secret agreement by which it was provided that, while none of the land about Ma-san-po harbour should be disposed of in any way to any foreign Power, Russia should be permitted to establish a coaling depôt and a special settlement at the port. For two years the terms of this instrument remained undisclosed, the outbreak of the Boxer crisis, in the summer of 1900, putting an end, for the nonce, to the diplomatic rivalries of the Powers in Korea.

With the opening of the twentieth century, Russia renewed her intrigues against British domination of the Korean Customs. On the plea that Lady Om, the Emperor's principal concubine, required Mr. McLeavy Brown's house, the Chief Commissioner was given, in March, summary notice to leave his private quarters. Fortunately the British

Government sharply intervened and the plan miscarried. Foiled in this, M. Pavlov, in April 1901, succeeded in securing the renewal for a further three years of M. Brunner's Yalu lumber concession which, by virtue of the five-year penalty clause, had now lapsed. Meanwhile, Yi Yong Ik had not been idle, and, supported by the Korean Foreign Minister, he made the announcement that a loan of 5,000,000 yen had been arranged between the Korean Government and a French syndicaté (the Yunnan Syndicate) upon the security of the Korean Customs. As the terms had been arranged without the sanction of the Chief Commissioner of the Korean Customs, Mr. McLeavy Brown declined to countenance the proposals, in which attitude he was supported by the Ministers of Great Britain and Japan, who strongly opposed anything which might give to France—and therefore Russia—a particular predominance in the affairs of Korea. In view of the attitude of the High Commissioner of the Customs, Yi Yong Ik summoned Mr. McLeavy Brown to resign his office, but the matter dropped before the firm front of the British Minister.

By way of reply to the recrudescence of Russian and French activities in Korea the first sods of the Japanese Seoul-Fusan railway were turned at Yongtong-po, near Chemulpo, on August 20, 1901, and at Fusan on September 21. Measures of more far-reaching effect were under consideration, and were revealed,

on January 30, 1902, when an offensive-defensive alliance between Great Britain and Japan, with special reference to the Hermit Kingdom, was announced. Signed by the Marquis of Lansdowne and Baron Hayashi, in London, the articles were as follows :—

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the Extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China, and the Empire of Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows :—

1. The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and of Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree, politically as well as commercially and industrially, in Korea, the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the contracting parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

2. If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

3. If in the above event any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

4. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

5. Whenever in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

6. The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature and shall remain in force for five years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war the alliance shall, *ipso facto*, continue until peace is concluded.

The publication of this Treaty led to an exchange of opinion between the French and Russian Governments, with the result that some seven weeks later, on March 19, 1902, an addition to the Franco-Russian Treaty, already in existence, was made known, by which it was no less plain that France would support Russia in the event of Great Britain assisting Japan in any Far Eastern war. The clause was as follows :—

The allied Governments of France and Russia, having received communication of the Anglo-Japanese Convention of January 30, 1902, concluded with the object of assuring the *status quo* and general peace in the Far East and of maintaining the independence of China and Korea, which are to remain open to the commerce and industry of all nations, have been fully satisfied to find in it the essential principles which they themselves have on several occasions declared established, and which remain the basis of their policy. The two Governments hold that respect for these principles is at the same time a guarantee for their special interest in the Far East. Nevertheless, they themselves being also obliged to take into consideration the eventuality of aggressive action on the part of a third Power or fresh troubles in China jeopardizing the integrity and free development of that Power and becoming a menace to their own interests, the two allied Governments reserve it to themselves to consider in such a case means for assuring their protection.

The domestic situation in Korea, largely concerned with quarrels between the Extremists and Conservatives, was now quite overshadowed by the gravity of impending political complications, arising from the attempt of the Foreign Consuls to reform Korean currency, the founding of a Japanese Bank, and a loan of three million yen which a Japanese syndicate had forced upon the Korean Treasury. French and Russian interests, moreover, continued to exploit the situation. In May 1902 preliminary work in connection with the construction of the Seoul-Wiju railway was formally celebrated, while in June Baron Gabriel de Gunsberg, a Russian secret service officer, arrived in Seoul as the agent of the Foreign Timber Company of St. Petersburg, into which, under the guidance of M. Bezobrazoff, M. Brunner's Yalu concession had blossomed. Behind the syndicate stood the Russo-Chinese Bank, and in April 1903 the company established its own offices in the Korean capital. During the next two months numerous lumber camps, comprising parties of Cossack, Korean and Chinese lumbermen, under Russian protection, were formed on the Yalu river, while on July 20, 1903, an agreement was concluded between the Korean official Cho Sung-hyup and the Russian Inspector Bojisco, by which the district of Yong-an-po which commands the Yalu estuary was leased to the Foreign Timber Company on the following terms :—

Article 1. The said district in Yong-an-po shall be rented to the Russian Company. ..

Article 2. The boundaries of the said district shall be defined by the Russian Minister and the Minister in charge of the Foreign Office of the Korean Government.

Article 3. The Russian Company shall pay a land-tax to the Korean Government.

Article 4. If the owner of tombs within this district wish to remove them the expense of removal shall be borne by the Russian Company.

Article 5. If the Company wish to utilize wood which Koreans have cut and are bringing down the river, it must reimburse the owners with a fair and proper price.

Article 6. The Russian Company shall not raise any stock within this district except what is to be used therein.

Article 7. Korean offenders within this district shall be dealt with by the Korean courts. Russian offenders shall be dealt with by Russian civil officers.

Undisturbed by the universal attention that her activity on the Korean border was arousing, Russia proceeded to convert her various Yalu lumber camps into a military settlement, when the Japanese Minister delivered at Seoul, on August 25, 1903, an ultimatum to the Korean Foreign Office against the confirmation of the agreement in respect of Yong-an-po. In spite of the emphatic character of the Japanese protest, Russian activity on the Yalu in no wise abated. After the lapse of a few weeks, how-

ever, the Japanese Government entered into direct telegraphic negotiations with St. Petersburg, the failure of which was disclosed when, on February 10, 1904, the Mikado issued a Rescript, declaring war against Russia, in the following terms :—

We, by the Grace of Heaven, the Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make proclamation to all our loyal and brave subjects as follows :—

• We hereby declare war against Russia, and we command our army and navy to carry on hostilities against her in obedience to duty and with all their strength, and we also command all our competent authorities to make every effort in pursuance of their duties and in accordance with their powers to attain the national aim, with all the means within the limits of the law of nations.

We have always deemed it essential to international relations, and made it our constant aim to promote the pacific progress of our Empire in civilization, to strengthen our friendly ties with other States, and to establish a state of things which would maintain enduring peace in the Extreme East, and assure the future security of our Dominion without injury to the rights and interests of other Powers.

• Our competent authorities have also performed their duties in obedience to our will, so that our relations with all Powers have been steadily growing in cordiality.

It was thus entirely against our expectation that

we have unhappily come to open hostilities against Russia.

The integrity of Korea is a matter of gravest concern to this Empire, not only because of our traditional relations with that country, but because the separate existence of Korea is essential to the safety of our realm.

Nevertheless, Russia, in disregard of her solemn treaty pledges to China, and of her repeated assurances to other Powers, is still in occupation of Manchuria, and has consolidated and strengthened her hold upon those provinces, and is bent upon their final annexation.

And since the absorption of Manchuria by Russia would render it impossible to maintain the integrity of China, and would, in addition, compel the abandonment of all hope for peace in the Extreme East, we determined, in those circumstances, to settle the question by negotiations, and to secure thereby a permanent peace.

With that object in view, our competent authorities by our order made proposals to Russia, and frequent conferences were held during the last six months.

Russia, however, never met such proposals in a spirit of conciliation, but by her wanton delays put off the settlement of the serious question, and by ostensibly advocating peace on the one hand, while she was on the other extending her naval and military preparations, sought to accomplish her own selfish designs.

We cannot in the least admit that Russia had from the first any serious or genuine desire for peace.

She has rejected the proposals of our Government. The safety of Korea is in danger. The interests of our Empire are menaced. The guarantees for the future which we have failed to secure by peaceful negotiations can now only be obtained by an appeal to arms.

It is our earnest wish that by the loyalty and valour of our faithful subjects peace may soon be permanently restored, and the glory of our Empire preserved.

Although the necessity of maintaining the independence of Korea was affirmed in the Japanese Declaration of War, it was not until the conclusion of a Protocol between Japan and Korea on February 23, 1904, that Japan accepted full responsibility for the future of Korea.

The conditions were as follows :—

Article I.—For the purpose of maintaining a permanent and solid friendship between Japan and Korea and firmly establishing peace in the Far East, the Imperial Government of Korea shall place full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan, and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improvement in administration.

Article II.—The Imperial Government of Japan shall, in a spirit of firm friendship, ensure the safety and repose of the Imperial Household of Korea.

Article III.—The Imperial Government of Japan definitely guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.

Article IV.—In case the welfare of the Imperial House of Korea or the territorial integrity of Korea is endangered by aggressions of a third Power or internal disturbances, the Imperial Government of Japan shall immediately take such necessary measures as circumstances require, and in such case the Imperial Government of Korea shall give full facilities to promote the action of the Imperial Japanese Government. The Imperial Government of Japan may for the attainment of the above-mentioned object occupy, when the circumstances require it, such places as may be necessary from strategic points of view.

Article V.—The Governments of the two countries shall not in future, without mutual consent, conclude with a third Power such an arrangement as may be contrary to the principles of the present Protocol.

Article VI.—Details in connection with the present Protocol shall always be arranged as the circumstances may require between the Representative of Japan and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Korea.

In comparing the terms of this Agreement with the *post-bellum* position of Japan in Korea, a wide diversion will be noted. So much has happened, indeed, that it would be more than surprising if the Japanese position, as defined by *ante-bellum* treaties, had not been modified by the outcome of the campaign. At the same time, although Japan ostensibly went to war on behalf of Korea, for the second

time, her action aroused no appreciation among the Koreans, nor did it engender any desire for co-operation in the Korean Government. The fact is that Japan in the past possessed such a monopoly of supply and demand in relation to the requirements of the Koreans, and had so cruelly exploited her advantages, that the prospect of any extension of her powers destroyed rather than promoted Korean sympathies. Time, and the employment of less brutal methods, might enable the Japanese to appeal to the Koreans, at present repelled by their experiences at the hands of irresponsible settlers and merchants and predatory officials. In many ways a veritable campaign of aggression has been waged by the conquering Japanese, whose rapaciousness would seem to have been encouraged by the indifference of the Japanese officials to Korean complaints. Long before the war in Manchuria terminated the Japanese Government were inclined to coerce the Koreans, particularly in those instances where Japanese interests were in conflict with those of the Korean Government. Cajolery and threats alike were employed to induce the Emperor to accept a Japanese protectorate, and, while His Majesty hesitated, the Japanese Legation in Seoul promulgated the terms of a concession, by which all the waste lands of Korea were granted to Mr. Nagamori, without payment and for a period of fifty years.

34 PROBLEMS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Announced on June 17, 1904, the clauses of this arrangement were as follows :—

1. That the reclamation, rearrangement, improvements, and cultivation of forests, fields, and waste lands, exclusive of the grounds of Imperial mausolea, temple grounds, preserved forests, Government and private lands already reclaimed, shall be entrusted to Mr. Nagamori.
2. That the capital required for the enterprise shall be found by Mr. Nagamori.
3. That no similar concession shall be granted to any other person by the Korean Imperial Estate Bureau.
4. That the reclaimed lands shall be exempted from duty during the first five years, on the expiration of which term they are to be subject to a land tax not higher than that applied to the lands possessed by the Koreans.
5. That the details for the enterprise shall be agreed upon within six months after the signing of the Agreement.
6. That the term of the Agreement shall be fifty years, subject to extension by mutual consent.
7. That should the term be not extended, the Korean Government shall be bound to pay back to Mr. Nagamori the amount of the capital required, together with compound interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum.
8. That the concession shall be transferable either to Mr. Nagamori's heirs or any other person.

The publication of the document aroused a storm

of European and Korean protest, which on the part of the Koreans assumed for the time the dimensions of a national movement, and was not allayed until the proposals were withdrawn by orders from Tokio.

Checked in this direction, greater success awaited the renewal of the Japanese efforts to bring the Korean Government under more direct control, for on August 22, 1904, after considerable pressure, the following Treaty was proclaimed:—

1. The Korean Government shall engage a Japanese subject, recommended by the Japanese Government, as financial adviser to the Korean Government, and all matters concerning finance shall be dealt with only after his advice has been taken.

2. The Korean Government shall engage a foreigner, recommended by the Japanese Government, as diplomatic adviser to the Foreign Office, and all important matters concerning foreign relations shall be dealt with only after his advice has been taken.

3. The Korean Government shall first consult the Japanese Government before concluding treaties and conventions with foreign Powers, and in dealing with other important diplomatic affairs, such as the grant of concessions, to, or the making of contracts with, foreigners, the same procedure shall be followed.

At first sight this treaty does not disclose its *arrière pensée*. By the terms of clause 1 the Japanese Government hoped to determine the dual control exercised

by Sir John McLeavy Brown over the Korean Customs and the Korean Treasury, and to place the latter in the hands of Mr. (now Baron) Megata, while leaving the Korean Customs in the custody of their British Commissioner. By clause 2 the way was prepared for the preferment to the Bureau of Korean Foreign Affairs of the late D. W. Stevens, an American long identified with Japanese diplomatic interests, but murdered by Korean assassins at San Francisco on March 23, 1908. The frank hostility of clause 3 to foreign interests, aside from the prejudicial effect of clauses 1 and 2, at once raised the opposition of the Powers, many of whom possessed important commercial stakes in the kingdom.

In connection with this Treaty it is desirable to add that a second version would seem to exist. Although the text, as it appears above, reproduces the precise wording of the Treaty as it was submitted to the Powers, so wide a discrepancy exists between the two that the clauses of the second Treaty are here given, as they stand according to the *Japan Year Book* (1905):—

1. The Korean Financial Department to engage a Japanese as Superintendent of Korean Finances in order to carry out fiscal reforms.

2. Japan to advance the necessary funds to Korea in order to enable her to effect financial reforms, 3,000,000 yen being lent as first instalment.

3. Sound currency system to be established by

abolishing the present Mint and withdrawing the copper coins now in circulation.

4. Currency union to be established between Japan and Korea, and Japanese money to be accepted as legal tender by the Koreans.

5. A Central Bank to be established in Korea to facilitate the collection of taxes and the handling of public money.

6. A model administrative system to be adopted in Kyong-kwi Province, and a similar system to be adopted in other provinces when this experiment proves successful.

7. Mr. D. W. Stevens is to be engaged by the Korean Foreign Department as its Adviser in order to improve foreign intercourse.

8. Korea to recall her Ministers and Consuls stationed abroad when she decides to place her foreign affairs and the protection of her subjects staying abroad in charge of Japan.

9. The Foreign Ministers to Korea to be withdrawn from Seoul and the Foreign Consuls alone to remain on duty with the withdrawal of the Korean Ministers and Consuls from the foreign countries.

10. The Korean Army, at present 20,000, to be reduced to 1,000, and all the garrisons in the provinces to be disbanded, one at Seoul alone being kept.

11. Military arms to be made common between Japan and Korea with the object of adjusting the existing military system in the latter country.

12. Soothsayers, fortune-tellers, and other officials ministering to superstition, to be expelled from the surroundings of the Sovereign to uphold his dignity.

13. All superfluous Government offices to be abolished.

14. Government posts to be made open to all classes of the people, without regard to rank and family relation.

15. The practice of selling Government posts to be prohibited, and the officials to be selected from among those who are competent.

16. Salaries of the Ministers of State and other Government officials to be increased so as to awake in them a stronger sense of responsibility.

17. Definite educational policy to be established, and organization of universities, middle schools, and primary schools to be modelled after that existing in Japan; also technical schools to be established in order to encourage industry.

18. A distinct line of demarcation to be drawn between the Court and the Government.

19. The present foreign Advisers to be reduced in accordance with the abolition and amalgamation of the Government offices.

20. The post of Supreme Adviser to the Korean Government to remain unfilled for the present.

21. Agriculture to be improved by reclaiming waste lands and developing the natural resources of the soil.

Consideration of the twenty-one clauses of this convention prove how far reaching was the programme upon which the Japanese were embarking. In a measure, too, these later conventions were the logical supplement of the earlier one—that of February

23, 1904,—and were so regarded by the American Government, from whom the first recognition of the new arrangement emanated. In other quarters, however, where the Treaties were understood to veil the conversion of Korea into a Japanese protectorate, international objections were met by a move of remarkable boldness. Recognizing that British interests in Korea were affected more than those of any other Power there by the turn of events, Japan contrived to adjust her position in the State by agreeing to an extension of the principles of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902. Signed on August 12, 1905, and designed to allay the apprehensions of Great Britain in respect of Russian restlessness in Central Asia, the preamble provided for—

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India;

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by ensuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for commerce and industry of all nations in China ;

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions.

Of the articles, the most pertinent in connection

with the situation in Korea was Article III. It ran as follows :—

Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

By the "exercise of diplomacy the Japanese Government had crowned the success of its military operations, for with the conclusion of this Convention and its recognition by the Powers, Japan became the sole arbiter of the destinies of Korea. This position, too, was made more emphatic when the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth were made public, since in Article II of the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Peace the Russian Government—

Acknowledging that Japan possessed in Korea paramount political, military, and economical interests, engages neither to obstruct nor interfere with measures for guidance, protection, and control which the Imperial Government of Japan may find necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated in exactly the same manner as the subjects and citizens of other foreign Powers, that is to say, they shall be placed on the same

footing as the subjects and citizens of the most favoured nation. It is also agreed, in order to avoid causes of misunderstanding, that the two High Contracting Parties will abstain on the Russian-Korean frontier from taking any military measure which may menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.

At last secure in their position the Japanese Government pushed forward the task of converting Korea into a Japanese protectorate, and with this object in view overtures were made early in September to the Emperor. Alarmed at their evident determination, and cognizant of the many pledges to respect the integrity of Korea which the Japanese Government had given, His Majesty looked to the Powers for help. In the Treaty of 1882 between America and Korea the first Article was as follows :—

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United States and the King of Chosen, and the citizens and subjects of their respective Governments. If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.

To this clause the Emperor now pinned his faith, dispatching in October an American friend, Mr. Homer B. Hulbert, with a petition to the American

Government. According to the statement of his Envoy, His Majesty's petition—

Cited the fact that Korea had heretofore received many tokens of good-will from the American Government and people, that the American representatives had been sympathetic and helpful, and that American teachers of all kinds had done valuable work. He granted that the government had not been what it should have been, and that many mistakes had been committed, but he urged that whatever the Korean people might think of their government, they were passionately attached to the real Korea, to their nationality; that they had few things to be proud of, and that if their nationality and independence, which had been guaranteed by Japan, were swept away, there would be left no incentive for the people to advance. He acknowledged the need of Japanese supervision, and declared that the advice of Japan had been and would be followed along all lines that looked toward the betterment of conditions in the peninsula. He intimated that the acts committed by the Japanese during the past year did not warrant giving to Japan complete control in Korea, for it would make Japanese residents there all the more contemptuous of the private rights of Koreans. He urged that Japan would be doing herself an injury, in breaking her promise to preserve the independence of Korea, for it would make other Powers rightly suspicious of Japan's good faith elsewhere in the Far East. In conclusion, he asked the President to bring to bear upon this question the same breadth of view and the same sympathy which

had characterized his distinguished career in other fields ; and if, after a careful investigation, the facts above enumerated and others that would come to light should seem to warrant him in so doing, he should use his friendly offices to prevent the disaster to Korea which seemed imminent.

Through the presence of Japanese spies on board the steamer which carried Mr. Hulbert, the purport of his mission was discovered, and the Japanese were spurred to thwart the Imperial plans. With the least possible delay an autographed missive from the Mikado to the Emperor of Korea was prepared, and entrusted for immediate delivery to the Marquis Ito. Setting forth at once, the veteran statesman arrived in Seoul on the 10th of November, and fulfilled his mission on the following day, when he presented in person the Imperial message to His Majesty.

It was as follows :—

I, the Emperor of Japan, hereby congratulate your Majesty on the restoration of peace in the Far East, and, in order that the friendly relations existing between our two nations should become still closer, I hereby send my special ambassador, whom I beg you to receive.

I also wish to assure your Majesty that I shall hereafter guard the integrity of Korea, and vouchsafe the personal safety of the Imperial household.

On the 15th the Marquis Ito returned to the Palace, and in a special audience endeavoured to

secure the signature of the Emperor to the three following proposals :—

Article I.—The Korean Department of Foreign Affairs shall be abolished. In future all diplomatic dealings on the part of Korea will be dispatched by a Council sitting at Tokio.

Article II.—The Japanese Minister at Seoul shall hereafter be called “General Superintendent” or “Director of Affairs.”

Article III.—The Japanese Consular representatives at Seoul and at the different parts of Korea shall hereafter be called “Superintendents.”

Whatever may have been His Majesty's opinion of the Mikado's letter he realized at once the dire significance of the demands which the Marquis Ito now made upon him, and to the proposed surrender of his Imperial prerogatives His Majesty was reported by his Court Chamberlain to have returned the following responses.

The Emperor said—

“Although I have seen in the newspapers various rumours that Japan proposed to assume a protectorate over Korea, I did not believe them, as I placed faith in Japan's adherence to the promise to maintain the independence of Korea which was made by the Emperor of Japan at the beginning of the war and embodied in a Treaty between Korea and Japan. When I heard you were coming to my country I was glad, as I believed your mission was to increase

the friendship between our countries, and your demands have therefore taken me entirely by surprise."

To which Marquis Ito rejoined—

"These demands are not my own; I am only acting in accordance with a mandate from my Government, and if Your Majesty will agree to the demands which I have presented it will be to the benefit of both nations and peace in the East will be assured for ever. Please, therefore, consent quickly."

The Emperor replied—

"From time immemorial it has been the custom of the rulers of Korea, when confronted with questions so momentous as this, to come to no decision until all the Ministers, high and low, who hold or have held office, have been consulted, and the opinion of the scholars and the common people have been obtained, so that I cannot now settle this matter myself."

Said Marquis Ito again—

"Protests from the people can easily be disposed of, and for the sake of the friendship between the two countries Your Majesty should come to a decision at once."

To this the Emperor replied—

"Assent to your proposals would mean the ruin of my country, and I will therefore sooner die than agree to them."

After four hours' protracted argument, in which the Japanese Envoy first flattered and then^e bullied the Emperor, negotiations were transferred to the Japanese Legation, and from there to the Council Chamber of the Korean Cabinet. On the 16th the Marquis Ito assembled the members of the Cabinet at his hotel, with the exception of Pak Che Sun, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was closeted with the Japanese Minister, and discussion of the proposed terms began at three and continued until midnight. In spite of bribes, threats and other forms of intimidation, the Ministers supported their Emperor in declining to entertain the Japanese demands. On the 17th, at eleven o'clock in the morning, another conference took place at the Japanese Legation, continuing until two o'clock. From there an adjournment was made to the Palace, where a bitter wrangle broke out in the Imperial presence and lasted until midnight. Meanwhile a military demonstration was held outside the Palace, and Japanese soldiers with drawn bayonets and loaded magazines were encouraged to invade the courtyard and Palace buildings.

Within the Palace, at the council which had been opened before His Majesty, and in which the Marquis Ito and Mr. Hayashi, reinforced by an infantry escort, at first had participated, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister passionately declaimed against the Japanese proposals. After His

Majesty had withdrawn, the strain of the past few days began to make itself apparent in the irresolution of several of the Ministers, which became more marked when the Marquis Ito resumed his attack upon them. Returning to the council meeting after a brief absence, he reassembled all the members of the Cabinet, and again repeated his orders that the proposals should be signed as, at the same time, he demanded an audience of the Emperor. Although His Majesty evaded the request, referring the Marquis Ito to his Cabinet, it was evident to the Prime Minister that the resistance of the Cabinet was breaking down before the exhortations of Marquis Ito and Mr. Hayashi and the threats of General Hasegawa. Upbraiding his colleagues for their cowardice, the Prime Minister quitted the chamber for the purpose of reporting to His Majesty the change in the complexion of events. From this moment the situation grew steadily worse. Drawing the gloomiest forebodings from the non-appearance of Han Kiu Sul, who was held a prisoner by the Japanese in an anteroom and unable to communicate with the Emperor or to return to the meeting, the majority of the Ministers, after a final onslaught by their tormentors, succumbed at midnight.

Nothing now remained to hinder the sealing of the Treaty, and in the small hours of the morning of the 18th the Marquis Ito dispatched Japanese police

to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the seal of the Foreign Minister. With its arrival the Ministers for Home Affairs, War, Agriculture, and Education appended their seals, but the Ministers of Finance and Justice refused, while the Prime Minister was not present, the termination of this singular method of securing a treaty of friendship arriving when the Marquis Ito himself compelled the Minister of Foreign Affairs to affix the seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the document.

The Treaty so signed is as follows :—

The Governments of Japan and Korea, desiring to strengthen the principle of solidarity, which unites the two Empires, have with that object in view agreed upon and concluded the following stipulations, to serve until the moment arrives when it is recognized that Korea has attained national strength :—

Article I.—The Government of Japan, through the Department of Foreign Affairs at Tokio, will hereafter have the control and direction of the external relations and affairs of Korea; and the diplomatic and consular representatives of Japan will have the charge of the subjects and of the interests of Korea in foreign countries.

Article II.—The Government of Japan undertake to see to the execution of the Treaties actually existing between Korea and other Powers, and the Government of Korea engages not to conclude hereafter any act or engagement having an international character except through the medium of the Government of Japan.

Article III.—The Government of Japan shall be represented at the Court of His Majesty the Emperor of Korea by a Resident-General, who shall reside at Seoul, primarily for the purpose of taking charge of and directing matters relating to diplomatic affairs. He shall have the right of private and personal audience of His Majesty the Emperor of Korea. The Japanese Government shall also have the right to station Residents at the several open ports, and at such other places as it may deem necessary. Such Residents shall, under the direction of the Resident-General, exercise the powers and functions hitherto appertaining to Japanese Consuls in Korea, and shall perform such duties as may be necessary in order to carry into full effect the provisions of this Agreement.

Article IV.—The stipulations of all Treaties and Agreements existing between Japan and Korea, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, shall continue in force.

Article V.—The Government of Japan undertakes to maintain the welfare and dignity of the Imperial House in Korea.

The news of the signing of the Treaty fell like a thunderclap upon the startled senses of the Koreans, and certain ex-Ministers arranged at once to memorialize the Throne. The petition was presented on November 26. It demanded the repudiation of the Treaty and the death of the Ministers who had signed it. It was renewed on the 27th and again on the 28th, when, in addition, General Prince Min Yong Whan,

the leader of the movement, addressed the following Circular to the foreign Legations, of whom two refused to accept it:—

It has been acknowledged by the world that Korea is an independent nation, and Japan has solemnly announced on many occasions, beginning with the Treaty of Shimonoseki and including the Declaration of War between Japan and Russia, and ending with the Treaty between Japan and Korea in February of last year, that she also would respect and preserve the independence and integrity of our Empire.

A few days ago the Japanese Envoy and the Japanese Minister entered the Palace and compelled the Minister for Foreign Affairs to place his seal upon a document which provides for the establishment of a Japanese supreme administrator in Korea, and for the transfer of Korean diplomatic affairs to Japan. This document, being utterly opposed to what Japan has led us to expect, has not been agreed to by our Emperor, and is firmly opposed by the Prime Minister of our Cabinet.

The Japanese Envoy used threats and violence to obtain the consent of the Ministers; the Palace was besieged with soldiers, and the official seal was stolen from the Foreign Office. The Japanese call a document concluded in such circumstances a Treaty!

Foreign Ministers who reside in Seoul are being driven away, and Korea will be deprived of all hope of appeal. We therefore trust that the foreign Ministers will take joint action and refuse to recognize a Treaty made under such conditions.

Meanwhile, throughout these three days, bowed in mute appeal before the Palace gates was a vast crowd of the more humble subjects of His Majesty, while within the precincts of the Palace itself knelt numerous ex-Ministers and an array of departmental officials. For three days, without breaking fast, without sleep and without shifting their positions save when General Hasegawa, with the assistance of Japanese police, dispersed them, the supplicants awaited the decision of their Sovereign. By nightfall on the 29th it was known that the Japanese advisers had dictated the rejection of the national prayer; and at daybreak on the morning of the 30th General Prince Min Yong Whan, a blood-cousin of the Imperial Family and principal aide-de-camp to the Emperor, committed suicide in protest against the shame inflicted on his country. After his death the subjoined letter, addressed to the Korean nation, was found among his effects :—

Through my inability in the service of the Empire the present threatening state of affairs has resulted. I am killing myself; my object in doing this being to demonstrate my sense of gratitude to the Emperor, and to allay in part the just resentment of my twenty million compatriots.

My death may have no immediate result, and after my death nothing need be said about me, but I am sure that under the new state of affairs troubles will destroy our nation and the people of our land.

The foreign Ministers must have known what Japan proposed to do. I hope that the foreign Ministers will make known to their Governments and to their people the condition of our Empire, and I hope that some measure of justice presently may be meted out to my unhappy country.

It must not be thought that our people are not patriotic. We are. If the foreign Ministers can do anything to restore freedom and independence to the people of Korea I shall send them my grateful thanks from Heaven.

A few days later, on December 6, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pak Che Sun, overwhelmed with shame for having permitted his seal to appear on the hateful Treaty, attempted his life in the presence of the Japanese Minister. Recovering after treatment in the Japanese hospital, Pak Che Sun was made Prime Minister in place of the exiled Han Kiu Sul, enjoying but a temporary experience of the office.

In view of the world-wide publicity imparted to the proceedings in Seoul, and the ferment which had arisen in the provinces, the Japanese Legation in Seoul proceeded to issue the following *communique*:—

“Several days’ conference between Marquis Ito and Mr. Hayashi, on the one hand, and the Korean Ministers on the other, convinced the latter that in consideration of the peace of the Far East and the situation occupied by Korea, the conclusion of the new Convention was inevitable. Nevertheless, it is true that when, on November 17, the Ministers

assembled in the Palace, the Prime Minister, Mr. Han Kiu Sul, declared himself radically opposed to the Convention, and, with the exception of one or two of his colleagues, all refrained from addressing to the Throne any declaration of conviction that the Convention should be concluded.

It is further true that, although the Emperor of Korea was persuaded by his interviews with Marquis Ito and by the latter's careful explanations that the Convention was necessary, His Majesty nevertheless expressed a desire that certain modifications tending to the advantage of the Empire and the Throne's position and dignity should be introduced, and that a postponement should be made for the purpose. He did not, however, endorse the opposition offered by Prime Minister Han and his fellow-thinkers, but, on the contrary, repeatedly directed them to come to an amicable arrangement with the Japanese plenipotentiaries.

The latter, on their side, stated that while they were willing to introduce any suitable amendments offered by the Koreans, they could not agree to postpone the conclusion of the Convention, inasmuch as, in their opinion, circumstances did not admit of delay. Therefore they suggested that the conference should be resumed in the evening of the same day.

This was done, and on that occasion nearly the whole of the amendments proposed by the Koreans were embodied in the Convention with Marquis Ito's approval. This was not all. For, at the Emperor's direct desire, a new clause was inserted at the end of the Convention—the clause guaranteeing the safety and prestige of the Throne.

These facts show clearly that the Convention, as finally drafted, embodied the ideas of the contracting parties, and had their assent.

Thereafter the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pak Che Sun, signed the Convention in the presence of all his colleagues, and attached his seal to it.

Prior to the latter step, and while the discussion of the Convention, article by article, was going on, the Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned many times to the Foreign Office for his seal. But the custodian of the seal happening to be absent, it was not until two hours had elapsed that the Chief Secretary arrived with the seal. During the interval between the Foreign Minister's signature and the arrival of his seal, the Emperor expressed to Marquis Ito his satisfaction that an amicable agreement had been reached, and announced his intention of retiring to rest with a tranquil mind, which step he recommended to Marquis Ito also. The Marquis accordingly withdrew before the final conclusion of the Convention.

As for the statements that force was employed by the Japanese, the only exhibition of force was that, in view of some indications of disturbance, steps were taken to guard the Japanese and Korean plenipotentiaries on their return from the Palace.

As these events were taking place in Seoul, Mr. Homer B. Hulbert safely delivered the petition of the Emperor of Korea to the State Department in Washington, too late to arrest the action of the Japanese, who had already announced the execution

of a protectorate over Korea. Assistance from the liberty-loving Republic, moreover, was out of the question since the American Government had been the first to recognize the claims of Japan. Rebuffed in the one quarter whence he had reason to expect some little aid, His Majesty continued to agitate against the action of the Japanese. After several weeks of ineffectual intrigue he contrived, with the help of Mr. Douglas Story, the well-known correspondent, to publish an explicit denial of the right of the Japanese Government to announce a protectorate over Korea. Dated January 29, 1906, the Imperial *dementi* was as follows:—

Clause I.—His Majesty the Emperor of Korea did not sign or agree to the Treaty signed by Mr. Hayashi and Pak Che Sun on November 17, 1905.

Clause II.—His Majesty the Emperor of Korea objects to the details of the Treaty as published through the tongues of Japan.

Clause III.—His Majesty the Emperor of Korea proclaimed the sovereignty of Korea, and denies that he has by any act made that sovereignty over to any foreign Power.

Clause IV.—Under the Treaty, as published by Japan, the only terms referred to concern the external affairs with foreign Powers. Japan's assumption of the control of Korean Internal Affairs never has been authorized by His Majesty the Emperor of Korea.

Clause V.—His Majesty the Emperor of Korea never consented to the appointment of a Resident-General from Japan, neither has he conceived the

possibility of the appointment of a Japanese who should exercise Imperial powers in Korea. °°

Clause VI.—His Majesty the Emperor of Korea invites the Great Powers to exercise a joint protectorate over Korea for a period not exceeding five years with respect to the control of Korean foreign affairs.

The publication of the Imperial message brought from the Japanese Minister in Seoul a prompt refutation of its authenticity, and, while the Japanese Government rebuked the temerity of the Korean Emperor, the Marquis Ito concluded the conversion of Korea into a Japanese protectorate. In the capital the Imperial household was held in such rigorous restraint that His Majesty was practically a prisoner in his own apartments. Korean Ministers of independent character in the Cabinet were replaced by those in sympathy with Japan, while in view of the treaties of February 23, August 22 and November 17, and encouraged by the action of America, the Powers were induced to withdraw their diplomatic representatives from Seoul. All foreigners in the service of the Korean Government were succeeded by Japanese, Sir J. McLeavy Brown, Chief Commissioner of Customs, being among the first to fall. Japanese judges were appointed to the native judiciary, and Korean laws gave way to those from Japan; Japanese post offices displaced the Korean postal bureaux, and the Korean currency was called in

and exchanged for Japanese. Later on, too, the Palace guards gave room to Japanese police, and thousands of Japanese immigrants were admitted to districts where, under the pretext that the land was required for strategic purposes, large areas had been appropriated. In this way no less than one thousand villages were dispossessed, amid scenes in which pillage, rape and murder figured prominently. Private rights in the mineral, agricultural and timber lands of the kingdom were treated with equal violence, and neither notice nor compensation was given, while monopolies were created over the minor industries of the people.

By these means the government of the country, the administration of its foreign affairs, the control of trade, as of all possessions of the Throne, passed into the hands of the Japanese. But resentment against their methods of procedure was universal. Expressed by the suicides of important officials no less than in assaults upon the Ministers whose signatures figured upon the Treaty of November 17, it was fed by the treatment to which their Emperor was subjected. Deprived of the society of his Korean friends and prevented from receiving the advice of Europeans, the misfortunes of his lot increased so steadily that a movement started in the capital for paying off the Korean debt of 13,000,000 yen (£1,300,000) to Japan, in the hope of securing His Majesty's liberty while, at the same time, promoting the independence

of the country ! Offices for the receipt of contributions were opened in many parts of the kingdom, and the scheme at once assumed a national character, large sums being subscribed with enthusiasm.

In the meantime, influenced by the impression that the clauses of the obnoxious Treaty were invalidated through the measures by which it was extracted, His Majesty met Japanese coercion by intrigue. Accordingly, early in the spring of 1907, the Emperor dispatched as his private Envoy to the Peace Conference a blood-cousin, His Highness Prince Yong-i-Yi, whose arrival at the Hague on July 16 took the Japanese Government by surprise. The first act of His Highness was to confirm the genuine character of the Imperial Edict of January 29, 1906, a proceeding which became the signal for the Japanese Government to demand from the pro-Japanese Korean Cabinet, which the Marquis Ito had installed, Imperial acquiescence in the following :—

1. That the Emperor should ratify with his own seal the Treaty of November 17, 1905.

2. That the Emperor should retire and appoint a Regent.

3. That the Emperor should proceed in person to Tokio for the purpose of apologizing for the dispatch of Yong-i-Yi to the Hague.

4. That Yong-i-Yi should be recalled for punishment.

The situation was now undoubtedly critical, but none the less His Majesty declined to surrender. At the same time he decided to abdicate, and, on July 19, 1907, issued the following Edict:—

We have been, in succession to our ancestors, on the Throne for forty-four years, and have met with many disturbances. We have not reached our own desire. While Ministers are frequently improper men, and progress is uncontrolled by the right men, the times are contrary to natural events.

A crisis, extremely urgent in the life of the people has arisen, and the progress of the State is more than before imperilled. We fear a danger like that which befalls a person crossing ice. Fortunately we have a son, endowed by nature with brilliant virtue, and well worthy of being charged with plans for the development of the Government, to whom we transfer our inheritance, sanctioned by the customs of ancient times. Therefore be it known that as soon as proper to be done we will hand over the affairs of State to the Crown Prince as our representative.

Military as well as civil disturbances, resulting in much bloodshed, attended the announcement of His Majesty's abdication and the transference of the Imperial seal to the Crown Prince, which took place in the afternoon of July 20; but the culmination of the state of incipient rebellion, which had been growing ever since the events of November 17, 1905, was delayed a little longer. For the moment it was

evident that the change of ruler merely facilitated the plans of the Japanese Government, for, on July 24, 1907, the terms of a Convention, establishing in its final form a Japanese protectorate over Korea, were proclaimed in the following articles :—

The Governments of Japan and Korea, animated by a desire promptly to develop the wealth and strength of Korea, and increase the welfare of the Korean people, agree as follows :—

(1) The Government of Korea will follow the guidance of the Resident-General in administrative reforms.

(2) Legislative enactments and important administrative measures shall be forthwith approved by the Resident-General.

(3) Judicial affairs shall be distinguished from ordinary administrative affairs.

(4) The appointment or dismissal of high Korean officials shall be subject to the consent of the Resident-General.

(5) Korea shall engage as Korean officials Japanese recommended by the Resident-General.

(6) Korea shall not engage foreigners without the consent of the Resident-General.

(7) The first clause of the agreement concluded on the 22nd August, 1904, shall be abrogated.

For his service in thus establishing Japanese protection over Korea the title of Prince was conferred upon the Marquis Ito.

As the concluding act in the degradation of this

people there yet remained the disbandment of the Korean army. Voiceless and leaderless, without weapons and inspired only by the courage of despair, the Koreans were powerless to oppose the armed mastery of Japan, and required gentle, even generous, treatment. If generosity were not to be expected from a Government who had deliberately condoned the murder of Queen Min, one would have thought that common prudence would have dictated the wisdom of pursuing a pacific policy, in preference to the relentless baiting of a sadly persecuted people which has distinguished the Japanese administration of Korea. Unhappily in the hour of his triumph the Oriental is apt to be savage. Hence when, on the morning of August 1, the Korean battalions mustered for the last time, the Japanese were inspired with the wish to emphasize the humiliation of the occasion, if, indeed, they were not intending to provoke an outbreak among the Korean soldiery. No word of their impending fate had reached the troops when, as the sun rose, they assembled to listen to an Imperial Rescript which informed them that their services in defence of their Sovereign and of their country no longer would be required, and would be performed in future by their hated adversaries.

Unarmed and unprepared, the Korean army gazed in sullen silence upon the serried ranks of the surrounding Japanese, who, with loaded rifles, stood in readiness to suppress the first sign of mutinous

objection. Yet, as the "last post" of the troops veritably sounded, it was accompanied by the notes of a deeper tragedy. As soon as the Korean officers had been deprived of their swords and the shoulder-straps of the rank and file ripped off, thus withholding in a time of peace honours usually accorded to prisoners of war, the officer commanding the degraded troops stepped to the centre of the parade and killed himself as a protest against the dishonouring of his men. Sobs of passionate lament arose as the men, in whom Prince Ito has denied even the principle of fidelity, fell out. Keyed to desperation many ran to the adjoining barracks for their arms, while others threw themselves against the Japanese, whereupon began a carnival of massacre of which the world to-day has hardly heard.

Quickly gathering their forces the Japanese stormed the barracks, from where an incessant and well-directed fire was proceeding. Repulsed with loss, artillery was summoned but the guns were useless against the solid masonry until under cover of their fire an ineffective rush was made for the windows. Meanwhile the Japanese were falling fast and the approaches to the barracks were littered with their dead, when, by throwing a number of hand grenades against the position, the barrack walls were shattered. During the momentary confusion the Japanese, led by Captain Kajiwara, who distinguished himself at Port Arthur, gained an entrance through the wall, their

leader just succeeding in cutting down two Korean officers when he fell, pierced by half-a-dozen bullets. The Koreans, now somewhat discomfited, forsook the ruined barracks and began to deploy on the streets. One company succeeded in occupying a favourable position on the city walls near the Palace, from which point of vantage they concentrated a heavy fire upon their enemy. Another Korean regiment formed in front of the Palace gate, and poured a deadly rifle-fire into the Japanese troops who attempted to dislodge it. But the Japanese were gradually dominating, and as their machine guns began to play the Koreans gave way and, flying through the streets of the city, threw off the uniforms that distinguished them and took refuge in private houses.

So soon as fighting round the Korean barracks ceased, the authorities decided to seize all who had escaped into private houses and to bring them to justice. The many foreigners who witnessed the results of this order aver that the cruelties inflicted were ruthlessly savage and inhuman. Neither age nor condition was sufficient to spare any Korean suspected of aiding, abetting or taking active part in the *émeute*. Further, when the police gave the word a number of Japanese civilians participated in the carnage, and a bout of hideous butchery prevailed, in which the passage of the So-shi, who pounded the lives out of defenceless people, was marked by dead and dying, until the streets resembled a shambles.

Armed with clubs, bars of iron, stones, or any weapon that came to hand, they looted houses indiscriminately and brained all who opposed them, a favourite method of disabling a victim being to break the bones of his legs or arms, bind him with a rope and then trail him through the streets.

By noon the fighting subsided, when nearly four hundred Koreans had been killed. In time the missionaries ventured abroad. Powerless at first to intervene lest they themselves became targets for bullets, they ordered as many of the wounded as were yet alive to be carried into the mission hospitals, which soon were overflowing. Meanwhile, pending the arrival of succour, half-naked Japanese giped at the stricken Koreans, sometimes kicking their prostrate forms, sometimes poking them with sticks. Women, too, wanton and smoking the eternal cigarette, gave the men encouragement.

Seoul, the palsied capital of an age-worn empire, was not the only point where the exasperation of a defenceless, unarmed and goaded nation broke into inadequate revolt. At Chong-ju, Wanjū, Pyōng-yāng, Chu-Chong and other places, in the north as in the south, on the coast and inland, "insurrectionary" movements gave pretext for further carnage. While hundreds of Koreans were killed and thousands wounded, scores of villages were burnt to the ground in pitiless retribution on a people whose lot is misgovernment, and whose chief sin lies in an

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ineradicable hatred of Japan.) Thus the passing of Korea, amid evidences of the bloodiest outrages that have ever disfigured her history, excelling in their complete shamelessness the atrocities which accompanied the murder of Queen Min.

APPENDIX I

THE ARTICLES OF THE OTTOMAN CONSTITUTION OF 1876

Article I.—The Ottoman Empire comprises the actual countries and possessions and the privileged provinces. It forms an indivisible whole from which no part may ever be detached for any motive whatsoever.

Article II.—Constantinople is the capital of the Ottoman Empire. This city does not possess, to the exclusion of the other towns of the Empire, any special privilege or immunity.

Article III.—The Ottoman Sovereignty, which unites in the person of the Sovereign the Caliphate Supreme of Islamism, belongs to the eldest of the Princes of the Dynasty of Osman, according to the laws established *Ab antiquo*.

Article IV.—His Imperial Majesty the Sultan is, as Caliph Supreme, the protector of the Mussulman religion. He is the Sovereign and the Padishah of all the Ottomans.

Article V.—His Imperial Majesty the Sultan is responsible to none; his person is sacred.

Article VI.—The liberty of all the members of the Imperial Ottoman dynasty, their personal belongings, movable and otherwise, together with their civil list during their life, are guaranteed.

Article VII.—His Imperial Majesty the Sultan counts amongst his Sovereign rights, the following prerogatives: He appoints and deposes the Ministers, and confers the grades, offices and insignia of his Orders; he bestows the investiture upon the chiefs of the privileged provinces in the forms appointed according to the privileges which have been granted them; he has the right to coin money; his name is mentioned during public prayer in the mosques; he concludes treaties with the Powers; he declares war; he makes peace; he commands the naval and military forces; he orders all their movements; he sees that the conditions of the Cheri (the sacred law) and the laws are carried into execution; he makes the laws of public administration; he remits or commutes the penalties inflicted by the Criminal Courts; he convokes or prorogues the General Assembly; he dissolves, if he considers necessary, the Chamber of Deputies, but must take proceedings for the re-election of the Deputies.

THE PUBLIC RIGHTS OF OTTOMANS

Article VIII.—All subjects of the Empire are, without distinction, called Ottomans, whatever religion they profess. The qualification of Ottoman can be acquired and lost according to the cases specified by law.

Article IX.—All Ottomans enjoy individual liberty on condition that they do not interfere with the liberty of others.

Article X.—Individual liberty is absolutely inviolable. None shall, under any pretext, suffer any punishment whatever, except in cases determined by law, and following the forms that it prescribes.

Article XI.—Islamism is the State religion. At the same time as guarding this principle, the State protects the free exercise of all forms of worship recognized in the Empire, and maintains the religious privileges accorded to the various communities on condition that no breach of public order or good morals be committed.

Article XII.—The Press is free within the limits drawn by the law.

Article XIII.—Ottomans have the power of forming associations, commercial, industrial or agricultural, within the limits determined by the laws and regulations.

Article XIV.—One, or more persons belonging to the Ottoman nation have the right of presenting petitions to competent authority on the subject of infractions of the law committed either to their personal prejudice or to the prejudice of public interest, and they may also address, in the shape of a protest, signed petitions to the General Ottoman Assembly, complaining of the conduct of the functionaries or employees of the State.

Article XV.—There are no restrictions as to education. Every Ottoman may be educated publicly or privately, provided he conforms with the law.

Article XVI.—All schools are placed under the supervision of the State. Directions will be given in the proper quarters to unify and regulate the education of all Ottomans, but no interference will be made with the religious instruction of the various communities.

Article XVII.—All Ottomans are equal in the eyes of the law. They have the same rights and the same duties towards the country, without prejudice as to that which concerns religion.

Article XVIII.—Admission to public offices has as condition the knowledge of Turkish, which is the official language of the State.

Article XIX.—All Ottomans are admitted to public departments according to aptitude, their merit and their capacity.

Article XX.—The amount and assessment of the taxes are fixed, in conformance with the special laws and regulations, in proportion to the wealth of each taxpayer.

Article XXI.—Immovable and other property, legally established, is guaranteed. No expropriation may take place except for reason of public utility, duly stated and payment having been made previously, in conformance with the law, to the value of the property to be expropriated.

Article XXII.—The privacy of the home is

inviolable. The authorities may not forcibly enter any residence, to whomsoever it belong, except in cases determined by law.

Article XXIII.—No one may be compelled to appear before a Court other than the competent Court, in conformity with the law of procedure which will be edicted.

Article XXIV.—The confiscation of property, statute labour and the *djéréme* (exaction in form of pecuniary penalty) are prohibited. However, taxes legally raised in time of war and measures necessitated by warfare are excepted from this condition.

Article XXV.—No sum of money may be gathered, as a duty or a tax, or under any other denomination, except in pursuance of a law.

Article XXVI.—The rack and torture in any form whatsoever are completely and absolutely prohibited.

THE MINISTERS

Article XXVII.—His Imperial Majesty the Sultan nominates to the offices of Grand Vizier and of Sheikh-ul-Islam personages in whom he has the greatest confidence. The nomination of the other Ministers takes place by Imperial Irade (Decree).

Article XXVIII.—The Council of Ministers assembles under the presidency of the Grand Vizier. The duties of the Council of Ministers comprise all important affairs, both home and foreign, concerning

the State. Resolutions which have to be submitted for the sanction of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan are rendered executory by Imperial Iradé.

Article XXIX.—Each head of a ministerial department governs, within the limit of his powers, the affairs of the jurisdiction of his department. For those which go beyond the limit he refers to the Grand Vizier. The Grand Vizier attends to matters which are sent to him by the heads of the various departments, either by deferring them, if there be cause, to the Council of Ministers, and afterwards presenting them for Imperial sanction, or by deciding them himself or submitting them to the decision of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. A special regulation will determine the various categories for each ministerial department.

Article XXX.—The Ministers are responsible for deeds and acts of their management.

Article XXXI.—If one or more members of the Chamber of Deputies wish to lodge a complaint against a Minister, in consideration of his responsibility, and on account of matters about which the Chamber has a right to know, the application containing the complaint is delivered to the president, who sends it within three days to a special committee, where the matter is inquired into, and it is decided if there is reason to submit it to the deliberation of the Chamber. The decision is arrived at by the majority of votes after the necessary information has been obtained and explanations have been furnished by the Minister in question. Should it be decided to submit the complaint to the Chamber,

the report stating this decision is read at a public sitting, and the Chamber, after having heard the explanations of the Minister in question summoned to attend the sitting, or of his deputy, puts it to the vote, and if there be a majority of two-thirds the evidence of the report is adopted. In this case an address, demanding the trial of the Minister in question, is presented to the Grand Vizier, who submits it for sanction to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and the trial takes place before the High Court in pursuance of an Imperial Irâdê.

Article XXXII.—A special law will determine the legal procedure to be observed for the trial of Ministers.

Article XXXIII.—There is no difference between Ministers and private individuals in that which concerns private trials, and which are outside their duties. Trials of this sort are deferred to the ordinary jurisdiction.

Article XXXIV.—The Minister whose trial has been decided upon by the Chamber of Accusation of the High Court is suspended from office until he has been cleared of the accusation brought against him.

Article XXXV.—In case of the rejection, by a vote passed by the Chamber of Deputies, of a Bill, the passing of which the Minister thinks he ought to insist upon, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan orders the dissolution of the Chamber on condition of the re-election of the Deputies within the limited time fixed by law.

Article XXXVI.—In the case of urgent necessity,

if the General Assembly is not sitting, the Minister may issue orders with a view to providing the State against danger and protecting the public security. These orders, sanctioned by Imperial Iradé, temporarily become law if they are not contrary to the Constitution. They must be submitted to the General Assembly as soon as it meets.

Article XXXVII.—Every Minister has the right of assisting at the sitting of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies, or to be there represented by a high official of his department. He has also the right of being heard first before any member of the Chamber who may have asked leave to speak.

Article XXXVIII.—When, after a decision taken by the majority of votes, a Minister is summoned to the Chamber of Deputies to make explanation, he is obliged to answer questions that are addressed to him either personally or by delegating a superior official of his department. Nevertheless, he has the right of reserving his defence if he thinks necessary by taking upon himself the responsibility of the adjournment.

PUBLIC OFFICIALS

Article XXXIX.—All nominations for the various public offices will take place in accordance with the regulations which determine the merit and ability exacted for admission to the employment of the State. Any official nominated on these conditions cannot be deposed or removed if it is not proved that his conduct legally justifies his dismissal; if he

has not given in his resignation, or, still further, if his dismissal is not considered indispensable to the Government. Officials whose good conduct and honesty have been proved, also whose retention is considered indispensable by the Government, will have the right either of promotion or of a retiring pension, or a retaining salary, in conformance with the conditions which will be determined by a special regulation.

Article XL.—The duties of the various officers will be fixed by special rules. Each official is responsible within the limits of his province.

Article XLI.—Every official must hold his superior in respect, but obedience is only due to orders given within the limits laid down by the law. For unlawful acts, the fact of having obeyed a superior does not free the official who has performed them from responsibility.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Article XLII.—The General Assembly is composed of two Chambers—the Chamber of Lords, or the Senate, and the Chamber of Deputies.

Article XLIII.—The two Chambers assemble on November 1 of each year; the opening takes place by Imperial Iradé. The closing of the session, fixed for March 1 following, also takes place in pursuance of an Imperial Iradé. Neither of the two Chambers may assemble beyond the time of sitting of the other Chamber.

Article XLIV.—His Imperial Majesty the Sultan may, according to the requirements of circumstances, advance the time of opening and abridge or prolong the session.

Article XLV.—The opening ceremony takes place in the presence of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, either in person or represented by the Grand Vizier, and in the presence of the Ministers and members of the two Chambers. A reading of an Imperial speech is given showing the situation of the home affairs of the Empire and the state of foreign affairs during the course of the past year, and indicating the measures, the adoption of which are considered necessary for the following year.

Article XLVI.—All the Members of General Assembly are sworn to fidelity to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and to the country, to uphold the power confided to them, to observe the Constitution, and to abstain from all acts contrary to their duty. The taking of the oath takes place, for the new Members, at the opening of the session in the presence of the Grand Vizier, and, after the opening, in the presence of their respective presidents and at a public sitting of the Chamber of which they form a part.

Article XLVII.—The Members of the General Assembly are free in the emission of their opinions and votes. None of them may be bound by instructions or promises, nor influenced by threats. They may not be persecuted for their opinions or the votes issued by them in the course of debates of the Chamber of which they form a part, unless they

have infringed the rules of this Chamber, in which case the conditions, determined by the regulation are applied to them.

Article XLVIII.—Any Member of the General Assembly who, by an absolute majority of two-thirds of the Chamber of which he forms a part, is accused of treason, of attempting the violation of the Constitution, or of peculation, or who has been legally sentenced to imprisonment or exile, forfeits his title of Senator or Deputy. The trial and the infliction of the penalty belong to a competent Court.

Article XLIX.—Each Member of the General Assembly gives his vote in person. He has the right of being absent at the time of voting.

Article L.—None may be at the same time a Member of the two Chambers.

Article LI.—No debate may take place in either Chamber unless one more than half its number be present. Except in cases where the majority of two-thirds is required, resolutions are taken from the majority of Members present. In case of division, the president gives the casting vote.

Article LII.—Any petition relating to private interests presented to either Chamber is rejected if the inquiries which are made result in proving that the petitioner has not addressed in the first place the public officials whom the petition concerns, or the authority which controls these officials.

Article LIII.—The initiative of a Bill or the modification of an existing law belongs to the

Minister. The Senate and the Chamber of Deputies may also demand a new law or the modification of an existing law on matters included within their province. In the last case the demand is submitted by the Grand Vizier to His Majesty the Sultan, and, if there be occasion, the Council of State is ordered, in pursuance of an Imperial Iradé, to prepare a Bill which is the object of the proposition, on the information and explanations furnished by the proper departments.

Article LIV.—The Bills, elaborated by the Council of State, are submitted, in the first place to the Chamber of Deputies, and in the second place to the Senate. These Bills are not made law until, after having been passed by the two Chambers, they are sanctioned by an Imperial Iradé. All Bills definitely rejected by one of the two Chambers must not be submitted to a new reading in the course of the same session.

Article LV.—A Bill is not considered as passed if it has not been accepted successively by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate by a majority of votes, article by article, and if the whole of the Bill has not gained the majority of votes in each of the two Chambers.

Article LVI.—With the exception of the Ministers, of these delegates, and of officials summoned by a special invitation, no one may gain admittance to either Chamber, nor be allowed to make any communication whatever, whether he appears in his own name or representing others.

Article LVII.—The debates of the Chambers are held in the Turkish language. Bills are printed and distributed before the day fixed for the discussion.

Article LVIII.—Votes are given by nominal appeal, by outward manifestation or by secret ballot. The votes of secret ballot are subordinate to a decision of the Chamber given by the majority of the members present.

Article LIX.—The policy of each Chamber is directed by its president.

THE SENATE

Article LX.—The president and the other Members of the Senate are nominated directly by His Majesty the Sultan. The number of the Senators must not exceed one-third of the members of the Chamber of Deputies.

Article LXI.—To be able to be nominated Senator, it is necessary to have proved oneself worthy of public confidence by one's actions or to have rendered signal services to the State and to be at least forty years old.

Article LXII.—The Senators are appointed for life. The dignity of Senator may be enjoyed by persons not otherwise engaged, having exercised the functions of Minister, Governor-General (vali), Commander of a regiment, Cazasker (grand judge), Ambassador, or plenipotentiary, patriarch, knakhambach (grand rabbi), by generals of divisions of naval or military forces, and also by individuals combining

the desired qualifications. The members of the Senate, called by their own desire to other offices, lose their title of Senator.

Article LXIII.—The salary of a Senator is fixed at the monthly sum of ten thousand piastres. The Senator who receives a salary from the Treasury or allowances from another source has only the right to a portion of it if the amount is less than ten thousand piastres. If the amount is equal or superior to the salary of a Senator, he continues to receive the whole.

Article LXIV.—The Senate considers Bills of law or Budget which are sent up by the Chamber of Deputies. If, in the course of the consideration of a Bill the Senate finds a clause contrary to the Sovereign rights of His Majesty the Sultan, to liberty, to the Constitution, to the territorial integrity of the Empire, to the interior security of the Country, to the interest of the defence of the country, or to good morals, it will be definitely rejected by a vote stating the reasons, or it is returned, accompanied by observations, to the Chamber of Deputies, with a request that it should be amended or modified as suggested. Bills passed by the Senate are stamped with its approval and forwarded to the Grand Vizier. The Senate considers petitions which are presented; those deemed worthy are forwarded to the Grand Vizier accompanied by observations.

THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

Article LXV.—The number of Deputies is fixed

at the rate of one Deputy to fifty thousand individuals of the masculine sex of Ottoman nationality.

Article LXVI.—The election takes place by secret ballot. The mode of election will be determined by special law.

Article LXVII.—The office of Deputy is incompatible with public functions, with the exception of that of Minister. Any other public official, elected to the deputation, is at liberty to accept or refuse, but, in the case of acceptance, he must resign his offices.

Article LXVIII.—The following may not, be elected Deputies : (1) Those who are not of Ottoman nationality ; (2) those who, in pursuance of the special regulation in force, enjoy immunities attached to the foreign service which they practise ; (3) those who have no knowledge of Turkish ; (4) those who have not reached the age of thirty ; (5) persons engaged in private service ; (6) undischarged bankrupts ; (7) those who are notoriously disgraced by their conduct ; (8) individuals who have received the penalty of judicial interdiction, so long as the interdiction is not raised ; (9) those who do not possess civil rights ; (10) those who claim to belong to a foreign nation. After expiration of the first period of four years, one of the conditions of eligibility to act as Deputy will be to be able to read Turkish, and, as far as possible, write the language.

Article LXIX.—The general elections of the Deputies are held every four years. The office of Deputy is of four years' duration.

Article LXX.—The general elections commence, at the latest, four months before November 1, which is the date fixed for the assembling of the Chamber.

Article LXXI.—Each member of the Chamber of Deputies represents the whole Ottoman nation, and not exclusively the limited number by which he was nominated.

Article LXXII.—The electors are obliged to choose their Deputy from amongst the inhabitants of the province to which they belong.

Article LXXIII.—In case of the dissolution of the Chamber by an Imperial Iradé, the general elections must commence in time for the Chamber to be able to reassemble, at the latest, within six months of the date of its dissolution.

Article LXXIV.—In case of death or judicial prohibition, or prolonged absence, the loss of the title of Deputy resulting from condemnation or from the acceptance of public offices, proceedings for providing a substitute take place in accordance with the directions of the electoral law, and, in case of an adjournment, the new Deputy may exercise his commission, at the latest, in the following session.

Article LXXV.—Deputies elected to fill a vacant place retain their seat until the next general election.

Article LXXVI.—Twenty thousand piastres a session will be allowed by the Treasury to each Deputy, and also travelling expenses. The total of these expenses will be settled in accordance with the

regulations which govern the payments made to the civil officials of the State, and calculated on the basis of a monthly salary of five thousand piastres.

Article LXXVII.—The president and two vice-presidents of the Chamber of Deputies are chosen by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, from a list of nine candidates elected by the Chamber by a majority of votes; three for the presidency, three for the first vice-presidency, and three for the second vice-presidency. The nomination of president and vice-presidents takes place by an Imperial Iradé.

Article LXXVIII.—The sittings of the Chamber of Deputies are public. However, the Chamber may form itself into a secret committee if the proposition is made by the Ministers, or by the president, or by fifteen members, and if this proposition is voted in secret committee.

Article LXXIX.—No deputy may, during the session, be arrested or prosecuted, except in case of *flagrante delicto*, or on a decision taken by a majority of the Chamber granting authority to prosecute.

Article LXXX.—The Chamber of Deputies discusses the Bills which are submitted to it. It passes, amends, or rejects the clauses concerning the finances of the Constitution. It examines in detail the general expenses of the State included in the Budget, and settles the sum total with the Ministers. It determines, also, in agreement with the Ministers, the nature, the amount, and the manner of distribution, and the realization of receipts destined to meet expenses.

JUDICIAL POWER

Article LXXXI.—The judges, nominated in accordance with the special law on this matter, and provided with a brevet of investiture (Berat), are elected for life, but they may give in their resignation. The promotion of the judges in hierarchical order, their displacement, their retirement, their repeal in case of judicial condemnation are submitted to the conditions of the same law. This law determines the conditions and qualifications required to exercise the functions of judge or other functions of the judicial order.

Article LXXXII.—The sittings of all the Courts are public. The publication of sentences is authorized. However, in cases specified by law, the Court may hold its sittings with closed doors.

Article LXXXIII.—Every individual may, in the interests of his defence, make use before the Court of the means allowed by law.

Article LXXXIV.—No Court may refuse, under any pretext whatever, to judge a case which is in its department. Neither may it delay or adjourn the trial once proceedings have been commenced, unless the plaintiff withdraws his claim. However, in penal matters the public action continues to be followed up, in conformance with the law, even in a case where the plaintiff has withdrawn.

Article LXXXV.—Each case is tried by the Court in which jurisdiction it is. Lawsuits between

private persons and the State are in the department of the Common Courts.

Article LXXXVI.—No interference is allowed in the Courts.

Article LXXXVII.—Cases concerning the Cheri are tried by the Courts of the Cheri; the trial of civil matters belongs to the Civil Courts.

Article LXXXVIII.—The various categories of Courts, their departments, their powers, and the emoluments of the judges are regulated by law.

Article LXXXIX.—Beyond the Common Courts, there may not be established extraordinary Courts, under any denomination whatever, nor Commissions to judge certain special cases. However, the arbitration (Tahkim) and the nomination of Muayella (Deputy Judge) are allowed in forms determined by law.

Article XC.—No judge may hold a plurality of offices remunerated by the State.

Article XCI.—Imperial proctors will be appointed, charged with the carrying through of public trials. Their duties and their hierarchy are fixed by law.

THE HIGH COURT

Article XCII.—The High Court consists of thirty members, ten Senators, ten Councillors of State, and ten members, chosen from amongst the presidents and the members of the Court of Cassa-

tion, and the Court of Appeal. All members are elected by lot. The High Court is convoked, when it is necessary, by an Imperial Iradé, and assembles at the Senate House. The duties consist of judging the Ministers, the president and the members of the Court of Cassation, and all other persons accused of the crime of *lèse-majesté*, or of attempt against the safety of the State.

Article XCIII.—The High Court is composed of two Chambers: the Chamber of Accusation and the Chamber of Judgment. The Chamber of Accusation consists of nine members, elected by lot, from amongst the members of the High Court; three Senators, three Councillors of State, and three members of the Court of Cassation or of the Court of Appeal.

Article XCIV.—The sentence to appear before the Chamber of Judgment is pronounced by the Chamber of Accusation, by a majority of two-thirds of its members. The members belonging to the Chamber of Accusation must not take part in the deliberations of the Chamber of Judgment.

Article XCV.—The Chamber of Judgment consists of twenty-one members, namely, seven Senators, seven Councillors of State, and seven members of the Court of Cassation or of the Court of Appeal. It passes sentence, by a majority of two-thirds of its members, and, in accordance with the laws in force, on lawsuits which are sent up to it by the Chamber of Accusation. Its judgments are not open to appeal or to petitions for pardon.

FINANCES

Article XCVI.—No tax to the profit of the State may be established, assessed or collected, except in pursuance of a law.

Article XCVII.—The Budget contains the forecast of the receipts and expenses of the State. The taxes to the profit of the State are regulated by this law with regard to their condition, their levying and their collection.

• Article XCVIII.—The examination and the voting, by the General Assembly, of the law of the Budget take place point by point. The annexed lists, comprising the details of the receipts and expenses, are divided into sections, chapters and articles, in accordance with the copy defined by the regulations.

Article XCIX.—The Budget is submitted to the Chamber of Deputies immediately after the opening of the session, so as to render possible its being brought into execution from the commencement of the receipts and expenditures with which it is concerned.

Article C.—No outlay in excess of the Budget may be made from the funds of the State, except in pursuance of a law.

Article CI.—In urgent cases, arising from extraordinary circumstances, the Ministers may, during the absence of the General Assembly, create, by Imperial Iradé, the necessary resources, and cause

an outlay unforeseen in the Budget, on the condition that they do inform the General Assembly by a Bill at the next meeting.

Article CII.—The Budget is voted for a year ; it is in force only during the year to which it refers. However, if, in consequence of exceptional circumstances, the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved before the voting of the Budget, the Ministers may, by a resolution passed in pursuance of an Imperial Iradé, apply the Budget of the preceding year until the next session, without the provisional application in the Budget being made for more than a year.

Article CIII.—The definite regulation law of the Budget indicates the sum total of receipts realized and payments effected on the revenues and expenses of the year to which it refers. Its form and divisions must be the same as those of the Budget.

Article CIV.—The definite regulation Bill is submitted to the Chamber of Deputies, at the latest at the end of four years, dating from the end of the year to which it refers.

Article CV.—There will be instituted an audit-office charged with examining the transactions of the accountants of the finances, as also the annual accounts drawn up by the various ministerial departments. It will forward to the Chamber of Deputies each year a special report of their works, accompanied by observations. At the end of each quarter will be presented to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, through the medium of the Grand Vizier, a report containing the account of the financial situation.

Article CVI.—The audit-office will be composed of twelve members appointed for life by Imperial Iradé. None may be dismissed without the reason stated as motive for dismissal, be approved by a decision of the Chamber of Deputies, taken by a majority of votes.

Article CVII.—The rank and qualifications required of the members of the audit-office, the details of their duties, rules applicable in case of resignation, of providing substitutes, of promotion and of pensioning off, as also the organization of the offices, will be determined by a special law.

PROVISIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Article CVIII.—The administration of the provinces will be based on the principle of decentralization. The details of this organization will be fixed by law.

Article CIX.—A special law will regulate, on a larger basis, the election of the Administrative Councils of province (vilayet) of district (sandjak) and of canton (Kaza), as also that of the General Council, which assembles annually in the capital of each province.

Article CX.—The duties of the General Provincial Council will be determined by the same special law, and will include the faculty of debating on subjects of public utility, such as the establishment of means of communication, the organization of agricultural

interests, the development of trade, commerce and agriculture, and the extension of public education ; the rights of lodging complaints to the competent authorities to obtain redress for acts and deeds committed against the laws and regulations, either in the levying or gathering of taxes, or in any other matter.

Article CXI.—In each Kaza, there will be a Council dealing with each of various communities. This Council will be charged with the control of : (1) The administration of the revenues of the estates or of the funds vacouf (pious endowments), the special destination of which is determined by the express orders of the founders or by custom. (2) The use of funds derived from landed property given over, by testamentary disposition, to acts of charity and beneficence, (3) The administration of funds for orphans, in accordance with special regulations which rule the matter. Each Council will be composed of members elected by the community it represents, in conformance with a special regulation to be established. The Councils will be amenable to the local authorities and the General Councils of the provinces.

Article CXII.—Municipal affairs will be administered at Constantinople and in the provinces by elected Municipal Councils. The organization of the Municipal Councils, their duties, and the mode of election of their members will be determined by a special law.

VARIOUS DISPOSITIONS

Article CXIII.—Should there be any manifestations of a nature to presuppose disturbances in any part of the Empire, the Imperial Government has the right of there proclaiming a state of siege. The effects of the state of siege consist in the temporary suspension of the civil laws. The method of administration of the localities submitted to a state of siege will be regulated by a special law. To His Imperial Majesty the Sultan belongs the exclusive power of expelling from the territory of the Empire all those who, from reliable information received by the Administration of Police, are recognized as being dangerous to the safety of the State.

Article CXIV.—Primary education will be obligatory for all Ottomans. The details of instruction will be determined by a special law.

Article CXV.—No order of the Constitution may, under any pretext whatever, be suspended or neglected.

Article CXVI.—In case of necessity, duly ascertained, the Constitution may be modified in some of its regulations. This modification is subordinate to the following conditions: Every proposition of modifications, presented either by the Ministry or by one or other of the Chambers, must be submitted in the first place to the deliberations of the Chamber of Deputies. If the proposition is approved by the majority of two-thirds of the members of the Chamber, it is forwarded to the Senate. In the case where

the Senate also adopt the proposed modification by the majority of two-thirds of the Senators, it will be submitted for the sanction of His Majesty the Sultan. If it is sanctioned by Imperial Iradé, it becomes law. Any condition of the Constitution being proposed for modification remains in force until the proposition, after having been submitted to the deliberations of the Chambers, has been sanctioned by Imperial Iradé.

Article CXVII.—The interpretation of the laws belongs to the Court of Cassation for the civil and penal laws ; to the Council of State for the administrative laws ; and to the Senate for the regulations of the Constitution.

Article CXVIII.—All the conditions of the laws, regulations, wages and customs actually in force continue to be applied, so far as they have not been modified or repealed by laws or regulations.

Article CXIX.—The provisional instruction of the 10 Cheval, 1293 (October 16/28, 1876), concerning the General Assembly; will cease to have effect from the closing of the first session.

APPENDIX II

THE PERSIAN CONSTITUTION I.

THE ELECTORAL LAW OF SEPTEMBER 9, 1906

Regulations for the Elections of the National Assembly, dated Monday, Rājab 20, A.H. 1324 (= September 9, A.D. 1906).

FIRST SECTION .

RULES GOVERNING THE ELECTIONS

Article I.—The electors of the nation in the well-protected realms of Persia in the Provinces and Departments shall be of the following classes : (i) Princes and the Qájár tribe ; (ii) Doctors of Divinity and Students ; (iii) Nobles and Notables ; (iv) Merchants ; (v) Landed proprietors and peasants ; (vi) Trade-guilds.

Note I.—The tribes in each province are reckoned as forming part of the inhabitants of that province, and have the right to elect subject to the established conditions.

Note II.—By “landed proprietor” is meant the owner of an estate, and by “peasant” the tiller of the soil.

Article II.—The electors shall possess the following qualifications : (i) their age must not fall

short of 25 years ; (i) they must be Persian subjects ; (iii) they must be known in the locality ; (iv) the landed proprietors and peasants amongst them must possess property of a value of at least one thousand *túmáns* (=about £200) ; (v) the merchants amongst them must have a definite office and business ; (vi) the members of trade-guilds amongst them must belong to a recognized guild, must be engaged in a definite craft or trade, and must be in possession of a shop of which the rent corresponds with the average rents of the locality.

Article III.—The persons who are entirely deprived of electoral rights are as follows : (i) women ; (ii) persons not within years of discretion, and those who stand in need of a legal guardian ; (iii) foreigners ; (iv) persons whose age falls short of twenty-five years ; (v) persons notorious for mischievous opinions ; (vi) bankrupts who have failed to prove that they were not culpable ; (vii) murderers, thieves, criminals, and persons who have undergone punishment according to the Islamic Law as well as persons suspected of murder or theft, and the like, who have not legally exculpated themselves ; (viii) persons actually serving in the land or sea forces.

The persons who are conditionally deprived of electoral rights are as follows : (i) governors, and assistant governors, within the area of their governments ; (ii) those employed in the military or police within the area of their appointments.

Article IV.—Those elected must possess the following qualifications : (i) they must know Persian ; (ii) they must be able to read and write

Persian ; (iii) they must be Persian subjects of Persian extraction ; (iv) they must be locally known ; (v) they must not be in government employment ; (vi) their age must be not less than thirty or more than seventy ; (vii) they must have some insight into affairs of State.

Article V.—Those persons who are debarred from being elected are : (i) women ; (ii) foreign subjects ; (iii) those who are actually serving in the land or sea forces ; (iv) fraudulent bankrupts ; (v) persons who have been guilty of murder or theft ; criminals ; persons who have undergone punishment conformably with the Islamic Law ; and persons suspected of murder, theft and the like, who have not legally exculpated themselves ; (vi) those whose age falls short of thirty ; (vii) those who are notorious for evil doctrine, or who live in open sin.

Article VI.—The number of persons elected by the people in the different parts of Persia shall correspond with the total number of the inhabitants of that locality. In each province (*ayálat*) six or twelve persons shall be elected in accordance with the following table, save in the case of Tih-rán, when the number of those elected shall be as follows : (i) Princes and members of the Qájár family, 4 ; (ii) doctors of Divinity and students, 4 ; (iii) merchants, 10 ; (iv) land-owners and peasants, 10 ; (v) trade-guilds, 32, in all, one from each guild.

In other provinces and departments the numbers shall be as follows : (i) Ázarbayján, 12 ; (ii) Khurásán, Sístán, Turbat Túrshíz, Qúchán, Bujnúrd, Sháhrúd and Bistám, 12 ; (iii) Gílán and Talish, 6 ; (iv) Mázanda-

rán, Tunukábun, Astarábád, Firúzkúh and Damáwand, 6 ; (v) Khamsa, Qazwín, Simnán and Dámghán, 6 ; (vi) Kirmán and Balúchistán, 6 ; (vii) Fars and the Persian Gulf Ports, 12 ; (viii) Arabistán, Luristán and Burújird, 6 ; (ix) Kirmánsháhán and Garrús, 6 ; (x) Kurdistán and Hamadán, 6 ; (xi) Isfahán, Yazd, Káshán, Qum and Sáwa, 12 ; (xii) 'Iráq, Malá'ir Túy Sirkán, Niháwand, Kamra, Gulpáyagán and Khwánsár, 6.

Article VII.—Each elector has one vote and can only vote in one class.

Article VIII.—The number of those elected to the National Consultative Assembly throughout the whole well-protected realms of Persia shall not exceed two hundred. In the individual towns of each province each class shall assemble separately, elect one representative, and send him to the chief town of that province. The delegates so elected must reside in the town for which they are elected, or in the environs of that town. Three delegates thus elected in the individual towns of the provinces shall assemble in the chief town of the province, and shall elect members for the National Consultative Assembly according to the number specified in the above table for each province, so that they may present themselves to the National Consultative Assembly, and during the period of their appointment, may discharge their duty and function, which is to guard the rights of the Government and the Nation.

The electors are not absolutely compelled to elect [a deputy] out of their own class or guild.

Article IX.—In every place where elections are carried out a Council (*anjuman*) shall be formed of well-known local representatives of the six classes of electors to supervise the elections. This Council shall be under the temporary supervision of the Governor or Deputy-Governor of that place. In this way two Councils shall be formed, one local and one provincial, the former in each of the individual towns in the province, the latter in the chief town of the province.

Article X.—Complaints in connection with the elections shall not interfere with the carrying out of the elections; that is to say, the Councils mentioned above in Article IX shall investigate such complaints without suspending the elections.

Article XI.—Should any one complain of the local Council, he shall refer his complaint to the provincial Council, and if his application be without effect, it shall be referred to the National Consultative Assembly.

Article XII.—If any Member of the National Consultative Assembly should resign or die, and if more than six months intervene before the next [general] elections, the Members of the Assembly shall elect [in his place] one from his province.

Article XIII.—The local and provincial Council shall send the names of the electors and the elected of each department to the Record Office (*daftar-khāna*) of the National Consultative Assembly, where their names shall be arranged in alphabetical order, and shall be printed and published for the information of

the public. So likewise, after the conclusion of the elections, the local Council shall, within the space of one week, communicate the result of the election to the provincial Council.

Article XIV.—Those elected in the individual towns of the province must be provided with a certificate from the local Council; and in like manner those elected in the chief towns of the provinces must be provided with a certificate from the provincial Council, which they must produce in the National Consultative Assembly.

Article XV.—The election of the persons designated shall be by a majority of votes.

Article XVI.—After the election of the Members of the National Consultative Assembly, the names of those elected shall be recorded in the Registry of the Assembly, and shall be announced in the newspapers.

Article XVII.—The National Assembly of Electors shall be established in all towns where there is a resident Governor, which are divided into two categories. The local Governor, having regard to local requirements, is empowered to fix the place of the Assembly of Electors.

Article XVIII.—The time and place of the election must be made known to all the people one month beforehand by the local government, by means of printed leaflets and other suitable channels of advertisement.

Article XIX.—Those elected to represent the Capital and the various provinces shall proceed to

Tihrán as quickly as possible.' Since those elected in the provinces must be elected in accordance with the Regulations, and since consequently some considerable time will necessarily elapse before they can present themselves, therefore the representatives of Tihrán shall be elected, and the Assembly constituted immediately, so that it may proceed to discharge its functions until the provincial representatives shall present themselves, nor shall the delay in the arrival of these latter cause the Assembly to be inactive.'

Article XX.—The living expenses and annual allowance of the Members of the National Consultative Assembly depends on the determination and sanction of the Assembly itself.

Article XXI.—The period for which the National Representatives are appointed shall be two years, after which period fresh elections shall take place throughout the whole of Persia.

Article XXII.—Complaints regarding the Assembly and its Members respecting the carrying out of the Elections, etc., must, in so far as they refer to the Assembly, be submitted in writing to the President of the Assembly, so that the subject of complaint may be investigated in the National Consultative Assembly and judgment thereon delivered.

Article XXIII.—No Member of the Assembly can be arrested or detained on any pretext without the permission of the Assembly, unless he shall publicly commit some crime or misdemeanour.

All written or spoken statements of Members of

the Assembly on the affairs of the Government and the Nation shall be free, except in cases where such writings or statements of any Member shall be contrary to the public good, and, according to the enactments of the Most Luminous Law [of Islām], shall deserve punishment. In such cases, by permission of the Assembly, persons of this description shall be brought before the Court of Cassation.

Article XXIV.—Government officials and employees of government offices who are elected in a representative capacity, as members of the Assembly shall quit their previous service, and while employed in this capacity shall have no right to intervene or concern themselves in their former office or in any other [similar] service, otherwise their representative function and membership shall be null and void.

SECOND SECTION

THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTION AND REGISTRATION OF VOTES, AND THE CONDITIONS THEREOF

Article XXV.—The election of Members of the National Consultative Assembly in the Capital, and in the towns of large, moderate or small size, will take place in the presence of the Governor, or Deputy-Governor, under the supervision of the Council (*anjuman*) mentioned in Article IX.

Article XXVI.—Election shall be by votes, and by absolute or relative majority. In case of an equality of votes, the determination of the elected [candidate] shall be effected by a [second] voting.

Article XXVII.—The Polling day for the Election of Members to the Assembly and the recording of votes shall, in whatever year it takes place, be on a Friday,¹ with due observance of the following arrangements.

First, the voting shall take place in the presence of the Governor, the local Council and the electors who are present.

Secondly, for the organization of the electoral court the Councils (*anjumans*) mentioned in Article IX shall be responsible.

Thirdly, the voting-paper shall be of white paper having no sign.

Fourthly, each of the voters shall inscribe his vote on this Voting-paper outside [*i.e.* before he enters] the electoral court, and shall give it, closed up, to one of the members of the above-mentioned Council who shall be designated [for that purpose], who, in the presence of all, shall throw it into the ballot-box.

Fifthly, one of the members of the Council (*anjuman*) mentioned in Article IX shall compare the names of those voting with a list furnished to him.

Article XXVIII.—Before the votes are taken, one of the Members of the Council shall lock the ballot-box, which shall be sealed by two others, while another Member of the Council shall take charge of the key.

Article XXIX.—After the voting has been concluded, the lid of the box shall be opened, the voting-papers shall be counted in the presence of all, and the

¹ Friday is chosen because in Persia, as in other Mahommedan countries, it is a general holiday.

majority and minority shall be verified by the list [of persons entitled to vote], while several of those present shall, under the supervision of the Council, and in the presence of all, set themselves to work out the result of the voting.

Article XXX.—Voting-papers on which nothing is written, or which bear illegible inscriptions, or which fail to specify clearly the name of the Candidate voted for, or on which the voter has inscribed his own name, shall not be taken into account, but shall be noted in the minutes. Thereafter the result of the election shall be proclaimed in a loud voice, and shall be declared by the president of the electoral court.

Article XXXI.—Should the number of Members elected by the people exceed the number fixed upon, those persons will be regarded as elected who possess seniority of age. Otherwise, should the occasion allow, the votes will be recounted. If, after the votes have been recounted, it appears that the number of voting-papers exceeds the number of electors, the election shall be regarded as null and void, and a fresh election shall be held.

Article XXXII.—The Members elected for Tihrán shall choose from amongst themselves one President, two Vice-presidents, and four Secretaries, and the Assembly shall then be opened under the Honorary Presidency of His Imperial and Most Sacred Majesty (may God immortalize his reign!).

Article XXXIII.—The President, the two Vice-presidents, and the Secretaries of the National Con-

sultative Assembly shall, with the approval of the Members of the Assembly, be changed once a year. In renewing the election of the persons above mentioned, it is understood that regard shall always be paid to the majority of votes of the Assembly.

THE PERSIAN CONSTITUTION, II

THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF DECEMBER 30, 1906

The Fundamental Law of Persia, promulgated in the reign of the late Muzaffarū'd-Dīn Shāh, and ratified by him on Zigadā 14, 1324 (= December 30, 1906).

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY

Article I.—The National Consultative Assembly is founded and established in conformity with the Farmán, founded on justice, dated the fourteenth of the Second Jumáda, A.H. 1324 (= August 5, 1908).

Article II.—The National Consultative Assembly represents the whole of the people of Persia, who [thus] participate in the economic and political affairs of the country.

Article III.—The National Consultative Assembly shall consist of the Members elected in Tihrán and the provinces, and shall be held in Tihrán.

Article IV.—The number of elected Members has been fixed, in accordance with the Electoral Law separately promulgated, at one hundred and sixty-two, but in case of necessity the number above mentioned may be increased to two hundred.

Article V.—The Members shall be elected for two whole years. This period shall begin on the day when all the representatives from the provinces shall have arrived in Tihrán. On the conclusion of this period of two years, fresh representatives shall be elected, but the people shall have the option of re-electing any of their former representatives whom they wish and with whom they are satisfied.

Article VI.—The Members elected to represent Tihrán shall, so soon as they meet, have the right to constitute the Assembly, and to begin their discussions and deliberations. During the period preceding the arrival of provincial delegates, their decisions shall depend for their validity and due execution on the majority [by which they are carried].

Article VII.—On the opening of the debates, at least two-thirds of the Members of the Assembly shall be present, and, when the vote is taken, at least three-quarters. A majority shall be obtained only when more than half of those present in the Assembly record their votes.

Article VIII.—The periods of session and recess of the National Consultative Assembly shall be determined by the Assembly itself, in accordance with such internal regulations as itself shall formulate. After the summer recess, the Assembly must continue open and in session from the fourteenth day of the Balance, which corresponds with the festival of the opening of the First Assembly.

Article IX.—The National Consultative Assembly can sit on occasions of extraordinary public holidays.

Article X.—On the opening of the Assembly, an Address shall be presented by it to His Imperial Majesty, and it shall afterwards have the honour of receiving an answer from that Royal and August quarter.

Article XI.—Members of the Assembly, on taking their seats, shall take and subscribe to the following form of oath :

(Form of the Oath.)

“We the undersigned take God to witness, and swear on the Qwi'an, that, so long as the rights of the Assembly and its Members are observed and respected, in conformity with these Regulations, we will, so far as possible, discharge, with the utmost truth, uprightness, diligence and endeavour, the duties confided to us ; that we will act loyally and truthfully towards our just and honoured Sovereign, commit no treason in respect of either the foundations of the Throne or the Rights of the People, and will consider only the advantage and well-being of Persia.”

Article XII.—No one, on any pretext or excuse, shall have any right, without the knowledge and approval of the National Consultative Assembly, to molest its Members. Even in case of the Members committing some crime or misdemeanour, and being arrested *flagrante delicto*, any punishment inflicted upon him must be with the cognizance of the Assembly.

Article XIII.—The deliberations of the National Consultative Assembly, in order that effect may be

given to their results, must be public. According to the Internal Regulations of the Assembly, journalists and spectators have the right to be present and listen, but not to speak. Newspapers may print and publish all the debates of the Assembly, provided they do not change or pervert their meaning, so that the public may be informed of the subjects of discussion and the detail of what takes place. Every one, subject to his paying due regard to the public good, may discuss them in the public Press, so that no matter may be veiled or hidden from any person. Therefore all newspapers, provided that their contents be not injurious to any one of the fundamental principles of the Government or the Nation, are authorized and allowed to print and publish all matters advantageous to the public interest, such as the debates of the Assembly, and the opinions of the people on these debates. But if any one, actuated by interested motives, shall print in the newspapers or in other publications anything contrary to what has been mentioned, or inspired by slander or calumny, he will render himself liable to cross-examination, judgment and punishment, according to law.

Article XIV.—The National Consultative Assembly shall organize and arrange, in accordance with separate and distinct Regulations called “the Internal Code of Rules,” its own affairs, such as the election of a President, Vice-presidents, Secretaries, and other officers, the arrangements of the debates and divisions, etc.

ON THE DUTIES OF THE ASSEMBLY AND ITS
LIMITATIONS AND RIGHTS.

Article XV.—The National Consultative Assembly has the right in all questions to propose any measure which it regards as conducive to the well-being of the Government and the People, after due discussion and deliberation thereof in all sincerity and truth; and, having due regard to the majority of votes, to submit such measure, in complete confidence and security, after it has received the approval of the Senate, by means of the First Minister of the State, so that it may receive the Royal Approval and be duly carried out.

Article XVI.—All laws necessary to strengthen the foundations of the State and Throne and to set in order the affairs of the Realm and the establishment of the Ministries, must be submitted for approval to the National Consultative Assembly.

Article XVII.—The National Consultative Assembly shall, when occasion arises, bring forward such measures as shall be necessary for the creation, modification, completion or abrogation of any law, and, subject to the approval of the Senate, shall submit it for the Royal Sanction, so that due effect may thereafter be given to it.

Article XVIII.—The regulation of all financial matters, the construction and regulation of the Budget, all changes in fiscal arrangements, the acceptance or rejection of all incidental and subordinate expenditure, as also the new Inspectorships [of

Finance] which will be founded by the Government, shall be subject to the approval of the Assembly.

Article XIX.—The Assembly has the right, after the Senate has given its approval, to demand from the Ministers of State that effect shall be given to the measures thus approved for the reform of the finances and the facilitation of "co-operation between the different departments" of the Government by division of the departments and provinces of Persia and their governments.

Article XX.—The Budget of each Ministry shall be concluded during the latter half of each year for the following year, and shall be ready fifteen days before the Festival of the Naw-rúz.¹

Article XXI.—Should it at any time be necessary to introduce, modify or abrogate any Fundamental Law regulating the [functions of the] Ministries, such change shall be made only with the approval of the Assembly, irrespective of whether the necessity for such action has been declared by the Assembly or enunciated by the responsible Ministers.

Article XXII.—Any proposal to transfer or sell any portion of the [National] resources, or of the control exercised by the Government or the Throne, or to effect any change in the boundaries and frontiers of the Kingdom, shall be subject to the approval of the National Consultative Assembly.

Article XXIII.—Without the approval of the

¹ The *Naw-rúz*, or Persian New Year's Day, falls about March 21 in each year.

National Council, no concession for the formation of any public Company of any sort shall, under any plea soever, be granted by the State.

Article XXIV.—The conclusion of treaties and covenants, the granting of commercial, industrial, agricultural and other concessions, irrespective of whether they be to Persian or foreign subjects, shall be subject to the approval of the National Consultative Assembly, with the exception of treaties which, for reasons of State and the public advantage, must be kept secret.

Article XXV.—State loans, under whatever title, whether internal or external, must be contracted only with the cognizance and approval of the National Consultative Assembly.

Article XXVI.—The construction of railroads or *chaussées*, whether at the expense of the Government, or of any Company, whether autochthonous or foreign, depends on the approval of the National Consultative Assembly.

Article XXVII.—Wherever the Assembly observes any defect in the laws, or any neglect in giving effect to them, it shall notify the same to the Minister responsible for that department, who shall furnish all necessary explanations.

Article XXVIII.—Should any Minister, acting under misapprehension, issue on the Royal Authority, whether in writing or by word of mouth, orders conflicting with one of the laws which have been enacted and have received the Royal Sanction, and shall admit his negligence and lack of attention, he

shall, according to the law, be personally responsible to His Imperial and Most Sacred Majesty."

Article XXIX.—Should a Minister fail to give a satisfactory account of any affair conformably to the laws which have received the Royal Sanction, and should it appear in his case that a violation of such law has been committed, or that he has transgressed the limits imposed [on him], the Assembly shall demand his dismissal from the Royal Presence, and should his treason be clearly established in the Court of Cassation, he shall not again be employed in the service of the State.

Article XXX.—The Assembly shall, at any time when it considers it necessary, have the right to make direct representations to the Royal Presence by means of a Committee consisting of the President and six of its Members chosen by the Six Classes. This Committee must ask permission for, and the appointment of a time for approaching the Royal Presence through the Master of the Ceremonies (*Wajir-i-Darbúr*).

Article XXXI.—Ministers have the right to be present at the Sessions of the National Consultative Assembly, to sit in the places appointed for them, and to listen to the debates of the Assembly. If they consider it necessary they may ask the President of the Assembly for permission to speak, and may give such explanations as may be necessary for purposes of discussion and investigation.

ON THE REPRESENTATION OF AFFAIRS TO THE
NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

Article XXXII.—Any individual may submit in writing to the Pétition Department of the Archives, of the Assembly a statement of his own case, or of any criticisms or complaints. If the matter concerns the Assembly itself it will give him a satisfactory answer; but if it concerns one of the Ministries it will refer it to that Ministry, which will inquire into the matter and return a sufficient answer.

Article XXXIII.—New laws which are needed shall be drafted and revised in the Ministries which are respectively responsible, and shall then be laid before the Assembly by the responsible Ministers, or by the Prime Minister. After being approved by the Assembly, and ratified by the Royal signature, they shall be duly put in force.

Article XXXIV.—The President of the Assembly can, in case of necessity, either personally, or on the demand of ten Members of the Assembly, hold a private conference, comprised of a selected number of Members of the Assembly, with any Minister, from which private meeting newspaper correspondents and spectators shall be excluded, and at which other Members of the Assembly shall not have the right to be present. The result of the deliberations of such secret conference shall, however, only be confirmed when it has been deliberated in the said conference in presence of three-quarters of those selected [to serve on it], and carried by a majority of

votes. Should the proposition [in question] not be accepted in the private conference, it shall not be brought forward in the Assembly, but shall be passed over in silence.

Article XXXV.—If such private conference shall have been held at the demand of the President of the Assembly, he has the right to inform the public of so much of the deliberation as he shall deem expedient; but if the private conference has been held at the demand of a Minister, the disclosure of the deliberations depends on the permission of that Minister.

Article XXXVI.—Any Minister can withdraw any matter which he has proposed to the Assembly at any point in the discussion, unless his statement has been made at the instance of the Assembly, in which case the withdrawal of the matter depends on the consent of the Assembly.

Article XXXVII.—If a measure introduced by any Minister is not accepted by the Assembly it shall be returned supplemented by the observations of the Assembly; and the responsible Minister, after rejecting or accepting the criticisms of the Assembly, can propose the aforesaid measure a second time to the Assembly.

Article XXXVIII.—The Members of the National Consultative Assembly must clearly and plainly signify their rejection or acceptance of measures, and no one has the right to persuade or threaten them in recording their votes. The signification by the Members of the Assembly of such rejection or acceptance

must be effected in such manner that newspaper correspondents and spectators also may perceive it, that is to say, their intention must be signified by some outward sign, such as [the employment of] blue and white voting papers, or the like.

THE PROPOSAL OF MEASURES ON THE PART OF THE ASSEMBLY

Article XXXIX.—Whenever any measure is proposed on the part of one of the Members of the Assembly it can only be discussed when, at least fifteen Members of the Assembly shall approve the discussion of that measure. In such case the proposal in question shall be forwarded in writing to the President of the Assembly, who has the right to arrange that it shall be subjected to a preliminary investigation in a Committee of Inquiry.

Article XL.—On the occasion of the discussion and investigation of the measure mentioned in Article XXXIX, whether in the Assembly or in the Committee of Inquiry, notice shall be given by the Assembly to the responsible Minister, if any, concerned in the measure, that if possible he himself, or, if not, his Assistant Minister, shall be present in the Assembly, so that the debate may take place in the presence of one or other of them.

The draft of the [proposed] measure, with its additions, must be sent from ten days to a month before the time (with the exception of matters added at the last moment) to the responsible Minister; and

so likewise the day of its discussion must be determined beforehand. After the measure has been discussed in the presence of the responsible Minister, and in case it should, by a majority of votes, receive the approval of the Assembly, it shall be officially transmitted in writing to the responsible Minister, so that he may take the necessary steps [for its execution].

Article XLI.—If the responsible Minister cannot, for any reason, agree with the Assembly about a measure proposed by it, he must offer his excuses to it and give it satisfaction.

Article XLII.—Should the National Consultative Assembly demand explanations on any matter from the responsible Minister, the Minister in question must give an answer, which answer must not be postponed unnecessarily or without plausible reason, save in the case of secret measures, the secrecy of which for some definite period is to the advantage of the State and the people. In such cases, on the lapse of the definite period the responsible Minister is bound to disclose this measure in the Assembly.

ON THE CONDITIONS REGULATING THE FORMATION OF THE SENATE

Article XLIII.—There shall be constituted another Assembly, entitled the Senate, consisting of sixty Members, the sessions of which, after its constitution, shall be complementary to the sessions of the National Consultative Assembly.

Article XLIV.—The Regulations of the Senate must be approved by the National Consultative Assembly.

Article XLV.—The Members of this Assembly, shall be chosen from amongst the well-informed, discerning, pious and respected persons of the Realm. Thirty of them shall be nominated on the part of His Imperial Majesty, (fifteen of the people of Tihrán, and fifteen of the people of the Provinces), and thirty by the Nation (fifteen elected by the people of Tihrán, and fifteen by the people of the Provinces).

Article XLVI.—After the constitution of the Senate all proposals must be approved by both Assemblies. If those proposals shall have been originated in the Senate, or by the Cabinet of Ministers, they must first be amended and corrected in the Senate and accepted by a majority of votes, and must then be approved by the National Consultative Assembly. But proposals brought forward by the National Consultative Assembly must, on the contrary, go from this Assembly to the Senate, except in the case of financial matters, which belong exclusively to the National Consultative Assembly. The decision of the Assembly, in respect to the above-mentioned proposals, shall be made known to the Senate, so that it in turn may communicate its observations to the National Assembly, but the latter, after due discussion, is free to accept or reject these observations of the Senate.

Article XLVII.—So long as the Senate has not been convoked, proposals shall, after being approved

by the National Consultative Assembly, receive the Royal assent, and shall then have the force of law.

Article XLVIII.—If any proposal, after undergoing criticism and revision in the Senate, be referred by a Minister to the National Consultative Assembly, and be not accepted, such disputed proposal shall, in case of its being of importance, be reconsidered by a third Assembly composed of Members of the Senate and Members of the National Consultative Assembly elected in equal moieties by Members of the two Assemblies. The decision of this [third] Assembly shall be read out in the National Council. If it be then accepted, well and good. If not, a full account of the matter shall be submitted to the Royal Presence, and should the Royal judgment support the view of the National Consultative Assembly, it shall become effective; but if not, orders will be issued for a fresh discussion and investigation. If again no agreement of opinion results, and the Senate, by a majority of two-thirds, approves the dissolution of the National Consultative Assembly, this approval being separately affirmed by the Cabinet of Ministers, then the Imperial Command will be issued for the dissolution of the National Consultative Assembly, and at the same time orders shall be given for the holding of fresh elections, the people, however, having the right to re-elect their former representatives.

Article XLIX.—The new representatives of Tihrán must present themselves within the space of one month, and the representatives of the provinces within the space of three months. When the representatives of the Capital are present, the Assembly

shall be opened, and shall begin its labours, but they shall not discuss disputed proposals until the provincial representatives shall arrive. If, after the arrival of all its Members, the new Assembly shall by a clear majority confirm the first decision, His Most Sacred and Imperial Majesty shall approve that decision of the National Consultative Assembly, and shall order it to be carried into effect.

Article L.—In each electoral period, which consists of two years, orders for the renewal of representatives shall not be given more than once.

Article LI.—It is agreed that the kings of our successors and posterity shall regard as a duty of their sovereign state and an obligation incumbent upon them the maintenance of these laws and principles, which we have established and put into force for the strengthening of the edifice of the State, the consolidation of the foundations of the Throne, the superintendence of the machinery of Justice, and the tranquillity of the Nation.

“Zigada 14, 1324”
(= December 30, 1906).

“These Fundamental Laws of the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate, containing fifty-one Articles, are correct.

‘Dhu’l-Qa‘da 14, A.H. 1324”
(= December 30, 1906).

[Underneath the concluding words is the signature of the late Sháh, Muzaffaru’d-Dín, and on the back

of the page are the seals of the Crown Prince or *Wali-ahd* (the present Sháh, Muḥammad 'Alí), and of the late Mushíra'd-Dawla.]

THE PERSIAN CONSTITUTION III

THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF

OCTOBER 7, 1907

The following fundamental principles are added to the Constitutional Laws of the Persian Empire granted by His Late Majesty Muzaffar-ed-Din the Just; the 14th 'Zigada of the year 1324 (December 30, 1906).

GENERAL DISPOSITIONS

Article I.—The official religion of Persia is Shiite Islamism. The Sovereign of the Empire must profess this Religion and further its prosperity.

Article II.—The Persian Parliament, which is instituted by the Will of God, of the Sovereign and of the People, must in its deliberations conform with Islamic laws. As the heads of the Church have to decide whether the new laws are or are not in conformity with the doctrine of Islamism, it is officially decreed, that Parliament shall always number among its Members five Professors of Canonical Law (*moutch-tehid*), men of proved integrity, wide learning, and thoroughly conversant with the requirements of their

age. The manner of their election is as follows: All Heads of Clergy and Professors of Canonical Law shall choose among themselves twenty persons of eminence whose past records have proved their impartial spirit, and shall lay their names before Parliament. From among these twenty, Parliament will select five by ballot to form an Ecclesiastical Council, to whom will be submitted all weighty questions concerning projected laws touching upon or involving Islamic matters.

Article III.—The Frontiers, Provinces and Districts of the Persian Empire can only be modified in pursuance of the law.

Article IV.—The capital of the Empire is Teheran.

Article V.—The National Flag of the Empire is green, white and red, with the emblem of the lion and the sun.

Article VI.—The security of the persons and property of aliens living in Persia is guaranteed, and every liberty is assured to them upon condition that they conform with the laws of the country.

Article VII.—The Constitution is inviolable as a whole and in all its details.

RIGHTS OF THE PERSIAN NATION

Article VIII.—All Persians are equal in the eyes of the law.

Article IX.—The life, property, homes, and honour of individuals are inviolable, and above all attack. The infringement of the liberty of any person whomsoever is prohibited except in cases determined by law.

Article X.—Except in case of crime no one can be arrested save on a warrant in good and due form and in accordance with the laws of the country issued by the Proctor or a head of the Courts of Justice. Even then it is indispensable that the Cause of Arrest be communicated to the person arrested, either immediately or at latest before the expiration of twenty-four hours.

Article XI.—No one can be compelled to appear before other than the competent Court, or choose a Court against his own desire.

Article XII.—No punishment can be ordered or put into execution except in pursuance of the law.

Article XIII.—The privacy of the home is inviolable. No one may forcibly enter any residence save in cases determined by law.

Article XIV.—A Persian cannot be exiled, or prevented from living in any one part of the country, nor can he be forced to choose any place of residence unless in pursuance with law.

Article XV.—No one can be deprived of their property except by purchase, and after payment of the agreed price.

Article XVI.—The confiscation of movable and

immovable property by way of penalty is absolutely prohibited except in cases specified by law.

Article XVII.—A proprietor may not be molested in the enjoyment of his property except in cases determined by law.

Article XVIII.—Education and instruction in all sciences, industries and arts are absolutely free from all restriction.

Article XIX.—The establishment of schools at the expense of the State, as well as compulsory education, must be in conformity with the regulations issued by the Ministry of Public Instruction, under whose direction are placed all universities and colleges.

Article XX.—The Press in general is absolutely free, save where it affects the Islamitic faith. The censorship of the Press is prohibited. Nevertheless, in cases of contravention of the law relating to the Press, the publisher and editor shall be punished in conformity with such law. If the editor is an inhabitant of Persia and is known, he alone shall be punished, and the publisher, newsagents and staff of the paper shall be exempt from all responsibility.

Article XXI.—Meetings and demonstrations which are not prejudicial to religion or public interest and order are absolutely free throughout the Empire. All persons, however, taking part in such meetings are prohibited from carrying arms. They must in this respect abide by the provisions of the law. Meetings in public places and in streets are also subject to police regulations.

Article XXII.—The secrecy of letters is guaranteed in a general way. Letters cannot be confiscated or opened save in exceptional cases specified by law.

Article XXIII.—Telegrams cannot be published without the authority of the addressee, nor confiscated save in cases specified by law.

Article XXIV.—Aliens may adopt Persian nationality. Their change of nationality, their right to remain Persian subjects, or their exclusion from this privilege are subject to special dispositions.

Article XXV.—No authorization is required where complaint has to be lodged against officials for failure in the discharge of their duties, except in the case of Ministers, when special laws must be followed.

PUBLIC POWERS

Article XXVI.—All power comes from the nation, and the manner of employing such power is regulated by Constitutional Laws.

Article XXVII.—The Powers are divided into three classes—

(i) Legislative power, for making new and improving existing laws. This power belongs to H.M. the Shāh, the Chamber of Deputies, and to the Senate. Each one of these three has the initiative of law, but in order for the law to be valid it must conform to Islamic laws, must be voted by the two Chambers, and must receive the

Imperial sanction. Nevertheless, in the case of the laws relating to the Budget, the initiative rights belong particularly to the Chamber of Deputies. The interpretation of the law also belongs to this Chamber.

(ii) The Judicial Power consists in distinguishing between justice and injustice. This power belongs, when religion is in question, to the Ecclesiastical Courts; civil questions are tried in the Civil Courts.

(iii) The Executive Power belongs to H.M. the Shah, *i. e.* the laws are executed in the name of H.M. by his Ministers in manner prescribed by the law.

Article XXVIII.—The three Powers are, and shall remain, distinct and separate each from the others.

Article XXIX.—The affairs of each province and district, shall be administered with the co-operation of the municipalities of such district.

Article XXX.—The members of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate are considered collectively as the representatives of the entire nation, and not, each one apart, as the representative of the province, district or town which has elected him.

Article XXXI.—No one can be at the same time a member of both houses.

Article XXXII.—A member of Parliament who accepts an office remunerated by the State, cannot retain his seat. He can only re-enter Parliament on resigning his salaried position and on re-election.

Article XXXIII.—Every member of Parliament has a right to be informed of the affairs of the nation.

Article XXXIV.—The deliberations of the Senate are not valid if the Chamber of Deputies is not sitting.

RIGHTS OF THE SOVEREIGN

Article XXXV.—The Sovereignty is a charge confided through Divine Inspiration by the nation to the Sovereign.

Article XXXVI.—The Constitutional Sovereignty of Persia is vested in the person of H.M. Ali Shah Kadjar and his heirs in succession.

Article XXXVII.—The inheritance to the throne falls, in the case of there being several children, to the eldest son, whose mother is a princess of Persian origin. Should the Sovereign have no son, the succession belongs to the prince who is his nearest relative. But should a son afterwards be born to the Sovereign the succession will revert to him.

Article XXXVIII.—When the heir to the throne is proclaimed Sovereign he cannot assume the government unless he has completed his eighteenth year. If under this age both Chambers together elect a Regent who governs until the Sovereign attains his majority.

Article XXXIX.—No Sovereign can ascend the throne without having taken previous to his corona-

tion, and before both Chambers assembled, the following oath—

“I take Almighty God as my Witness and I swear on the Koran and on all that is dear to the Creator that I shall employ all my powers for the furtherance of the integrity and independence of Persia and for the preservation of her territory and the rights of the nation: that I will maintain the fundamental laws of the Constitution and will reign in conformity with the established laws. That I will further the prosperity of the Shiite religion; that I will not forget in my actions and in my conduct the presence and control of Almighty God, that I will have no aim but the greatness and welfare of my country. I call upon God Almighty to aid me in the services I have to render to my nation in the path of progress and I invoke all the Saints that they may come to my aid.”

Article XL.—Any Regent who may be appointed must take the same oath.

Article XLI.—When a Sovereign dies, the two Chambers assemble in their own right, at the latest two days after his death.

Article XLII.—If the death of a Sovereign occurs when the commission of the Deputies has expired and before the new Deputies have been elected, the old Deputies assemble.

Article XLIII.—The Sovereign cannot undertake the government of another country without the consent of the two Chambers.

Article XLIV.—The Sovereign is exempt from all responsibility. It is the Ministers in power who are responsible to the two Chambers.

Article XLV.—Imperial decrees of judgment concerning the affairs of the country cannot be executory unless they are countersigned by the respective responsible Minister, and he is responsible for the utility and authenticity of such documents.

Article XLVI.—Ministers are appointed and dismissed by Imperial decree.

Article XLVII.—The right of conferring decorations and other honorary distinctions based on merit, belongs to the Sovereign.

Article XLVIII.—The Sovereign nominates all administrative functionaries of the State, both at home and abroad. Such nominations are proposed by the responsible Minister, with certain exceptions provided by law. The nomination of subordinate functionaries does not belong to the Sovereign except where the law so provides.

Article XLIX.—The Sovereign has the right of promulgating laws, and in no case can such promulgation be retarded or stopped.

Article L.—The supreme command of Military and Naval forces belongs to the Sovereign.

Article LI.—The right of declaring war and concluding peace also belongs to the Sovereign.

Article LII.—The treaties which in accordance with Article XXIV of the Constitution of fourteenth

Zigada 1324 must remain secret, shall, after the disappearance of the *raison de force majeure* and as soon as the interests and safety of the country require it, be sent, with adequate explanations, to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

Article LIII.—The secret Articles of a treaty cannot annul the Public Articles of such treaty.

Article LIV.—The Sovereign has the right of convoking an Extraordinary Assembly of the two Chambers.

Article LV.—The right of coining money belongs to the Sovereign.

Article LVI.—The Budget of the Imperial Court must be fixed by law.

Article LVII.—The powers of the Sovereign consist solely of those mentioned in the present law.

POWERS OF MINISTERS

Article LVIII.—No one can attain to the rank of Minister unless he is a Mussulman of Persian nationality and a Persian subject.

Article LIX.—The Princes of first rank, *i.e.* the son, brother and uncle of the Sovereign, cannot become Ministers.

Article LX.—Ministers are responsible to the Chambers and should appear before them on all occasions as soon as summoned. They must keep within the limits of their powers.

Article LXI.—Besides their individual responsibility with regard to their respective ministerial functions, Ministers are responsible for the collective acts of the Ministry, and are considered as jointly and severally liable for the others.

Article LXII.—The number of Ministers shall be determined by law, according to necessity.

Article LXIII.—The honorary title of “Minister” is permanently abolished.

Article LXIV.—Ministers may not, on the strength of a verbal order from the Sovereign, evade their responsibilities.

Article LXV.—The Chamber of Deputies and the Senate may bring an accusation against Ministers.

Article LXVI.—The responsibility of Ministers and the relative functions shall be determined by law.

Article LXVII.—When the Senate or Chamber expresses its dissatisfaction to the Ministry or to a Minister, the Ministry or Minister should tender its or his resignation.

Article LXVIII.—Salaried Ministers may not accept other offices than their own.

Article LXIX.—The Chamber or Senate may submit charges against Ministers to the jurisdiction of the High Court, and the said Court, all its members being present, shall proceed to judgment unless the accusation concerns the Minister's private affairs, outside his official capacity.

(Should the High Court not be sitting, a Commission formed of members elected by both Chambers in equal numbers, shall perform the functions of a High Court.)

• Article LXX.—When an accusation is brought against a Minister by the Chamber or the Senate, or if in the administration of their office they have laid themselves open to accusation, their trial and punishment shall be determined by law.

JUDICIAL POWER

Article LXXI.—The Ministry of Justice and the Courts of Justice are established for the hearing of cases of oppression and the administration of judgment in religious matters, the latter being determined by Religious Professors according to Canonical Law.

Article LXXII.—Differences relating to political rights are within the province of the Courts of Justice, save in cases specified by law.

Article LXXIII.—The institution of the Civil Court must be in accordance with law, and no one may upon any pretext whatsoever institute a Court.

Article LXXIV.—No Court may be established except according to the provisions of the law.

Article LXXV.—Only one High Court shall be created throughout the whole Empire ; it will have its Seat in the capital. It will not concern itself with questions of inferior jurisdiction, except in the case of Ministers.

Article LXXVI.—The sittings of all Courts are public unless this publicity infringes upon the safety and honour of women, when the necessity of hearing the case with closed doors is announced by the Court.

Article LXXVII.—In political or press trials, if it appears necessary to hold the sittings with closed doors this decision must only be pronounced with the unanimous approbation of the Court.

Article LXXVIII.—The sentence of the Courts must be clear and definite, and must contain the Article of the Law or Laws on which the sentence is based. They must be read publicly.

Article LXXIX.—In political or press trials, the Jury must be present throughout the proceedings.

Article LXXX.—The heads and members of the Courts of Justice are chosen in the manner specified by the Judicial Laws and nominated by Imperial Decree.

Article LXXXI.—No Judge of a Court of Justice can be provisionally or definitely suspended from his office without a judgment to that effect, unless he himself tenders his resignation.

Article LXXXII.—No change in the duties of the Judge of the Courts can be effected without his consent.

Article LXXXIII.—The dismissal of the Proctor cannot be effected except on the proposition of Canonical Judges and by the Sovereign.

Article LXXXIV.—The appointment of Members of the Courts of Justices shall be fixed by law.

Article LXXXV.—The heads of Courts of Justice may not accept salaried public offices unless they exercise them gratuitously and on condition that their acceptance is not contrary to law.

Article LXXXVI.—In each chief town of a province there shall be an Inferior Court which shall be constituted according to the regulations issued by the Ministry of Justice.

Article LXXXVII.—There shall be a Military Court according to the law throughout the Empire.

Article LXXXVIII.—Differences relating to the limits of the powers of public administration and of the State are deferred according to the spirit of the law, to the High Courts.

Article LXXXIX.—The Court of Justice and other courts shall only deliberate upon regulations—customary, general, provincial, district and urban—when in conformity with the law.

PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT COUNCILS

Article XC.—Provincial or District Councils are instituted throughout the Empire according to special regulation, and must be according to fundamental law.

Article XCI.—These councils are directly elected by the inhabitants according to the regulations for Provincial or District Councils.

Article XCII.—Provincial and District Councils

have the duty of safeguarding and furthering public interest, but always within the limits laid down by existing laws.

Article XCIII.—A full statement of receipts, and expenses of whatever nature of each province or district, are published by these councils.

FINANCE

Article XCIV.—No tax may be imposed except in pursuance of the law.

Article XCV.—Localities exempt from taxation shall be designated by law.

Article XCVI.—The budget is voted yearly by a majority of the Chamber of Deputies.

Article XCVII.—With regard to taxation, there shall be no distinction made between or concession to different persons.

Article XCVIII.—No reduction, or exemption from taxation can be allowed except by law.

Article XCIX.—Apart from instances clearly specified by law, nothing can on any pretext be demanded from the people, excepting only State, Provincial, District or Urban taxation.

Article C.—No bond can be given on the Treasury excepting in conformity with the law.

Article CI.—Members of the Audit-office shall

be appointed by the Chamber and Deputies for the term specified by law.

Article CII.—The special function of the Audit office is to examine and revise all the accounts of the Ministry of Finance and to liquidate all accounts of the Treasury. Above all, its duty is to ensure that no expenses fixed by the Budget exceed the sum granted and see that these sums reach their proper destinations. It has also to examine and revise the accounts of all the Administrative bodies of the State, collect all documents, and present to the Chamber of Deputies all the certified accounts of the Empire.

Article CIII.—The organization and administration must be in conformity with law.

Article CIV.—The recruiting of troops, the duties and rights of soldiers and their promotion, are determined by law.

Article CV.—The Budget of the Ministry of War is voted yearly by the Chamber.

Article CVI.—No foreign troops may be employed in the service of the State, nor remain in or pass through any part of the Imperial Territory except in accordance with law.

Article CVII.—Soldiers cannot be deprived of their appointment, rank, or the functions of their grade except by law.

APPROVAL OF THE SHAH

In the name of the Most High I have carefully examined and approved the complement of the Constitution reproduced above. With the help of God I will myself be the Support and Guardian of all these laws. My successors and descendants will also maintain the sacred Constitution.

Given the 29th Chaban 1395 at the Imperial Palace of Teheran.

APPENDIX III

THE PERSIAN ARTICLES OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION OF AUGUST 31, 1907.

I

Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of British subjects, or in favour of the Subjects of third Powers, any Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

II

Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favour of Russian subjects, or in favour of the Subjects of third Powers, any

Concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as Concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc.—beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions referred to.

III

Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any Concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II.

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of Concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia.

All Concessions existing at present in the region indicated in Articles I and II are maintained.

IV

It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the exception of those of Farsistan, and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaranteeing the amortization and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse" up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of the Post and Telegraphs, shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement.

V

In the event of irregularities occurring in the amortization or the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the "Banque d'Escompte et des Prêts de Perse" and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article II of the present Arrangement, or for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article I of the present Arrangement, the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Arrangement.

COMMERCIAL CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND PERSIA

Signed at Teheran, February 9, 1903

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, animated by the same desire to consolidate the Commercial relations between two friendly Countries, have judged it expedient to modify and complete the arrangements constituted by the second paragraph of Article IX of the Anglo-Persian Treaty signed at Paris on March 4, 1857, and for this purpose have named as their Plenipotentiaries, viz.—

His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, Emperor of India, Sir Arthur Hardinge, Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George, His Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of Persia; and

His Majesty the Shah of Persia, his First Minister, the Atta Bek Azam Ali Asghar Khan Amin-es-Sultan; and M. Joseph Naus, Minister of State, Administrator General of Customs and Posts; who, duly authorized for that purpose, have agreed as follows—

Article I.—Merchandise of British origin imported into Persia by British subjects, and likewise, produce of Persia exported by British subjects, shall be subject to the Customs duties laid down in the detailed Tariffs (A) and (C) annexed to the present Declaration.

Article II.—Merchandise of British origin imported into Persia (see Article I) shall be liable to the payment of Customs duties in conformity with Tariff (A) once for all, on its entry into Persia, and shall not thereafter be subjected to the payments of any other Customs duty, or other charges, with the exception of those provided for by Article V of the present Declaration.

It is formally stipulated that British subjects and imports into Persia, as well as Persian subjects and Persian imports into the British Empire, shall continue to enjoy under all conditions most-favoured-nation treatment; it is understood that a British Colony, having a special Customs Tariff, and which may cease to grant most-favoured-nation treatment to Persian imports, will no longer have the right to claim the same treatment for its own imports into Persia.

Persian products exported and destined for the United Kingdom shall pay Customs duty on their entry into the latter, in accordance with the general Tariff in force; subject to the reservation that such imports shall always have the benefit of most-favoured-nation treatment. In the event of the United Kingdom establishing duties in its general Tariff, without previous agreement with Persia, on the Persian products enumerated in Tariff (B) applicable to Persian imports into Russia (and annexed *ad memorandum* to the present Declaration), other than those now existing in the above-mentioned general Tariff, and higher than the duties laid down in the said Tariff (B), Persia shall have the right to impose, in its turn, corresponding duties on articles

of the same description coming from the United Kingdom. A special Convention shall be negotiated for this purpose; in default of agreement the present Declaration would become void, and both parties would again become subject to the former system laid down by Article IX of the Treaty of Paris.

The Regulations imposed, or to be imposed as regards products, the importation of which is prohibited into the United Kingdom, and also as regards the export duties of the United Kingdom, shall be applicable to Persian trade in the latter.

Article III.—The export duty of 5 per cent., hitherto in force in Persia, on exported merchandise and products, is entirely abolished, with the exception of the export duties imposed by Tariff (C) on the products therein mentioned.

British and Persian merchandise may, under the stipulations of the present Arrangement, be freely exported from one to the other of the two States, with the clearly understood exception of the prohibitions and restrictions already imposed or to be imposed by each of the two High Contracting Parties, either in the interests of public safety or preservation, or with a view to eventually prevent the exportation of products of the soil which it may, for the moment, be necessary to retain in order to secure the public supply of food.

Article IV.—The Persian Government undertakes to abolish all "rahdari" taxes now levied for the maintenance of caravan roads, and not to allow the establishment of other road or barrier taxes elsewhere than on carriage roads, including constructed

works for which concession has already been, or may be, granted by special Firman. In the latter case, the rate of the taxes to be levied by the "concessionaire" would be fixed by the Persian Government, who shall inform His Britannic Majesty's Legation thereof, such taxes not exceeding, per farsakh, those of the Resht-Tehran Road, their levy can only begin after the completion of the road, or at least of its principal branches between important localities, and in no case exceeding, in the case of British merchandise, the rates levied on merchandise arriving from elsewhere.

Article V.—The system of farming out the collection of Customs duties in Persia, which it is necessary to abolish entirely, shall be replaced on all the frontiers of the kingdom by the establishment of Government Customs offices, organized and administered in such a way as to secure for traders equality of collection and a fair treatment of their merchandise.

The Persian Government will take all necessary steps to secure generally the safety of merchandise during its deposit in the Customs offices, and assumes direct responsibility for the integrity and proper preservation of merchandise which may be deposited in the warehouses of the Customs offices. Consequently, the Persian Government undertakes to have built as soon as possible, and in any case not later than the period specified below in Clause (a) of this Article, in the offices indicated for that purpose by a Regulation referred to hereafter, warehouses, properly secured and sufficiently large to provide for the storage of the quantity of merchandise usually im-

ported ; in all other offices suitable provision shall be made in accordance with the needs of the trade passing through them. British traders shall enjoy, under the conditions laid down by the same Regulation, the right of storage, in bond for twelve months, dating from the day of the arrival of the merchandise, without the payment of any dues or taxes for storage.

A General Regulation, drawn up by the Customs Administration, and which shall be established, in agreement with the British Legation at Tehran, shall settle, as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Convention—

(a) The classification of the Customs offices and their functions, the points on the land and sea frontiers, and the roads open for the import and export of merchandise, as well as the organization of the warehouses at the Customs offices and the date appointed for the commencement of the working of these offices and warehouses ;

(b) The formalities to be observed by traders for the import and export of merchandise ;

(c) The storage regulations to be applied to British merchandise during twelve months dating from its arrival at one of the offices open to this traffic ;

(d) The charges to be levied on trade while merchandise remains in Customs warehouses, or for any other services rendered by the Customs to traders ;

(e) The Customs procedure as regards the checking of merchandise liable to specific duties and the calculation of those imposed *ad valorem*, as well as the fines to be imposed in cases of fraud or of violation of the formalities and rules laid down.

As regards the Customs procedure applicable to

merchandise entering or being exported from the United Kingdom, Persian subjects shall be under the laws in force, or to be put into force in the said kingdom; but the provisions of the latter shall not, in any manner whatsoever, sanction less favourable arrangements as regards the trade of Persian subjects than those applicable to traders of countries which enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment.

Article VI.—The payment of import duties in the United Kingdom shall be made in the currency sanctioned in that country for the payment of Customs duties.

As regards the application of Tariffs (A) and (C), the Persian batman of Tabreez shall be calculated at 640 Persian miscals, equivalent to 2.97 French kilogrammes; and 100 Persian krans shall be calculated at the equivalent in English money of 48 French francs in gold.

In the event of the rate of the kran in relation to the franc falling more than 10 per cent., and remaining at that rate more than one month, the Persian Government shall have the right, after verification of the fact by the principal banks and previous notice to His Britannic Majesty's Legation, to raise proportionally the amount of the specific duties laid down in Tariffs (A) and (C). The notification respecting the increase of the duties shall be made by the Persian Government to the British Legation at Tehran at least two weeks before such increase shall be put into force.

In the event of a rise in the value of the kran exceeding 10 per cent., and remaining at that rate for more than one month, the British Government

shall have the right to demand a proportional reduction of Tariffs (A) and (C), and the Persian Government shall be bound to grant the said reduction.

. . Article VII.—The Persian Government undertakes to apply the terms of the present Convention, together with Tariffs (A) and (C) with the modifications laid down in Article VI, to all the frontiers of the kingdom.

The present Declaration, of which, in case of dispute, the French text shall be binding, shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Tehran. It shall be published by the two Governments, and shall come into force on a date to be agreed upon.

Done in duplicate, in French and Persian, the 9th February, 1903.

(L.S.) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.

(L.S.) NAUS.

The Persian text is stated to have been also signed by the Atabeg-Azam. The Tariffs (A), (B) and (C) referred to in the above Convention were signed on the same date and in the same manner.

RUSSO-PERSIAN COMMERCIAL CONVENTION

(Signed at Teheran on October 27,
November 9, 1901.)

His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and
His Majesty the Shah of Persia, animated by the

same desire of facilitating the development of commercial relations between the two neighbouring and friendly countries, have judged it advisable to modify and complete the arrangements established by Article III of the additional treaty concluded between Russia and Persia at Tourkmentchai on the 10th / 22nd February, 1828, and to this effect have named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say : His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, His Envoy Extraordinary, and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Persia, Privy Councillor Argyropoulo, and Privy Councillor Valentin Goloubew, member of the Council of the Ministry of Finance : and His Majesty the Shah of Persia, his Prime Minister, L'Atabek-Azam Mirza Ali Asghar Khan Amin-es-Sultan, and Mr. Joseph Naus, Chief Administrator of Customs, all of whom duly authorized to this effect, have agreed as follows:-

Article I.—Merchandise imported into Persia or exported from that kingdom by Russian subjects, and likewise merchandise produced in Persia and imported into Russia, either by way of the Caspian Sea, or by the land frontier dividing the two States, by Persian subjects, and likewise Russian merchandise exported by Persian subjects out of the Empire by the same routes, shall be submitted no longer to the taxation prescribed by Article III of the Supplementary Treaty of the 10th / 22nd February, 1828, but to the Tariffs in detail (A), (B), (C) which will be found joined to the present Declaration.

Article II.—Merchandise exported from Russia (see Article I) shall be subjected to the payment of

Customs Duties in conformity with Tariff (A), once for all on their entering Persia, and shall not subsequently be subjected to the payment of any other Customs Duty, or any other charges except those prescribed by Article V of this Declaration.

Persian products exported into Russia (see Article I) shall pay the Customs Duties on their entry into Russia in conformity with Tariff (B), and shall not be subjected to any other export tax, or other charge on their exportation from Persia, except those exceptions foreseen in Articles III and V of this Declaration.

All merchandise and articles of Persian export not specified in Tariff (B) shall be submitted in Russia, to the payment of the right of entry, stipulated by the Tariffs applicable to the most-favoured-nation clause, except those Tariffs established or to be established for the exported products of China and other neighbouring Asiatic countries.

The regulations laid down or to be laid down for products forbidden to be imported into Russia, and also for the right of export from Russia, shall be applicable to Persian trade in Russia.

Article III.—The 5 per cent. Export Duty hitherto existing in Persia on merchandise and products exported is totally abolished, with the exception of the export duties established by Tariff (C) on the products therein named.

Russian and Persian merchandise may be under the conditions of the present arrangement, freely exported from one to the other of the two States, taking into account of course, the interdictions or prohibitions already established or to be established by each of the two High Contracting Parties, either

in the interest of safety, or the good of society, or possibly for preventing the export of agricultural produce, which it might be necessary at the moment to restrict in order to assure the people's food.

• Article IV.—The Persian Government undertakes to suppress all the *raghdari* taxes actually levied for the upkeep of the roads, and not to permit the establishment of any other road taxes or barrier taxes anywhere else than on roads practicable for carriages admitting of engineering works the concession for which has already been granted or may be granted by special Firmans. The rates of taxes to be levied in this case by the Concessionaires should be fixed by the Persian Government, who should inform the Imperial Russian Legation of them; these taxes must not exceed, per farsakh, that of the Recht-Teheran Road; the levying shall not begin until after the completion of the road, or at least, of its principal sections, between important localities, and should not exceed in any case for Russian merchandise the rates exacted from the merchandise of other origin.

Article V.—The system of farming out the levying of Customs Duties in Persia being about to be for ever abolished, shall be replaced on all the frontiers of the kingdom by the establishment of Government Customs Houses, organized and administered in such a way as to ensure to traders equality of collection and good treatment of their merchandise.

• The Persian Government will take all necessary steps generally to ensure the safety of merchandise during its detention on the Customs Premises, and

assumes direct responsibility that the merchandise deposited in the warehouses of the Customs shall be kept intact and well preserved. In consequence, the Persian Government undertakes to have built as soon as possible, and in any case not later than hereunder specified in Clause (A) of this Article, in the Customs Offices designed for this purpose by a regulation hereinafter provided, warehouses duly enclosed and of sufficient size to ensure the warehousing therein of the amounts of merchandise habitually imported, in all the other Customs Offices there shall be established facilities suitable with regard to the requirements of the traffic to be moved. Russian merchants shall enjoy, under the conditions fixed by the same regulation, the right of warehousing for twelve months from the day of the arrival of the merchandise, without paying any duties or taxes for such warehousing.

A general regulation agreed by the Customs Administration in conjunction with the Russian Legation at Teheran, shall fix anteriorly to the putting in force of this Convention—

(a) the classification of the Customs Offices and their privileges, the points of the land and sea frontiers and the roads open to the import and export of goods as well as the organization of the Customs Offices' Warehouses and the fixing the terms to indicate the commencement of operations of these offices and warehouses ;

(b) the formalities to be observed by the trade for the importation and export of merchandise ;

(c) the rules of warehousing applicable to Russian merchandise during twelve months from the date of

their arrival in one of the offices open to this traffic ;

(d) the payments to be levied on trade for the warehousing of merchandise in the Customs Warehouses, or for any other services rendered by the Customs to merchants ;

(e) the Customs procedure regarding the verification of merchandise, subject to special customs duties, and the valuation of *ad valorem* duties, likewise the fines applicable to cases of fraud or violation of the established formalities and regulations.

Concerning the Customs procedure applicable to merchandise on its entrance or exit from Russian territory, Persian subjects shall be submitted to the laws promulgated or to be promulgated by the Empire, but so that the provisions of these laws shall not in any way establish with regard to the trade of Persian subjects provisions less favourable than those which are applicable to merchants belonging to countries enjoying the treatment of the most favoured nation.

Article VI. — The payment of the Import Duties into Russia in accordance with Tariff (B), joined to the present Declaration, shall be made in money which passes for the payment of Customs Duties throughout the whole Empire, calculated on the basis of the pound, equivalent to 40 Russian pounds, 16.38 French kilogrammes, 5.5 batmans of Tauris of 640 Persian miskals. For the application of Tariffs (A) and (C) the Persian batman, so called of Tauris, shall be calculated at 640 Persian miskals, equivalent to 7.27 Russian pounds and to 2.97 French kilogrammes,

and the 100 Persian kran shall be calculated at 18 Russian roubles, or 48 French francs in gold coinage.

Should the exchange of the kran with reference to the Russian rouble come to be lower by more than 10 per cent. and should maintain this rate for more than one month, the Persian Government would have the right, after the fact had been attested by the chief banks, and after previous notice had been given to the Imperial Russian Legation, to proportionately raise the amounts of the specific duties inscribed in Tariffs (A) and (C). The notification concerning the raising of the duties must be made by the Persian Government to the Russian Legation at Teheran at least two weeks before the application of this higher scale.

In the case of a rise in the price of the kran exceeding 10 per cent. and maintaining this rise during more than a month, the initiative of the proportional lowering of Tariffs (A) and (C) would belong to the Imperial Government of Russia, and the Persian Government would be compelled to agree to the said lowering.

Article VII.—The Persian Government undertakes to apply on all the frontiers of the kingdom, the dispositions of this Declaration, and also Tariffs (A) and (C) together with the modifications provided by Article VI.

This Declaration, of which, in case of dispute, the French shall prevail, shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Teheran, after which it shall be promulgated by the two High Governments, and shall come into force on the date

which shall be fixed by mutual agreement on the day of the exchange of the ratifications.

Made in duplicate, in French and in Persian, the 27th October of the year 1901, and the 26th Redjeb 1319 of the Hegira, at Teheran.

(Signed) ARGYROPOULO (L.S.)
 ATABEK-AZAM (L.S.)
 GOLOUBEV (L.S.)
 MOUCHIR-OUN-DOVLEH (L.S.)
 NAUS (L.S.)

The three Tariffs (A) (B) and (C) annexed to this Convention bear the same date.

PROTOCOL

We the undersigned, having met together this Saturday, December 13, 1902 (the 12th of Ramazan 1320), have proceeded to the exchange of the copies of the Declaration signed at Teheran the 27th October / 9th November, 1901 (the 26th Redjeb 1319 of the Hegira), ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Russia and the Shah of Persia, and have, in conformity with the dispositions provided by Article VII. of the said Declaration, fixed the date of the 1st / 14th February, 1903, for its coming into force.

In faith of which this protocol has been drawn up in two copies, and signed by us

(Signed) ATABEK-AZAM (L.S.)
 P. WLAŚSOW

APPENDIX IV

THE BAGHDAD RAILWAY CONVENTION

Signed at Constantinople, March 5, 1903, between His Excellency Zihni Pasha, Minister of Commerce and Public Works, acting in the name of the Imperial Ottoman Government, of the one part; Arthur Gwinner, Chairman of Directors, Dr. Kurt Zander, General Manager, and M. Edouard Huguenin, Assistant General Manager, of the Ottoman Railway of Anatolia, acting in the name and on the account of the Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia at Constantinople, of the other part—

Article I.—The Imperial Ottoman Government grants the concession for the construction and working the extension of the line from Konia as far as Baghdad and Basra, passing through or as near as possible to the towns of Keraman, Eregli, Kardash-Beli, Adana, Hamidie, Osmanie, Bagtsche, Kazanali, Killis, Tell-Habesh, Harran, Resulain, Nussibin, Avniat, Marjin, Mosul, Tekrit, Sadije, Baghdad, Kerbela, Nedjef, Zubeir and Basra, as well as the following branch lines, that is to say—

1. From Tell-Habesh to Aleppo.
2. From a point in the proximity of the main line, to be determined by mutual agreement, to Urfa.

The Imperial Government will not grant, in any shape, a guarantee for the construction of this branch line, of which approximate length is thirty kilometres, nor any appropriation for working expenses, but the gross receipts from the branch line, of all kinds shall belong exclusively to the Concessionaire.

3. From Sadije to Khanikin.

4. From Zubeir to a point on the Persian Gulf to be determined by mutual consent between the Imperial Ottoman Government and the Concessionaire, as well as all dependencies of the said lines.

Article. II.—The duration of this concession shall be ninety-nine years. This period shall be equally applied to the lines of Angora and Konia, and it shall begin to run from the date of the issue of the Firman and the exchange of the present Convention. As regards the new lines, this term of ninety-nine years shall begin to run, separately for each section, from the time that the Imperial Government shall have handed over to the Concessionaire the Government Securities in conformity with Article XXXV of the present convention.

Article III.—These lines, taken all together, are divided into sections of 200 kilometres, for the purpose of facilitating the surveys. The Concessionaire shall, within three months of the date of the issue of the Firman of Concession, the exchange of the present Convention and of the Conditions of the Contract (and after the performance of the stipulations contained in Article XXXV), present to the Ministry of Public Works complete plans, in conformity with the provisions of the Conditions of the

Contract, of the first section of 200 kilometres starting at Konia, and passing by or as near as possible to Keraman and Eregli, according to the direction of the Baghdad line. As to the other sections, the plans relating to them shall be presented within eight months from the date on which the concession of each section commences, by the performance of the stipulations of Article XXXV, which relate to each section.

The plans shall be examined by the Ministry, and either approved as they are, or shall be modified, if necessary, within three months from the date of their being presented. Should this period have expired, and the Imperial Government not have notified its decision to the Concessionaire, the latter shall be entitled to consider the plans which he has presented, as having been approved, and he shall proceed with the carrying out of the works. If the Imperial Government introduces modifications of a nature to entail a delay of more than one month in the approval of the plans, the period fixed for the construction shall be prolonged by a period equal to that of the delay caused by the examination of these modifications and the approval of the plans. The special appropriation destined for the first section of 200 kilometres, starting at Konia, and passing through, or as near as possible to, Keraman and Eregli, shall be determined by Schedule I (Financial Convention), which forms an integral part of the present Convention.

Article IV.—The Concessionaire undertakes to commence, at his own expense, work on the first section of 200 kilometres within three months

from the approval of the plans, and to finish it at the latest within a period of two years. The Concessionaire undertakes to commence work within three months from the approval of the plans referring to the other sections, and to complete the whole line together with its branches within a period of eight years from the date of the issue of the Firman, and of the exchange of the present conventions. Notwithstanding, all delays occurring in the carrying out of the stipulations of Article XXXV for any section, that is to say, all delays occurring in the handing over of the securities by the Imperial Government to the Concessionaire, shall be added to the said period of eight years. The works must be carried out in conformity with the Article, and with the provisions of the Conditions of Contract hereto affixed, and as provided by the approved plans. Nevertheless, in case of *force majeure* the periods allowed for the carrying out of the work shall be extended by a time equal to that of the interruption of the works, on condition that the Concessionaire shall immediately advise the local authorities as well as the Ministry of Public Works. There shall be considered as cases of *force majeure* a war between European Powers, and any radical change in the financial position of Germany, England, or France.

Article V.—The Ministry of Public Works shall control the works by means of one or more Commissioners, during their execution, on the completion of the works, and before taking them over. This control shall be applied in the same way to the working and upkeep in good condition of the works during the period of the Concession. The Conces-

sionaire shall deposit each year, to the order of the Ministry of Public Works, as a contribution to the control, a sum of 270 piastres gold per kilometre, payable monthly, and these payments shall start from the commencement of the work and continue until the termination of the Concession:

Article VI.—This enterprise being of public utility, the land necessary to the establishment of the railway and its belongings, the quarries and ballast-pits needful to the railway, and belonging to private individuals, shall be taken in conformity with the law on expropriation, whenever an understanding cannot be arrived at between the Concessionaire and the proprietors for the purchase of such land. The Government, after the surveys of the line shall have been approved, and within a period of two months, shall take the necessary steps for the expropriation and for the surrender to the Concessionaire of the ground necessary to the establishment of the road, and of its belongings.

Land which may be required for temporary occupation during the carrying out of the work shall be placed at the disposal of the Concessionaire by the local authorities, on condition that he shall indemnify the owners. If any of the land needed for the establishment of the railway and its dependencies shall be the so-called Arazii-Emiriei-Halie lands, it shall be handed over to the Concessionaire free of cost. If within a zone of fifteen kilometres on either side of the railway there are found the so-called Arazii-Emiriei-Halie lands, and in such lands are found quarries and ballast-pits, the Concessionaire shall be able to work these free, of

charge during the period of construction, on condition that he shall close them as soon as the works are completed. Should the Concessionaire desire to make use of these quarries and ballast-pits during the period of working the railway, he will be obliged to conform to the regulations governing material, and to pay the rent determined in this respect. The temporary occupation of these lands during the work of construction will be also granted to him free of charge.

Article VII.—The railway shall be built as a single line; although land shall be acquired with a view to the establishment of a second track. As soon as the gross receipts per kilometre shall attain the amount of 30,000 francs per year, the Imperial Government shall have the right to demand the establishment of the second track, which the Concessionaire shall be obliged to construct at his own cost.

Article VIII.—The railway plant, and the materials, iron, wood, coal, engines, carriages and wagons, and other stores necessary for the initial establishment, and also for the enlargements and general extensions of the railway and its dependencies, which the Concessionaire shall buy in the Empire, or which he will cause to come from abroad, shall be exempt from all internal dues, and from all Custom House duties. Exemption from Custom House duties is also granted for the coal required for the working, which the Concessionaire shall cause to come from abroad, until the gross receipts of the line and its branches shall reach the sum of 15,500 francs per kilometre. In the same

way, during the term that the Concession lasts, the ground, capital and revenue of the railway and its dependencies shall not be liable to any tax, and no stamp tax shall be levied on the present Convention of the annexed Conditions of Contract, on the further conventions or any subsequent instruments, or for the service of State securities to be issued, or on the subventions collected by the Concessionaire; nor shall any tax be levied on his shares, his preference shares, or his debentures, or on the securities, which the Imperial Ottoman Government shall hand over to the Concessionaire.

The Concessionaire shall be subjected to stamp duties for all his operations other than those in respect of which the freedom is granted to him in the present Article. The Concessionaire shall form a Turkish company under the style of "The Imperial Ottoman Railway Company of Baghdad," which shall take the place of the Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia for everything which concerns the new line from Konia to the Persian Gulf with its branches, and will be governed by the statutes annexed hereto. The Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia undertakes never to cede or transfer to any other company the existing lines from Haidar-Pasha to Angora and to Konia. The Imperial Ottoman Railway Company of Baghdad, which shall be formed, undertakes likewise neither to cede nor transfer the lines to be built from Konia to Baghdad, and to Basra, and their branches.

Article IX.—The *matériel* for the construction and working of the line and its branches, and all employees, shall be transported under the supervision

of the Admiralty, on the Shatt-el-Arab, the Tigris and the Euphrates, by means of steamers, sailing-ships or other craft, which shall be procured or hired by the Company. These transport ships shall be exempt from Customs duties, taxes, etc.

Article X.—The wood and timber necessary for the construction and working of the railway may be cut in the forests of the neighbouring regions belonging to the State, in conformity with the Regulation relating thereto.

Article XI.—As soon as the Concessionaire shall notify the Ministry of Public Works that the works of one section are completed, the latter shall cause the finished works to be inspected by a technical Commission, nominated for this purpose, and shall proceed to take them over provisionally, if there is reason to; one year after the provisional taking-over, a second inspection of the works shall be made by a technical Commission, and if it shall be established that the works have been carried out in conformity with proper workmanship, and with the provisions of the Conditions of Contract, the Ministry of Public Works shall pronounce the definite acceptance on the report of the Commission.

The Concessionaire shall have the right to open the lines for traffic by successive sections, after they shall have been provisionally handed over. The lengths of these finished sections, starting from Konia, Adana, Baghdad and Basra, as also from different intermediate points, shall be at least forty kilometres, and must terminate at a station.

Article XII.—Should the Imperial Government

decide to construct branches connecting the railway which forms the subject of the present Convention to the sea, at a point situated between Mersina and Tripolis in Syria, it shall not be entitled to grant the Concession of the said branches except solely to the Concessionaire, reserving to itself, nevertheless, to safeguard the rights already granted to the railway company of Damascus-Hamah and its extensions.

Notwithstanding, if the Concessionaire within a maximum period of one year, counted from the notification which the Imperial Government may have made to him on this matter, should not agree to construct the railway or its branches in question, under the clauses and conditions of the present concession, or if, having agreed, he should not carry out the work within the time agreed upon between the Imperial Government and the Concessionaire, the latter shall be deprived of all right to the said branches, and the Imperial Government shall be entitled to grant the Concession for them to third parties.

The Concessionaire shall besides have preferential rights on equal terms over the following branches—

- (a) Towards Marach ;
- (b) „ Aintab ;
- (c) „ Biredjik ;
- (d) „ Mardin ;
- (e) „ Erbil ;
- (f) From Diala towards Salahie and Tòuzkòur-matli ;
- (g) From El-Badj to Hit.

This right of preference for the seven branches above specified, in order to be available, is subjected to the following conditions, to wit—

Should the Imperial Government decide definitely to grant the Concession of one of these branches to third parties, the Concessionaire is obliged within nine months from the date of the notification which shall be made to him on the subject by the Ministry of Commerce and of Public Works, to declare to the Imperial Ottoman Government if he be willing to take up this Concession on the conditions agreed to by the third parties above named.

Article XIII.—The Concessionaire shall have the right, with the permission of the local authorities, to establish and work tile and brick fields on the line. The machinery and tools intended for the said factories shall enjoy the same exemptions granted to the plant and tools of the railway. The coal which shall be consumed in these factories shall enjoy freedom from Customs duties.

These factories shall be given up to the State on the expiring of the Concession without charge.

Article XIV.—During the term of the Concession the Concessionaire is obliged to maintain in a perfect state of repair the railway and its dependencies, as well as his plant and rolling stock, in default of which he will be dealt with in conformity with Article XVI of the Conditions of the Contract.

Article XV.—Concerning the police and the safety of the railroad, the Concessionaire is obliged to conform to the laws and regulations actually in force and hereafter to be promulgated in the Ottoman Empire. The Imperial Government will take the necessary steps for the maintenance of order along the line and in the construction camps. In the case

of any interruption on part or throughout the length of the line, arising from the fault of the Concessionaire, the Imperial Government will take the necessary steps, in conformity with Article XVI of the Conditions of Contract, to secure proper working, at the Concessionaire's expense, risk and peril.

Article XVI.—The Concessionaire shall have the right to levy toll in conformity with the tariffs of the Conditions of Contract, from the time of the provisional acceptance of each section of the railway, until the Concession expires.

Article XVII.—The transportation of military and naval details, in war and in peace, munitions and provisions of war, prisoners and convicts, Government servants and mail bags shall be carried out in conformity with the provisions of Section V of the Conditions of Contract.

Article XVIII.—As guarantee for the carrying out of the present undertakings, the Concessionaire shall within three months from the day on which the promulgation of the Firman of Concession shall be officially notified to him, deposit at a Constantinople bank approved by the Government, and by way of caution-money, a sum of £730,000 at the current rate of exchange in cash or in securities of the State, or of a Turkish company, or one guaranteed by the State. Should the deposit be made in shares, the bank must be given an undertaking to make up the difference in case of a fall in price. Immediately after the deposit of the caution-money, the Firman of Concession shall be handed over to the Concessionaire. The caution-money shall not be returned until

a section of work has been accepted, and then only proportionately to the length of line accepted. If the Concessionaire does not make the above-named deposit within three months, he shall be deprived of all rights to the Concession without any previous formal demand. Should it be impossible to fulfil the stipulations of Article XXXV, the Concessionaire shall have the right to remove his caution-money without formality, and without having obtained previously the Government's consent.

Article XIX.—The Imperial Ottoman Government reserves to itself reversionary powers at any time over the line from Konia to Basra and its branches, on paying to the Concessionaire up till the end of the Concession, a yearly sum equivalent to 50 per cent. of the average gross receipts for the five years which shall have preceded the year of the resumption of the Concession, but the said yearly sum shall not be less than 12,000 francs per kilometre. In this case, the Imperial Ottoman Government shall redeem completely and by one payment only, the Government securities which shall have been granted to the Concessionaire and shall not have been previously paid off. The yearly amount to which the Concessionaire shall be entitled in virtue of the present Article, shall be subtracted from the annuity of the said loans, that is to say, from 11,000 francs per kilometre. The Government shall assure to the Concessionaire the regular payment at stated times of the monies coming to him by reason of the resumption of the Concession, which shall form the subject of a special convention.

• The surrender of the line and of its branches, to

the Government, and the purchase by the latter of all *matériel* of the line, shall proceed in conformity with Article XIX of the Conditions of Contract. In the event of the line reverting to the Ottoman Government should the Imperial Government deem it inexpedient to work it by its own agents, the Government shall not grant to any other company the right of working the line, but promises to lease the line to the Concessionaire.

Article XX.—At the termination of the Concession of each section, the Imperial Government shall take the place of the Concessionaire in all interests appertaining to the railway, and shall enter into enjoyment of the benefits relating thereto. The handing over of the system free of all debts and incumbrances to the Imperial Government, and the purchase by the latter of the plant and supplies, shall take place in conformity with Article XX of the Conditions of Contract.

Article XXI.—The servants and agents of the railway shall wear the uniform adopted by the Imperial Government. They will wear the fez, and they will be chosen as much as possible from amongst Turkish subjects. Five years after the date of the opening of each section for traffic, the whole of the executive traffic staff of each section, the higher officials excepted, shall be exclusively composed of Turkish subjects.

Article XXII.—The Concessionaire shall be allowed to work the mines which he may have discovered within a zone of twenty kilometres on each side of the railway, conforming to the laws and

regulations relating thereto, and without this constituting for him a privilege or a monopoly. Likewise he shall be permitted to cut down in the forests near the line, either for the purpose of timber, or for charcoal making, after applying to the competent authority and conforming to the regulations.

Article XXIII.—The Concessionaire shall have the right to build at his own expense at Baghdad, Basra and at the terminal point of the branch line leaving Zubeir, harbours with all the necessary plant for bringing ships alongside the quay, loading and discharging the same, and the storing of merchandise. The plans for these ports must be presented within a maximum period of eight years from the exchange of the present Convention, and the works of each port must be completed at latest within twelve years from the date of the commencement of the works of each section in which the respective harbour is situated. The tariffs to apply must be joined to the plans. These three harbours shall form an integral part of the railway, and the net receipts from them shall be paid to the account of the gross receipts of the railway. On the termination of the Concession, these harbours and their dependencies will revert to the State free of charge.

If the Concessionaire does not construct one or other of these harbours within the period above mentioned, the Imperial Government may grant the Concession to a third party. In any case the Concessionaire may, during the construction of the railway, establish at these three points and also at the harbour of Casaboul, provisional plant for the discharge of material for the railway. This plant must

be removed after the completion of the works, if the Imperial Government requires it.

Article XXIV.—The Concessionaire may likewise establish and work in such places as may be needed, and on ground forming a part of the railway company's zone, depôts and magazines which the public shall be at liberty to use. These depôts, magazines and other permanent establishments shall become the property of the Government on the expiration of the Concession, in conformity with Article XX of the Conditions of Contract. The Government shall have a share of 25 per cent. in the net receipts of these depôts and magazines.

Article XXV.—The Concessionaire is authorized to use free of charge along the line, the natural hydraulic power, the right to the enjoyment of which belongs to no one, or such as may be hereafter created, for the purpose of producing electric energy for traction purposes, lighting, and for the requirements of traffic. The plans of such works shall be submitted to the approval of the Ministry of Commerce and of Public Works. Should use be made of this electric energy, 50 per cent. of the saving in working expenses resulting under this head shall be credited to the Imperial Ottoman Government. At the expiration of the Concession, all these installations shall revert to the State free of charge.

Article XXVI.—The Government may erect at its own expense entrenchments and defensive works at any point on the main line, or of its branches, and wherever it may deem necessary.

Article XXVII.—Objects of art and antiquity discovered during the construction of the line shall be submitted to the regulations governing the question. The Concessionaire shall be absolved from the formality of obtaining an authorization to carry on such researches.

Article XXVIII.—The Concessionaire is obliged to present to the Ministry of Public Works a monthly account of all the receipts. These statements shall be drawn up in conformity with the instructions of Article XVII of the Conditions of Contract.

Article XXIX.—The railway being considered to be divided in sections of 200 kilometres in length, if the Concessionaire, unless for a case of *force majeure* duly attested, shall not have commenced the works within the fixed period, or if he shall not have finished the works of one section within the required period, or if he shall have interrupted the service of transport, or, lastly, if he shall not have carried out, on any section, the other principal engagements arising under the present Convention, the Imperial Government shall make to the Concessionaire a formal demand indicating which of the above obligations remain to be fulfilled by the Concessionaire, and if the latter, within eighteen months from the date of this formal demand, shall not have complied or explained his non-compliance he shall forfeit his rights of Concession for each section of the line for which he shall have been duly proved in default, and the matter shall be decided with regard to him in conformity with Article XVIII of the Conditions of Contract.

It is understood that as long as the main line

between 'Konia' and Baghdad is not finished in its entirety the Concessionaire shall not be permitted to work those parts of the line from Baghdad to Basra which shall have been built. During this period of the non-working of the sections comprised between Baghdad and Basra the Concessionaire shall reimburse to the Imperial Government, when the annuities fall due, the annuity of 11,000 francs per kilometre, paid by way of interest and redemption of the Bonds which the Imperial Government shall have handed over to him for the said sections, and he will naturally not receive the working expenses; but these clauses do not affect in any way the other rights of the Concessionaire on the Baghdad-Basra line. The forfeiture pronounced on one or more sections of the railway shall not carry any imputation against the rights of the Concessionaire as to the remainder of the sections of the new lines, nor as to the old lines considered as a whole.

Article XXX.—The Concessionaire shall establish free of charge, at the places pointed out by the Government premises required for the offices of the Imperial Railway Commissioners and for the officials of the Custom House, Post Office and Police. The Concessionaire shall also provide at important stations, after agreeing with the Ministry of Commerce and of Public Works, two rooms and a water-closet for the employees of the postal service.

Article XXXI.—The Concessionaire may establish at his own expense a telegraph service for the whole length of the line. Such service may be used only in the interests of the railway. The Imperial Govern-

ment reserves to itself the right to have the telegraphic business dispatched by the company's wires, controlled at all times by inspectors appointed by the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs.

The Government may make use of the railway's telegraph posts to establish one, or in case of need, two telegraph lines, and the railway's telegraph posts shall be erected in such a way as to be capable of carrying these two additional wires as well as those of the company. In case of need the Government shall have the right to cause to be erected at its own expense other posts along the line, or to establish, in case of breakage, or of its lines being out of order, telegraph operators in the stations for the transmission of important and urgent official dispatches by the telegraph lines of the company, but on the condition that no hindrance shall be offered to the service of the railway.

Article XXXII.—The Concessionaire shall have the right to transport, and without paying any tax to the postal service of the Empire, the correspondence and mail bags exclusively concerning the railway service; but on condition that he submits them, in accordance with the regulations, to the control of the agents of the postal service. Private letters of the staff shall be liable to the postal taxes, and the Concessionaire shall not convey letters of this kind, except by submitting himself to the provisions of the inland regulations of the Post Office in force in the Empire. He shall likewise have the right to have carried, and without affixing any stamp, articles, and materials for consumption, such as coal, fats, plant, and material necessary to the construction, up-keep,

and working of the railway, as on the existing lines, and on the lines forming the subject of the present Convention.

Article XXXIII.—The Imperial Government undertakes to have the line from Haidar-Pasha to Sirkedji and to the Karakeuy bridge, served by the Administration of the Mahsousse, by means of three new boats, of an average speed not less than fourteen miles per hour. If within one year counted from the date of the exchange of the present Convention, the Administration of the Mahsousse should not have organized the service under the conditions hereinbefore indicated, the Concessionaire shall have the right to carry on the transportation of passengers and goods, between the said points, on the condition that he chooses the crews of these boats, from amongst retired officers and sailors of the Imperial Ottoman Navy, or from amongst the certificated students of the Imperial Naval School.

The boats of the Concessionaire shall perform their service in lieu of those of the Administration of the Mahsousse, and shall belong exclusively to the service, and the Concessionaire shall pay yearly to the said Administration a sum equal to 5 per cent of the gross receipts relating to the carriage of passengers and goods between the points above mentioned. There will be deducted from the surplus of the gross receipts—

1. The Working Expenses.
2. Interest of 8·30 per cent. on the sum first appropriated for the acquisition of the boats; after having deducted the said amounts, the remainder

shall be carried to the account of gross receipts of the new guaranteed lines.

It is thoroughly understood that if the gross receipts for one year do not allow these expenses to be met, the Company shall have no claim against the Imperial Government. On the other hand, the Company may make up the deficit by the receipts of following years. The boats of the Concessionaire being considered a part of the Mahsousse Service, they will enjoy identical rights with it.

Article XXXIV.—The Concessionaire Company and the Company to be formed by it being Turkish Limited Companies, all disputes and differences which might arise, whether between the Imperial Government and the Concessionaire or the Company, or between the Concessionaire or the Company and private individuals, following on the execution or the interpretation of the present Convention and of the Conditions of Contract annexed thereto, shall be referred to the competent Ottoman Tribunals. Correspondence with the State Departments must be conducted in the Turkish language, which is the official language of the Imperial Ottoman Government.

Article XXXV.—The Imperial Government guarantees to the Concessionaire for each kilometre constructed and worked, an annuity of 11,000 francs, as well as a forfeitable amount of 4,500 francs per year and per kilometre worked, as working expenses. This annuity of 11,000 francs shall be represented by an Ottoman State Loan, bearing 4 per cent. interest,

and 0.087538 per cent. sinking fund, redeemable during the period of the Concession. The Concessionaire will have the right to Bonds of a face value of 269,110.65 francs per kilometre constructed and opened to traffic, without being able to demand any other sums on this account from the Imperial Ottoman Government.

The Bonds accruing to the Concessionaire in conformity with the above, will be handed over to him by the Imperial Ottoman Government on the signature of each special Convention for each section, but the Concessionaire must make good to the Imperial Ottoman Government the amounts which the latter shall have paid during the period of construction up till the date of the provisional acceptance of each section of the railway. These amounts shall be paid by the Concessionaire to the Ottoman Public Debt, for the account of the Imperial Ottoman Government.

The Imperial Government reserves to itself the right at all times to modify the system of paying the kilomètric annuity of 11,000 francs, determined in the first paragraph of the present Article, after the repayment of the State Bonds issued representing the said annuity. As soon as the development of the traffic and the receipts, and the financial position shall permit the issue by the Concessionaire himself of private shares, destined to replace the Bonds, which shall have been delivered to him by the Imperial Government, the Concessionaire shall agree with the Imperial Government for the purpose of proceeding with this object.

For the first section of 200 kilometres beyond Konia, the amount of Bonds to be issued by the

Imperial Ottoman Government to the Concessionaire, is fixed at 54,000,000 francs. But after the final acceptance of this section, and as soon as the length of the line constructed shall be finished, the amount of shares shall be fixed at the rate of 269,110.65 francs per kilometre, which shall be acquired by the Concessionaire for this section. The surplus shall be calculated at the price of issue, plus the interest at the rate of 4 per cent. accrued up to the day of payment, and shall be in effect paid by the Concessionaire to the Imperial Treasury. It is thoroughly understood that this calculation shall be made at the rate of $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

The Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia guarantees the Imperial Ottoman Government the first section of 200 kilometres, until the work has been completed. Should the Imperial Ottoman Government deem it necessary, it may also demand from the Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia guarantees in respect of other sections, which guarantees the Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia will have to furnish. The annuity of 4,500 francs per kilometre towards the working expenses shall be guaranteed to the Concessionaire by a special Convention for each section, simultaneously with the Convention which shall regulate the annuity of 11,000 francs. As far as concerns the first section of 200 kilometres beyond Konia, the annuity of 4,500 francs per kilometre is guaranteed to the Concessionaire by the surplus of the guarantees actually applied to the lines of the Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia. The Bonds to be issued for the kilometric annuity of 11,000 francs shall be

regulated by a special appropriation, determined by consultation with the Imperial Government before the construction of the several sections.

Besides, the Imperial Ottoman Railway Company of Baghdad, on its part, pledges irrevocably and inalienably to the bearers of these bonds, the line from Konia to the Persian Gulf, together with its branches and rolling stock, and its share of the net receipts of this line. The Bondholders shall have no right to interfere in the management of the Company. The said share of the receipts shall, in case of need, be paid yearly by the Company to the service of the Ottoman Public Debt, for the account of the Bondholders. The Imperial Ottoman Government shall repay to the Company the amounts which the latter may have furnished on this account. The Imperial Ottoman Government also sets aside irrevocably and inalienably for the benefit of the Bondholders its share of the gross receipts of the line.

If the gross kilomètric receipts of the line exceed 4,500 francs, yet do not exceed 10,000 francs, the excess over and above 4,500 francs shall revert wholly to the Government. Should the gross kilomètric receipts exceed 10,000 francs, 60 per cent. of the excess beyond these 10,000 francs shall revert to the Imperial Government, and 40 per cent. shall revert to the Company. It is thoroughly understood that if the gross kilomètric receipts do not reach 4,500 francs, the sum necessary to make up the deficit shall be paid to the Concessionaire by the Government at the same time as the annuity of 11,000 francs, on a basis to be determined by arrangements between the Imperial Government and the Concessionaire, before

the execution by the Concessionaire of the clauses of the present Convention relating to each section. The said appropriations shall be collected and paid by the Administration of the Public Ottoman Debt. For the Bonds issued the receipts payable to the Imperial Government shall be collected together and appropriated in the due proportion of the nominal original amount of each issue. Immediately after the payment of the coupons, and of the amortization of the Bonds issued, the surplus of the receipts belonging to the Imperial Ottoman Government shall be paid annually to the latter, after the formalities provided by Article XL of the present Convention shall have been complied with.

Article XXXVI.—To be able to determine the average of the kilometric receipts, as the sections of the new lines are put into working, all the receipts relating to all the parts of the new lines, and also the net receipts provided in Articles XXIII and XXXIII of the present Convention shall be placed together. The average of the gross receipts per kilometre, thus obtained shall form the basis for determining the amount of the sums to be paid in conformity with Article XXXV.

Article XXXVII.—The Concessionaire undertakes to carry out at his own expense, on the old lines from Haidar-Pasha to Angora and Eski-Chehir to Konia, all the improvements rendered necessary by the introduction of a service of express trains, within an expenditure of 8,000,000 francs. As compensation for these expenses, and for the new extraordinary charges which will be entailed for their working, by

the introduction of the service of express trains, the Imperial Government pays to the Concessionaire—

1. An annuity of 350,000 francs for thirty years in interest and redemption of the capital of 8,000,000 francs as above.

This annuity shall begin to run from the commencement of the works of improvement.

2. An annuity of 350,000 francs for the inauguration of express trains.

This last annuity will only be payable from the time when the principal line shall reach Aleppo.

The annuities provided in the present article shall be paid to the Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia on the actual appropriations for the guarantees of the old system, and in the same manner as these.

Article XXXVIII.—The Concessionaire undertakes to construct and work immediately on the Imperial Government's demand that he shall do so, a branch line starting from the Konia-Basra line, and ending at Diarbekir and at Karpout.

Article XXXIX.—The junction of the Damascus-Hamah line and its extensions, with the line of the Baghdad Railway will take place at Aleppo.

Article XL.—The Concessionaire shall submit to the Ministry of Public Works during the month of January of each year a statement of receipts, previously verified and approved by the Imperial Commissioner, on the basis of which the amounts due to the Imperial Government and to the Company shall be determined in conformity with Article XXXV. of this Convention. As soon as the share of the Government

in these receipts shall be established, the Imperial Ottoman Railway Company of Baghdad shall pay it to the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt for the Bondholders, and the Debt shall pay to the Imperial Government any surplus which shall remain for disposal, over and above the amounts required for the payment of the coupon falling due on July 1, of the current period. The Imperial Government undertakes on its part to inform the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, within two months of the receipt of the statement of accounts, of the amounts due for payment.

Article XLI.—The Concessionaire shall have the right to establish between Hamidie and the port of Castaboul, a provisional branch line for the transportation of plant and material necessary for the railway. It is, however, understood that after the completion of the works which form the subject of this Convention, the Concessionaire must, if the Imperial Government informs him of its demand, remove the rails of this provisional branch line. It is understood that during this provisional working neither annuity nor working expenses will be contributed by the Imperial Government to this branch line.

Article XLII.—The lands and quarries which shall be expropriated in accordance with Article VI of the Convention, shall be no larger than is strictly necessary for the work of the railway and its dependencies. The expropriations shall be made under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Works.

Article XLIII.—All the plant and material necessary to the construction of the new line and its

dependencies, mentioned in Article VIII of the Convention, being exempt from all taxes and duties, shall be on their arrival, inspected in conformity with usage by the custom-house officers.

Article XLIV.—The Depôts and Magazines to be constructed in conformity with Article XXIV of the Convention, shall be used only for the storage of merchandise which is awaiting transportation. These Depôts and Magazines shall be built in accordance with plans which shall be presented by the Concessionaire and approved by the Ministry of Public Works.

Article XLV.—The Concessionaire must establish at his own expense but limited to an expenditure of 4,000,000 francs, such military stations that may be considered necessary by the Ministry of War. The number, situation, and arrangement of these military stations and their dependencies shall be determined by agreement between the Concessionaire and the Ministry of War.

Article XLVI.—The Concessionaire undertakes to pay yearly to the Asylum of the Poor after the opening of the main line to traffic a sum of £T500.

The following are the most important articles of the Statutes of the "Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company" of 1903.

Article I.—There has been formed between the undersigned and all the Shareholders hereinafter created, a Turkish Limited Company, having for its object the construction, management and working of the railway lines indicated in the Convention and Conditions of Contract exchanged on March 5 / February

20, 1903 (1318), between the Imperial Ottoman Government and the Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia, in accordance with the stipulations of the said Convention and Conditions of Contract. The Company shall be entitled also to interest itself, by purchase of shares, in new companies or those already existing for the construction and working of railway companies in the Ottoman Empire.

—Article II.—The Company shall be known as The Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company, and shall be subject to the laws and regulations of the Empire in its capacity of a Turkish company.

Article III.—The Company shall have its registered office at Constantinople, and shall be entitled to open branches in every other town of the Ottoman Empire, or abroad.

Article IV.—The life of the Company is fixed at ninety-nine years, except in the case of previous liquidation or extension. Its life shall be prolonged in accordance with Article II of the Convention dated March 5 / February 20, 1903 (1318).

Article V.—The Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia grants to the new Company the Concession which has been granted to it by the Imperial Ottoman Government, with all the rights, privileges and advantages attaching thereto or deriving therefrom, and the new Company becomes the holder and proprietor of the said Concession, and assumes in its stead all the rights and obligations of the Concessionaire. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia reserves for its own exclusive account the rights and obligations which only concern the old lines and notably such rights and obligations

which derive from Articles II, XXXIII and XXXVII of the Convention, dated March 5 / February 26, 1903 (1318). The Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia will hand over to the new Company the Firmans, Conventions, instruments and documents whatsoever concerning the Concession.

Article VI.—The Capital of the Company is composed of Shares and Bonds, which shall be issued later in accordance with the needs arising from the application of the clauses and conditions of the Concession. The original Share Capital of the Company is 15,000,000 francs—say 12,240,000 marks; say £600,000; divided into 30,000 shares of the nominal amount of 500 francs—say, 408 marks; say £20 each. The Share Capital may be increased by General Meeting by 50 per cent. The Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia will subscribe 10 per cent. of the Share Capital; these Shares shall be inalienable and the Ottoman Railway Company of Anatolia shall not be able to dispose of them without the consent of the Imperial Ottoman Government. The Imperial Ottoman Government shall also have the right to subscribe up to an amount of 10 per cent. of the Share Capital.

Article XX.—The Board of Directors has the most extensive powers for the management of the property and business of the Company; it may even exceed and compromise; it determines the accounts which must be submitted to the General Meeting and proposes the distribution of dividends. The Chairman of the Board of Directors represents either personally or it may be by proxy, the Company at law, either as plaintiff or defendant.

INDEX

Abbas Mirza, 73
 Abdul Hamid II, 8, 9, 11, 17, 26 *et seq.*, 177
 Abdul Medjid, 2 *et seq.*, 42
 Abdur Rahman, reign of, 229 *et seq.*, 238, 271

Adrianople, Treaty of, 1829, 1
 Afghanistan, letter of Russian Government to Amir of, 206
 Aga Mohammed Khan, 63
 Ahmed Riza Bey, 11, 12, 13
 Ahmed Shah Abdali, 64

Ala-es-Sultaneh Muhammad Ali's answer to Mr. Marling, 140-1; apology to Mr. Marling, 141; guarantee of, 142

Alexander I, 65, 68

Alexieff, M., 318-9

Ali Khan, 141

Amir-es-Sultan, murder of, 115

Amir Bahadur, expulsion of, 122

Amir Habib Ullah Khan, 229

Amir-ul-Umra, Lord, 260

Anglo-Persian Convention of 1851, 77; of 1853, terms of, 78

Anglo-Russian Convention, the, 187 *et seq.*; articles of, 189-92

Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Persian articles of the, 435-51

Anglo-Russian loan, conditions of, 111

Armenian massacres, 11

Armenian revolutionary Federation, 13-4

Articles of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876, the, 367-92

Ayler Pasha, 274

Azim Khan, 232

Baghdad Railway Convention, the, 452-80

Baghdad Railway, Great Britain, Germany, and the, 156 *et seq.*

Benckendorff, Count, 217

Brodrick, Mr. St. John, 260

Brooke, Captain V., 260

Brown, Sir J. McLeavy, 319, 322-3, 356

Bulgarian internal organization, 13-4

Bulwer, Sir H., dispatch from Lord John Russell to, 6

Burnes, Sir A., murder of, 231

Cassel, Sir E., 61

Cavagnari, Sir L., massacre of, with his staff, 233

Chamberlain, Sir Neville, 233

Chang, Chinese plenipotentiary, 228

Chao Erh-fung, 226

Chao Erh-hsun, 226

Chino-Japanese Convention of 1885, 303

Christianity, introduced into Korea, 297

Clarendon, Lord, 3, 5, 207

Committee of Liberty, the, 18

Constitution of 1908, Articles of, 55 *et seq.*

Constitution, re-establishment of, 42

Crawford, Mr. R. F., 61

Curzon, Lord, 101, 193, 247, 260

Czar of Russia, assassination of, 65

Dane, Sir Louis, 260 *et seq.*

Dane Treaty, terms of, 267-8

Derby, Lord, 60

Directors of Baghdad Railway, 174-5

Jobbs, Mr. H. R., 260

Jolgorouki, Prince, 89

Dost Mahommed, 231-2

Downe Mission invests Shah with Order of the Garter, 97

- Dufferin, Lord, 226
 Durand, Sir Mortimer, 95
 Elphinstone, Mr., 231
 Enver Bey, Major, 28-9
 Fefid, Grand Vizier, 31
 Franco-Russian Treaty, 326
 Futti Ali Shah, alliance with, 64
et seq.
 Gamble, Rear-Admiral E. H., 61
 Ganda, Treaty of 1735, 63
 Gardanne, General, 67
 Germany, Great Britain, and the
 Baghdad Railway, 156 *et seq.*
 Goltz, General von der, 274
 Gorchakoff, Prince, circular of, to
 Russian representatives, 83, 207
 Great Britain and Afghanistan, 229
et seq.
 Great Britain, Germany, and Bagh-
 dad Railway, 156 *et seq.*
 Great Britain and Japan, alliance
 between, 324-6
 Grey, Sir Edward, 59, 118, 200, 210,
 219
 Griffin, Sir Lepel, 234
 Gulistan, treaty of peace signed at, 70
 Habib Ullah, rule of, 247 *et seq.*
 Hakki Bey, 28
 Halil Ganem, 12-3
 Hamidian absolutism doomed, 33
 Hamilton, Lord George, 206
 Han Kiu Sul, 352-3
 Hardinge, Sir Arthur, 98
 Hasegawa, General, 351
 Hayashi, Baron, 324, 347, 352
 Hedjaz Railway, the story of the,
 273 *et seq.*
 Hilmi Pasha, ultimatum to, 32-3
 Hirza Reza, 94
 Hulbert, Mr. H. B., 341, 343, 354
 Ignatieff, General, 8
 Inoué, Count, 306
 Isvolsky, M., quoted, 118-9
 Ito, Prince, 303, 343 *et seq.*
 Jamal-ud-Din, 91, 94
 Japan and Great Britain, alliance
 between, 324-6
 Jaubert, M., 67
 Jemaledin Effendi, Grand Vizier,
 resignation of, 44
 Jones, Sir Harford, 67 *et seq.*
 Kauffman, General von, 233-4
 Keane, Lord, 231
 Komura, Baron, 312
 Korea, Christianity introduced into,
 387
 Korea, the passing of, 293 *et seq.*
 Korean protectorate, 1906, an-
 nounced, 355
 Kozloff, Lieut. - Col., "scientific"
 mission of, 222
 Kutchuk Said Pasha, 31-3
 Laredorff, Count, 217
 Lansdowne, Lord, 217, 219, 227,
 324
 Lascelles, Sir Frank, 92
 Lawrence, Sir John, 232
 Lebanoff, Prince, 314
 Liakhoff, Col., appointed military
 governor of Teheran, 131; pro-
 clamations issued and withdrawn,
 134, 142; addresses troops, 348-50
 Li Hung-Chang, 302
 Lockhart, Sir William, 246
 Lytton, Lord, 233
 Macartney, Mr. George, 225
 MacMahon, Col. Sir Henry, 99
 Macnaghten, Sir William, murder
 of, 231
 Mahomed Ali, succession of, 113;
 126, 123, 130; convocation of new
 Parliament by, 143; 151 *et seq.*
 Mahomed Mirza Shah, 73-4
 Mahommed Afzul Khan, 237
 Malcolm, Capt. John, 64
 Malcolm Treaty, 69, 70, 75
 Malleton, Major W., 260
 Management of Baghdad Railway,
 135
 Marling, Mr., letter of, to British
 Legation, 117, 123, 128; Ala es-
 Sultaneh apologizes to, 141
 Matunine, M., 321
 Mayo, Lord, 232
 Mazir-i-Sharif, death of, 233
 Meissner Pasha, 283
 Midhat Pasha, 7-10

- Mikado declares war against Russia, 329
 Min Pong Whan, General Prince, 351
 Mirza Nebi Khan, 65
 Miura, Viscount, 308
 Mouravieff, Count, 204
 Munir Pasha, 26
 Murad Bey, 11
 Murad V, 8
 Muzaffar-ed-Din, 95, 110; address to Court Party, 105; death of, 113
 Nâdir Shah, 63-4
 Napoleon, Emperor, 230
 Napoleon and Paul, joint plan for invasion, 63
 Nasir-el-Mulik, imprisonment of, 122
 National Council convened by the Shah, 105; refusal of Court party to take part in, 106
 Naus, M., 96, 113
 Nazim Bey, Dr., 25-8
 Nazir-ed-din, 91, 94; murder of, 103
 Nazr Ullah Khan, 251 *et seq.*
 Niazi Bey, 30
 Nishi-Rosen Convention, clauses of, 119-20
 Nizâm-es-Sultan, 124-5
 Nobles petition to European Parliaments, 152
 O'Connor, Sir Nicholas, 23
 Osman Feizi Pasha, Marshal, 29-30
 Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress, 14, 32, 51-2, 55
 Ottoman Constitution of 1876, articles of, 57, 367-92
 Ottoman people's first Constitution proclaimed, 4
 Ouseley, Sir Gore, 70-1
 Pak Che Sun, attempts suicide, and made Prime Minister, 352
 Parliament and the Shah, 121-2
 Paul and Napoleon, joint plan for invasion by, 63
 Paul I, 63
 Pavlov, M., 321-3
 Persia and the Powers, the story of, 62 *et seq.*
 Persian articles of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, 435-51
 Persian Constitution, terms of, 109 *et seq.*
 Persian Constitution, the, 393-434
 Persian people's appeal to the civilized world, 145
 Planty, M. Colin de, 321-2
 Priem, M., 113
 Queen Min, 302, 361
 Resht, Treaty of 1732, 63
 Reuter, Baron Julius de, concession to, 85 *et seq.*
 Ripon, Marquis of, 234, 236
 Roberts, Lord, 234
 Roos-Koppel, Major, 260
 Rose, Admiral, blockade of Han River by, 300
 Russell, Lord John, dispatch from, to Sir Henry Bulwer, 6
 Russia and Afghanistan, Gt. Britain's attitude towards, 205
 Russia, declaration of war against, by Mikado, 329
 Russian treaty with Afghanistan, text of, 210
 Russo-Japanese memorandum, 312-3
 Russo-Tibetan Treaty, articles of, 216-7
 Saad-ed-Dowleh, expulsion of, 122, 124
 Sabah-ed-Din, Prince, 13
 Safvet Pasla, 9
 Said Mahomed, 78
 Salisbury, Lord, 200, 204-5, 242
 Shah's rescript to Provincial Governors, 132-3
 Sheikh Abu-l-huda, 31
 Sheikh-ul-Islam, 37 *et seq.*
 Shershhi Pasha, 28
 Shir Ali, 232-3
 Speyer, M. de, 318-9
 Staal, M. de, 204
 State Expenditure, Committee of Inquiry appointed, 115
 Stevens, Mr. D. W., 336
 Stewart, Sir Donald, 234
 Stolietoff, Major-General, 233
 Story, Mr. Douglas, 355
 Stratford de Redcliffe, Lord, 3
 Sultan, position of, 34 *et seq.*

- Tahmasp II, 63
 Tai Won, Kun, return from exile, 304; issues spurious decree, 306; cancellation by the King, 310 *et seq.*
 Teheran, Treaty of, 71
 Thompson, Sir Ronald, 88
 Tibet, 215
 Tilsit, Treaty of, 67
 Tiralt Field Force, formation of, 246
 Treaty of Adrianople, 1829, 1
 Treaty of Paris, 1857, 8
 Treaty of Shimoda, 305
 Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, 1832, 1
 Tsar Alexander, 130
 Turco-Greek War, 11
 Turkish officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina, injustice and brutality of, 6
 Turkish Parliament, meeting of, 9
 Turkman Chai, Treaty of, 1828, 62, 72
 Unkiar-Skelessi, Treaty of, 1832, 1
 Ushakoff, Capt., 157, 150-1
 Waeber, M., 312, 318
 Waeber - Komura - Lebañoff - Yamagata Convention, 317-20
 Walinski, Colonel, 62
 Wanliss, Major, 260
 Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond, 82, 9
 Yakub Khan, 233
 Yamagata, Marquis, 314
 Yildiz Party, 15
 Yi Yong Ik, 322
 Yong-i-Yi, Prince, 358
 Younghusband expedition, 226-7, 227-8
 Young Turks Party, 9 *et seq.*; constitution of, 18 *et seq.*
 Yuan-shi-kai, 302
 Zeman Shah, 64

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